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Preface
The Berlin Reader draws together already published and unpublished work that 
best illuminates urban transformations in Berlin since the fall of the wall. It 
aims to provide an international audience with an overview of the most central 
debates and developments the city has experienced in the last two decades. We 
have included both strictly scholarly and non-scholarly writings, thus enabling 
a varied range of perspectives. 
The texts are arranged in four chapters, each focusing upon a specific pe-
riod in the development of Berlin. All chapters include an introductory section 
by the editors which sets the texts in context and discusses how the individual 
papers fit into broader academic and political debates. 
By collecting widely dispersed yet central writings, the Berlin Reader is an 
essential resource for students of urban development and transformation in 
one of the most interesting and important metropolises in Europe. The volume 
will have a widespread appeal for urban sociologists, planners, and political 
scientists alike.
This book owes its greatest debt to the authors whose work we have reprinted 
and to the translaters. In addition to these, a number of people and institutions 
have crucially contributed to making this volume possible. We would like to 
thank the Humboldt University Berlin, the Leibniz Institute for Regional De-
velopment and Structural Planning in Erkner (IRS) and the Rosa Luxemburg 
Foundation who supported the project both financially and with personal re-
sources. We are also grateful to Kerstin Wegel and Carmen Elisabeth Liebich 
for their practical support. Thanks are also due to Adrienne Gerhäuser (foto-
agentur version) who provided the photograph for the book cover.

Introduction
Matthias Bernt, Britta Grell, Andrej Holm
“Berlin belongs to the whole world” – this quote from a current travel guide (Me-
rian Berlin, 2013) paradigmatically symbolizes the growing international inter-
est in the German capital. Berlin has, for many years, been a magnet for tourists 
and a city with an enormous attraction for students, artists and other so-called 
creatives from around the globe. The number of annual overnight stays more 
than doubled from 11 millions to almost 25 millions between 2002 and 2012. 
Berlin, since 2009, is positioned in third place behind London and Paris as the 
most popular European city. Interest in the German capital is growing among 
planners, architects, historians, social scientists, as well as among all those who 
are professionally concerned with questions of (careful or social) urban develop-
ment, housing policy, and urban social movements, too, and also in relation to 
its particular urban history and the contestations that result from it. This is, 
among other things, visible in the growing number of national and internation-
al academic conferences and workshops to which experts in urban politics from 
Berlin are invited to share their findings and experiences. At the same time, 
more and more publications appear (ranging from journal articles to doctoral 
theses) on the topic of Berlin, particularly in the English-speaking world.
In this process we can observe, however, that key findings and publications 
in the field of social sciences made by German experts and authors, as well as 
their particular debates on Berlin’s urban development, are rarely noticed – not 
at least due to existing language barriers. In the past, it was only a few texts 
that were also written for an audience from abroad and translated into Eng-
lish. It is only since quite recently (for approximately the past ten years) that 
one finds texts that are specifically written for an international audience and 
made by academics, architects, and politicians who live in Berlin. And still, this 
international audience somewhat struggles – according to our experiences of 
talking to colleagues, students and visitors from abroad – to comprehend the 
specific political position and development of Berlin and the resulting conflicts 
(the coming-together of East and West since 1989; specific social, cultural and 
economic demands; traditions of careful urban renewal and so on). 
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ACADEMIC DEBATE AND RESE ARCH
Due to its front position during the Cold War, for a long time Berlin held a spe-
cial status and for this reason was of rather little interest to international urban 
research. Over the past twenty years this situation has increasingly changed, 
and subsequently the themes and questions that are negotiated since the fall 
of the wall are today fairly numerous. In the 1990s the contributions often fo-
cused on the process of becoming the capital and the realization of large-scale 
construction projects (see Strom 1996; Marcuse 1998; Cochrane/Jonas 1999) 
alongside the politics of remembering in relation to the painful German his-
tory (see Ladd 1997; Czaplicka 1995; Huyssen 1997; Young 1999; Jordan 2006; 
Till 2005). Since the turn of the millennium we can observe a shift towards “ur-
ban based cultures” (Stahl 2008: 301) centering on the by now established cre-
ative economy (see Boyer 2001; Jakob 2011; Ward 2004; Gresillon 1999; Färber 
2008) and various alternative and DIY projects (see Rosol 2010; Sabate Muriel 
2009; Shaw 2005; Novy and Colomb 2012).
A singular common narrative framing research on Berlin no longer exists. 
Instead, catchphrases in Feuilleton-style such as “Berlin is poor but sexy” con-
tinue to circulate alongside Berlin being the “party and clubbing capital,” or, 
more recently, narratives about a surprise boom in Berlin real estate. In ad-
dition, academic attributions such as “Cultural Metropolis” (Grésillon 1999), 
“Virtual Global City“ (Ward 2004), or “European City” (Molnar 2010) seem less 
well suited to represent the particularities of Berlin’s urban development. The 
image often reproduced within critical studies of a “site for experimentation for 
social movements and alternative life styles” similarly is a rather idealized and 
one-sided description of urban realities.
Like a jigsaw puzzle without a frame, it seems difficult to combine existing 
insights and observations of development trends to form a consistent image 
of Berlin. As much as clubbing and hipster culture, the squats, the many new 
community gardens, memorial sites of the wall, or the argument over the re-
building of the Prussian City Palace in the borough of Mitte belong to Berlin, 
there are few conclusions we can make from these about the living conditions 
of most residents and about what we consider as key sites of urban political 
conflict, interest, and power relations. The majority of contributions about Ber-
lin are – from our point of view – concerned with rather specific phenomena 
and neglect a necessary historical and political assessment of the objects under 
study; this neglect stands in the way of a fuller understanding of the city’s de-
velopment as a whole. Typical for many studies (e.g. on the squats, club culture, 
or alternative economic projects) is a focus on internal visions and a perspec-
tive concerned with the particular project, analyzing its motivations, actors and 
processes but omitting contextual conditions, comprehensive processes and 
above all their outcomes in terms of urban politics. A detailed description of 
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the needle is of little use in the middle of the haystack. In addition, many of 
these studies are in danger of exoticizing Berlin’s situation and contributing to 
an unreflective hype (aka “Berlin: the city of unlimited possibilities”).
Hardly illuminating in this context are also the many studies and texts on 
the debate over changing the German capital and the relocation of the govern-
ment from Bonn to Berlin. Studies on the background of the “Capital Contract” 
of 1991 and its implementation are certainly well suited to critically analyze the 
new German patriotism and the changing constellation of German elites at 
the end of the Cold War. However, with Berlin almost exclusively understood 
in these debates as a discourse topic and metaphor for a new “republic” and a 
new geopolitical positioning of Germany, actual urban change rarely features 
in these studies.
Another visible trend in research on Berlin lies in using the here-found 
restructuring, problems, and political disputes solely as proof for broader in-
ternational trends and developments. Often, as seen for example in the charge 
of an UK-based author to his colleagues, these seem to remain stuck in their 
own debates and “impose their own preconceptions on distinctive experiences 
which actually fit uneasily with them” (Cochrane 2006: 371). Thus, most stud-
ies on large-scale urban renewal projects and key development sites in Berlin 
(such as Potsdamer Platz, Alexanderplatz, Friedrichstraße) solely “rediscover” 
in these locations the developments that already exist in New York, London, 
and other cities in the English-speaking world. The massive restructuring pro-
cesses of the 1990s in particular were usually interpreted as a catching up of 
globally-oriented and investor-driven urban development (see Strom 1996; Len-
hardt 2001; Lehrer 2003).
Gentrification processes, the restructuring of the welfare state and of plan-
ning instruments, or the tourist boom of late, are also primarily analyzed and 
discussed against a model of urban development concepts as established in 
international research. Yet, what commonalities the dynamics of displacement 
in Berlin’s Prenzlauer Berg and the Lower East Side in New York actually share, 
whether investment planning at Potsdamer Platz follows a similar logic to the 
reclamation of the London Docklands, or whether Berlin’s tourist marketing 
can be explained with the strategies applied in Bilbao, is usually left unexam-
ined. Whether Berlin constitutes an “exceptional case” (Latham 2006) or an 
“ordinary city” (Cochrane 2006), whether the developments of the past twenty 
years can be described as “normalization,” and what perspective would result 
from either, are all important questions – also for the urban researchers who 
live here. One requirement for a qualified response, however, has to be a jointly 
shared idea of what the actual developments in Berlin are.
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FR AMING THE JIGSAW PUZ ZLE: WHAT WE CONSIDER 
AS NECESSARY FOR UNDERSTANDING BERLIN
If urban research does not want to confine itself to the reproduction and ap-
plication of global statements and concepts but is instead seriously concerned 
with explaining urban processes, it seems to us that a historical, political, and 
economic contextualization is required. Our starting point for this is: Berlin 
was and is in a whole range of ways “particular” and shaped by framing con-
ditions that (at least in this combination) are nowhere else to be found. Key 
influences and contextual factors of urban development in Berlin today are 
found in:
1) the continuing consequences of the East West division and the new inequali-
ties and injustices that are the outcome of the take-over of East Germany by 
West Germany;
2) the continuing economic crisis of Berlin and its development as the poorest 
metropolis of Germany;
3) moments of crisis of the Berlin banking scandal at the start of millennium 
and the resulting politics of austerity;
4) a historically specific grown culture of planning and its particularities in 
re-ordering urban politics and development.
1) Consequences of Division and Reunification
Forty years of division and the subsequent joining up of the East half to the 
West half of the city still remains one of the most formative events and ex-
periences and is indispensable for understanding Berlin. From a geographical 
perspective, the reunification was linked to a territorial re-ordering of the city. 
In contrast to almost all other metropolises across the globe, this re-ordering 
involved the complete renegotiation of the relationship between the center and 
the periphery. While locations such as Alexanderplatz (since the late 1960s the 
center of East Berlin) thus immediately after the fall of the wall rapidly lost their 
significance, areas that, due to their proximity to the wall or on the margins of 
the West Berlin half of the city, had for a long time remained rather insignifi-
cant, such as Potsdamer Platz or the area around the Reichstag, gained a new 
centrality. For the political administration, reunification of the two half-cities 
meant a radical wind down of all East Berlin institutions. This not only applied 
to the state and administrative apparatus but also to large sections of industry, 
which were practically pulverized over night. Part of the everyday experiences 
of many East Berliners was not only the neglect of their educational and vo-
cational qualifications but also the restoration of property to former owners, 
which lead to a vast dominance of West German land owners. Those who had 
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grown up in East Berlin were suddenly confronted with the fact that from 1990 
onwards not only was their workplace in danger but it was no longer certain 
that they could pay the rent for their homes. Bus and tram lines changed their 
numbers over night, trusted shops closed down, and the independence so hard 
fought for in the revolution of 1989 was no longer worth much. 
In urban planning, a far-reaching transfer of personnel, structures, and 
instruments from West to East took place. The devaluation of East German 
experiences was reflected here in the open stigmatization and marginaliza-
tion of urban planners, architects, and other professionals from the GDR (see 
particularly the contribution by Simone Hain in this collection). Culturally, the 
East West conflict was expressed in how to deal with, among other things, the 
historic center, the demolition of the Palace of the Republic, and the public per-
ception of precast concrete buildings; considered as a modern form of housing 
provision in the East but regarded in the West mainly as an aesthetic irritant 
and structural symbol of the hated GDR. While many East Germans valued Al-
exanderplatz as a place for meetings, shopping, and demonstrations, West Ber-
lin planners only found “Mongolian expanse” (see Wolfgang Kil’s contribution 
in this collection) and had little inhibition in proposing a comprehensive rede-
sign. Parts of the social aspects include, not least, the drastic consequences aris-
ing from the considerable construction projects and gentrification processes 
that set in after the fall of the wall (see the contributions by Holm and by Bernt 
and Holm for this). In Prenzlauer Berg and other East Berlin areas of renewal, 
they caused the displacement of up to 80 per cent of their original (mainly East 
German) residents. In total, these developments often led, particularly among 
East Berlin intellectuals and social movements, to a feeling of “colonization” by 
Western bureaucrats and elites. 
2) Berlin: Metropolis of Povert y
Another crucial starting point for understanding Berlin lies in the crisis of 
its urban economy, something that has not been overcome in the past twenty 
years. Considering Berlin was before WW  II still the largest industrial me-
tropolis of Germany and East Berlin later the economic center of the GDR, for 
a not inconsiderable part of the local population the fall of the wall meant the 
destruction of their foundations for living and a definite loss in social status. 
The outcome of privatization and winding down of the industrial base of East 
Berlin, the dissolution of one whole government and administrative apparatus, 
as well as an end to the subsidies for labor-intensive businesses in the front-line 
city of West Berlin, is that they have primarily resulted in the extreme decline 
of jobs and an erosion of the city’s economic base, which to this date has not 
been overcome (see Krätke’s contribution in this collection).
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This development took place in East Berlin as early as the summer of 1990, 
almost over night, and led to the high base unemployment and low level of 
income that exists to this day. But also for a not inconsiderable part of West 
Berlin’s population – in particular from the left and alternative milieu, and for 
migrants who arrived since the 1960s from Turkey and other South European 
countries as so-called guest workers in the front-line city –  the new circum-
stances led to considerable disadvantages. For one, many migrants felt threat-
ened and excluded when confronted by the reunification fever which at times 
included openly nationalist and racist traits. Also, their working and living con-
ditions came under unexpected pressure, often after having taken on a kind 
of niche existence in the shadow of the wall (e.g. in large parts of Kreuzberg).
Accordingly, Berlin is until today not only the German city with the high-
est unemployment but is also on a European scale the only capital whose GPD 
lies below the national average (Gornig 2012: 43). Or, to put it differently: the 
wealthiest and by now also most powerful country in the European Union has 
the relatively poorest capital. The city’s constant economic crisis not only has 
social consequences but is also, and always, at the same time the basis for the 
extensive clubbing culture and alternative economies (see in this collection the 
contribution by Scharenberg and Bader). The widely famed techno scene of the 
early 1990s would simply have had no playground without the closure of East 
Berlin’s industrial businesses. The same applies to the start-ups (considered as 
innovative by various sources) as well as to the many commercial or cultural 
temporary uses of space in often income-poor neighborhoods such as Wedding 
or Neukölln. Many of the new and hip galleries, “art spaces,” bars and small 
businesses – whose offer is often not addressed to local populations but largely 
to out-of-towners and visitors – to this day benefit indirectly from the extensive 
unemployment and poverty and the resulting relatively low costs of living in 
Berlin.
3) Banking Scandal and Austerit y Politics
Although Berlin’s economic and financial crisis has many different structural 
and political origins, the “Berlin banking scandal” at the start of the 21st century 
deserves a special mention. After all, speculating with public finances – with 
the knowledge of the former government, several billion Euros were gambled 
away as security for private real estate transactions through a publicly-owned 
bank – permanently changed the framework of Berlin’s urban politics. By res-
cuing the bankrupt Berlin Bankgesellschaft an “extreme budgetary emergency” 
was created (the city’s deficit sits at the moment at around 60 billion Euros), 
which for many years has been used to justify the retreat of the local state from 
a range of tasks and funding programs (e.g. the funding of social housing and 
self-help construction projects). The highest political aim for Berlin has since, 
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and independently of current political power and government coalitions,1 been 
a balanced budget (long before the official adoption of the so-called debt brake 
in 2011 into the German constitution). This orientation led to an extensive wave 
of privatizations at the start of the millennium, both of public housing stock as 
well as of numerous communal infrastructure companies (electricity, gas and 
water), affecting a range of other welfare state achievements (see the contribu-
tions by Uffer and by Beveridge and Naumann in this collection). The transi-
tion to “austerity urbanism” (Peck 2012) in Berlin did not have to wait for a 
global financial crisis.
4) The (Lost) Inheritance of “Careful Urban Renewal”
A formative particularity for Berlin’s planning culture is the concept of “care-
ful urban renewal,” developed in West Berlin in the context of the 1987 Inter-
national Building Exhibition. It can also be considered as a response to the 
squatters’ movement in the West half of the city, which was very active in the 
first half of the 1980s with their massive protests against property specula-
tion. The concept combined the physical renewal of existing buildings with 
the expectation of preserving urban and social structures. During the 1980s 
what this practice meant for the neighborhoods with old building structures 
in West Berlin was restoration instead of demolition, protection of low-income 
populations instead of displacement, as well as an active participation (where 
possible) of the residents in restoration decisions where they are concerned. 
This inheritance, supported by considerable financial subsidies from the fed-
eral government, shaped into the 1990s the planning culture of Berlin and 
led to a range of participatory processes as well as to particular forms of co-
operation between NGOs, respective networks, and coalitions of interest (see 
Bernt 2003). Although the instruments used in the past to create “carefulness” 
are largely considered outdated and are discredited among experts due to their 
poor sustainability and high cost, the aims of “careful urban renewal” have 
never been openly challenged. In contrast to many other Western metropolises, 
there still exists in Berlin a shared belief – reaching far into conservative quar-
1 | Following the fall of the wall, Berlin was governed by changeable political coalitions: 
between 1989 and 1990, first by a coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens, 
which broke up over the dealing with squats in East Berlin; between 1990 and 2001, by 
a coalition of SPD and Conservatives (CDU), which broke up over the banking scandal; 
between 2001 and 2011, by a red-red coalition including alongside the SPD also as 
junior partner the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) – the successor party to the 
Communist part of the former GDR and today called DIE LINKE (the Left). Since 2001 
the city is governed, despite a tendency towards a lef t majority among the voters, by a 
grand coalition of SPD and CDU. 
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ters – that displacement of low-income populations from the city center should 
be avoided; that a socially mixed city has to be preserved; that residents are to be 
involved in decisions that directly affect them; and that the local state is respon-
sible for all this. Although the reality is often a different one, these convictions 
remain to this date a significant influence on Berlin’s urban politics.
ON THE STRUCTURE AND THE INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
OF THIS RE ADER 
Setting out with the assumption formulated above on the factors that influ-
ence Berlin’s urban development, we, when conceptualizing this Berlin Read-
er, began our search for contributions that either explicitly approached these 
concerns or were suited to making explicit for an international audience the 
main lines of conflict linked to the far-reaching restructuring and urban trans-
formations since 1989. At the start of the project we sought inspiration from 
experienced colleagues who research and write on Berlin, and asked them to 
point us towards what they consider to have been key texts on Berlin’s urban de-
velopment over the past two decades. The result is a combination of some more 
traditional social science texts presenting key empirical findings – e.g. on social 
segregation and the city’s economic base, or in relation to migration – and more 
journalistic articles and polemics that are best considered as interventions in 
public political controversies (such as over the design of the historical center or 
the consequences of the government relocation).
To allow for a certain orientation we allocated the texts – which, except for a 
few, were only published in German before (see the copyright information on 
p. 277 ff. ) – into four chapters that follow a rough chronology and are intended 
to reflect key themes or specific stages of urban political contestation in Berlin. 
We have included brief introductions to each chapter to provide some historical 
context for the contributions and their line of argument and to briefly introduce 
the author(s). 
The first section is titled “Berlin’s Megalomania” and above all provides 
a reminder when viewed from today of the odd expectations (of growth) and 
capital fantasies that dominated political debates immediately after reunifica-
tion and during the first years after the fall of the wall. The authors assembled 
here belonged to the few critical voices in that situation that questioned the 
megalomania and wishful thinking of many predictions and called for a dif-
ferent planning culture – one that was guided by the needs of local popula-
tions in both East and West. The contributions in the second section, entitled 
“Berlin In-Between,” originate from a period of transition and a shared sense 
of disillusion during the second half of the 1990s. In contrast to today, dur-
ing that time in Germany and Berlin hardly anyone outside of expert circles 
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knew of the term gentrification. This marks the phase during which the first 
comprehensive empirical studies on new social and geographical divisions in 
the city were conducted. These led to extensive public discussions about the 
causes of the emerging divisions. The third section concerns the clearance sale 
of Berlin (“Berlin on Sale”). The city was facing bankruptcy at the beginning 
of the 21st century due to both a lack of economic development towards a suc-
cessful service and commercial metropolis and the many errors made by local 
elites. This decisive stage for urban politics  –  characterized by considerable 
welfare cuts and a strict plan for budget consolidation, despite a fairly leftist lo-
cal government – still remains to be properly analyzed and come to terms with 
(see Holm et al. 2011). Accordingly, most studies on the privatization of hous-
ing or of public infrastructure organizations and their consequences, of which 
we assembled a few in this section, are of a fairly recent date. Finally, with the 
contributions to the fourth and final section, under the title “Berlin Contested,” 
we seek to cast light on to several significant contemporary cultural currents 
and social movements in the city. All these ask, in very different ways, how is 
the “Right to the City” to be understood in the context of a metropolis that like 
Berlin considers itself to be liberal, tolerant, and cosmopolitan? What does this 
mean in the context of diverse forms of old and new migration? How does Ber-
lin deal with the demands that are linked to the ever-increasing diversity of life 
styles and ideas of urban use, in particular in relation to the central spaces of 
its city center? What alternative demands are made by current political protest 
movements, and what are their chances of realization in the face of conditions 
that in the critical social sciences are increasingly considered as “post-political” 
or “post-democratic” (see, e.g., Swyngedouw 2009)?
This collection takes on these questions but certainly does not provide suffi-
cient answers. As with other readers, there remain thematic gaps and the selec-
tion of material and authors can be called into question. A comprehensive, com-
plete and balanced presentation of all issues that are to be discussed in relation 
to Berlin does not only exceed the frame of a reader but is practically impos-
sible; the topic itself presents a “moving target.” At the same time, there remain 
huge gaps in relation to research on Berlin’s urban development – this is also 
reflected in our edited collection. This applies, e.g., to an analysis of urban so-
cial movements, the history and present of migration, or the role played by the 
local government and specific governance structures. All these points are not 
given the relevance that they actually deserve in light of their significance for 
Berlin’s urban development – neither in actual research nor in this reader. For 
these reasons we hope that our Berlin Reader provides further inspiration for 
research but also for political debate over the future of Berlin and other cities. 
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Berlin’s Megalomania
In the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, in the early 1990s, the city changed dra-
matically, regarding both perceptions and imaginations as well as its urban reality.
A number of political decisions were central to the ensuing period. First, due to 
the haste in which decisions were taken, the GDR and its former capital East Berlin 
were incorporated into a “ready-made-state.” This meant the introduction of capital-
ist market rule and the direct transfer of institutions, elites, and resources from the 
West to the East, practically overnight. Second, both the decision to move the (West) 
German capital (back) from Bonn to Berlin and to apply for the Olympic Games in 
2000 stand for the claim of the Western elites to (re)position Berlin in the national 
and international arena. The hype around an emerging “new Berlin” raised high ex-
pectations about anticipated population growth (up to 5 million over the next 10 
years), the settlement of headquarters of large international corporations, and the 
overall opportunities for investment and economic development. Overoptimistic 
growth forecasts by many urban and economic research institutes decisively influ-
enced public discourses and urban planning processes. A strategic study “On the 
way to the commercial capital Berlin,” launched by the local government in 1992, 
predicted that Berlin would soon play in the same league as London, Paris or even 
New York, and rise to a global city status. 
One result of this gold rush mentality – shared by local politicians and interna-
tional investors alike – were massive redevelopment projects and building sites such 
as the Potsdamer Platz, Friedrichstraße or the construction of more than 100,000 
new residential units in the urban periphery of East Berlin (the “new suburbs”). At 
the same time, the social and economic prospects of large parts of the population 
remained rather bleak. The collapse of state socialism in the Eastern part of the city 
and the breakdown of a state-subsidized economy in the Western part had funda-
mental consequences for the daily lives of most Berliners. Mainly due to the compre-
hensive privatization and destruction of the formerly state-managed industry in East 
Berlin, the process of deindustrialization accelerated and destroyed hundred thou-
sands of jobs. In addition to that, the population of East Berlin was confronted with 
the restitution of most properties (built before 1949) to old owners or their heirs, and 
the initiation of a private housing market with sky-high rents. East Berliners also had 
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to deal with the experience of the delegitimization and dismissal of vir tually all exist-
ing administrative structures and the takeover by new administrations from the West.
Against the background of these diverging realities and experiences it should not 
be surprising that urban discussions around that time were also rather polarized and 
driven by various projections concerning both the past and future of the city. Whereas 
the elites took a position that tried to enforce the vision of a reunified and economi-
cally prospering Berlin as a national project, opposing views to this also existed. 
The article by Hartmut Häußermann und Walter Siebel in this section of the book 
represents precisely such an opposing perspective. Under the metaphorical title 
“Berlin Won’t Remain Berlin,” two of Germany’s well-known professors for urban so-
ciology expressed their skepticism against the hype of the “new Berlin” and explored 
possible developments and new configurations of Berlin’s urban structure. This ar ti-
cle was not only important because it was one of the first critical voices in the “Berlin 
discussion” after 1990 but, fur thermore, they predicted and foresaw a wide range of 
socio-spatial consequences. 
Another voice and concern in the urban debates in the early 1990s unfolds in 
Volker Eick’s ar ticle on the prospects for security structures in the new German capi-
tal. His analysis stands as exemplary for a wide range of critical publications calling 
the “new Berlin” out as a conservative, reactionary and revanchist project of Germa-
ny’s ruling political classes. This perspective, critical of the state, is representative of 
a left-wing and liberal-minded milieu in West Berlin, socialized with the hope of social 
and ecological reforms and marginalized in the reunified Berlin. 
The articles of Wolfgang Kil and Simone Hain (both working in the field of architec-
ture and from the former GDR) not only reflect the discontent with the urban master 
plan for East Berlin’s inner city but also express the deep anger and disappointment 
of East German intellectuals about the disregard urban planning and urban planners 
from the former GDR received post-1990. Whereas Wolfgang Kil criticizes the “West-
ern” view embodied in the skyscraper project north of Alexanderplatz developed in 
the early 1990s, Hain analyzes the power structures and hegemonic narratives un-
derlying the “Planwerk Innenstadt,” a master plan project for Berlin’s central district 
that became subject to heated debates in the late 1990s. The formative experience 
of alienation caused by the paradox of the political experience of winning a revolution 
but subsequently being overrun by reunification is strongly present in both ar ticles. 
Berlin Won’t Remain Berlin1
Hartmut Häußermann and Walter Siebel
The decision has been made concerning the future seat of government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The constitution, the political system, and even 
the name of the newly created country will simply be taken over from the West-
ern half, but the seat of government will be transferred: according to the major-
ity in the Bundestag, this is the “completion of unification.”
We wish to deal more extensively with the consequences for the develop-
ment of Berlin arising from the decision to make it the capital.
URBAN STRUCTUR AL ASPECTS
The perspective that after the unification of both German states Berlin might 
simply become a big city with lots of problems has apparently come as a lasting 
shock to Berlin politicians. The only political perspective for the city that the 
Senate and municipal authorities were capable of developing was: being the 
seat of government for Germany. This appeared to be the simplest solution, 
since it was associated with the hope of continuing federal subsidies and pre-
venting a decline in importance. Berlin: the capital. What else? Yes, what else? 
That would have been the question if by coincidence another majority had won 
the day in the Bundestag on June 20, 1991. Nobody in Berlin would have been 
able to answer the question, since in the past, nobody had to seriously consider 
any strategies other than throwing money at problems and dressing them up 
in symbolism. 
However, this bet won’t pay off in the future. On the contrary: in terms of 
its inner structure and political culture, the city is confronted with even more 
difficult times than ever before. And if people are now gushing about the “me-
tropolis of the future,” we have to ask what contours can already be made out.
1 | Source: Häußermann, H. and Siebel, W. (1991) Berlin bleibt nicht Berlin. Leviathian.
Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft 19.3, 353-371. 
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BERLIN HAS SOME MASSIVE CHALLENGES BEFORE IT
• In Berlin, both social systems confront one another: two different econo-
mies and cultures, as well as a diversity of biographies and individual cha-
racters. Here, we’ll find out most quickly whether that which was so fun-
damentally separated can grow together, and at what cost to whom.
• Berlin has to once again become a single city. Two city torsos, which had 
alternately stood in secret and open opposition to one another, have to be-
come one.
• In terms of economy and urban development policy, Berlin had existed in a 
bubble. That preserved economic and spatial structures that had long since 
disappeared in the old Federal Republic of Germany. Now, in the shortest 
possible time, Berlin has to catch up with changes that have been consum-
mated in West German cities for the last thirty years:
(a) For one thing, suburbanization. The wall had inhibited any push into the 
hinterlands, but in the next few years the pent-up desire for a house with 
a lawn will pour out onto the sands of the Mark of Brandenburg. Industry 
will occupy new lots in the previously untouched landscape. Nowhere has 
it been possible to stop urban sprawl into the surrounding countryside. In 
light of the long pent-up pressure and the expected influx to Berlin, the 
city will have to make great efforts in order to prevent the Mark from being 
covered in the same tenacious mush of settlements that has sprawled out 
between Frankfurt am Main and the Taunus mountains.
(b) For another thing, the reorganization and dismantling of industry. In con-
trast to London and Paris, Berlin first became prominent as an industrial 
city – not as exclusively as the Ruhr, but similarly. The city still bears the 
marks of this structure even today. In West Berlin, the enormous subsidiza-
tion of industry led – as in East Berlin – to the maintenance or creation of 
structures that had long since disappeared elsewhere: obsolete production 
facilities for obsolete products, extended workbenches, and too many work-
ers with low qualifications or the wrong qualifications. In industrial enter-
prises in Munich, the share of academics is double that of Berlin. Berlin is 
standing before a dramatic upheaval in its economic base, for which other 
regions had far more time to prepare, even if they have not completely man-
aged it. In the upper Spree region in the east, in Oberschöneweide, Trep-
tow, Friedrichshain, and Marzahn, old hazardous waste dumps have to be 
found and eliminated, and branches of industry revamped. There are thus 
enormous tasks of constructional, social, ecological, and cultural renewal 
comparable to those taken up by the IBA [International Building Exhibition] 
Emscher-Park in the northern Ruhr region for the next ten years.
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(c) And third, the transformation into a modern service-sector city; service 
sector employees in Berlin work primarily in public service and services 
financed by the state. More thinly staffed are the so-called production-ori-
ented services, which are decisive for the economic prosperity of a region. 
So there is considerable catching-up to do. However, these are jobs for those 
with above-average qualifications. That means that of the cautious estimate 
of 300,000 unemployed for the year 1991 in the greater Berlin area (DIW-
Wochenbericht 22/1990: 301), only a small number will be able to occupy 
new jobs – in part because high qualifications are required for the new jobs 
in the production-oriented services, which local unemployed people don’t 
have, and in part because the reorganization and shrinking in industry will 
have as a consequence a reduction in the number of low-skilled workers, 
and partially because the technical and cultural abilities of future immi-
grants are not in demand in a post-industrial metropolis. As a result, the 
gap between the employed and those in the gray area of the labor market or 
the unemployed will continue to widen – with far-reaching consequences of 
social marginalization.
In addition to these problems of a long backed-up spatial, economic, and social 
structural transformation, which have to be caught up on in the shortest pos-
sible period of time, there are also the tasks of merging two different social 
formations and two cities, as well as managing new growth spurts.
PROGNOSES
The prognoses for greater Berlin are impressive. In the coming twenty years, 
the number of residents is expected to increase by about 1.2 or 1.4 million, the 
number of jobs by 700,000, and the number of automobiles by 1.8 million. 
800,000 apartments and 20 million square meters of office space have to be 
built. For industry and trade, an additional 22.5 million are required. The enor-
mous need for space will have to be satisfied primarily in the surrounding 
areas, since there are too few industrial areas and areas cleared by the allied 
powers available. Recreational areas near the city will presumably be settled. 
The construction of new dwellings will to a considerable extent have to occur 
in the space-eating form of the single family home, if competition for inner city 
residential locations is not to be further intensified. Environmental contamina-
tion from automobile traffic and energy use will increase.
So the demand for construction is massive: according to conservative es-
timates, 20,000 to 40,000 apartments and 1 million square meters of office 
space have to be built each year. Furthermore, the enormous tasks of maintain-
ing and modernizing apartments, office buildings, road networks and canals, 
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the extension of the public transportation system, and the renewal of industrial 
facilities. Construction capacity, on the other hand, is extremely limited. The 
Berlin Senate speaks of a lack of 152,000 apartments for the year 1992 alone. In 
the 1980s in West Berlin, a maximum of 8,000 apartments and 50,000 square 
meters of office space were constructed annually.
The discrepancy between the need for spaces and construction and the 
available capacity and reserves will necessarily lead to an extreme jump in 
prices. This process is already underway. Rents and sale prices for apartments, 
offices, and commercial space have risen explosively, with corresponding con-
sequences for less profitable businesses and low-income households (cf. Der 
Spiegel 10/1991). In the real estate section of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung (FAZ), reports on Berlin are dominated by keywords such as “gold rush” 
and “gold-digger mentality.” Here, the federal government will be confronted 
“up close and personal” with a socio-political problem: real estate speculation. 
Office rents have tripled and quadrupled within a few months after German 
reunification to 70-100 DM per square meter. “Even residential real estate is 
worth its weight in gold. Monthly rents of 20 to 50 DM per square meter are be-
ing demanded” (FAZ, April 19, 1991). The Berlin government will have to think 
of something to prevent a situation where most of the money earmarked for 
reconstructing the capital ends up in the hands of real estate owners.
In light of the foreseeable deepening economic decline in the East and 
South, we can expect strong immigration from Eastern European countries, 
Turkey, and more distant countries. As in the metropolises of the Western 
world, the Third World and also the “Third Europe” will settle in Berlin.
SPATIAL AND SOCIAL SEGREGATION IN THE CIT Y?
Prognoses concerning the extent of immigration from the East and Southeast 
are highly speculative. Less speculative, however, is the assumption that on the 
real estate market, as well as on the job market, the gap between those on the 
inside and those on the outside will increase. Even in Berlin, slums and larger 
territories with emergency accommodation, a shadow economy, and gray labor 
markets could spread; in cities like New York, London, or Paris they have long 
since become normality. However, this has negative effects upon the islands of 
the well-off. Locations whose immediate surroundings are threatened by the 
spread of slums, such as the London Harbor area, will hardly be attractive to the 
growing number of business people over the long term. Some so-called “good 
neighborhoods” in New York (e.g. Battery Park City) are secured with a military 
effort and the most sophisticated surveillance techniques. In Liverpool, new 
residential areas with elements of medieval fortifications are constructed as 
so-called “defensible space.” These architectural and security techniques are 
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the necessary consequence of social segregation in the city. At the same time, 
with the defense that they offer, they give their beneficiaries the experience of 
being permanently threatened and subject to complete control. Over the long 
term, both might put off even the most hardened yuppie from living in the city.
In any case, Berlin will definitely grow, and much too fast for its construc-
tion and planning capacities to become adequate to this growth. During the 
process of deciding what city would be the new German capital, the question 
was not whether Berlin would grow, but rather how fast, how chaotically, and how 
ruthlessly toward weaker interests.
URBAN DE VELOPMENT RISKS
Among these weaker interests are not only groups living at the margins of soci-
ety or the environment. Creating space in ten to fifteen years for an entire gov-
ernment also contains urban development and architectural risks. Will build-
ings constructed under such time pressure withstand the next forty years? Will 
the architecture conceived so hastily age with dignity, so that it will still be 
regarded as tolerable in future times? Or will it be the case that all too soon 
the fads of the 1990s will be recognizable, like the annual growth rings of the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s are today? For the International Building Exhibition 
of 1957, Berlin gathered the heroes of modernism: Alva Aalto, Le Corbusier, 
Walter Gropius, and Oscar Niemeyer. Their result, the Hansa district, was cel-
ebrated worldwide. These days, it would lose in every international competition. 
The shelf life for urban and architectural fads has become considerably shorter 
than that of the buildings themselves. The great gestures of postmodernism 
might also age rapidly.
At the moment, the relocation of the government offers the hope of realiz-
ing the postmodern dreams of many architects. The FAZ action “12 Architects 
Design the Berlin of Tomorrow” offers the most striking proof that a city can 
no longer get by without the gesture of an architectural grand master. O.M. 
Ungers thus drew the ironic conclusion: he proposed to build everything in 
Berlin that had hitherto remained unrealized in architectural history. “Louis 
Cahns office high-rise, Leo Nidov’s concept for Red Square, Adolf Loos’ Chica-
go Tribune tower, or L. Lissitzsky’s cloud iron” (FAZ, May 1, 1991). His proposal 
would gain a bit of color if one added a few living exemplars to the unrealized 
drafts: the Great Pyramid of Cheops, the Eiffel Tower, the Empire State Build-
ing and Neuschwanstein Castle. Berlin as a theme park of world architecture! 
And a competent developer could also probably be found: the Disney Company.
Such urban planning absurdities nonetheless have a rational kernel: the 
notion of the polycentrality and chaotic diversity of the modern agglomeration 
and the attempt to create good individual buildings. However, one fears that 
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Berlin will get a lot of new junk. In Berlin, there will be little time for good 
architecture and urban planning, democratic participation and “cautious ur-
ban renewal.” The haste alone with which the central zone between Potsdamer 
Platz and the Staatsbibliothek was thrown at Daimler Benz reveals what kind of 
“mixture of actionism and privy council politics” (Manfred Sack) holds sway in 
Berlin. When the federal government is added to the picture, the result is an 
orgy of “unbureaucratic decisions” and fashionable glamour architecture that 
the city will suffer from for at least a century. Christoph Hackelsbeger writes:
“Greater Berlin needs a totally reorganized, powerful, central planning department 
which attracts a large number of free forces and makes use of their creativity. This reor-
ganized planning department needs a departmental leader at the top exempt from any 
feuds and the usual hindrances that loom over electoral seasons and who can behave 
intelligently over the long term” (Die Welt am Sonntag, August 7, 1990).
This is the old longing of the architect for Baron Haussmann and Napoleon the 
Third, which Hitler’s “general inspector for the Reichshauptstadt” also probably 
would not have formulated any differently. The cry for authority and authori-
tarian power arises less from a self-conscious conviction than from a power-
less display in the face of the helplessness of the urban planner with regard to 
the reality of modern big cities. However, the task of designing a capital city 
will all too often yield pretenses for imposing gestures, and will leave little 
time for rethinking and reflection – and above all else will change the political 
culture of decision making concerning the design and utilization structure of 
the city. Where history and the nation find their way, the years will hardly be 
squandered on the nerve-wracking involvement of economically uninteresting 
groups in urban planning.
A CLIMATE OF REPRESSION INSTE AD 
OF ME TROPOLITAN URBANIT Y?
Due to its position as the easternmost Western city, Berlin had the chance to of-
fer a place for the encounter and intersection of different cultures. As a multicul-
tural city in a welfare state system, during the period of the “new mass migra-
tion” expected as a result of the collapse of the socialist countries, it could have 
actually become the “capital of the 21st century.” However, the chances of all this 
will be worse, when national and international centers of power usurp the city.
A multicultural city, which bears this title not as a burden but as a privilege, 
is comprised of a multitude of sufficiently large ethnic and national minorities, 
who need a liberal environment and spatial development possibilities in order 
to work out their cultural tensions.
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“The bracing climate of a world city can, in the form of a concentrated intelligentsia, 
be very productive for the whole society; in contrast, such a bracing climate is a con-
siderable danger for political centers, and the transmission of tensions in their sphe-
re of activity make them unpredictable, susceptible to extor tion, or defensive. When 
East-West cooperation was taken into consideration in the 1980s, the unique cultural 
resources of Berlin were regarded as the foundation for its status as a city of culture and 
a center for the encounter between East and West. Now, after the collapse of the Soviet 
empire, Berlin’s chances are better than those at any time during the last sixty years to 
draw upon its old mediating function as the fringe of Eastern Europe. And, through its 
reclaimed central position, in which Berlin has become the star ting point for Eastern 
Europe, hardly an hour from the Oder border, such a mediating role is more important 
than ever. Recent news items show us that Berlin is not spared the foreigner-syndrome 
of the new German states. But a cultural world city, which is always comprised of many 
sufficiently large partial cultures, can remain capable of integration, can translate so-
cial tensions into cultural ones, and can confront the unavoidable consequences of a 
world city, namely increased delinquency, criminality, and mafia-like structures, with 
a liberality more promising of success than a circle of violence. A city with emphatic 
political functions, in which politicians have to isolate themselves against the suscep-
tibility to extor tion, will not be able to perform this task: it will become defensive, it will 
seal up the border of prosperity at the Oder, it will nationally displace its multicultural 
potential, it will become a hotbed of inner militarization and attempt to transform the 
space of experimentation known as culture into a coulisse of representation” (Niet-
hammer 1991: 7 f.).
Very little speaks for the notion that the relocation of the federal government 
to Berlin will make the management of its enormous economic, social, archi-
tectural, ecological, and socio-political tasks any easier. On the contrary, the 
pressures of growth will increase and thus the time pressures and costs. Even 
more demand, even greater use of space, price increases, and displacement, 
and less time for decisions to be made in a well-considered manner and for 
plans to mature. The relocation of the federal government to Berlin will in-
tensify Berlin’s problems. According to estimates from Bonn, 55,000 jobs are 
directly affected by the decision. Along with family members, this means an 
addition of 100,000 new residents of Berlin with purchasing power. The fight 
for the capital can begin; it’s clear who the probable losers will be.
PERSPECTIVES
When, in the last twenty years, the “crisis of the big cities” was debated and 
the perspective of a “new urbanity” discussed, concepts like “ecological, social, 
decentralized, democratic, and multicultural” played a central role. In the dis-
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cussion concerning the advantages of Berlin as a seat of government and the 
future perspectives of the new capital, they were hardly mentioned, and they 
were not relevant to the decision in any respect. It looks like the decision for 
the capital was made against a modern development of the city, as if policy and 
city conceptions of the 19th century were the inspiration and not perspectives 
for the 21st century. If ecological, social, and democratic perspectives are not to 
be simply yielded to the new city management without a struggle, Berlin will 
be confronted by a more conflict-laden and turbulent future than was ever con-
ceivable in the past. However: the chances for the new, the chances for a livable 
city, in which all residents can establish themselves in an acceptable way, have 
in no way become better.
Translated by Alexander Locascio
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Berlin is Becoming the Capital —  
Surely and Securely1
Volker Eick
The change from being an extended workbench, from the metropolis of sub-
sidies to the East-West hub, to “enterprise Berlin” (Eberhard Diepgen) –  this 
is both the dream and belief of the city’s political and business elites. But not 
theirs alone. International marketing and development agencies, multination-
als (or at least their counterparts), banks, PR strategists and not least the fed-
eral government, all want to give Berlin the right form and shape or, even, to 
continue in the good old German tradition of “where we stopped in 1945” – as 
the CEO of Berlin Bank AG (now, since its merger, the 8th largest bank of Ger-
many) reported with a refreshing honesty.
Deregulation is the magic word and Berlin is being trained in five central 
aspects to become a global city. All the elites who rally around profit maximiza-
tion share a common interest; to proceed without disturbances with Berlin as 
the logistical center. The required security apparatus, put together by the fed-
eral government, the Berlin Senate and private sector shortly before the turn of 
the millennium, happily takes to the stage – in contrast to the city’s poor. The 
latter have to disappear. A little journey through Berlin’s present shows the in-
struments designed to get rid of the poor as well as saying goodbye to the goal 
of abolishing poverty.
1. ADMINISTRATION: The merger of different Senate positions and the reduc-
tion of the Berlin administration (by 30,000 to 50,000 posts) was introduced in 
1992 with the so-called Heckelmann papers (cf. Münter 1992); the change from 
cameralistic budgeting to “lean public administration” is in process (Liebold 
1995: 1); potential “efficiency savings” of a further 20,000 jobs are considered 
as realistic if the Länder Berlin and Brandenburg merged (cf. Sparmann 1995: 
1 | Source: Eick, V. (1995) “Berlin wird Hauptstadt, aber sicher …” In Sträter, F. (ed.) 
Los Angeles – Berlin. Stadt der Zukunft – Zukunft der Stadt. Context Verlag, Stuttgart, 
129-142.
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6); the planned aggregation of currently 23 districts into only twelve has so far 
failed due to the resistance of local administrations. 
2. PRIVATIZATION: Services and construction projects that until now 
have been solely public are increasingly conducted as public-private-partner-
ships (Zawatka-Gerlach 1995: 9); the privatization of transport and other utili-
ties and public services (water supply, hospitals, street cleaning) is running at 
high speed (cf. Jurczyk 1994); municipal city marketing and tourist advertising 
are being privatized; the direct investment strategies for industry and service 
sector businesses are being transferred into private ownership or taken out of 
parliamentary accountability. 
3. INVESTMENTS: The Senate contributes in four key investment fields to 
Berlin’s anticipated future leading position, both globally and within Germany: 
the expansion of Berlin as a location for industry fairs, the establishment of 
Adlershof as a research and technology location, and the expansion of Berlin as 
the site of parliament and government. All of which illustrate an urban politics 
of international dimensions (cf. IHK Berlin 1992 and 1993). In the meantime, 
larger social housing projects are threatened, halted, delayed or subjected to 
financial reductions (cf. Lessen 1995: 7).
4. CAPITAL: These processes of deregulation are superposed by the deci-
sion of the German Parliament (the Bundestag) to transfer its own location as 
well as the site of the federal government to Berlin, even if not all government 
departments arrive in full but (in the first instance) only with a so-called head 
office. City center locations were primarily chosen as sites for departments and 
administration, leading to a subsequent relocation of embassies, (foreign) in-
dustry and trade agencies and lobby organizations alongside company head-
quarters and banks.
5. URBAN STRUCTURE: The concept of decentered concentration, pro-
moted as a key vision by the Senator for Urban Development, Volker Hassemer, 
is intended to strengthen the poly-central structure of the city. The relocation of 
industrial companies into the Berlin hinterland (its affluent commuter belt), an 
orientation towards services for the city center (European Service Metropolis) as 
well as a modified concept of careful urban regeneration (cf. Bodenschatz and 
Welch-Guerra 1993), however, leads in a programmed and determined frame-
work to small-scale social polarization (cf. Borst 1993; Der Spiegel 8/1995: 52 f.).
Admittedly, new lines of conflict are pre-programmed into the changes 
sketched out above. However, the grand coalition of SPD and CDU that governs 
in Berlin is not threatened by a parliamentary opposition and can integrate the 
remainders from the Fordist era of the “Berlin quagmire” (CDU) and respective 
“sleaze” (SPD) into its modernizing strategy (Sontheimer and Vorfelder 1987). 
While the numerous newly arriving and aspiring elites in their demands for 
political power provoke new conflicts, the power of definition over what consti-
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tutes accurate goals, important problems and serious problem groups remains 
in the hands of the established pro-growth coalition.
FROM MANAGING THE POOR TO REMOVING THEM 
Up until the middle of the 1980s we can talk with certain justification about 
certain freedoms in Berlin for migrants, prostitutes, beggars, homeless, punks 
and drug users. This can be done without trivializing the repressive politics 
against marginalized groups or even ignoring the conflicts between squatters 
and the Senate in the early 1980s. Not at least the pressure from the so-called 
new social movements also led to the creation of a network of self-help initia-
tives that was able to institutionalize aspects of these freedoms. In this way, 
poverty was at once managed while the responsibility was handed to intermedi-
ary organizations and NGOs. For this, (little) financial resources were provided. 
None of the problems were resolved by this policy – a fact also acknowledged by 
the self-help groups – but it nonetheless created the above-mentioned freedoms 
(cf. Lang 1994). The support for such projects is now being reduced by the Ber-
lin Senate, making way for a discourse and program of exclusion. If up until 
reunification poverty was considered primarily as a problem of a social nature 
and of public order, the poor are now regarded as a threat to safety and security 
(cf. Cremer-Schäfer 1993). Social exclusion and stigmatization go hand in hand 
with spatial separation.
The homeless are now persecuted more strongly and systematically ex-
pelled from public spaces; subway stations, parks and places near tourist attrac-
tions more and more turn into no-go areas for them. In recent years they are not 
only threatened by the police and shop owners but also increasingly subjected 
to private policing initiatives. We can observe similar developments for those 
migrants who live from trading cigarettes, gambling and begging. The hunt on 
foreigners as pursued by the official government over the past three years ad-
ditionally exacerbates their living conditions (cf. Amnesty International 1994: 
160 ff.).2
Senate policy initially focused on the growing number of people who lived 
in Wagenburgen (alternative settlements made of vans, construction and recre-
ational vehicles), mostly in inner city locations. Not only poverty but also the 
desire for alternative forms of living contributed to this residential form that 
2 | E.g., the so-called Polish market was an urban space in Kreuzberg, directly adja-
cent to Potsdamer Platz where – organized mainly by Polish and Turkish traders – cloth-
ing, food as well as alcohol and cigarettes were provided cheaply in a judicial grey area 
(under black market conditions). The Berlin Senate first established a police task force 
and then, in the summer of 1989, banned the market. 
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until now has also been marketed by the Senate as a tourist attraction. Mas-
sive police operations have so far evicted two of a total of twelve Wagenburgen 
from the inner city (Engelbecken/Kreuzberg; Potsdamer Platz); two have been 
allocated alternative locations on the edge of the city (cf. Büttner 1995: 24). The 
media prepared for the evictions with propaganda headlines such as “Slums in 
Prime Location,” “Centers of Epidemics,” “Hiding Place for Criminals” (tatblatt 
1993: 16). In addition, the police clear local drug scenes in some urban spaces 
with the support of private security services. In this process, a large part of the 
drug scene at Nollendorfplatz (Kreuzberg 61) has moved to Kottbusser Tor and 
Mariannenplatz in the previous postal district Kreuzberg 36.
In a city without a red-light district regulation, prostitutes are also subject 
to increasing pressures. These attacks are currently centered on the future gov-
ernment district (Tiergarten-Süd). Here, prostitutes ought to disappear, regard-
less of recent agreements having been reached between residents and prosti-
tutes (Hydra 1994: 3). This stance is, among other arguments, being justified 
by drug-related prostitution. It is considered as not fitting for the area. There-
fore, the then Permanent Secretary of the Senator for the Interior, Armin Jäger, 
suggested that “fences with locks should be erected” and a more visible [police] 
presence demonstrated (Berliner Morgenpost, March 26, 1992).
“KILLING THEM SOF TLY ...” — OLD AND NE W ACTORS IN BERLIN
Violence, crime and security are the key vocabulary with which the ruling elites 
want to keep the “new Berlin” free from potential disturbances or to cleanse it. 
This approach to the regulation of poverty has changed the structures of the se-
curity apparatus and has expanded its scope of duties. Security structure in this 
context means “security of the interior,” i.e. security organized and financed 
by the state (police, border police, armed forces, secret service) as well as the 
private security sector and neighborhood watches and architectural measures 
designed to establish a particular notion of security in architectural form. Pri-
vate security includes all private persons and businesses that “provide security 
services in which they, for payment, try to protect individuals, property and 
interests from danger” (Nogala 1992: 18).
... THE FEDER AL GOVERNMENT
The federal government, together with the Treuhand (the privatization agen-
cy for formerly state owned properties in East Germany), is one of the largest 
ground and property owners in Berlin. With the decision to relocate the parlia-
ment and government to Berlin, it was demanded to disempower the districts 
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of Tiergarten and Mitte and shift decision-making powers for central decisions 
to the federal government. The “Capital Contract” regulates these interests and 
has led to a centralization planning authorities (cf. Schulz 1992: l). The dis-
tribution of government buildings across the two districts (in contrast to the 
closed-off government district in Bonn) will lead to decentralized mobile secu-
rity zones, for each of which access rights will be granted or denied according 
to its needs. All planning processes are conducted under the highest security 
level so that no detailed information can be obtained (cf. Zwoch 1994: 1327).
The debate concerning the scale of the intended exclusion zone around the 
Reichstag is, however, a sham. Police as well as the federal government want, for 
technical reasons, an exclusion zone as small as possible; vehicle movements 
between each government building and during visits of foreign government 
guests will be the deciding factor. The former State Secretary for the Interior, 
Hans Neusel, already confirmed this by declaring site and building protection 
as one of the key problems (die tageszeitung, August 9, 1991). The Border Police 
(BGS) controls the local train system (S-Bahn), German airports and has also 
begun to control the long-distance railway stations since October 1992. Begin-
ning in January 1995, Deutsche Bahn AG (German Rail) has established within 
its “SSS concept” (security, service, cleanliness) an additional and new security 
service. In Berlin, 426 BGS officers with dogs are on duty against homeless 
people on S-Bahn and long-distance railway stations. In Ahrensfelde, 30 kilo-
meters outside Berlin, the “Security Squadron Federal Government” was es-
tablished in January 1992 on a former GDR Ministry of State Security property 
(Der Tagesspiegel, January 26, 1992).
This image of a purified Germany ought to find its architectural expres-
sion, according to the federal government’s will, to an exceptional extent in the 
old and new capital (cf. Arch+ 1994; Libeskind 1994: 38 ff.). Besides the staging 
of the mock City Palace, discussed all over the country, the continuing scandal 
over the New Guard House as the central memorial site of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, and the concept of the government district and Reichstag, the pre-
sentation of other central spaces also takes on a new significance. The federal 
government has gained significant influence following the decision to relocate 
the capital. We can observe a national setting in scene of the city by the federal 
government. It finds its expression in the federal armed forces marching un-
derneath the Brandenburg Gate and the renaming of streets. It also establishes 
new conditions for access while redefining groups that are in disagreement 
over the ruling forms of use of these spaces as a potential disturbance. All 
that could damage this staging, while also possibly making visible the conse-
quences of the pursued strategies of modernization, has to be expelled from 
the urban stage.
Berlin’s Megalomania38
... BERLIN’S INDUSTRY AND TR ADE AGENCIES, THE SENATE
The business owners who form the Working Group City (AG City) in the West 
center of Berlin (Kurfürstendamm) are, alongside the Chamber of Commerce 
of Berlin, the economic key agents of a politics of exclusion. With direct refer-
ence to Berlin’s new role and financial losses due to the visible misery outside 
their shops, they demand the removal of the poor. The traditional business peo-
ple of the upper middle classes in Berlin fear the poor as much as they fear the 
competition of newly arriving businesses. Customers with high spending pow-
er are in demand and one needs at least to clampdown on “people who damage 
their businesses” and who are responsible for “conditions such as in Chicago,” 
according to these retailers – even more so if foreign competition cannot be 
kept away. This, at least, was the argument made by the chair of the AG City, 
Peter Hosemann, at a press meeting (Link 1993: 16). With this argument, those 
who organized within the AG City were able to force the Senator for the Interior 
to provide every day up to 100 police officers solely for the Kurfürstendamm 
and to continue a practice of illegal employment, i.e. private security companies 
working without a license (cf. Remke and Rechenberg 1992). At the same time, 
the AG City thus defined what undesirable persons are at Kurfürstendamm 
and its adjacent streets: unemployed young people, gamblers, the poor and the 
homeless.3
Initial conflicts with the police, who were irritated by the fact that numerous 
people from the pimp scene and involved in prostitution were now employed by 
private security services, had been resolved. Thanks to their superior contacts 
to the Senate, the business owners remained dominant. Silently, a coalition of 
private security services, the Senate for the Interior and the police command 
has been formed against the city’s poor, transcending any democratic con-
cerns. Even threats of disinvestment are part of daily life in the business camp 
if it sees its profits endangered: there existed considerations to leave the city 
center, so they said. The “sliding of the city centers” caused by “the nuisance of 
beggars and impostors in pedestrian precincts” and “questionable events with 
cheap stalls” were not desired since they “attract a different audience and block 
the expensive shop windows” (Friedemann 1993: 41).
Another important actor in implementing the new security doctrine is the 
Berlin public transport company, Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe (BVG).4 Formally it 
3 | The AG City convenes four meetings a year with representatives of the police, pri-
vate security, the Senate and the Boroughs as well as staff of, often church-funded, 
homeless hostels. In these meetings the latter are told where homeless people are not 
desired. 
4 | As recently as the late-1970s the BVG rejected private security services; now it 
refers with pride to IHS and its work. From January to September 1992, its “balance of 
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reports to the Senator for Transport but in matters of maintaining public safety 
and order it is instructed by the Senator for the Interior. These instructions 
are given by a longstanding hardliner of Berlin’s security policy, Senator for 
the Interior Dieter Heckelmann. The removal or changing of seats in subway 
stations already began in 1987 (cf. die tageszeitung, October 17, 1987). At this 
moment, security technology (CCTV cameras and emergency telephones) are 
installed in order to increase passengers’ “feeling of safety” in the subway sta-
tions (Richter 1994: 19). In addition, a weekly exchange takes place between 
BVG, police, border police, Senate for the Interior and the IHS security service 
(cf. Pütter 1992: 36). Future tasks are allocated accordingly. These meetings are 
as little subject to (parliamentary) control as there currently exists a legal basis 
against the recording of personal information by private security (cf. Berliner 
Datenschutzbeauftragter 1994: 73).
Berlin took up security aspects in the building control of social housing 
as the first Bundesland. Berlin’s social service administration is also innova-
tive: under its instruction, the Berlin job center, through the SECU employ-
ment agency, offers positions to long-term unemployed who in uniform and 
equipped with walkie-talkies accompany older people in their shopping and 
in errands to administration offices and banks (cf. Arbeitsamt II 1994: 1). This 
initiative occurs alongside numerous other similar ones that intend to provide 
a (re-)newed function for uniformed presences within urban spaces. The Berlin 
Senate also intends, for the first time, to deploy the Voluntary Police Service 
(FPR) aggressively in urban spaces, while until now the FPR only supported 
the police in site and building protection. Plans exist to deploy the FPR against 
illegal barbeques in municipal parks and green spaces from summer 1995 on-
wards. The largest inner-city park, Tiergarten, is primarily frequented by Turk-
ish families and lies right in the middle of the future government district (cf. 
Heisenkamp 1994: 17).
… THE BERLIN POLICE
In total, Germany had 325,460 people employed in the police in 1992. In Ber-
lin, the ratio of police per population is the highest with 32,500 people. “A 
police officer is responsible for 107 citizens in the German capital […]. On aver-
age, the ratio police to resident is 1:243 across the country” (Höft 1992: 63). The 
activities” reads as follows: “A total of 167,000 operations: 35,300 passengers pre-
vented from travel due to alcohol consumption, 46,000 instructed to leave stations, 
25,000 homeless people called to order; 15,653 times ‘influence exerted’ on noisy 
young people, 6,439 times patrolled against smokers, 1,637 against musicians, 3,115 
against beggars, 1,694 against ad hoc trading” (Club der Verdrängten 1994: 5).
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total number of police officers in Germany is 225,000. There are now 200,000 
private security personnel.
The formation of special task forces to directly target undesirable people was 
not met with any critical responses. Part of these task forces is the Group AGA 
(Targeted Surveillance of Foreigners) and the special task force Blauer Dunst 
(“Blue Smoke,” primarily active around the Brandenburg Gate) against Polish 
and Vietnamese cigarette traders (cf. AG Innere Sicherheit 1994: 22). Special 
units of the Berlin police, border police and the Federal Office for Criminal 
Investigation (BKA) are dedicated to (foreign) young people who are assumed 
to be involved in youth gangs (cf. Senatsverwaltung für Inneres 1994: 44 ff.). In 
addition, many assaults against migrants are evidenced and recorded; the racist 
character of the Berlin police is by now the subject of publications of the hu-
man rights organization Amnesty International. The fact that the Berlin police 
apparatus, including large parts of its trade union, is infiltrated by members of 
the far-right party Die Republikaner (Republicans) (Krüger and Steinborn 1993: 
286) has been the subject of long and inconsequential debates.
So-called Operative Groups (OG), whose range of duties contains the cur-
rent and future core city center areas, provide support for these developments. 
Their organizational structure demonstrates the new policing that centers on 
the targeted extraction of undesired persons from particular spaces. Heckel-
mann instructed the establishment of the OG City West in July 1993 exclusively 
to target beggars, the homeless and foreign gamblers (Pütter and Strunk 1994: 
27). Corresponding to the investment and tourist centers of the Berlin Sen-
ate, so far four OG have been established: OG Alex (Alexanderplatz), OG Potse 
(Potsdamer Straße), OG City West (Kurfürstendamm), and, in January 1994, 
OG SO 36 (Kreuzberg). Also, any possible political protest has already been 
prepared for: the political police of the city, the Berlin State Security, holds a 
database of 300 people, originally set up for protests against the Olympics and 
now continued as “Anti-Restructuring File” (Berliner Datenschutzbeauftragter 
1994: 70 ff.).
... AND PRIVATE SECURIT Y SERVICES
750 private security services were counted in 1989 all over Germany. In Octo-
ber 1992, the police assumed that 170 legally registered private security services 
existed in Berlin alone. The sector consists of around ten large providers and 
numerous small (also illegally operating) businesses (cf. Jürgensen 1994: 14). 
Until now, no legally regulated training schedules exist.
Private security services currently find themselves in a third wave of expan-
sion, after 1945 and the late 1960s and early 1970s. A fundamentally new aspect 
in this is the expansion of their duties. Up until now almost all their activities 
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could be characterized as site, building and personal protection. This is no 
longer the case. Increasingly they take on tasks that originally resided within 
the powers controlled by the state, i.e. the police forces: traffic monitoring and 
the control of public spaces such as subway stations, pedestrian precincts and 
parks. Private security by now also frequently assists, illegally and in coopera-
tion with the police, in the eviction of squats.5 Search tasks are requested and 
already practiced within a legal grey area. Private security services are also use-
fully deployed in custody against delinquent foreigners or rejected asylum seek-
ers prior to their deportation (cf. Süddeutsche Zeitung, August 28, 1993).
New technologies, new management concepts and processes of social po-
larization have contributed to this third wave of expansion for the private se-
curity sector. Its main task, the “abstract prevention of danger,” is exclusively 
provided to affluent institutions, firms and individuals. In Berlin they are em-
ployed by the federal government, the Berlin Senate, as well as private industry. 
With their deployment in the city’s public transport network they also redefine 
public space into private space. The consequence of this is that private services 
define the conditions of access to these, now also privatized, public spaces. The 
re-orientation of how the city center is architecturally staged – filled to the hilt 
with shopping malls and precincts and a semi-public space (see “Daimler-City” 
at Potsdamer Platz or the Friedrichstadtpassagen as one of 911 building sites in 
Berlin-Mitte) – supports this process of eroding public space.
Large companies such as Veba AG (Raab Karcher Sicherheit), Stinnes AG 
(Brink’s Schenker GmbH), Pedus AG (Peter Dussmann Sicherheitsdienste), 
Wisser Group of the textiles and cleaning magnate Claus Wisser (Industrie- 
und Handelsschutz GmbH), or the Berlin Penz-Garski-Immobilien GmbH 
with its B.O.S.S. Sicherheitsdienst, stand behind these private security servic-
es. Former police officers as well as staff of other security forces are active in 
these companies. Founded in 1977 and in Berlin active since 1990, the Indust-
rie- und Handelsschutz GmbH (IHS) is, e.g., led by former head of the German 
Intelligence Service, Heribert Hellenbroich, and is one of the big ones in the 
sector with 2,500 employees.
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL IN BERLIN
If international companies are only mentioned in passing in this discussion of 
Berlin’s new security regime, this is also due to the fact that most of the larger 
5 | As in Cologne (cf. the 1994 documentary “Unsere Stadt soll sauber werden”), in 
Potsdam and Berlin (cf. Der Tagesspiegel, June 16, 1994; and Berliner Zeitung, May 31, 
1994, and June 16, 1994).
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construction projects are still in the process of being completed.6 Thus, little 
actual experience exists to date. The multinationals have so far, similar to the 
developers, let themselves not be directly drawn into the debates and round ta-
bles around security but, instead, act autonomously and directly. Many projects 
in Berlin are conceptualized so that atriums, covered spaces and underpasses 
form semi-public spaces that are controlled by private business. This creates 
the preconditions for businesses themselves to become agents in these new 
spaces. Numerous examples for this approach exist in the US and are referred 
to not only by many of the international companies but also by the AG City (cf. 
Sorkin 1992; Davis 1990).
There exists, however, evidence of some of the big investors in other cities. 
Sony AG, now with a construction project at Potsdamer Platz, thus threatened a 
relocation of its headquarter in Cologne in 1988 unless adjacent Roma and Sinti 
camps were not immediately removed. The campsite, according to the then 
Sony head, Jack Schmuckli, was “worse than a waste dump” (Tolmein 1988).
Also present in Berlin and also active in real estate is Douglas Holding 
AG (cosmetics), which recently demanded that city centers had to be managed 
“in the same way as shopping malls” (Friedemann 1993: 41). Its Chair of the 
Board also criticized transport policies that were damaging to retail businesses. 
Douglas Holding AG threatened that the company would withdraw from city 
centers if the city fathers were not able to keep their city center clean and tar-
geted crime successfully. Similarly, not all shop owners could afford private 
security and the police devoted more attention to illegal parking than criminals 
and drug users (ibid.). The influence and significance of international capital 
for aspects of security policies cannot be anticipated at this moment in time. 
Also for this reason we need to defer analysis of whether the concluding quote 
from the biggest real estate leader in Berlin describes a line of confrontation 
that may be applicable to the whole of Berlin at a later stage. We could probably 
only wish this to be the case for the population of the city, in the face of existing 
alternatives and despite its inherent contradictions:
6 | I will refrain from listing a myriad of international and national companies that have 
announced to, or already did, relocate their headquarters or branches to Berlin’s city 
center. An overview is provided by Jones Lang Wotton (1992) and Müller International 
(1993); for the consequences, see Brake (1992), Eichstädt (1992) and Krätke (1991). 
Their contributions amount, in terms of security policies, to what the federal SPD poli-
tician Jürgen Starnick (1994) formulated as an excuse for the security interests of the 
federal government as follows: one will discover “for the remainder of the parliamentary 
and government buildings that they compare with the headquarter of Deutsche Bank 
like an igloo to a castle.”
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“Several people are militantly resisting against looming changes in their ‘Kiez.’ Newly 
opened shops for more affluent consumers have their window fronts smashed, hated 
‘yuppies’ need to bear the verbal abuse once they have moved into refurbished loft 
apartments. Those considered to be ‘speculators’ have to expect the worst. In short: 
those who invest and live here [in Kreuzberg] have to rely on a cer tain toleration and 
should not have any fear of contact vis-à-vis the color ful people of dropouts (and 
scroungers)” (Plötz 1994: 52).
Translated by Gesa Helms
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Last Exit to Alexanderplatz1
Wolfgang Kil
A single ticket for Berlin’s public transport has since January 1, 1995, cost 3.70 
DM. If a visitor from the new Baltic states wants to take a single trip by bus or 
subway, he or she needs to work for about one full day (for the average income) 
to earn the respective value. For a visitor from closer-by Poland the ratio is 
slightly better; for Belarussians or Ukrainians it is decidedly worse.
This observation made in passing may appear somewhat random. Yet it de-
notes something fundamental – a misunderstanding still indulged in by Berlin 
towards its geographical realities. It desires so much to be a metropolis at the 
river Spree; the hub for people, commodities and ideas in the center of Europe. 
Yet the kind of Europe whose functioning center is Berlin does not exist. For 
too long, the city “has danced on the edge, the abyss of history” (Goldberger 
1995). And it will remain an outpost for an unforeseeable length of time: the 
shopping window of the West is full of glittering promises which cannot be 
fulfilled to those gazing with longing eyes.
Hence, a particular uncertainty rules the city, a lack of orientation, and 
for some, a childish defiance. The air is filled with a most noticeable fear; the 
fear of losing one’s “attachment to the West” and to fall behind other metropo-
lises, which, seemingly without any threat, indulge in luxury. West Berliners 
seem particularly unhappy in their outpost, thus practicing denial particularly 
strongly. The vested rights of forty years of post-war boom stand more effec-
tively in the way of impartial thinking than what a desire for new worlds could 
envision. Reasons for this are mainly of a mental kind: the opposing political 
system has vanished, now the “Third World” begins less than an hour’s drive 
beyond Berlin. And the fear of the unfamiliar takes effect below the surface. 
One nags as if their own misery never existed: poor road surfaces, grey build-
ings, and strange people. Long rehearsed, for generations, these defensive re-
flexes are reliable against all that means East. And in Germany the view that 
1 | Source: Kil, W. (1995) Last Exit Alexanderplatz. der architek t 4/1995. 
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made those infamous car stickers a top seller increasingly takes hold: “Your 
poverty makes me want to puke.”
If there exists a town planning metaphor for the mental prejudices of the 
West against the East, then it is the Kollhoff Plan for Alexanderplatz. This “help 
desk of the Zeitgeist for the nineties” will remain, even if the construction plans 
may perhaps at some point yellow in the archives. After all, their chances for 
realization are not particularly great; in any case they are even smaller than for 
those many other projects of ambition to which the Berlin Senate has let itself 
be seduced over recent years. Fundamental misconceptions – of the economy, 
planning policy and architecture and concept – are to blame.
BL ACKMAILED FIRST, THEN STOOD UP
Let’s refresh our memory: after two rounds of competition (April and Septem-
ber 1993), the well-known conception of Hans Kollhoff was crowned against 
the clearly-articulated resistance of East Berlin residents and pushed through 
by a lobby of investors and the Senate. The investors were the last to blame for 
the cascade of those eager to impress, first thirteen, then eleven, finally nine 
150 meter tall high-rise buildings. The investors only wanted to preserve their 
interest. A matter of corporate identity, each company thus fought for one tower.
Berlin’s polity has failed gravely in this whole process. Kollhoff’s aestheti-
cally exalted total work of art with a construction phase of twenty years uncov-
ered the absence of any far-sighted development concept for the city as a whole. 
Far removed from any historical realities as well as without any necessity, the 
Senator for Urban Development, Volker Hassemer, suddenly proposed the re-
location of the core city center areas from the Kurfürstendamm to the eastern 
edge of the old Berlin city center; supposedly, he fell in love, rather foolishly, 
with a new “picture postcard image” (sic!) of his city. The whole process was, in 
reality, only conducted in such unbecoming haste because real estate owners 
were already impatiently straining at the leash. The competition, according to 
a panicky hope, should have provided the Senate with the means to restrain 
the particular interests of individual owners and, as far as possible, utilize six 
billion DM as envisaged construction cost to provide a forward thrust for the 
“metropolis.”
“The whole thing is obviously a political problem. The city’s interests, those 
of the public and the inhabitants vis-à-vis the investors, have to be brought into 
the debate and to be made to count. The inhabitants have to demand this from 
their political representatives. The investors need to be obliged also to work for 
this purpose,” appealed Richard Weinstein (1993), one time chief planner of 
Manhattan and thus an expert in these matters, in the city forum to Berliners 
and their conscience. Only when the city takes sufficiently strong a position 
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vis-à-vis private investors will the public interest not suffer. But this was exactly 
what the city saw and still sees itself incapable of at this moment in time. Like 
a rejected child, the German capital has to go from door to door, courting atten-
tion. It is clearly not the case that it can hardly save itself from interest to move 
to and settle in the city. On the contrary, emigration losses are taking on dra-
matic proportions particularly in labor-intensive sectors. The Spree metropolis 
is a long time away from being an attractive address (for any business card). 
And, in its desperation, still tries to please even the most fickle developers.
These, one after another, are bailing out from Alexanderplatz: “We are go-
ing to start once we have tenants or buyers and not before,” announced TRI-
GON, project developer for Interhotel, in autumn 1994 (Guttmann 1994). The 
Treuhand real estate company and Terreno/Roland Ernst have also, for the time 
being, invested a large amount of money in existing property – which does not 
look like new buildings are to happen any time soon. [The publishing company] 
Gruner + Jahr announced that “due to the circumstances” it was considering an 
alternative location along the Spree riverbanks; the prime site at Alexanderplatz 
could well wait for any later realization.
Will time let gentle-minded grass grow over the hasty Alex affair? Not at all: 
German building law creates facts even if no building takes place. Fearing that 
the fractious administration of the Eastern district of Mitte could unduly delay 
or even thwart the matter, the Building Senate has taken over the process of 
approving the land use plan. Thus, the controversial “high-rise tempest” enters 
building law as a “virtual measure” even without investors and raises real estate 
values to the extreme.
Even if current (or new) owners had other goals in mind, they could no 
longer prevent the density legislated for in the Kollhoff plan. An expected floor-
space ratio of between nine and eleven enforces the most luxurious expecta-
tions of commercialization. Less profitable uses, such as family units or a mix 
including small businesses, are thus excluded. This speculation, promoted by 
the Senate in its blinded euphoria for skylines, has led to a “completely rudder-
less land value structure that precisely prevents those projects that Berlin needs 
today,” specifically also for Alexanderplatz (Eichstädt 1994: 47).
AN INSULT TO THOSE ON LOWER INCOMES
All involved have until now staunchly avoided any discussion over the conse-
quences of such massive valorization of the center city for adjacent residential 
districts such as Scheunenviertel, Prenzlauer Berg, and Friedrichshain. The 
always praised Martin Wagner has already cast his interested eyes over these 
areas: “The living quarters of the poor and the poorest and their decimated 
purchasing power obstruct city center development and need to be removed by 
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radically demolishing desolate living quarters” (Wagner 1994: 88). Today, the 
imaginary skyscrapers at Alex are casting their shadows onto the socially most 
intact and thus, for this reason alone, most livable mixed neighborhoods of East 
Berlin. Their gentrification is, at the very least, accepted by the Senate; skeptics 
even assume it is part of the approach. “The architectural plan is a surprise 
attack on the residents who live here” (Der Spiegel 13/94). As long as they are 
being denied a discussion over their prospects, the long-time residents, now 
well aware of the state of danger they find themselves in, have to consider Koll-
hoff’s visions as a call to arms by the Senate against the citizens of the Eastern 
districts with less purchasing power. There simply exist no strategies to limit 
any of the foreseeable upheaval in the hinterland of Alexanderplatz.
Western experiences that consider certain forms of “social differentiation” 
as normal are only one side of the coin. The other is simply called ignorance. 
Even the gestures of Kollhoff’s development idea talks the traitor’s talk of coop-
tation: the group of towers shaped as a sky-high double bowl encircles the pub-
lic space, screens it against the East and opens out towards the West. An osten-
tatious barrier is erected towards the hinterland, which has always been one of 
the special characteristics of the place. All illustrations and models prove that 
the Western gaze, fully commanding the city since 1990, has broadened its ho-
rizon, beyond the historic Friedrichstadt and the City Palace up to the bound-
ary of the S-Bahn. There it shall find a resting point in an imposing skyline: last 
exit for dynamic service providers and the clientele in search for luxury items. 
Once again prime location for front offices and designer boutiques. Beyond lies 
“Ulan Bator” (Michael Mönninger2) and “Asian emptiness” (Dieter Hoffmann-
Axthelm).
INTEGR ATION INSTE AD OF BLOCK ADING
“Nonetheless, the prospect isn’t bad,” writes Harald Bodenschatz (1994: 92), 
“that a pure valorization strategy with high-cost offices, shopping worlds filled 
with world-class goods, luxury apartments and expensive cafes will fail. His-
tory, the present and the foreseeable future will bring this place down to the 
ground, as a space of the East.” One can only hope that such predictions will 
be taken seriously before the first facts have been constructed. A failure of the 
“enterprise Alexanderplatz” at half term would exceed many times over the 
disaster of Kottbuser Tor (which in the early 1970s became the writing on the 
2 | “Alexanderplatz appears like a frontier post of Mongolia. Its emptiness and expanse 
reflect an Eastern economy of scarcity whose only item of luxury was the excessive was-
ting of space” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 17, 1993).
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wall for failed urban development in Berlin Kreuzberg in both social and archi-
tectural terms).
To return once again to the earlier mentioned mental barriers: [Alexander-
platz as] the public space of the East! If such a peculiar existence is already 
assigned with such stubborn insistence, why cannot Alexanderplatz develop 
its very own quality from such a characteristic? This would be possible if its 
redevelopment was based on the legitimate expectations of the East city’s users; 
if its significance as a lower order center, as a traditional meeting and distri-
bution point for uncounted everyday movements from Pankow, Weißensee or 
Lichtenberg, was final recognized and taken seriously. What if it was developed 
not as an office location in competition to the West-City but as a hub of fluc-
tuating movements of small-business activities (start-ups) and an urban site 
of integration (e.g. for immigrants)? That would, however, define the site as a 
fundamentally different urban concept to Kollhoff’s offering. It would need to 
be explicitly opened out towards the approaching radial roads of Prenzlauer Al-
lee, Greifswalder Straße, Landsberger and Karl-Marx-Allee (as proposed by Kny 
& Weber whose proposal came third). It would also suggest a far more varied 
mixing of functions and building typologies; a foundation for a step-by-step 
growth and permanent change (which was essentially the message of Libes-
kind’s runner-up proposal).
Above all, it would mean refraining from an obsessive (and fairly hopeless) 
Westernization of the East city, a process increasingly experienced over there 
as social exclusion (“For whom are these fancy shops?”3) or as a cultural in-
sult. In Frankfurt am Main, the wealth and profit orientation in the Western 
impression of the central city redevelopment, which has so far come only at 
the expense of marginal minorities, can already only be enforced against large 
resistance to the “re-ordering” of Kaiserstraße and the areas surrounding the 
train station. In Berlin, with its specific East-West divide, relevant parts of the 
population (read: potential voters) are being put under pressure.
The need for an expansion to accommodate the upper class is not as gigan-
tic as expected only four years ago. Berlin is big enough not to close off its city 
center to those with more modest incomes – and real poverty, increasingly to 
be expected from the neighboring countries in the East, doesn’t allow its access 
to be refused anyway. The developers at Alexanderplatz understood this earlier 
than Berlin’s politicians and some architects. The hesitant pause of the inves-
tors provides the Senate with some time for reconsideration. There is still time 
to correct its view of the city. Real metropolises allow for an equal footing not 
only of lifestyles but also grossly different income groups. Berlin’s special role 
in Germany as in Europe can only consist in a balancing of lives and their prac-
3 | Letter to the editor. Berliner Zeitung, May 29, 1993.
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tices that are fairly alien to each other. For this, small-scale and flexible urban 
structures are more productive than triumphant and excluding ones.
At Alexanderplatz, both the historical one and today’s, Berlin has a single 
opportunity (that cannot be repeated) to present itself as an open city, finally 
also towards the East. This opening, however, has to be desired. Can it be imag-
ined and thought? Hans Kollhoff wasn’t able to. Now his proposal sticks to the 
city’s image like the infamous bumper sticker.
Translated by Gesa Helms
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Berlin’s Urban Development Discourse 
Symbolic Action and the Ar ticulation of Hegemonic Interests1
Simone Hain
With the decline of the industrial sector in the late 1970s and the rise of the 
service industry as a crucial location factor, a concomitant change in the mean-
ing of urban development has emerged. While the functionalist, modernist 
“Fordist city” was oriented towards providing the best possible infrastructure, 
hygiene and mass accommodation, as well as regulating conflicts and ensur-
ing a social equilibrium, postmodernity has entailed a revision of these ideals. 
The focus now rests on the inventive presentation of soft location factors and 
the creation of exclusive places. Urban development has been superseded by an 
approach aimed chiefly at image creation by prioritizing aesthetics and culture 
in planning processes. As a result of overcompensation, architecture and the 
art of urban development regained their mystical aura, manifested in the abil-
ity to transcend the technical world. Highly valued “star architects” enjoyed 
favorable media coverage and thereby outshone the technocratic planners and 
social developers. 
The competitive or even hostile relationship between these two disciplines, 
both of which deal with regional planning and urban design, is no where more 
evident than in the city of Berlin. It was in this city that the modern welfare 
system and archetypal regional services were “invented” at the turn of the 19th 
century and during the Weimar Republic. And it is here that the contempo-
rary neoliberal drive for deregulation is most evident and the accompanying 
conflicts most pronounced. This is also because post-war reconstruction and 
urban development in the eastern and western parts of the city occurred in two 
distinct fashions, each a product of their respective political orders. These two 
worlds of architecture and urban development are both unique and rich in con-
trast, but also under threat from a small group of power-hungry actors. They 
exploit state weaknesses and attack these worlds as anachronistic by deploying 
1 | Source: Hain. S. (1997) Der Berliner Städtebaudiskurs als symbolisches Handeln 
und Ausdruck hegemonialer Interessen. WeltTrends 17/1997, 103-123.
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elaborate ideological arguments and intricate designs. They take issue with the 
burden of socialist urban development in what used to be East Germany but are 
equally opposed to the horrors of uncontrolled urban growth following a North 
American or East Asian pattern and brought about by a globalization in the 
interest of an educated middle class clientele. Instead, they favor establishing 
a “home city” inspired by the moderation and order inherent in Prussian clas-
sicism while also amalgamating the diversity of Berlin’s cityscape. However, 
the characterless and monstrous architecture of Potsdamer Platz and the cold, 
exclusive architecture that defines the redeveloped Friedrichstraße, indicate 
that such flight to the comforting past is impossible. This is so because today’s 
roving global capital has developed its own dynamics.
The case of Berlin is particularly important. Here the effects of contempo-
rary global structural change are felt by two political cultures and numerous al-
ternative and innovative milieus, while the to-ing and fro-ing of migrants, most 
of whom hail from what was known as the “second world,” is also influenced. 
As such, this can be viewed as an open-ended experiment with an eastern and 
western dimension. Since last year fierce debate has ensued regarding compet-
ing actors and their visions of the city’s future. More specifically, issues of inter-
pretative authority, creative authority but also credit-worthiness were debated, 
although predominantly within the confines of the city itself. There is a vision 
that authority over the city shall be transferred from the state back to its autono-
mous citizens. It remains to be seen how this can be achieved, who should be 
granted authority under these conditions and whether such bearers of authority 
could “normalize” their own status without state backing. Taken together these 
questions form an Adriadne’s Thread linking intricate discourses and heated 
debates within Berlin’s political and public arenas.
STR ATEGY NO 1: CATCH-UP MODERNIZ ATION 
AS A “NE W, BOLD AND BRUTAL WILHELMINIAN PERIOD”
Until the fall of the Berlin Wall the city remained in de-facto quarantine. For 
forty years it held the unique status of a city on the front lines of the Cold War. 
Moreover, contradictory reconstruction in both parts of the city after the total 
destruction incurred during the war, and economic marginalization until the 
end of the Cold War, added to the uniqueness. It all ended with the joyous 
surprise of November 9, 1989. Before any city-wide planning law could be es-
tablished, several vast estates in the City’s possession, both within and beyond 
its confines, were sold off. “Like trump cards,” to use one of Bourdieu’s meta-
phors, economic actors initially possessed all the advantages. As developers 
lacked a clear sense of how much profit to expect from urban construction this 
allowed for wildly optimistic speculation. Some fantasized about Berlin becom-
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ing a hub between east and west, a science metropolis, a stage for the Olympic 
Games, or a center for innovation in an era of communication technology. 
When it was decided that Berlin would regain capital city status, develop-
ers began making grand calculations regarding future demand for living, ho-
tel and businesses spaces. The city administration became caught up in this 
wave of euphoria and soon an overriding development concept was established: 
catch-up modernization in East Berlin. 
“Compared to the western part East Berlin lags some 25 years behind in developmental 
terms. Figures given indicate that between 10 and 15 million square meters of gross of-
fice space exist. These are dimensions that can barely be comprehended. I like referring 
to Otto Steidle’s Gruner & Jahr center in Hamburg to provide a comparison in terms of 
scale. It offers 100 000 square meters of gross floor space. Anyone can imagine what it 
would mean to build a complex 60 to 150 times this size. Entire office cities are needed 
in Berlin. This is a task of historical dimensions. The infrastructural deficit in the former 
GDR is too vast to publish if expressed in terms of investments or money and when com-
pared to Western Germany” (Stimmann 1992).
Such speculation on nominal growth pressured politicians at the time and led 
to the collapse of a widely popular paradigm of the 1980s that championed “cau-
tion and urban repair.” The then coalition government of the Social Democrats 
and Greens was, it was claimed, acting “contrary to economic developments” 
(Hans Stimmann) and represented an anachronistic “alliance of bureaucracy 
and biotope” (Hans Kollhoff). Its reluctance to embrace the large-scale initia-
tives of capital to drive urban construction was quickly attacked as “provincial-
ism” (Ezard Reuter). Ultimately this caused its defeat in the subsequent elec-
tions. The victors in turn formed a grand coalition and abandoned all rhetoric 
of social and environmental protectionism. They expressly welcomed the global 
players to the city and encouraged their involvement. “Have we not waited forty 
years for this? […] We cannot tame this tiger. Instead, we must ride him. We 
must not suppress but exploit these forces” (Hassemer 1991). Hanno Klein, the 
city administration’s investor liaison, even went so far as to wish for a new “bold 
and brutal Wilhelminian period.” On June 12, 1991, he was killed by a letter 
bomb, an as yet unsolved crime.
The necessary political debate on how the “normality of the Berlin Repub-
lic” (Jürgen Habermas) should find expression in the capital’s architecture was 
postponed, as talk of the end of history, different utopias and overarching theo-
ries dominated. Initiatives to encourage dialogue and mutual understanding 
were overshadowed by the attention-grabbing political symbolism of events 
such as the veiling of the Reichstag by Christo, as well as the myriad of com-
petitions and panel discussions. For seven years one competition and design 
event followed the next, each growing in size. The extent to which architecture 
Berlin’s Megalomania56
became spectacle and a site for exhibitions increased, too. Fabulous skylines, 
hip deconstructions, large-scale statues and monuments, picturesque or ratio-
nal facades, super-charged notions of progress, populist motives and high-tech 
modernisms all came together and increased the euphoria further still.
Today observers are conscious of the fact that these architectural plans had 
a mesmerizing effect on the economy, politics and public opinion. The state 
managers of former GDR property and temporary owners thereof (Treuhandan-
stalt) had expected the value of their estates to rise exponentially. The state was 
deeply involved in gambling on real estate. Such grand architectural visions 
led to an exorbitant jump in the prices of inner city property (2,000 Euros/
m²). It remains this expensive to today, despite the economic recession. The 
architectural imagery popular at the time raised expectations of high returns, 
and exclusively targeted large investors, while systematically disadvantaging lo-
cal developers.
In setting the scene for Berlin’s grandly fictitious future, the city’s architects 
and administrators could draw upon the symbolic capital they had accumulated 
over time. Thus, there was a history of international construction fairs in the 
West (Interbau, IBA), as well as a tradition of state-run urban development in 
the East. This allowed contemporary architects and administrators to make 
use of the channels and techniques of communication that had proven helpful 
in the past. Moreover, competences acquired in the context of urban construc-
tion and refurbishment in West Berlin proved to be an asset. Urban construc-
tion in the context of the city’s 750 year anniversary had been showcased and 
treated in a festival-like manner. After reunification this trend continued and 
aesthetic matters came to dominate the political agenda. Hereby a crop of plan-
ners and decision-makers gained substantial power, aided by their media prow-
ess, and utilized it to ultimately monopolize legitimate symbolic power. 
After a brief and open transition and orientation period, several local archi-
tects cemented the good reputations they had acquired for themselves over the 
past two decades. They did this by canonizing and categorizing their particu-
lar architectural style as Neue Berlinische Architektur (cf. Burg 1994). This also 
kept architectural newcomers at bay. The hegemonic architects of Neue Ber-
linische Architektur then continued to impact on, and ultimately conquer, the 
economic and political realm. They suggested prototype constructions to eco-
nomic magnates in the context of feasibility studies and preliminary building 
applications that would secure approval. Given that many of these architects 
also worked for the state as consultants, jury members and evaluators, they 
simultaneously approved the suggestions they themselves had made. The ur-
ban and geographic structure of Berlin was thus determined by a select group 
of administrators and designers, who combined the metropolitan fantasies 
of the young architects with the hopes of the older architects who wished for 
a revived Prussian classicism (cf. Sewing 1994). This bastardization of New 
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York style skylines and the physical manifestation of minor Prussian virtues 
can be observed today at Potsdamer Platz and along the Friedrichstraße.
AN ASPIC-PRESERVED, PRUSSIAN-ST YLE MANHAT TAN PROJECT 
The lead designers of Berlin’s new cityscape were driven by a number of fac-
tors. Among these were their shared understanding of urbanity, quality of life 
and social prestige, as well as the notion that Berlin should possess uniquely 
defining characteristics to bolster its global competitiveness. Consequently, 
they decided to “invent a tradition” (Eric Hobsbawm) of a particular archi-
tectural style, irrespective of the actual architectural plurality evident in the 
city. Thus it was claimed that contemporary construction in the city should 
conform to the architectural tradition of Berlin classicism. In a boldly me-
ta-historical move the city’s identity was linked to the (late) Prussian period. 
This strategy, regulated and approved by the building authorities, produced a 
cityscape that differed greatly from the low-density development that defined 
either sides of the city after the war. Instead, this new cityscape resembled a 
parade ground consisting of blocks and avenues. The resulting buildings were 
arranged sparsely and in orderly uniformity, with very little variation amongst 
them. None of the influential actors of the time were willing to abandon North 
American or East Asian models and to reject the notion that the ‘European 
city’ possesses a distinct urbanity.
At the same time, the city’s construction policy was split over two rival 
administrative departments (Construction and Accommodation, Transporta-
tion and Urban Development/Environmental Protection) pursuing competing 
party interests. Volker Hassemer, member of the CDU and Senator for Urban 
Development at the time, established an internationally renowned commission 
tasked with discussing urban construction in Berlin and consulting political 
actors. This he did to “ride” the proverbial economic “tiger” and to acquire the 
requisite legitimacy. During his time in office this commission, the so-called 
Stadtforum (Kleger et al. 1996), undertook cooperative simulations and kept 
interested specialists informed on latest developments. Hans Stimmann, who 
was a member of the building authority that was led by the SPD, favored a 
different approach to Hassemer. Stimmann considered himself so powerful 
that he preferred to liaise directly with investors and architects and to make 
unilateral decisions on how to proceed in matters of urban development. While 
Hassemer at least listened to the critics of the Stadtforum, Stimmann instead 
favored the frequent Architekturgespräche that were more akin to presentations 
of selected projects rather than genuine debates. Participants had pre-defined 
roles, while Hassemer presented his design concepts from an elevated podium, 
talking down onto the auditorium.
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Stimmann, supported by a cartel of architects, succeeded in restricting the 
height of newly built constructions and thereby at least ensured that the city’s 
overall structure remained largely intact. Nonetheless, weaker neighborhoods 
were negatively impacted upon. In the district of Mitte alone over eighty regis-
tered and potentially historic buildings were knocked down, as their utilization 
of space was deemed inefficient.2 From now on, future constructions would also 
have several floors below ground. Evidently, the regulatory framework established 
through the Berlinische Architektur served to minimize rampantly chaotic urban 
development by limiting the maximum eaves height and by controlling design 
issues and facade compositions. Together, these regulations formed a certain ge-
nius loci. Consequently, compositions of an aperspective or ambiguous nature, 
which are the epitome of enlightened, postmodern aesthetics, were shunned and 
strictly forbidden. Likewise, situationist and “green” conceptions were rejected. 
Stimmann, who served as the Senator for the building authority and considered 
himself the “aesthetic force of the political administration,” set out to devise a new 
doctrine for urban construction, for which he was supported by his staff of sixty 
colleagues. The following quote from Stimmann expresses his new thinking well: 
“I favor corporeal architecture and a Berlin built of stone […]. My architecture must 
follow in the footsteps of Gilly, Schinkel, Messel, Mies van der Rohe, Taut and Kleihues 
[…]. The first requirement is that construction must proceed in block formation. Where 
ever I can influence architecture I want to advocate the following traits: order, Prussian 
aesthetics, sparse coloration, use of stone, a tendency towards straight rather than 
curvy compositions” (Stimmann 1993).
Sceptical and radical critics, brought together by the “dispute over Berlin’s ar-
chitecture,” decried the building authority’s provisions as conservative, reac-
tionary and “neo-teutonic” (Klotz 1994; Kähler 1995). Beyond such ideological 
criticism, discursive and formal analyses indicate that matters of complexity 
reduction, tendencies to exclusivity and a fixation with surfaces could be ob-
served in the context of the new construction doctrine. Moreover, this doctrine 
also comprised an outdated 19th century notion that systematically interlinked 
identity and aesthetics, art and life, as well as imagination, will and deed.
Even in its earliest days the Neue Berlinische Architektur was a fundamental-
ly homogenous and exclusive architectural semantics that drew on the virtues 
2 | There are three prominent examples of this assault on Berlin’s historical buildings. 
The interior of the Wilhelmenian luxury hotel Esplanade was entirely discarded apart 
from the breakfast chamber, which, for the price of DM 2 million, was relocated to the 
Sony complex at Potsdamer Platz to suit modern-day hospitality requirements. Likewi-
se, the former Zollernhof on Unter den Linden had to make room for the ZDF (TV) head-
quarters, and the Rosmarinblock on Friedrichstraße was also knocked down.
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of idealism, order and the suppression of emotions. Initially, this universal code 
was applied only to a selection of construction projects that held a symbolic 
status. By 1996, however, a non-legally binding master plan3 was published that 
sought homogenization on a grand scale in the “power center of Europe’s most 
powerful nation” (Der Spiegel, December 2, 1996). Its aim was to unify ter-
ritory and society, geographic and social space, aesthetics and life, as well as 
urban development and social policy.
STR ATEGY NO 2: “CONQUERING THE CIT Y CENTER”
Berlin’s grandly ambitious “Manhattan Project” has crashed somewhere with-
in the Bermuda triangle of severe fiscal deficits, vast amounts of unused office 
space, endless construction sites and Berlin’s postponed rise to capital city sta-
tus. Huge, outsized building complexes and stand-alone super projects are the 
sobering outcome of this excessive speculation. They can be found throughout 
the city, detached from and foreign to their surroundings like stranded ocean 
liners. Contrary to expectations, nearby building lots failed to quickly attract 
further development and so these cold, Prussian island-like buildings, referred 
to by some as the “investors refrigerators,” contribute to a certain peripherial-
ization of the city center. A revived Wilhelmian period in Berlin has effectively 
failed to materialize. While the city center resembles an unfinished and va-
cant investment disaster, desperados, gamblers and the needy congregate at the 
city’s “dangerous locations” (police terminology).
Partially compelled and partly supported by the waning interest of capital, 
the Berliner Freundeskreis für Architektur went all out (SenSadt 1997) with an ur-
ban development concept that was referred to as “critical to economic growth” 
(Hoffmann-Axthelm 1997). Meanwhile, Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm (referred 
to as the “grey eminence of theory and history” by Gerwin Zohlen) was promot-
ed to chief planner by direct assignment from Hanns Stimmann, who himself 
now acted as State Secretary within the urban development department.
Hoffmann-Axthelm had published a report on the city center as early as 
1991 in which he proposed its division into small allotted areas. This idea, how-
ever, was never implemented as both the municipality and the federal state su-
pervisors of former GDR property (Treuhandanstalt) instead sold entire blocks 
3 | Since its publication in 1996 it was in actually labelled Planwerk Innenstadt. Prior 
to publication, contributors and members of the opposition had however begun calling 
it the master plan (which is how the English language bible refers to the process of 
creation) in the context of confidential consultations. A paradigm shif t can be obser-
ved from the principle of a target-oriented incrementalism towards a, albeit moderate, 
“godfather-like” totality.
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of land. Even then Hoffmann-Axthelm recognized the sign of the times and 
urged for large-scale planning intervention:
“This concerns the type of city that is needed in the future. The calm time in which cities 
gradually grew at their own pace has passed; dark clouds now loom on the horizon. 
Options on the table for Postdamer Platz are applicable to all wealthy, industrial cities 
today” (Hoffmann-Axthelm 1996: 88).
Now that the city’s grandiose development project is turning into a failure and 
the dominance of East Berlin’s cultural community in the historical center pre-
vails, Hoffmann-Axthelm is the man of the hour. Although he is neither an 
architect, nor an urban developer, the middle class clientele agrees with his 
credo. This broadly knowledgeable theologist acquired a solid reputation from 
years of stubbornly contesting building policies and engaging extensively in 
publishing. He is a symbol of a generation of bourgeois critics of moderniza-
tion that were radicalized in the context of 1968. They instantly associate the 
construction of terraced housing with “social fascism,” modern development 
plans with concentration camps, and assume that the omnipresent “big broth-
er” is watching in the open cityscape.
In 1996 Hoffmann-Axthelm, who was now an official representative of Ber-
lin’s government, developed a radical redevelopment and settlement project for 
the eastern part of the inner city, one supported by Bernd Albers (and a team 
of planners focusing on the western part). This project was instantly hailed by 
some journalists as the initiation of an “epochal turning point” (Hartung 1996: 
9). Hoffmann-Axthelm provided a plan for “how the West Berliners” could now 
finally “conquer the city’s historical center,” after having been prevented from do-
ing so for forty years. The return to dividing predominately public property into 
allotments was undertaken to attract private investment into the city, as open 
spaces and transit routes were closely integrated in contemporary urban devel-
opments. It was intended that such public property would then be sold to small 
developers at a political price far below market value, upon which they would 
erect buildings in line with the traditional historical style. The wide streets so 
typical for the center of East Berlin, the recreational areas and playgrounds that 
were designated as green areas, and the cold-wind corridors so important to the 
inner-city climate, were all cleared for construction. This used up almost all un-
developed plots and greatly increased the density of the inner-city. The modern, 
post-war development structure that had defined the city was to be countered 
with spatial typologies and attacked with aesthetic notions derived from the 19th 
century. Existing, modern structures would thereby become functionally over-
shadowed, reduced in their substance and also subjected to more traffic.
Hoffmann-Axthelm’s ideal city of the future is one that has returned to 
pre-industrial times. According to his nuanced anti-statist approach, the rein-
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troduction of small allotments should function as a fundamental regulatory 
and procedural framework, aimed at addressing urban challenges by means of 
a desirable mixture and overlap, through a revived public space, and through 
decentralization and a local economy. Hoffmann-Axthelm advanced a program 
that he hailed as republican, emancipatory and supportive of economically au-
tonomous individuals. This, he believed, would counter the continuous and 
implicit subjugation of citizens through the modern nanny-state and also con-
test the anonymity induced through large-scale societal structures. He sought 
to establish a modern Wilhelmenian era, in which middle-class entrepreneurs 
would develop the empty allotments of the modern city and thereby create a 
certain form of sustainable self-rule. This overlapping of social science and ur-
ban development theory assumes that the evolution of cities in the 20th century 
occurred in accordance with certain societal theories, rather than objective, 
economic circumstances. This approach thus presumes that modern and to-
talitarian planning ideologies must merely be deconstructed in order to ensure 
a return of liberalism.
Hoffmann-Axthelm’s refers to Hackesche Höfe in Berlin as a beacon proj-
ect through which the middle-class has regained its status and fulfilled its 
interests. He attests that here the lost physical sensation of confinement and 
synaesthesia are to be found, along with a reduction of stimuli, a functional 
mix and a down-to-earthness. This probably satisfied his self-image as a flâ-
neur, aesthete and member of the intelligentsia. A similar improvement of a 
single building block in suburban Spandau, meanwhile, has produced a radical 
change in the surrounding neighborhood. In the space of just two years, the av-
erage income of these residents almost doubled, while the number of children 
living there halved. When confronted with these developments, Hoffmann-
Axthelm retorts that “this is the sacrifice that simply must be made” for such 
beautiful surroundings.
The critics of modernization are rightfully credited with being the first to 
think about how the pictorial aspect of architecture and the overall appearance 
of the cityscape impacts upon city life generally. Yet, these concerns have now 
grown wildly out of proportion. Picturesque, old town scenery does not pro-
vide the necessary space for contemporary everyday life to unfold freely. The 
historical roots of a certain neighborhood are reduced to nothing more than a 
theatrical backdrop for tourists to congregate, where pastimes are pursued and 
state receptions held. Rabbits in the back yard, saddle manufacturers, shabby 
but cheap flats – all these would get just as thoroughly erased as in the orderly 
and loosely developed city of modern times. The post-modern city is under the 
lethal pressure of globally roving capital that seeks to acquire immobile riches. 
The demise of the city is akin to that of the polis of the “Athens Charter” and 
similarly exhibits a simplistic functionality and social interaction. Externally, 
the post-modern city upholds the appearance of urbanity. It returns to block 
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structures and boasts special facades at the “prime addresses.” It was hoped that 
the middle classes, which had profited so handsomely from the redistribution of 
public land, would contribute to a “reforestation of urban bare spots” (Michael 
Mönninger) and a recreation of the “characterless and debris-ridden spaces” 
(Klaus Hartung) in their role as new settlers within the city. It was anticipated 
that this would create an appropriate setting for the “arrival of 80 million citi-
zens at their new capital.” This plan however requires the long overdue move to 
firmly establish the political primacy of the city center, as it has become obvious 
meanwhile that “urban tradition and urban democracy belong together, and 
that the neglect of some leads to the neglect of others” (Hartung 1996: 9).
This notion of reforestation in a social class sense defined the second phase 
of urban development in Berlin and was referred to as sustainable (rather than 
catch-up) modernization. While the new middle classes and the developers are 
regarded as pioneers of civil society, the original inhabitants of the city center in 
turn are dismissed as “implants of the socialist state,” as “people with red party 
membership books” or as lachrymose losers (Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm).
URBANIT Y OR CITOYEN?
This power shift also manifests itself indirectly in the use of ecological termi-
nology in official declarations. Before, such language was practically ridiculed. 
Similarly, those who had championed a reduction in pace and the preservation 
of existing urban structures, and who had been sidelined for these views dur-
ing the euphoria of unification, now gained an audience. From 1993 onwards 
and against the backdrop of growing urban segregation and gentrification, 
their views proved accurate yet again. Crucially, the “critical wetlands” com-
prised of the “typical Berlin mixture of university environment and taz read-
ership milieu” (Klaus Hartung) regained some influence, after having been 
previously marginalized and dismissed as provincial. Citizen participation 
increased greatly in the context of the “City fora from below” (Stadtforum von 
unten) in which Alexanderplatz and housing policies were debated, particularly 
so because many citizens from East Berlin joined these gatherings.
After the 1995 elections, Berlin’s household troubles were gradually made 
public. From now on, this financial crisis had to be considered when ever city 
planners met. 
“The root cause of this financial problem is the multilayered structural-change that has 
occurred. To solve this problem, the public household must be restructured. How can 
the state’s share in spending be reduced? And how can tax revenues and expenditures 
be reformed without fundamentally harming social security and undermining societal 
harmony?” (Huber 1996: 18). 
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The solution to this debt problem and money shortage was and continues to be 
seen primarily in the wholesale privatization of state-owned capital and prop-
erty, more specifically in the selling of public estates, businesses and services. 
Naturally, a pleasantly framed justification for this was at hand: “The term 
privatization is somewhat misleading, given that this represents a structural-
change through which state ownership is transferred into a public ownership 
backed by civil law” (ibid.). Hereby, a crisis-induced necessity was eloquently 
rephrased and reframed as a virtue. Thus, the forced privatization of public 
property was couched in the language of a return to civil law.
Finally, it was elaborately suggested with the Planwerk Innenstadt that prac-
tically anyone (with a monthly income of roughly 5,000 DM) could in fact pur-
chase a generous piece of land in the city center, albeit within the “tight time 
frame” prior to the arrival of the bureaucrats from Bonn and the next wave 
of foreign investments. The private property model was heralded as a form 
of “emancipation for those living in rented accommodation.” The inventors of 
this innovative product deliberately targeted the double-income families in East 
Berlin, as well as wealthy residents of West Berlin gambling on the stock ex-
change. Thus, the accompanying rhetoric of the Planwerk shimmered in all the 
colors of the rainbow and should have drowned out any form of critique in its 
overdose of pleasantly vague ideology.
The opposition was not, however, lulled into sleep. Upon learning of plans to 
orchestrate large-scale demolitions in East Berlin, protest movements emerged 
that utilized both die tageszeitung and the district newspaper for the inner city 
Scheinschlag for their discussions.4 This urban movement demanded specific 
opportunities for participation, rather than a city built in such a way that it “ful-
fills every citizen’s desire for an appropriate, dignified environment” (Klaus Har-
tung), as the media campaign had proclaimed. Yet as soon as this opposition had 
voiced its criticism it was dismissed as a bunch of badly tempered losers: “Only if 
the Planwerk can overcome the self-righteous grassroots activists can the citizens 
of Berlin hope to settle amongst them in the unified capital” (Hartung 1996: 13).
This grassroots challenge, however, was reflected in other, wider debates 
elsewhere. The heated dispute in the great chamber of the State Council Build-
ing (Staatsratsgebäude) on November 29, 1996 was symptomatic of this overall 
debate. Therein, the existing cityscape was cherished as a product of foregone 
violence and destruction, as well as of mistakes and learning processes. It was 
regarded as characteristic and a reminder of forty years of global division and 
as such of aesthetic and historical value. It was deemed so valuable in fact that 
it outweighs Berlin’s mythical past as a city built of stone. Moreover, it was 
4 | Besides a series of articles on the issue of public space, taz and Scheinschlag to-
gether published an additional 12 page dossier on December 19, 1996, entitled “stadt.
plan.Mitte.”
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argued that one must not wait for new, reputable urban citizens to settle, as a 
newly politicized citizenship already established itself publicly in the context 
of the watershed year 1989: “If the former state property of the GDR should be 
returned after 1989 to the citizens of the city, why not return this very property 
to those citizens who were involved in 1989?”5
The conflict of interests stems from the demands of two functionalist mi-
lieus, both of which claim to be treated as this new citizenry. After the self-ref-
erential notion “urban citizenship,” coined by the Planwerk, was openly booed, 
a substitute was created. This urbanite, who resembles a kind of cosmopolitan 
cyborg, and sports a mobile phone and a recumbent bike, has been declared 
the new focal point of urban city life. Contrary to this notion of citizenship, 
a rather different, real, socially heterogeneous notion is put forward. It is an 
understanding of urban citizenship that is universally egalitarian from birth 
(Hannah Arendt), and adheres to the principle of the citoyen who proclaims 
freedom, equality and fraternity (Baule 1996: 98 f.).6
A small crop of no more than ten actors continue to dominate this dis-
course, simply because they hold key positions. This great dispute has mean-
while involved several thousand citizens and numerous experts also. Critical 
media coverage, however, remains an exception. Public critics of the Planwerk 
are either ignored or explicitly branded demagogues or lachrymose Ossis (East 
Germans)7 (cf. Hartung 1997; Hoffmann-Axthelm 1997). Civil society actors 
with an alternative mentality in turn demand greater fairness and equal treat-
ment within the political realm. They increasingly refer to human rights dis-
courses and speak for all those who are marginalized, suppressed and needy 
(cf. Rada 1997). Crucially, these civil society actors reject the formalistic plan-
ning policies and ritualized processes of participatory procedures. Opposition 
to these programs of urban segregation and disintegration will, to refer yet 
again to Pierre Bourdieu, depend fundamentally upon how objective such con-
testation can become.
Translated by “Truly Translated,” together with Ben Restle
5 | Question from a student in the audience of the Stadtforum on November 29, 1996.
6 | See, for example, Bernward Baule: “The citizens of the GDR took to the streets with 
all those demands of freedom mentioned. They themselves fought for their individual 
freedom and their own, free democracy in a peaceful revolution. This remains their ac-
tual, mundane achievement.”
7 | Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm: “The East Berliners do not consider themselves respon-
sible – they have found someone else to blame for the changing circumstances. They can 
sit on the sidelines and complain. They do not carry responsibility for this capitalism.” 
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Berlin In-between
In the second half of the 1990s Berlin experienced a rather problematic phase of 
“inbetweenness.” As the decade passed, it became more and more clear that neither 
the high-flying visions of the ruling elites nor the fears of those opposed were about 
to become reality. There was no sign that Berlin would any time soon catch up with 
global metropolises like London or New York, and even the relocation of Germany’s 
government was not yet to show much impact on the everyday life of the city. What 
Berlin did in fact experience was a rather intensive deindustrialization, subsequent 
impoverishment, and increasing real estate speculation in the housing sector. At the 
same time, the traditional politics of “careful urban renewal” (behutsame Stadter-
neuerung) came under increasing pressure on various fronts: the decrease in federal 
subsidies for the former “showcase of the West” led to ongoing budget-cuts and a 
salami-slicing of public support for renewal programs and other social and welfare 
projects. The restitution of properties to the original owners in formerly socialist East 
Berlin catalyzed a change of ownership structures and bulldozed the way for unprec-
edented real estate speculation inside the historic neighborhoods within the S-Bahn 
circle. The collapse of (formerly highly subsidized) labor-intensive industries led to 
the layoff of thousands of low skilled, and often immigrant, workers. As a result, un-
employment was on the increase. This was especially to be felt in inner-city neighbor-
hoods such as Kreuzberg, Neukölln, Wedding, and Tiergarten, the traditional home 
for low-income families and immigrants. 
Taken together, all these developments created a sense of rupture for many Ber-
lin-based intellectuals, politicians, and social movements. It became more and more 
clear that Berlin did not change the way it was expected to, yet the contours of what 
was about to come were not clear either. Owing to the fact that many of the develop-
ments described above happened at the same time and with great speed, Berlin’s 
geography changed very rapidly, and so it is little wonder that Berlin’s urbanists were 
rather at odds in their interpretations. From the many discussions of these times, we 
consider three topics particularly noteworthy to highlight:
The first relates to discussions about an “Easternization” of Berlin. Both before 
and even after the fall of the wall the elites did not really show much interest in what 
was happening east of the river Oder and, in this context, even the strongly aspired 
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role as a hub of an East-West exchange was principally understood as Berlin being 
the foremost outpost of the West rather than an “Eastern” city. In the second half of 
the 1990s this view was successively undermined by the arrival of new immigrants 
from Eastern Europe as well as by growing tensions between East and West Germans 
in many public debates. “Easternization” became real. In a manifesto-like manner 
this is reflected in Uwe Rada’s book “Berliner Barbaren” (Berlin’s Barbarians), report-
ing on observations and encounters with East European immigrants as well as the 
reaction of Berlin’s society. Working for the daily newspaper die tageszeitung, Uwe 
Rada developed a nuanced sense for the changes underway and his books “Berliner 
Barbaren” and “Hauptstadt der Verdrängung” (Capital of displacement but also of 
psychological repression]) had a formative influence on the way Berlin was perceived 
by many intellectuals of that time.
The second crucial discussion, characteristic of this period, is the observation 
of new lines of socio-spatial division in Berlin. This became a central topic in Berlin 
around 1997 when the Häußermann-Studie, a report written by one of the leading 
German urban sociologists, pointed towards the growing concentration of poverty in 
various inner city areas. That this sort of study was commissioned by the Social Dem-
ocrat-led Urban Development Administration was already a sign of the increasing 
cracks within the ruling coalition government as it practically poached in the preserve 
of the CDU-led Building and Construction Administration. While the interpretation of 
the causes for these developments was highly contested among scientists (Borst and 
Krätke wrote a whole book attacking Häußermann’s analysis, see Borst and Krätke 
2000), the report was proactively taken up by public policies and eventually led to a 
new funding program, called “Soziale Stadt” [social city], at the federal level. Impov-
erishment and segregation, clearly not on the map for debate in the early 1990s, now 
became central paradigms for the majority of discussions about Berlin. 
Moreover, new forms of segregation were coming into being via the introduction 
of new modes of governance that took a leaf from traditional Fordist arrangements 
while replacing these with more area-based, cross-sectoral and partnership-orient-
ed approaches. Social mix, to be achieved by stimulating an in-migration, became 
a central topos for an increasing number of politicians. “Urbanites with mobiles and 
laptops,” to quote an infamous description made by the then chief planner of Berlin’s 
Building Administration, Hans Stimmann, were successively seen as a sort of savior 
against segregation and a broad number of policy initiatives were developed to lure 
them in. 
This chapter documents these paradoxical developments with two texts. The first 
one is from a monograph written by Hartmut Häußermann and Andreas Kapphan in 
the wake of the 1997 study. It demonstrates Häußermann’s argument about the new 
lines of division in Berlin. The second text has been written by Margit Mayer, a politi-
cal scientist with a strong focus on urban research in both Germany and the U.S. In 
her paper she picks up on the same issue yet with a focus on policy responses and 
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argues that the new policies developed in Berlin successively follow the path of neo-
liberal approaches developed in the U.S.
A third, and somewhat related, contested field of urbanist debates emerged 
around gentrification and urban renewal in Prenzlauer Berg, a historic neighborhood 
in East Berlin. Here, the situation was also somewhat dif ficult to grasp. Being “Eu-
rope’s largest urban renewal area,” the neighborhood experienced sustained hype as 
a trendy area in the second half of the 1990s. This cultural hype was accompanied 
by an influx of West German middle-class households as well as intensive upgrading 
and speculation. At the same time, much of the borough was formally declared an 
“urban renewal area” and Berlin’s renewal policy at that time was explicitly designed 
to slow down rent increases and prevent the displacement of low-income tenants. In 
this situation, many experts felt seriously provoked when two (then) young scholars 
made the claim that Prenzlauer Berg was about to be gentrified. The outcome was 
heated and confrontational discussions. Bernt and Holm’s text “Exploring the sub-
stance and style of gentrification,” first published in an international edited volume 
comparing gentrification across the globe, as well as chapter 6 and 7 of the book by 
Häußermann and Kapphan (both documented here) give a flavor of these academic 
and political controversies.

The Barbarian East1
Uwe Rada
Forget about the “new Berlin:” Even ten years after reunification, Berlin is 
still a “frontier city.”
I. 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has a sense for images. When he looks 
out of the window of his provisional office in the State Council Building, he 
recently said, he sees before him the “monstrous” and “ugly” Palace of the Re-
public. Motivated by concerns that a Chancellor in a Brioni suit might not be en 
vogue on Berlin’s Schlossplatz, he called in an interview with the Zeit newspa-
per for Berlin’s Royal Palace to be rebuilt “just because it looks nice.”
Images, although not nice ones, were also the focus of a Harvard University 
congress on Berlin in February 1998. Right at the start of that gathering in Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, one of the event’s organizers asked those charged with 
planning the new capital, “What is Berlin’s place in Europe?” John Czaplicka, 
who asked that question, did not even wait for an answer. He was of the opinion 
that the often cited image of Berlin as a hub connecting East and West applied 
to Berlin only insofar as the formerly divided city had become a preferred place 
of refuge for eastern European migrants. “Berlin is a frontier city and shows it,” 
said Czaplicka. “The only question is, how far Berlin is prepared to accept its 
reality as an immigrant city” (die tageszeitung, February 14, 1998).
What is Berlin’s place in Europe? What does the “new Berlin” of Hacke-
scher Markt and Schröder’s sense of nice images have to do with the functional 
aesthetics of the Palace of the Republic and its former use? Does Berlin truly 
accept its reality as frontier city, as John Czaplicka demanded at the renowned 
University of Harvard?
1 | Source: Rada, U. (2000) Der barbarische Osten. In Scharenberg, A. (ed.) Berlin: 
Global City oder Konkursmasse? Eine Zwischenbilanz zehn Jahre nach dem Mauerfall. 
Karl Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 129-133.
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II.
“Berlin: open city” was the friendly-sounding title of an exhibition organized 
by the marketing company Partner für Berlin throughout the city environment 
in Berlin last year. The developments in the city, its growing together and its 
renewal were the visiting cards with which the “new Berlin” presented itself. 
However, anyone searching for an explanation of Berlin’s openness in a volume 
of essays published at the same time was disappointed (cf. Architektenkammer 
Berlin 1999). The essays speak more about the “return to the capital” (Michael 
Mönninger) or the “new trade worlds” (Gerwin Zohlen). Berlin’s panoramas, it 
seems, are open only to the West, or to the past. The future of the city, however, 
is in the wild, barbarian East. 
Travellers to distant Kazakhstan or the even more easterly Vietnam report 
even now that those who are keen to come here have long been familiar with the 
car marts of Berlin’s suburbs or the latest news from Rhinstraße in Marzahn. 
And so Berlin really does have a global image, only not the one aspired to after 
the fall of the wall. The “most westerly city in the East and the most easterly city 
in the West” failed to become the metropolis of hope but instead became the 
metropolis of the hopeful – a disputed space between “civil society” hunkered 
down in its island of prosperity and the “cheerful barbarism” of those deter-
mined to make a new start (Matthias Greffrath). Berlin has once again become 
a special border area, but this time on a European scale, and the border runs 
right through the middle of Schlossplatz – between the Palace of the Republic, 
which has become a symbol of the “ugliness of the East,” and the State Council 
Building, the center of power of the “nice new center,” provisionally, at least.
III.
“The second discovery of the East will begin when we have got rid of the im-
age that we have had of it,” writes the Eastern Europe expert Karl Schlögel. 
“It will begin when we start to remember faces which are new and to perceive 
a tone of expression which we have not been prepared to listen to before – or 
which we had forgotten” (Schlögel 1995). As a citizen of the former West Berlin, 
Schlögel, who now teaches Eastern European history at the European Univer-
sity Viadrina in Frankfurt/Oder, has the honor of having made early reference 
to Berlin’s geographical location. As early as May 1989, Schlögel wrote that the 
Senate in West Berlin had repeatedly referred to Berlin as a city at the center of 
Europe. “Now that people have realized that Berlin really is halfway between 
Bonn and Warsaw, they are astonished” (Schlögel 1991). The tone of expression, 
the new languages that can be heard on public transport in the city are still 
ignored today, however, despite the fact that the government has moved here 
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and the political center has shifted to the East. Berlin’s glitterati may still dine 
in the fine restaurant Paris-Moskau, lodged between the government quarter 
and the Moabit prison, but as they leave the restaurant perched on the edge of 
urban civilization, they can’t get away fast enough. The closer the East comes, 
the more they long for the West.
IV.
The West –  that means more than fashion and glamour, communes and in-
dividual self-expression. The West also means having a sense of la distinction 
(Pierre Bourdieu). Ludovica Scarpa, formerly a committed campaigner against 
urban poverty, now sees these “distinctions” as the “right to be unequal,” as a 
form of defence against the agenda of the Modern Age; Scarpa believes this 
so-called egalitarianism is a direct road to fascism (Berliner Zeitung, March 6, 
1999). What this longing for the West expresses, however, is not only a desire 
to avoid the dark sides of fashion and glamour, culture and commerce. It is 
also a desire to blur the fine distinctions, going even so far as to express these 
differences in the city in a spatial way – a Berlin of “citadels” which is visibly 
distinguishable from the Berlin of the “ghettos.”
If we are going to have segregation and urban flight, polarization and Amer-
icanization, then let’s do it properly at least, with surveillance cameras, police 
presence and zero tolerance. Those who aim to arrive in the center of society 
want to have achieved that position before things start to get really uncom-
fortable. But what if things are already uncomfortable? What if there are not 
enough people to defend the citadels? What if even Potsdamer Platz is invaded 
by the bargain hunters? If one Charlottenburg neighborhood after another de-
teriorates into a “problem area” and Hackescher Markt appears strangely small 
and pompous when viewed from Fischerinsel? Didn’t time already make the 
first judgements long ago? Since the last direct flight from Berlin to New York 
was cancelled years ago due to lack of demand in business class, the only re-
maining non-stop transcontinental flights connect the city directly with Pyong-
yang and Ulan Bator. Berlin’s Ostbahnhof in Friedrichshain, like Lichtenberg 
station which is currently under reconstruction, has become an intersection 
of Eastern European Berlin. This is where the trains from Moskva, Tomsk, 
Kraków or Warszawa arrive. Berlin is simply a different kind of boomtown from 
New York City or swinging London. Another professor at the Viadrina Univer-
sity made it clear to Berliners recently once again. There can really be no talk of 
a service metropolis, writes the geographer Stefan Krätke in his latest book on 
Berlin. It is not the strategically important sectors, such as financial services, 
which dominate the German capital, but the “bad jobs.” Thus, Berlin is more 
of a servants’ metropolis than a service metropolis or, as Krätke writes, it is 
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the “capital of cleaners” (Krätke and Borst 2000). There are still enough politi-
cians, however, who refuse to accept that Berlin is not a global city in waiting 
but rather a cleared out industrial center, a metropolis at best for new gold dig-
gers and fortune hunters, more a saloon than a salon, a crazy mixture of Detroit 
and Lodz, a city bordering the East, indeed.
V.
What do the Große Stern in Tiergarten and the lay-bys on the roads to the east 
of the river Oder have in common? Both here and there, on either side of the 
border, Polish teenagers offer their services, washing windscreens for a few 
pennies, entering the lowest level of the service economy. Further up the lad-
der, industrial cleaners, many of them also from Poland, wipe the windows of 
the new office towers. At the same time, Polish housewives, working illegally of 
course, dust the books of those who spend their days in the newspaper offices 
or the corridors of power, dreaming of Berlin’s future.
What Helmut Höge (1997) calls the “Berlin economy” is described by Karl 
Schlögel (1999) as the Eastern European “ant trade.” And Berlin, the German 
capital, is one of the centers of this survival economy, just like Warsaw, Bucha-
rest and Istanbul. “The spaces,” says Schlögel, “develop along the fracture lines, 
ignoring the old line of division” (ibid.). He says places which were once far away 
have shifted into the local vicinity, and what used to be familiar has suddenly 
become difficult to access. It can be put another way, loosely quoting Scarpa, the 
unequal are insisting on their rights. The time of cosy comfort is really over.
When the majority of people are robbed of the opportunity to participate in 
the prosperity of society, warned the sociologist Hartmut Häußermann (1996) 
some time ago, that society is living on the verge of civil war. Karl Schlögel adds 
to this American experience of the crisis of the city a further example from 
Eastern Europe. “The whole of Eastern Europe has successfully completed a 
process which the West still faces: to engage with the dangers of an interim 
period, when an existing situation has become unviable, while a new situation 
has not yet become established; to live in a provisional state without feeling 
like it is the end of the world; not to dissolve into panic and hysteria when the 
normalities of a way of life cease to be normal” (Schlögel 1999).
VI.
What is normal and what is not? While intellectuals like Karl Schlögel, despite 
their efforts to “discover the East,” while in fact actually hoping for a renais-
sance of the West there, and hankering after a “return of the cities,” the “return 
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of the urban citizen,” see a glimmer of hope in any accumulation of capital, 
even if it is in the hands of the mafia, others are more honest. For such people, 
the geographical location of Berlin as a frontier city is not an opportunity, but a 
threat. Consciously or unconsciously anticipating Samuel Huntington’s theory 
of the clash of civilizations, some politicians – even among the Social Democrats 
and Greens – tried, after the fall of the wall, to bind visa-free travel between 
Poland and Berlin to the travellers’ ability to prove they had hard currency. 
Leaping into the breach, that is the Eastern breach, is one way of dealing with 
Berlin’s crisis; the other consists of erecting of new borders not only along the 
river Oder but also in Berlin – “invisible frontiers,” as the Bremen-based politi-
cal scientist, Lothar Probst (1995), describes them. What these two reactions 
have in common is the desire to deny the negative sides of Berlin’s position 
as a frontier city. That, at least, has a long, a very long tradition. Even the An-
cient Greeks excluded as “barbarians” those who said only “bar bar bar,” that is, 
who had no mastery of the civilized language of their host country.2 Little has 
changed in the Berlin of the 21st century. In the age of Parma ham and ciabatta, 
anyone who prefers solyanka, curry wurst or doner kebab can be nothing other 
than an attack on good taste. Seen this way, Berlin is nothing other than the 
“capital of the barbarians,” and Hackescher Markt is no more than a little Gaul-
ish village peopled by gourmet partisans.
What is normal and what is not? While Harvard intellectuals like John 
Czaplicka come up with sayings about Berlin like “survival not revival” (die tag-
eszeitung, February 14, 1998) or critics of Huntington such as Jean-Christoph 
Rufin (1994) see in the tenet of the clash of cultures an attempt to build a new 
limes, the new barbarians have long since reached Berlin. They define them-
selves as “barbarians” such as in a youth club in Schöneberg, call themselves 
Kanak Attak such as in Kreuzberg, or play with the concept of the “barbarian 
from the East,” like the Russian-Jewish columnist Wladimir Kaminer. This 
begs the question, why shouldn’t they be part of the “new Berlin,” too? Why 
shouldn’t the German capital, a frontier city by definition, be allowed to be 
barbarian? What is the difference between someone like Peter Dussmann, with 
his bookshop chains in Eastern Europe, and a Polish cleaning lady looking 
for work here? And would it really be the downfall of the “Berlin Republic” if 
the reconstructed Berlin Royal Palace, so championed by the Chancellor, were 
eventually to house a common-or-garden DIY store?
Translated by David Shaw and Regina Webs
2 | Allow me to mention here the intention of Berlin’s naturalization authorities to make 
the ability to understand a German newspaper ar ticle a prerequisite for citizenship.
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Berlin: From Divided to Fragmented City? 
Socio-Spatial Changes Since 1990
Hartmut Häußermann and Andreas Kapphan
THE NE W CRISIS OF THE HOUSING ESTATES1
The prefabricated housing territories of the GDR on the eastern periphery of 
the city have not undergone the rapid depreciation predicted by many experts 
in the year 1990. Investments in renovation, modernization, and improvement 
in the residential environment, all financed with public funds, have contrib-
uted to this. Nonetheless, mobility processes are occurring that are putting at 
least some of these areas into a very difficult situation.
The housing estates brought about by social housing construction in West 
Berlin were neighborhoods of the German middle class in the 1980s. The num-
ber of foreigners was low, and poor sections of the population lived not so much 
in the housing estates but in the inner city areas full of older buildings. This 
changed in the 1990s; through the greater supply of housing in Berlin and the 
surrounding area, which was strongly subsidized by tax breaks, middle class 
households had new options. If they had to pay an inappropriate occupancy 
charge as a result of their income level, then rent plus utilities reached a level 
that was hardly below that of nearby new buildings. There was a great incen-
tive to give up social housing in a high-rise housing estate and move to a small 
house with a yard a few kilometers outside of the city.
In the following, we present the social and structural development of the 
social housing stock in West Berlin and the large estates of East Berlin in the 
1990s using in each case a concrete example for illustrative purposes.
1 | Source: Chapter 6 of Häußermann, H. and Kapphan, A. (1990) Berlin: von der ge-
teilten zur gespaltenen Stadt? Sozialräumlicher Wandel seit 1990.  Leske + Budrich, 
Opladen.
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THE SOCIAL HOUSING ESTATES IN WEST BERLIN
In the western part of the city, ca. 30 percent of the entire housing stock is 
comprised of social housing. A considerable part of it lies in territories in which 
large settlements were built in the 1960s and 1970s. Gropiusstadt, Märkisch-
es Viertel, and Falkenhagener Feld are the largest. The largest share of social 
housing stock in 1997 in West Berlin was thus located in the boroughs of Neu-
kölln, Reinickendorf, Spandau, and Tempelhof. 55.4 percent of social housing 
was concentrated there, and constituted almost 40 percent of all housing in 
these boroughs (cf. IfS/S.T.E.R.N. 1998 and Figure 1).
Rent control and occupancy rights of the boroughs are tied to the duration 
of so-called social obligations of property ownership. The housing construction 
activity of pre-1990 West Berlin is reflected in the spatial distribution of these 
obligations. The newer the housing stock, the more frequently is it located on 
the periphery of the city, since new housing construction spread outward. The 
newest of these are also the largest settlements. That could give rise to a special 
problematic in the future: if the social housing stock as a whole decreases in 
the city, but the demand for state subsidizing of needy households remains the 
same or increases again, a concentration of low-income and poor households in 
the housing of the outer boroughs will be the result.
This is already the situation in some social housing complexes in the in-
ner city today. The Senate Administration for Construction, Housing, and 
Transportation examined the large estates and social housing complexes for 
“problematic” developments in November of 1997. Turnover, the percentage of 
foreigners, and the percentage of inappropriate occupants served as the base 
data. Characteristics for a problematic situation were defined as high turnover 
(greater than 9 percent in 1996), a high percentage of foreigners (greater than 
26 percent), as well as a low percentage of inappropriate occupants (less than 
19 or 15 percent, with an income 50 percent over the income limit). A growing 
percentage of foreigners is an indicator that such areas are hardly in demand 
anymore among the German population.
Of the 34 housing complexes examined, 11 were designated as “problematic 
residential areas.” These areas lie – with the exception of the housing complex on 
Schlangenbader Straße, which has its own problematic as a result of its bizarre 
architecture and situation directly over a freeway – in the West Berlin inner city, 
in which surroundings areas of older buildings also exhibit problematic develop-
ments. Three areas had, according to the Senate Administration, had “reached the 
critical threshold” as a result of high turnover: Wedding-Brunnenstraße, Kreuz-
berg-Mehringplatz, and Wilmersdorf-Schlangenbader Straße. The settlements 
described as “problematic living areas” comprise over 18 percent of the dwellings 
in the 34 areas examined. All other settlements, whose development is regarded 
as less problematic or unproblematic, lie outside of the West Berlin inner city.
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Figure 1: Large Complex Housing Estates, Social Housing Complexes, 
and Urban Renewal Areas
Source: Senatsverwaltung für Bauen und Wohnen, November 20, 1997
The spatial concentration of social housing is a current and future problem, 
since the current high turnover is leading to social segregation. In moves to 
Berlin, foreign immigrants predominate. Since, in the last few years, this group 
of people was comprised exclusively of family migrants, refugees, or immi-
grants who obtain German citizenship, they have the right to a priority certifi-
cate to publicly-subsidized housing. So, they have the right to move into empty 
social housing; in most cases, the rent is then covered by state benefit pay-
ments. For households with a low enough income to remain entitled to social 
housing, but not low enough to receive dole payments, rent in social housing is 
too expensive. To put it bluntly: these households are not poor enough to live in 
such an expensive apartment.
For every household with a higher income that vacates such an apartment, 
a poor household takes its place – and these poor households are increasingly of 
foreign origin. In many cases, this brings friction and conflicts, since the living 
habits of “foreigners” and natives strongly differ (cf. Neuhöfer 1997; GdW 1998), 
which, in badly soundproofed high-rises, is an unsolvable problem. Attempts 
to attend to the transformation of such neighborhoods by community interven-
tion have been hitherto too weak and often too late. The flight of higher-income 
groups and the influx of households with low incomes have thus led to a social 
situation that has further increased the selective fluctuation. That public housing 
could become such a “problem asset” is due to a systemic contradiction rooted in 
planning decisions of the 1960s and 1970s and political decisions of the 1980s.
Berlin In-between80
Table 1: Selected Data on Problematic Residential Areas of Social Housing 
Construction in West Berlin
Borough Area name
Social 
housing 
apartments
Fluctuation 
1996 in %
Number of 
foreigners, 
in %
Payers of a false 
occupancy charge
total in %
More 
than 50% 
over the 
income 
limit in 
%
Schöne- 
berg
Bülow- 
straße 2,489 9.7 40.3 15.1 10.3
Kreuz- 
berg
Neues 
Kreuz- 
berger 
Zentrum 
(NKZ)
295 10.5 54.1 9.9 7.5
Neukölln Rollberg-siedlung 2,023 9.9 26.9 16.1 11.8
Tiergarten
Heinrich 
Zille- 
Siedlung
858 9.6 26.0 14.2 10.3
Wedding Wollank- straße 402 10.7 37.8 18.9 11.3
Wilmers- 
dorf
Schlan- 
genbader 
Straße
1,182 9.6 13.7 21.8 13.7
Wedding Brunnen- straße 4,595 10.3 22.4 20.9 15.6
Kreuz- 
berg
Wasser- 
torplatz 2,975 8.8 29.7 14.9 11.6
Kreuz- 
berg
Marian- 
nenplatz 1,030 7.9 46.3 12.3 8.4
Schöne- 
berg
WAK 
Sozial- 
palast
514 9.1 51.2 8.8 8.0
Kreuzberg Mehring- platz 1.026 9,9 25,0 20.8 17.9
Source: Senatsverwaltung für Bauen und Wohnen, November 20, 1997
The “false subsidizing” of households that, during the period of residency in 
social housing, actually experienced income growth and thus were above the 
income limit, is a problem that has long been well-known. However, as long as 
the public budgets were willing and able to extend the supply of publicly subsi-
dized housing with further subsidies, it was tolerated. This bonus is revoked, 
however, when these households have to pay a higher rent (“inappropriate oc-
cupancy charge”) as a result of their higher income – to which they then react 
by moving away. The low income limits valid for the right to social housing 
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turn it into “welfare housing,” a refuge for the poor and immigrants without 
means. The spatial concentration of social housing and its occupation primari-
ly by households with problems clashes with the intention of the welfare state to 
provide integrative accommodation to those who cannot provide for themselves 
on the “free” housing market. “Housing for marginal social groups,” which 
social housing is increasingly turning into at the national level due to political 
decisions, should have never been built in such a spatially concentrated man-
ner consisting of such large estates.
L ARGE ESTATES ON THE PERIPHERY OF E AST BERLIN
In many respects, the problems and developmental tendencies in the large es-
tates of East Berlin are similar to those of social housing in West Berlin. None-
theless, there are numerous differences resulting from the specific history of 
these estates and that lead in part to different situations.
In these areas, which are primarily managed by municipal non-profit hous-
ing associations (Wohnungsbaugesellschaften), the population was relatively 
young in 1989 and reflected the socialist middle class of skilled laborers and 
salaried employees. For the last few years, the population numbers – in contrast 
to the trend in other areas of the outer boroughs – are declining. The flight of 
households with an above-average income (often families with children) to the 
suburbs and surrounding hinterlands is unanimously lamented by the hous-
ing associations. Due to the occupancy requirements of the housing stock – 45 
percent of the apartments of the housing associations and 30 percent of the co-
op apartments are rented according to the social housing criteria – primarily 
poor households move into the vacant apartments. The losses due to moving 
out have been enormous in the large estates, they amount to 1 percent of the 
population each year, and the share of employed among those moving away is 
considerably higher than among those moving in. Data concerning the migra-
tory movements of the employed show an extremely strong selectivity of popu-
lation exchange which will alter the character of the large estates in the east 
considerably in the future.
Although the apartment houses in the large estates were first built in the 
1980s, considerable “shortcomings” became noticeable after the Wende. The 
necessity of renovating the buildings – above all else the hot water supplies and 
thermal insulation, in order to reduce the extremely high utilities costs – and of 
targeted measures to improve the living environment was quickly recognized 
by the housing associations, the federal government, and the state of Berlin. 
Corresponding measures were supported with considerable additional subsi-
dies. These stabilized the situation in the large estates, but could not prevent 
the flight of households with higher incomes. The rent levels of the large estates 
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appear to be too high to compete with privately financed housing construction. 
Furthermore, the quality of the buildings, the low number of rooms, the size 
of the apartments, and well as the standardized layouts also induce households 
with higher incomes to move away (cf. Hannemann 1996 and 2000).
An additional problem arose due to the method used to rent out apartments 
in the tower-block areas, which led to a homogeneous age structure among 
residents. In the newly provided areas, it was primarily young families that 
were admitted, who then aged together. As a consequence, this led to a situa-
tion where first daycare centers were scarce, then elementary schools, and then 
youth centers. Social infrastructure facilities are now empty and there is no 
money to convert them, maintain them, or tear them down.
A constant problem is the mono-functional structure of the large estates. 
Usually the tower blocks were situated near large industrial areas, but in the 
areas themselves there are few jobs. Complete big cities in terms of their num-
ber of residents, the large estates have functionally remained “bedroom com-
munities.” In socialist society, this might have been less problematic, since all 
the residents – women, men, and children – all either went to work, school, or 
daycare during the day and only experienced their neighborhood after quitting 
time. Time on the weekends was passed in “datschas,” weekend cottages lo-
cated in the countryside (GdW 1998: 181). With a decline in the employment of 
women and increasing unemployment, however, the large estates are increas-
ingly inadequate to the needs of their residents.
MAR Z AHN-NORTH/WEST
The borough of Marzahn was founded in 1979; between 1976 and 1989, 65,000 
apartments were industrially constructed. Construction work in northern Mar-
zahn was first concluded at the end of the 1980s. The overwhelming majority 
of buildings have 11 stories. In 1991, Marzahn had 166,000 residents; in 1998 
the number was only 142,000. With a 22 percent decline in the number of 
residents, northern Marzahn lost a large part of its population: in 1998 only 
29,000 people still lived there. In the GDR, the apartments were rented out 
primarily to young families. Today, 40 percent of the population is still under 
25 years of age and only 5 percent have reached retirement age. The moving 
away of households with above-average incomes to other boroughs and the sur-
rounding hinterlands has led since 1994 to a considerable change in the popu-
lation structure. Those moving away have made a decision in preference of 
larger apartments or for their own homes; the small-size of apartments was the 
most important reason for the termination of rental contracts (IfS 1995: 1997).
Vacancy in Marzahn has in the meantime become considerable; the official 
number given by the housing association amounted to 6 percent, while the 
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press has even given the figure of 12 percent. Large apartments have proven to 
be especially difficult to rent out. Ethnic German repatriates from Eastern Eu-
rope have been moving into these since 1993, since they have registered a con-
siderable demand in this segment. Their share of the population in northern 
Marzahn is at about 15 percent, while the share of foreigners – primarily Viet-
namese – is merely 3.6 percent. In the case of the ethnic German repatriates, 
they constitute a group that hardly has access to jobs in the current Berlin labor 
market. Furthermore, their poor knowledge of German is usually a hindrance 
to become more highly-qualified workers. The domestic population considers 
them to be “Russians” and shun them.
In Marzahn, there is a strong radical right-wing youth scene, which repeat-
edly clashes primarily with ethnic German repatriates. This leads to a situa-
tion where repatriate youths are able to construct few points of contact with 
other youths in the district. Cultural and ethnic segregation are strengthened 
in this conflict situation and lead to ethnically segregated youth milieus. The 
lack of leisure facilities and cultural opportunities also makes the situation 
more acute, since fights for dominance occur over the few existing facilities (cf. 
Dorsch et al. 2000).
The entire borough has an unemployment rate that is average for Berlin 
(Sept. 1999: 15.4 percent), but a low concentration of those receiving welfare 
(Dec. 1998: 6.1 percent, Dec. 1997: 5.6 percent). Northern Marzahn, however, 
exhibits a higher unemployment rate and a higher share of welfare recipients, 
which was about 8.7 percent in 1997 (cf. AG SPAS 1999: 22). It is primarily 
children, youths, and young adults who are affected by poverty. As a result of 
the high rate of participation in the labor market by women, most families dis-
pose of at least one wage-based income despite the high rate of unemployment, 
and hence potentially of unemployment insurance, so that it is not necessary 
to receive lower-tier entitlements like welfare. However, in the last few years, 
the number of welfare recipients in Marzahn-North/West has strongly risen, 
which is a sign of how precarious the social situation is. Since the Wende, the 
total number of employed people in the borough has declined, and since 1994, 
the number of employed people with a mid-level income has declined – signs 
of an income polarization in the borough.
The public presentation of social problems has led to the borough being 
defended against “unjust accusations.” Nonetheless, at the end of 1998, in 
Marzahn-North/West – as the only territory within the borough – a Quartiers-
management2 was established in order to prevent the growth of social problems 
in the area. The biggest problem is the flight of middle- and higher- income 
groups, whereas those moving in tend to be those pushed out of the inner city 
2 | Translator’s note: roughly “neighborhood management,” institutions intended to 
aid planning and development in “problem” neighborhoods.
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by urban renewal and ethnic German repatriates. Up until now, this selec-
tive population exchange could be understood as the “normalization” of the 
social structure of a large public housing estate. When exactly the population 
exchange has come to an end and a new stabilization has been reached cannot, 
however, be determined at the moment. The example of the West Berlin large 
housing estates shows rather that new segregation processes can also set in 
when a quarter had already seemed to have already found a social profile over 
a long period time.
These examples have shown how sensitively large housing estates react to 
changes in demographic development as well as fluctuations in the labor and 
real estate markets. In the competition for tenants, the large estates seem to be 
losing out to the new construction areas of the 1990s; they supply the potential 
tenants of the newer settlements. In both examples – in Marzahn-North and in 
the Gropiusstadt – immigrants provide consumer demand for apartments to a 
considerable extent, but their presence is considered to be a social deterioration 
by the current residents. The structural conditions of social housing construc-
tion – occupancy requirements and false occupancy charges – strengthen this 
process.
IS THE INNER CIT Y BECOMING A SLUM?3
In Chapter 5, using the example of migration between different parts of the 
city, we demonstrated that particularly drastic changes for the inner city are be-
coming apparent. In almost all inner city areas, the frequency of moves is very 
high and a large part of the population has been living in their respective neigh-
borhoods for a short period of time. Above all, families and those with jobs have 
been moving to the surrounding hinterlands or the suburbs. A concentration 
of a poor (domestic and foreign) population was ascertained, expressed in a 
high rate of unemployment and a higher concentration of welfare dependency. 
As a result of a strong fluctuation in the population, long-term and sustainable 
social relationships that could stabilize the situation from inside are difficult to 
construct. Unstable family situations also lead to conflicts having effects in the 
neighborhood.
In the following, we will examine more closely the current tendencies of 
development for two areas of the inner city. Our example for the Western part 
of the city will be the northern part of Neukölln, and our example from the 
Eastern part will be the older building area of Prenzlauer Berg.
3 | Source: Chapter 7 of Häußermann, H. and Kapphan, A. (1990) Berlin: von der ge-
teilten zur gespaltenen Stadt? Sozialräumlicher Wandel seit 1990.  Leske + Budrich, 
Opladen.
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THE WESTERN INNER CIT Y
The inner city areas of West Berlin exhibit a large share of young people, single 
households, and immigrants. Only a few seniors live in the older buildings; 
however, their numbers will increase considerably in the next 20 years, espe-
cially due to the aging of immigrant residents. The western inner city boroughs 
don’t just have the highest percentages of workers and unemployed, but also 
the largest percentage of low-wage workers. There are also many student house-
holds.
The moving away of German families from the western part of the city is 
always regarded as cause for alarm, since it is considered a reaction to manifes-
tations of dilapidation in public space and to the situation in the daycare centers 
and schools, where the overwhelming majority of children have not grown up 
speaking the German language (cf. IfS/S.T.E.R.N. 1998). Since in the case of 
such high mobility there are less employed people among those moving into 
the inner city neighborhoods, the concentration of beneficiaries of state trans-
fer payments and poor people increases steadily. In the case of those with an in-
come, a rise in the percentage of those belonging to the lowest-income segment 
is evident. In Chapter 4, table 10, we already showed that low-income groups 
are increasing strongly primarily in the boroughs of Wedding and Tiergarten, 
but also in Neukölln (see the excerpts in the table below). For Kreuzberg, in 
contrast, there are signs that the segment of those with mid-level incomes is 
rising. Income polarization concomitant with a decline in employment is a con-
sequence of the flight of the middle-class from inner city neighborhoods.
Table 2: Income Groups as a Percentage of all Employed Individuals 
in the West Berlin Inner City Boroughs 1991-1998
Borough
1991 1994 1998
below  
1,400 DM
over  
3,000 
DM
below 
1,400 DM
over  
3,000 DM
below 
1,400 DM
over 
3,000 DM
Kreuzberg 23.6 11.7 23.6 21.2 21.7 20.7
Tiergarten 18.3 20.8 17.2 24.6 22.9 25.6
Wedding 17.5 14.6 15.9 17.6 20.5 18.8
Neukölln 18.5 21.6 17.0 23.8 18.0 25.3
Source: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin: Mikrozensus
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In general, public spaces in these areas are more highly populated by chil-
dren and youth groups than in other parts of the city. At first glance, that might 
appear to be a positive fact, especially when one keeps in mind that in the other 
parts of the city which are home to a more well-off population, there are hardly 
any children or youths to be seen in public. However, their presence in public 
space is often simply the consequence of apartments that are too small, as well 
as a lack of apprenticeship and work opportunities. Particularly with regard 
to youths, unemployment leads to a lack of orientation and perspective, and 
thus because a cause of anti-social behavior. Consequently, rival youth groups 
frequently clash with one another in public spaces, carry out power struggles, 
and create a menacing and frightening climate through their behavior. This is 
intensified by violent conflicts and the display of the willingness to resort to vio-
lence by corresponding insignia: particularly favored in this regard are attack 
dogs. Illegal activities, such as drug dealing and prostitution, also contribute to 
this negative image (Landeskommission Berlin gegen Gewalt 2000).
Open areas and playgrounds pose a particular problem, as conflicts often 
arise here, since they are frequented due to a lack of other places. Children 
no longer feel safe at playgrounds, since they are harassed by alcoholics and 
threatened by attack dogs. Frequently, youth welfare offices report that – just 
imagine! – children themselves requests opportunities and spaces to play un-
der protective supervision. Often, however, it is the deterioration of public space 
in general that repels and disturbs residents. Bulky refuse is thrown away in 
courtyards, sidewalks, and open spaces, without anybody feeling responsible 
for it (cf. IfS/S.T.E.R.N. 1998). Along with roaming or loitering groups of youth, 
who obviously don’t have any steady work or attend school, a feeling of alien-
ation arises that gives rise to the desire to move away and further drives the 
spiral of cumulative causes.
The share of foreigners exceeds 30 percent in almost all selected statistical 
areas belonging to the inner city; among foreign children and youths the figure 
is almost 50 percent. Alongside the precarious social situation and selective 
emigration, these problem-ridden areas also exhibit the lowest electoral par-
ticipation in West Berlin. Alongside the foreign residents, 40 percent of the 
eligible voters among Germans did not participate in the elections to the Berlin 
City Parliament in 1999. Over half of adult residents thus had either no inter-
est or no right to participate in the election of their political representatives. 
Formal political institutions are dramatically losing their legitimacy, and hence 
their integrative potential, in these neighborhoods.
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NORTHERN NEUKÖLLN
In the northern part of the borough of Neukölln, there is an extensive area of 
older buildings, directly abutting the borough of Kreuzberg. Half of Neukölln’s 
300,000 residents live in this northern part, which consists of a concentration 
of Wilhelminian-era buildings of one- and two-room apartments as well as two 
social housing quarters: the so-called High Deck and the Rollberg housing es-
tate. The share of foreigners in northern Neukölln is somewhat more than 30 
percent. Since the 1970s, immigrants who had previously been concentrated 
in the urban renewal area of Kreuzberg moved into Neukölln in increasing 
numbers. Since 36.5 percent of its employed population is comprised of work-
ers, in 1998 Neukölln was, after Wedding, the borough with the highest share 
of working-class residents. In the 1990s, the number of employed declined by 
22 percent, and it is not at all certain whether the trend of layoffs and job losses 
has reached an end. It was primarily poorly-qualified and unskilled workers 
who became unemployed, among them many immigrants. Many youths have 
not even found an entry into working life. The unemployment rate has risen 
dramatically: if it was still 16.6 percent in 1995, by 1999 it had risen to 24 per-
cent. Neukölln also exhibits above average figures for youth unemployment and 
unemployment among foreigners, with the northern part of the borough being 
the most affected.
In terms of the concentration of dole recipients, there are only figures for 
the entire borough. In the year 1991, 8.5 percent of Neukölln’s residents re-
ceived social assistance (Sozialhilfe), the lowest-tier welfare benefit available 
in Germany. In 1998 the figure had already reached 13.5 percent. This par-
ticularly strong increase of transfer payment recipients can be explained by 
the traditionally high number of industrial workers who have lost their jobs. 
The number of foreigners among dole recipients is very high at 36 percent 
(foreigners are 20 percent of the total number of residents), and as indicated, 
these live primarily in the northern part of the borough. Children and youths 
are particularly affected: one-third of welfare recipients are under 18 years 
of age, and they are primarily the children of single parents. In every sixth 
household that receives welfare (16.5 percent), there is only one parent. The 
share of two-parent families receiving welfare is lower, at 13.8 percent. The 
overwhelming majority of welfare recipients is comprised of single men (30 
percent) and single women (24 percent), an indication of a lack of support 
networks. It is precisely in the northern part of the borough that the at-risk 
groups for welfare are concentrated: single-parents, foreigners, and singles 
households. There, between 25 and 30 percent of residents receive benefits 
from the social assistance office.
In the following, we will more closely examine the example of the area 
around Reuterplatz, which is far to the north, bordering Kreuzberg. The area 
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around Reuterplatz corresponds to a large extent to other parts of northern 
Neukölln; the percentage of foreigners and unemployed is even a little bit low-
er. Between 1974 and 1982, the number of foreigners increased from 3,000 to 
6,500, remained stable until the end of the 1980s, and rose again in the 1990s 
to 10,000. The increase in the number of foreigners in this area is due to the 
fact that German households are increasingly moving out while non-Germans 
are taking their place.
The number of those employed in Neukölln is declining drastically, pur-
chasing power is declining and the supply of goods has become limited to su-
permarkets with discount offers and greengroceries that are often run by for-
eigners. Vacancies of apartments and retail spaces have increased. In the year 
1998, 16.4 percent of the labor force was unemployed, corresponding to a rate 
of around 30 percent of the working population. 31.5 percent of the unemployed 
are foreigners, which corresponds roughly to the number of foreigners. That 
means that unemployment in the area is not high because there are so many 
foreigners, but rather that a high number of foreigners in the area accompanies 
a high share of poor and unemployed Germans. Over a third of those unem-
ployed (35 percent) have been unemployed for more than year (cf. Dorsch et al. 
2000).
The flight of middle-class families since 1994 contributes to the highly 
problematic social situation in the north of Neukölln. Between 1994 and 1997, 
5.8 percent of the population on balance has left the area, above all employed 
people with children. The share of employed people among those moving in is 
considerably lower than among those moving away. One family with two chil-
dren that we interviewed explained their decision for a new apartment in the 
following words: “smaller, more expensive, but it’s in Wilmersdorf,” referring 
thus to the social milieu of the neighborhood. The fluctuations in northern 
Neukölln amounted to 18 percent each year in the years 1994-1997. That means 
that over 1/6th of residents move away each year, with the tendency increasing 
in that period of time. Employed people and families with small children are 
the groups that more commonly leave the area, the loss among the popula-
tion amounting to 4.4 and 5.0 percent respectively. This selective flight, along-
side increasing unemployment among the remaining population, is a growing 
problem in northern Neukölln.
The supply of apartments appears to have become unattractive for apart-
ment-seekers in the 1990s. The neighborhood was not able to compete with 
offers in the suburbs and the hinterlands. Many of the apartments are small, 
and renovation and modernization measures were only first significantly im-
plemented in the 1990s. According to the census of 1987, the area around Re-
uterplatz has 18,800 apartments in mostly five-story buildings. 3/5ths of the 
buildings were constructed before the Second World War. After that, social 
housing construction filled the holes left by the aerial bombing during the war. 
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The average size of the apartments is 2.2 rooms or 62 square meters. In 1987, 
63 percent of households were single-person households; the average size of a 
household was 1.6 people. The share of larger households is extremely small, 
and already in 1987 the majority was foreign families.
Due to the bad condition of the buildings, part of the area was designated a 
renewal area at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1992 a preparatory investigation 
was conducted that ascertained considerable deficits in the degree of amenities 
in the apartments, infrastructure services, and green spaces. However, only a 
few “postage-stamp sized” properties were marked for renovation. Since the 
1990s, public means for renewal areas have been flowing almost exclusively to 
the eastern half of Berlin. Even today, rents in Neukölln are considered particu-
larly low, so that primarily those households move in that cannot afford a more 
expensive dwelling in another borough. However, not all apartments find new 
tenants, and even in northern Neukölln vacancy is high. Around 10 percent of 
apartments are empty.
In Neukölln, resignation reigns and conflicts are increasing. In the sum-
mer of 2000, the social assistance council publicly discussed the possibility 
of hiring private security services to protect employees of the social welfare 
office from physical attacks by its clientele. Electoral participation is low, and 
declined between the elections of 1995 to 1999 to under 60 percent. Many resi-
dents feel let down by politics und don’t see any chance of influencing things 
by means of elections. The northern part of Neukölln is also counted among 
the areas with a relatively high percentage of voters of radical right-wing politi-
cal parties.
THE E ASTERN INNER CIT Y QUARTERS
The development in the inner city areas with older buildings of East Berlin 
is similar in some respects to the developments in the West Berlin inner city. 
Fluctuation is high and the population is changing rapidly. The composition of 
the population is however still socially heterogeneous; nonetheless, migration 
is more selective than in the inner city areas of West Berlin.
In the inner city areas of East Berlin, migratory movements are also char-
acterized by the flight of families with children, a negative balance among the 
employed, as well as an increasing influx of immigrants. The transformation 
in the system of distributing apartments and the beginning structural renova-
tion of older buildings has had effects upon social composition. On the one 
hand, only some residents can or are willing to pay the higher rents for the 
modernized apartments. On the other hand, a considerable number of dwell-
ings in dire need of renovation have not been reached by investment funds for 
modernization due to lack of clarity concerning ownership or inactive absen-
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tee owners. The accompanying unsatisfactory condition of daycare centers and 
schools, general defects of social infrastructure, as well as a scarcity of useable 
open spaces is occasion above all for families with children to move away.
Upgrading and decline occur simultaneously and spatially close to one an-
other. The speed of the transformation process is unusual. The old-building 
areas of East Berlin exhibit a very high and increasing volume of migratory 
movement; in 1997 there were already between 400 and 500 arrival and depar-
ture registrations for every 1000 residents, versus 300 to 350 in the year 1994. 
That means that in an apartment building in the year 1997 every fourth or fifth 
apartment had a new occupant. In a few areas, 40 percent of the residents first 
moved into the borough in the years between 1993 and 1997.
Flight from the area leads to a sharp decline in the number of residents, 
and has been increasing in the last few years primarily in the outer boroughs 
of East Berlin and the hinterlands surrounding Berlin. The losses due to move-
ment compared to the surrounding area doubled between 1994 and 1996, in 
those three years the loss of population to the surrounding areas amounted to 
about 2 percent of residents – and those are not the poor households pushed 
away by urban renewal moving into the newly-built areas of the hinterlands. Of 
all areas, the older-building areas of Friedrichshain exhibit the greatest loss of 
children due to movement. The balance of those employed is also negative. For 
a few areas, the share of those employed among adults moving in is as much as 
20 percent lower than among those moving away.
Similar to the inner city areas of the western part of the city, a high per-
centage of residents are unemployed, although the percentages are lower. With 
an unemployment rate of 20 percent (September 1999), Prenzlauer Berg is 
at the top of the East Berlin scale. Even in the Western part of the city, only 
Kreuzberg, Neukölln, and Wedding have higher rates of unemployment. This 
numbers point to a problematic development: rising unemployment, selec-
tive flight, and the development of a polarized income distribution, there is 
a danger of a development “toward the bottom” in East Berlin as well, of the 
emergence of segregated neighborhoods. Alongside this, however, there is a 
tendency toward an upward valuation of some areas due to the influx of child-
less households with high-level incomes. Symbolic processes of price apprecia-
tion of neighborhood properties via the location of galleries, chic restaurants, 
and shops for luxury consumption can be observed for example in the area of 
Berlin-Mitte known as Spandauer Vorstadt, and the area around Kollwitzplatz 
in Prenzlauer Berg.
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E X AMPLE: PRENZL AUER BERG
The older-building areas of Prenzlauer Berg had largely deteriorated by the end 
of the GDR. At the beginning of the 1990s, preparatory investigations initially 
determined in what areas redevelopment statutes were to be issued. The deci-
sion by the senate commission for construction and housing affected a total of 
five areas in the borough that had been decided upon between 1993 and 1995. 
The goal was on the one hand to renovate the dilapidated old housing stock and 
modernize the apartments, while on the other hand maintaining the composi-
tion of the population and keeping rents affordable. However, maintaining the 
population structure has proven difficult under the existing conditions. The 
social mixture that emerged in the older-building areas during the GDR period 
can hardly be conserved under the new conditions, as well as against the back-
ground of the enormous transformations of the social structure in East Ger-
man society. New living offers and opportunities have opened up for residents, 
and at the same time new property owners have moved into these areas of the 
borough who have an interest in the most effective possible valorization of their 
real estate. The intention to maintain the population structure in the renewal 
and environmental protection areas thus becomes a tightrope walk between 
further deterioration of the building material and price appreciation through 
modernization. Each development drives a particular population group to move 
away, and this explains the high fluctuation in the neighborhood.
In terms of housing stock, there are two recognizable types that lead to dis-
tinct motivations for residents to move out: in the unrenovated houses, which 
were long affected by unclear ownership and in which for that reason an emer-
gency management without renovation and modernization, measures as well 
as exclusively simple repairs to secure the house were implemented, initially 
all those residents moved out who wanted a modern apartment, or at least one 
with a bath and indoor toilet – an option that became available from the middle 
of the decade. Poor people and students moved into these houses, who simply 
wanted to establish themselves for little money and without luxury. The condi-
tion of the houses was to some extent catastrophic, so that many were partially 
vacant: the roofs were leaky, gas lines had to be turned off, external toilets were 
destroyed and staircases dismantled.
In the houses in which ownership was clarified, renovation measures were 
usually promptly begun. Many households now moved out because they did not 
wish to remain in the houses during the construction phase lasting an average 
of one to two years, and sought new apartments according to their standards 
and possibilities. Many left the borough. A study of motivations for moving 
away from renovation areas in Prenzlauer Berg arrives at the result that 66 
percent of households that had moved away were dissatisfied with the old apart-
ment, while 44 percent were dissatisfied with the area (cf. ARGUS 2000). Of 
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the barely 500 households surveyed that had moved out of their previous neigh-
borhoods between 1994 and 1999, only every sixth households remained in the 
borough, while 28 percent moved to other inner city boroughs, and 8 percent 
to the hinterlands. Over half of all households rented an apartment in the outer 
boroughs of Berlin. The study also examined the social structure of households 
moving away: of those surveyed, 45 percent had a college degree, 40 percent 
had completed vocational training; the overwhelming majority was employed 
(58 percent), 10 percent unemployed. These results correspond to our analyses 
of the migration data and show the high percentage of a high-status population 
among those moving away.
In the borough of Prenzlauer Berg, a striking social transformation oc-
curred in the 1990s. However, it is difficult to evaluate this transformation, 
since its movements have not been uniform. In contrast to the observations 
above, which attest to an emigration of families and the employed, political 
groups in the borough bemoan ‘gentrification’ which pushes out the “tradition-
al” population. There are no empirical studies about the households moving in, 
but on the basis of the changed social structure of the borough which can be 
ascertained from the micro-census, a few statements can be made. Tendencies 
toward price appreciation are recognizable from people’s vocational training 
and school degrees. The share of people with Abitur4 and college degrees in the 
borough rose considerably between 1991 and 1998: from 14 to 24 percent and 
from 25 to 41 percent, respectively. Both groups have increased by about 65 per-
cent. At the same time, the number of inhabitants with a Hauptschulabschluss5 
or a vocational apprenticeship has decreased. However, since 1995 their share 
has declined only slightly.
A similar development can be seen in the case of income. As we showed in 
Chapter 4, table 10, the share of people with higher incomes (over 3,000 DM 
a month) in Prenzlauer Berg and Mitte grew between 1991 and 1998, but after 
1994 an increase in those with low incomes is observable. So with income, as 
with educational and vocational degrees, a polarization of the structure of the 
population in the borough is evident. It is not the poor who are leaving the bor-
ough, but rather middle class families. Those moving in, in contrast, are over-
whelmingly young households. These are not just single-person households: 
the number of singles-households declined between 1994 and 1998 according 
to the micro-census, and the number of large households with at least four 
people is lightly rising.
4 | Translator’s note: the secondary school degree permitting its bearer to attend 
university.
5 | Translator’s note: the lowest level of secondary school degree.
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Table 3: Educational and Vocational Degrees in Prenzlauer Berg 1991-1998 
Residents 
(in 1.000)
Hauptschule 
Degree
Abitur/ 
Fachhoch- 
schulreife
Vocational 
Training or 
Apprenticeship
Higher 
Education 
Degree
1991   143.6   29.8    14.4   63.5   25.4
1993   147.7   32.2    16.4   64.8   26.5
1995   146.4   24.0    22.3   57.1   35.9
1996   143.9   23.3    24.6   54.0   38.3
1998   136.9   23.5    24.1   54.3   41.3
Source: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin: Mikrozensus
If the “gentrification” of an area is by definition the social replace of its resi-
dents, then it has not occurred so far in Prenzlauer Berg, since the moving 
away of middle class families continuously makes apartments available in 
which – depending upon rent and amenities – either households with high 
incomes or poor households move into. In houses that have been renovated 
and modernized, usually different people move in after this work has been 
concluded, and more that tend to be better situated socially than those who 
lived there previously. In the case of a conversion to owner-occupied flats, a 
complete replacement of residents occurs. But in a neighboring house, in 
which the living standard has not been improved and the rent thus remains 
low, the “better off” tend to move out: gentrification in one house, but the op-
posite in the other.
Up until now, around 40 percent of houses in the borough have been 
comprehensively renovated and modernized, so that there is still a sufficient 
stock of unrenovated older buildings in which poorer groups have been able 
to evade modernization. A displacement of the poor will occur when this 
housing stock is no longer available and there are no other alternatives in 
the borough. Price appreciation processes and continuing decline exist in a 
small space alongside one another in Prenzlauer Berg. In the neighborhoods, 
different milieus are developing, and even on streets adjacent to one another 
there are different social attributes which in the medium term will develop 
into an act of coexistence between decline and appreciation within a small 
space. The behavior of residents with regard to their perception of their rights 
and interests plays a role in all these processes. We will deal with that in the 
next chapter.
The tempo of renovation will slow down after the now effective end of the 
special depreciations. Maybe then the maintenance of the population structure 
will become a possibility – or, and this is a different scenario, after revenues 
from tax breaks dry up, property owners will have to demand higher rents to 
implement renewal and thus induce a stronger upward social trend. That will 
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only be possible in those quarters that have already experienced a strong sym-
bolic appreciation and which exhibit high architectural quality.
Translated by Alexander Locascio
REFERENCES
AG SPAS – Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Sozialplanung und angewandte Stadtfor-
schung e.V. (1999) Marzahn Nord und West. Soziale Lage und Strategien für 
eine Aufwertung. Berlin.
ARGUS – Arbeitsgruppe Gemeinwesen und Stadtteilplanung GmbH (2000) 
Wohnmobilität. Wegzugsmotive von Haushalten aus den Sanierungsgebieten in 
Prenzlauer Berg 1994-1999. Untersuchung im Auftrag der S.T.E.R.N.GmbH. 
Berlin.
Dorsch, P., Häußermann, H., Kapphan, A., Keim, R., Kronauer, M., Schubert, 
C., Siebert, I. and Vogel, B. (2000) Comparative Statistical Analysis at the 
National, Metropolitan, Local and Neigbourhood Level. Germany: Berlin and 
Hamburg. Urbex No. 4. AME, Amsterdam.
Hannemann, C. (1996) Neubaugebiete in DDR-Städten und ihr Wandel. In 
Schäfter, U. (ed.) Städtische Strukturen im Wandel. Leske + Budrich, Opla-
den. 
Hannemann, C. (2000) Die Platte. Industrialisierter Wohnungsbau in der DDR. 
Schelzky & Jeep, Berlin.
IfS – Institut für Stadtforschung und Strukturpolitik GmbH (1995) Mieterbaro-
meter Marzahn. Befragung der Mieter der Wohnungsbaugesellschaft Marzahn. 
Berlin.
IfS  –  Institut für Stadtforschung und Strukturpolitik GmbH/S.T.E.R.N. Ge-
sellschaft der Behutsamen Stadterneuerung mbH (1998) Sozialorientierte 
Stadtentwicklung (Gutachten im Auftrag der Senatsverwaltung für Stadt-
entwicklung und Umweltschutz). Kulturbuchverlag, Berlin.
Landeskommission Berlin gegen Gewalt (2000) Kriminalität, Gewalt und Ge-
walterfahrungen von Jugendlichen nicht-deutscher Herkunft in Berlin. Doku-
mentation eines Erfahrungsaustausches. Berlin.
Neuhöfer, M. (1997) Überforderte Nachbarschaften. Eine Analyse von Siedlun-
gen des sozialen Wohnungsbaus und die Wohnsituation von Migranten. 
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B49/1998, 35-45.
GdW Bundesverband deutscher Wohnungsunternehmen e.V. (ed.) (1998) 
Überforderte Nachbarschaften – soziale und ökonomische Erosion in Großsied-
lungen. Konsolidierung auf halbem Wege  –  ostdeutsche Großsiedlungen zwi-
schen sozialem Umbruch und städtebaulicher Erneuerung. Köln.
New Lines of Division in the New Berlin1
Margit Mayer
German perceptions of New York City zero in on the disparities furrowing 
this “most European” U.S. metropolis. Popular impressions appear horrified at 
the juxtaposition and intensity of glamour and squalor, while scholarly views 
contrast the social polarization so characteristic of U.S. cities – paradigmati-
cally represented by New York – with “the European City,” which, by definition, 
is more integrated, homogeneous, and inclusive (cf. Häußermann and Siebel 
1993). Such German views have a vast literature to go on: the social polarization 
and dividedness of New York City is documented and analyzed like no other. 
And, as a consequence, it has been labeled the exemplary “dual city” (Mollen-
kopf and Castells 1991), “divided city” (Fainstein et al. 1992) “quartered city” 
(Marcuse 1989), and “revanchist city” (Smith 1996).
Berlin, in contrast, has been depicted as the archetypal European city, char-
acterized by homogeneous fabric and socially mixed neighborhoods. This essay 
looks at Berlin since unification and finds that, twelve years after the fall of the 
Wall the city indeed is no longer divided by a “death strip,” but new, more and 
less visible boundary lines have come to traverse the city, establishing socio-
spatial patterns of polarization not known before. Clearly, it can no longer serve 
as a counter model to the polarized U.S. metropolis. What is more: the policy 
responses with which local politicians have sought to address these disturbing 
trends, and with which they are expressly attempting to prevent an “Ameri-
canization” of the German city, seem to exacerbate new forms of socio-spatial 
polarization heretofore more characteristic of U.S. cities.
What is striking on first sight is the transformation, since unification, 
from a relatively compact, socially integrated city to a fragmented, sprawling 
cityscape with more pronounced spatial inequalities. And along with this new 
1 | Source: Mayer, M. (2006) New Lines of Division in the New Berlin. In Lenz, G. et al. 
(eds.) Towards a New Metropolitanism: Reconstituting Public Culture, Urban Citizen-
ship, and the Multicultural Imaginery in New York and Berlin. Universitätsverlag Winter, 
Heidelberg, 171-183.
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socio-spatial topography of the new Berlin comes a discourse dismissing the 
long-held idea of the integrated European city. Different kinds of dividing lines 
are now running through the new Berlin landscape: still conspicuous, though 
in a different way than in the past, is the division between East and West, 
which is manifest in both mental and physical distance. Next, a qualitatively 
new boundary has emerged between Berlin and its outer periphery, the sur-
rounding state of Brandenburg, as well as between the central city and its outer 
districts. More small-scale, but significant novel boundaries are separating 
newly emerging islands of wealth and upgraded spaces from their surrounding 
bleaker environment. Next to these, spaces of marginalization have formed that 
play an important role in marking off the newly upgraded “primary” spaces. 
Overlaying and intermeshing with these patterns of spatial inequality are so-
cial and cultural boundaries dividing immigrants from Germans. Also, the 
division between the milieus of the new federal government and of the old-
established local government appeared to be a marking feature at least of the 
“transitional Berlin” (Der Spiegel, 15/2000). Even though this division between 
the camps of federal and state governments has spatial as well as cultural and 
political manifestations, we will have to leave it outside of our consideration in 
this piece.
OLD DIVIDING LINES
Except for two Eastern districts (Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg), where more than 
half of the residential population has been exchanged, West Berliners have 
mostly stayed in the West and East Berliners have mostly remained in the 
East. For many Westerners, mentally the boundary between “civilized West” 
and “foreign” or “wild East” still exists: what begins behind Alexanderplatz to 
them is not Friedrichshain, but terra incognita. The distance many Eastern-
ers feel towards the West – frequently mocked by Westerners as “ostalgia” or 
denounced as lack of democratic skills – may also be interpreted as an expres-
sion of disappointment with the lack of social participation afforded to them. 
The mutual distance between East and West is not merely a cultural gulf but 
finds political expression as well, as is dramatically underlined by the voting 
patterns. In the 1999 elections, the Western majority voted for the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) (49.3 percent), while the Eastern majority elected 
the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) (39.5 percent). The PDS dominated in 
every single one of the eleven Eastern districts (in Lichtenberg with 48 percent, 
in Mitte with 44.2 percent) and won almost all of the direct mandates in the 
East, whereas the CDU carried all the direct mandates in the West (except in 
Kreuzberg, where the Green Party won both mandates). In people’s minds, in 
their everyday behavior, in the way they use the media, in their consumption 
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patterns, and especially politically the city continues to be divided between East 
and West.
Another inherited form of segregation is that by citizenship. It is more pro-
nounced in Berlin than segregation by income, level of education, or employ-
ment position. Berlin’s segregation index for citizenship is significantly higher 
than that of several West German large cities, which is due to the fact that very 
few immigrants live in East Berlin compared to the Western cities (in 1998: 
5.7 percent as opposed to 17.4 percent in West Berlin). Large parts of East Ber-
lin continue to be “free of foreigners.” Concentrations of residents with other 
than German citizenship (i.e. more than 30 percent) are to be found in parts 
of Kreuzberg and in the northern areas of Neukölln and Schöneberg as well as 
in large parts of Wedding (Krätke and Borst 2000: 237). A “high percentage of 
foreigners” does not, however, automatically imply “bad neighborhood.” Only 
in combination with factors of socioeconomic strain do “high proportions of 
non-Germans” become synonymous with “social problems.” These concentra-
tions do document, however, the specific conditions of access immigrants have 
found to German housing markets. During the 1960s and 1970s the so-called 
“guest workers” were able to access the substandard housing of old inner city 
tenements; in the 1990s, when immigrants have come mostly from Eastern 
Europe and when deindustrialization had seriously deteriorated the conditions 
for integrating them, the new migrants would find access only to public hous-
ing or to the large settlements at the fringes of East Berlin (ibid.; Häußermann 
and Kapphan 2000: 13).
NE W CONCENTR ATIONS OF POVERT Y AND DISADVANTAGE
Since the wall came down, mobility has increased tremendously: 35,000 Ber-
liners leave the city every year for Brandenburg, mostly to the belt immediately 
around Berlin. This increased rate of mobility had the effect of intensifying 
earlier segregation trends, which heretofore had been less pronounced. Thus, 
for example, the wealthy southwestern districts Zehlendorf and Steglitz, as well 
as Wilmersdorf and Charlottenburg became more homogeneous, losing even 
more of their few low-income residents, while the traditional inner-urban work-
ing class districts of West Berlin (Kreuzberg, Wedding, Neukölln, Tiergarten) 
manifest disproportionally high gains in low-income, unemployed, and wel-
fare populations.2 While the socio-structural profile of the Western part of the 
city, characterized by some disparity already before unification, has become 
more strongly accentuated in its extremes, transformation in the East has been 
2 | The average monthly family net income in Zehlendorf amounts to DM 5,800, in 
Kreuzberg and Wedding to DM 2,900 (cf. Knecht 1999: 12).
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more radical. Eastern districts, which knew hardly any socio-spatial segrega-
tion, have been undergoing dramatic changes. Overall, though, the structural 
socio-economic transformation of the city has located the loser districts mostly 
in the West. 
While some studies make the increased mobility rates into the anchor of 
their analysis and interpret the intensifying concentrations of poverty and un-
employment in certain neighborhoods as a consequence of the out-migration 
of “stable social groups” (cf. IfS and S.T.E.R.N. 1998), others emphasize the 
employment crisis and the enormous loss of jobs in the city, i.e. they interpret 
the growing unemployment and welfare numbers as consequence of deindus-
trialization.3 The massive loss of jobs triggered by deindustrialization affected 
primarily the workers living in the traditional working class districts, many of 
whom immigrants, who before 1990 were primarily employed in manufactur-
ing.
Since the mid-1990s, neighborhoods with high concentrations of social 
disadvantage have increasingly become  –  through a complex process of me-
dia and political construction – associated with dilapidation, violence, poverty, 
drugs and crime, and high rates of immigration (a process well known from 
U.S. cities since the 1970s). In Berlin, this process began with a Spiegel feature 
about Neukölln (Der Spiegel 43/1997) depicting this working class district as 
an “outcast ghetto,” where shootouts have become everyday routine and public 
housing complexes have turned into slums. A torrent of similar articles swept 
through the local media as well during 1998, playing up violence and crime. 
A Tagesspiegel report turned “almost all of Kreuzberg into a no-go area,” where 
especially the Wrangel neighborhood is described as “rotting away from the 
inside,” the crime rate in this “foreigner ghetto is so immense that the German 
police has given up control” (quoted in Rada 1999: 19). Conservative politicians, 
such as the then-chair of the CDU delegates in Berlin’s parliament, Landowsky, 
have spoken of “those uncontrollable centers of crime” (Der Tagesspiegel, Sep-
tember 19, 1998) and that “one should be courageous and blow up” public hous-
ing complexes like Neues Kreuzberger Zentrum. Within the Social-Democratic 
Party as well more and more voices have been calling for tearing down such 
housing complexes – since they are detrimental to the image of the capital city 
(in the words of the Senate’s building director Stimmann). 
3 | Between 1990 and 1997 350,000 jobs have been lost, the number of unemployed 
rose, from 1993 to 1997, by 36 percent (West: 38 percent, East: 33 percent), the num-
ber of welfare recipients rose, from 1991 to 1998, by 14 percent (West: 12 percent, 
East: 17 percent). The overall unemployment rate in Berlin has been continually rising 
from 10 percent in 1991 to 16.4 percent in 2000, with the severest concentrations in 
Kreuzberg (29.2 percent), Neukölln (22.4 percent), Wedding (21.6 percent) and Tier-
garten (21 percent) (cf. Krätke and Borst 2000: 276).
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These different positions were unanimous in defining the new spatial con-
centrations of poverty as dangerous and as a threat to the public order. Simi-
larly, a study commissioned by the Senate for Urban Development in 1997 to 
identify “problematic neighborhoods” uses this kind of language to describe 
these neighborhoods (cf. IfS and S.T.E.R.N. 1998). Particularly the categories of 
inner-city old housing stock and the public housing complexes in West Berlin 
are said to manifest “alarming socio-spatial polarization,” as they are charac-
terized by high population fluctuation, high immigrant rates, and high out-
migration of employed, stable income groups. Public spaces in these neigh-
borhoods are described as characterized by dilapidation, increasingly violent 
interactions, drug crimes, alcoholism, dominance of immigrant youths, and 
growing insecurity (ibid.).
Such associations are, however, both methodologically problematic4 and 
substantively counterproductive, as they contribute to further stigmatize the 
residents of these neighborhoods. Obviously the new concentrations of poverty, 
of structural unemployment and of social disadvantage, which have emerged 
in the course of the 1990s (and which have been corroborated by a variety of 
studies – though with diverging explanations5) pose a threat to the social inte-
gration of the city and thus a challenge to urban development. But so do other 
divisions within the central city, which do not figure in the public debates, and 
which are not even perceived as problematic.
4 | They are based on the perceptions of the author’s interview partners, i.e. staff at 
the district and Senate administrations. Furthermore, to use the proportion of immi-
grants as an indicator for “neighborhoods characterized by social strain“ runs the risk 
of interpreting the very presence of non-German residents as “social strain“ (cf. Krätke 
and Borst 2000: 220, 238).
5 | In 1995, the Office of Health and Social Statistics showed, in a social space ana-
lysis pertaining to the whole city, that inner city districts were manifesting serious con-
centrations of indicators of social strain and that the social index of many of the already 
strained districts of Berlin had fur ther deteriorated (cf. Hermann and Meinlschmidt 
1995; Hermann et al. 1997). Methodologically, these studies used the so-called factor 
analysis. The data analysis of social statistics applied by Sozialorientierte Stadtent-
wicklung (IfS and S.T.E.R.N. 1998) concentrates on small-scale selective migration 
processes in the statistical areas of Berlin, in parts amplified by data on welfare, unem-
ployment and immigrant rates. The study by Krätke and Borst (2000) employed a cluster 
analysis for its interpretation of socio-spatial disparities. Cluster analysis allowed them 
to extract nine dif ferent area types representing the dif ferent types of socio-structural 
spaces in both halves of Berlin.
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ISL ANDS OF WE ALTH 
Newly upgraded spaces, especially in the center of the city, have established 
invisible boundaries around them. The visitors and users of Friedrichstadt-Pas-
sagen (with their department store Galeries Lafayette, their banks and top-level 
offices) rarely venture just 300 meters south into one of the so-called “problem 
neighborhoods” of Kreuzberg, which is Turkish and apparently threatening to 
those north of it. Nor do its residents cross the new Checkpoint Charly towards 
the north, even though the sign “Attention, you are now leaving the American 
sector!” (which is still there!) no longer prohibits this border crossing. Nearby 
Potsdamer Platz is also no longer demarcated by a death strip, and still the adja-
cent poor quarter of Potsdamer Straße, with its dilapidated housing and cheap 
stores, remains cut off from the glitzy world of consumption and entertain-
ment of Berlin’s latest tourist attraction. In Mitte, investors speak of the “profit 
boundary” separating the low-income Rosenthaler Vorstadt from the lucrative 
“tourist racing path” Spandauer Vorstadt (which meanwhile counts more seats 
in restaurants, cafes and bars than residents) (cf. Rada 1999c: 19). And in Prenz- 
lauer Berg, a similar stark new division has emerged between gentrified Koll-
witzplatz and the “problem area” Helmholtzplatz nearby.
The gentrification processes spreading throughout East Berlin’s inner city 
districts take the form of insular expansion. The people who have moved to 
Prenzlauer Berg in the course of the 1990s (70,000 new residents between 1991 
and 1997) have higher incomes (by 50 percent on average), are younger, better 
educated, and form more single households than those who left (65,000 between 
1991 and 1997). Their buying power and their very different consumptive behav-
ior have dramatically transformed the local infrastructure: expensive boutiques 
and fancy restaurants have displaced old tenants, small shops, and alternative 
projects that could not keep up with skyrocketing rents (cf. Gude et al. 1999).
Insular gentrification processes have also taken place in the middle of 
poverty-ridden Kreuzberg. Luxurious lofts, e.g. in the Paul-Lincke-Höfe, typi-
cally present a modest outside front, but the inside of these courts manifests 
high-class loft-living with, in this case, “paradise gardens bathed in neon light 
installations by the American land artist Martha Schwartz” (Rada 1999b: 19). 
Introverted architectures, turning their backs on the city, express a withdrawal 
into the private space of “closed society” which no longer trusts public space. 
The people who live here do not need public parks. State secretary of urban de-
velopment Stimmann makes himself their spokesperson as he favors, instead 
of the traditional public green spaces, small, high-standard so-called (in Ger-
man) “pocket parks” inside the core of new building blocks.6 
6 | A parallel but opposite trend to this expansion of closed-off islands of new wealth, 
so-called primary spaces, has been the emergence of a new periphery also in the 
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So, hand in hand with this trend of privatized primary space and down-
graded marginal space comes a transformation of public spaces. These undergo 
a degree and form of privatization that is novel for German cities. Shopping 
and entertainment zones in centrally located areas such as “Daimler City” (as 
Potsdamer Platz has informally been dubbed) as well as the train stations that 
have expanded into service and shopping centers have become privatized; while 
technically still public space, they are increasingly restricted to consuming and 
traveling customers. Some plazas, while still looking like public spaces, have 
already been sold, such as a small park called “Los Angeles Plaza” in downtown 
West Berlin that used to be a public green space. The city sold it to a private 
daughter corporation of the AG City (a coalition of Ku’damm businesses) in 
order to prevent that homeless people or drug addicts would use this park. A 
sign at the entrance of the park now lists the “house rules,” such as “no eating, 
no drinking, no being there after dark.”
These invisible boundaries protecting urban glamour zones require a type 
of control that is new both in quantitative and qualitative terms, to make sure 
that those who do not behave as the desired consumers are excluded. New forms 
of boundary policing have been introduced to Berlin and 36 so-called “danger-
ous places” have been designated, where essential citizenship rights can be sus-
pended: People and their belongings may be controlled without any concrete 
evidence of an offence, they can be ordered to leave the area, and they can be 
forbidden to even come there for up to three months. Special police units have 
been established (so-called “Operative Groups”) that have been deployed since 
1993 to target immigrants, beggars, youths, prostitutes, and drug users (cf. Eick 
1998). Whoever disrupts the desired use of the downtown areas or does not re-
spect the newly drawn boundaries, is removed by the “Operative Group Alex” or 
the “Operative Group City-West,” often taken to the forest at the edge of the city. 
Conflicts over the use of public space are also sparked within the so-called 
“problematic neighborhoods,” especially where opportunities for further gen-
trification present themselves in the small-scale coexistence of dilapidation and 
lavish upgrading, as is so characteristic of the current Prenzlauer Berg transi-
tion. For example, the “dangerous zone” around Helmholtzplatz, a traditional 
poor people’s neighborhood, where long-time residents and people on welfare 
as well as alternative projects and initiatives are disproportionately represented, 
has already come under development pressure as “attractive residential neigh-
borhood with turn-of-the-century ambiance and a rapidly growing hip scene” 
middle of central districts of the city. Nine wild encampments with about 700 residents 
had settled at various sites in the internal periphery of the city, particularly where the 
wall used to be, but the Senate forced them out to the edge of the city, with massive po-
lice force, creating new islands of marginality that are stigmatized and often unwanted 
by the “indigenous“ German residents (cf. Sambale and Veith 1998).
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(Rada 2000: 20; cf. Bernt 2001). The public debate about this conflict over the 
direction of the neighborhood depicts the alcoholics – who with the restoration 
of the park literally are marginalized and squeezed out of the park – as symbol 
of a no longer desired use of the park. For other “problematic neighborhoods” 
(such as around Kottbusser Tor in Kreuzberg or around Potsdamer Straße in 
Schöneberg), it is the drug users who get turned into the symbols responsible 
for making the area a “dangerous zone.” Deployment of the “Operative Group 
Potse” and “Operative Group SO 36” in fact hinder or even prevent the outreach 
work of drug counseling and social aid organizations (Eick 1999: 100). And 
media campaigns which scandalize the dilapidation of public space and de-
mand more security and police forces in order to address the consequences of 
spatially concentrated poverty, also no longer depict poverty as a social problem 
but exclusively as a threat to the public order.
POLITICAL STR ATEGIES AGAINST THE POL ARIZED CIT Y?
Both the “flight of middle class Germans” from the city and the growing so-
cio-spatial polarization and fragmentation have been perceived as evidence of a 
creeping Americanization – which politicians claim ought to be avoided at all 
costs. Two measures have been put in place to counter these tendencies: Plan-
werk Innenstadt to counter the exodus of urbanites was passed by the Senate as 
guiding concept for the development of the central city in 1999, and a communi-
ty management program for “problem neighborhoods” was introduced in 1999. 
Late in 1996 the Senator for Urban Development introduced a first version 
of its strategy Planwerk Innenstadt, i.e. a master plan for the inner city. The 
declared goal of the plan was to reconnect and restructure the East and West 
Berlin downtowns. But the focus has in fact been on the East, where the plan 
described the area between Alexanderplatz and Schlossplatz as “in need of 
transformation”: in spite of its excellent location opening up all the possibilities 
of primary space, it was described as presenting, in its extant form, a “develop-
mental barrier given the international urban competition.” Besides overcoming 
the “disruption” which urban planning of the modern age (i.e. real existing so-
cialism) had wreaked on the urban fabric, the plan was to create an urban envi-
ronment attractive to so-called “urban citizens.” The existing prefab highrises 
were not considered as suitable to prevent the exodus of high-income groups 
from the city. However, current residents were not involved in the plan, and its 
publication triggered outbursts of resentment from Eastern citizens who hap-
pened to like their familiar environment. 
Still, in order to more fully realize the potential value of this location, the 
plan called for more housing to be built, in the form of (initially 28,000, then 
only 20,000) condominium apartments. The assumption was that individual 
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home ownership would be the best way to upgrade the central city, guarantee 
a return to the private investors, and bring about the necessary change in “ur-
ban citizenship consciousness.” This “urban citizen,” to whose supposed needs 
the plan is oriented, is connoted as embodiment of urban culture. Thus, the 
Senator for Urban Development, Peter Strieder, gave these reasons for his strat-
egy in a piece titled “In Search of Urban Citizens”: “We are losing those who 
embody urban culture. […] It is our task to reactivate this urban citizenry. An 
important step in this direction is, for example, that we are making a lucrative 
offer for housing property in the city to those who want it” (Strieder 1998: 11).
In spite of the subsidization of urban land for home ownership formation, the 
envisioned wealthy urban professionals have not been coming forth in suffi-
cient numbers. This seems to be, at least in part, due to the fact that the new 
lofts and luxury apartments around Friedrichswerder, Molkenmarkt and Spit-
telmarkt are unaffordable even for Berlin’s professional managerial class at 
square meter prices of DM 8,000 and up, and sufficiently rich people are not 
interested to locate here (Rada 2000: 19).7 Housing policy – which in Berlin 
used to be that of a tenant city – has completely shifted towards a homeowner 
city: while subsidization of condo conversion is expanded, funding for social 
housing has been drastically curtailed, rent control has been terminated, each 
year 30,000 more housing units are “freed” from being reserved for low-in-
come groups, and the public housing associations are being sold.
Ostensibly in order to stem the advance of social polarization, the Senate 
attempts to keep or to attract high-income households in (to) the city. This strat-
egy appears logical when processes of impoverishment are seen primarily as 
consequence of the exodus of high-income “representatives of urban culture” 
as a ferment for the health of the city. However, the reasons for the accelerated 
processes of decay of the 1990s seem to be more complex and having their 
primary cause in the industrial restructuring and ensuing employment crisis. 
The way the Planwerk is designed, it is not likely to lead to a multiplication 
of different inner city users, but rather to replace low-income residents with 
upscale groups and to “clean up” the downtown. At the same time, it does not 
appear likely to stop the suburbanization of middle class families, for whom the 
move to the belt around Berlin is both more affordable and more attractive than 
the upscale condos in the built-up city.
The second strategy, which the Senate developed in response to the in-
creasing social segregation, is a program for the social revitalization of declin-
ing urban areas implemented in 1999. With reference to the neighborhoods 
identified as most “problematic” or “at risk of becoming problematic” in the 
study commissioned earlier (cf. IfS and S.T.E.R.N. 1998), this strategy has an 
7 | For a critical review of the Planwerk overall see Architektenkammer Berlin (1997).
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explicit sociospatial focus. In fifteen of these areas, community development 
agencies and teams were established that are charged by city government to 
use integrated approaches to mobilize local resources, to activate and empow-
er residents, to initiate job creation, to attract small businesses as well as de-
velop neighborhood-based subsistence work (Berliner Senatsverwaltung für 
Stadtentwicklung, Umweltschutz und Technologie 1999). The goal of the pro-
gram is not desegregation or redistribution – such goals are no longer seen as 
feasible. Instead, it defines itself as an attempt to mitigate the worst effects of 
restructuring and exclusion and to slow down the downward spiral, in which 
these neighborhoods are diagnosed to be caught, by some stabilizing support.
For this, the Senate invests DM 300,000 per agency per year, stipulating 
that the “neighborhood managers” are to increase this modest budget through 
funds from various European Union programs (ESF and EFRE), from differ-
ent German funding programs supporting the insertion of unemployed and 
welfare recipients into the labor market (ABM and HzA) and various programs 
subsidizing construction, as well as through funds available through the re-
cently passed federal program “Social City.”8 
With the establishment of new neighborhood offices, the Senate circum-
vented existing initiatives and community organizations, which have been in 
place in many of these areas, arguing that it was important to bypass those 
active groups, which “again and again demand resources instead of activation” 
(Häußermann and Kapphan 2000: 226). In various cases, organizations that 
have built themselves a reputation as tenant advocates or renewal agents have 
been inserted into the new constructions, which have drawn on a pool of em-
ployment agencies, social planning offices, economic development bureaus 
and enterprise consulting firms. In this way the Senate has created a parallel 
infrastructure overlapping with but in part displacing the existing community 
infrastructure – one that focuses more on economic and job creation develop-
ment on the one hand and on conflict moderation and (apolitical) technical 
expertise on the other.
Some communities have resisted the attribute “problematic neighborhood”: 
they resented being stigmatized by the definition as “dangerous place” and they 
did not want to be given a neighborhood management office. At Boxhagener 
Platz, for example, residents, community groups, and the district’s (Friedrichs-
hain) city council person responsible for urban development demanded that 
the area be recognized as “milieu protection area” (which would provide legal 
protection against condo conversions as well as against rapid rent increases 
based on private modernization) instead of as “problematic neighborhood.” 
8 | Passed in September 1999, this federal program channels ca. DM 5 million to 
Berlin neighborhood management, as of 2001, each neighborhood will have about DM 
500,000 to distribute yearly (cf. Holl 2002).
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The concept of the Senate, however, does not see rising rents but the out-migra-
tion of high-income groups as responsible for the decline, the most appropri-
ate solution for which would be subsidizing the formation of homeownership 
(Krätke and Borst 2000: 280).
Both strategies of the Senate, then, aim to enhance the attractiveness of 
the city. The neighborhood management program does so by striving to pre-
vent the most visible manifestations of urban decay such as vandalism and 
deterioration of public space (perceived as threatening the image and hence 
the competitiveness of the city). And the Planwerk does so by mobilizing and 
subsidizing primary urban land for the assumed needs of so-called “urban-
ites.” While the latter strategy actually contributes to accelerating the social 
polarization and segregation processes triggered by the economic restructur-
ing, neighborhood management will more likely consolidate the position of the 
targeted neighborhoods as basically marginal spaces, where those left behind 
by the restructuring are to self-manage their marginalization with self-help, 
social economy, and civil conflict moderation – and at low cost. 
Both policy responses thus actually tend to support the emergence of a 
pattern of centrality vs. marginality, the incipient formation of which we can 
already observe: islands of luxury and zones of upscale urbanites cut off and 
divided by multiple boundaries from marginal, downgraded zones that are 
concentrating nearby. While entrusting the downgraded neighborhoods to 
programs of community management aims precisely at stabilizing them as 
such – as downgraded zones –, the visible and invisible boundaries between 
these disparate zones require new and more intensive forms of surveillance 
and control than the integrated, socially mixed, and relatively homogenous city 
ever needed. The pattern of dualization and polarization as well as the new 
forms of policing are well known from the U.S. metropolis which Berlin’s poli-
ticians so anxiously claim to want to prevent.
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Exploring the Substance and Style of 
Gentrification: Berlin’s “Prenzlberg”1
Matthias Bernt and Andrej Holm
INTRODUCTION
Gentrification has been a significant topic in urban research for more than for-
ty years according to its chronicling in the West. In the context of Germany and 
its capital city, social division and economic transformation have also brought 
changes at the neighborhood level. This chapter describes the changes in this 
capital city and considers the changes at the neighborhood level in Prenzlauer 
Berg, an area of the old East Berlin and now symptomatic of the gentrification 
of much of the inner city.
Depending on the researchers’ intellectual background, analysis of gentri-
fication has been based either on economic or socio-structural and cultural fac-
tors. Though nowadays, such a one-dimensional view is generally regarded as 
obsolete and researchers have tended to try and incorporate approaches taken 
by other schools into their own research. However, this has arguably not led 
to conceptual clarification. In contrast recent attempts to paper over the fun-
damental cracks between Marxist and liberal, supply-side versus demand-side 
explanations, and structure versus agency, tended to move discussions even 
further away from the possibility of reconciliation of these views: a synthesis, 
that moved “beyond the positions of economics or culture” (Lees 1994b) has 
thus far been hard to find. 
Apart from these older debates about supply vs. demand an important issue 
remains over the relative generalizability of the process that has been described 
as gentrification. As Sykora in this book shows, gentrification has unfolded in 
different ways and means in cities that have moved from differing economic 
systems. Here we pick up on this theme but also consider the differing regula-
1 | Source: Bernt, M. and Holm, A. (2005) Exploring the Substance and Style of Gen-
trification: Berlin’s “Prenzlberg.” In Atkinson, R. and Bridge, G. (eds.) Gentrification in a 
Global Context. Routledge, London, 106-120.
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tory and tenurial systems that have affected the rate and distribution of gentri-
fication activity in Berlin and other of the larger German cities. Finally we try to 
consider the adequacy of explanatory frameworks of gentrification given their 
origins in cities and countries dominated by stronger sets of property market 
relations and differing welfare regimes.
International comparative research has generally restricted itself to Austra-
lia, the UK and US. In comparing the gentrification of London, New York and 
Paris, Carpenter and Lees, for example, found that the course of gentrification 
depended in large part on a range of public policies, planning schemes and 
subsidies (Carpenter and Lees 1995: 300). The argument that national and re-
gional context are crucial is also supported by a number of other contributions 
which have highlighted the role of national context in shaping local forms of 
gentrification activity (Kennedy and Leonard 2001; Lees 1994a; Badcock 1989; 
Musterd and van Weesep 1991). 
With this article we try to push the project to move beyond these estab-
lished positions further. Our main focus is on an attempt to confront estab-
lished gentrification theories with a case in East Berlin, where the framework 
under which gentrification has occurred is largely different from that of the 
US or Great Britain in which the dominant theoretical lines and case studies 
have been identified and developed. Our main conclusion from this work is a 
call to embed gentrification research into a more advanced political economy 
of land and housing markets and an analysis of state intervention which has 
often been lost sight of in the minutiae of regular and in-depth case studies at 
the local level. 
GERMAN RESE ARCH ON GENTRIFICATION 
The international debate on gentrification has been picked up by a number 
of German social scientists. Some have even gone so far as to suggest that 
gentrification represented “probably the most thrilling debate of recent years” 
(Helbrecht 1996: 2). What makes discussion difficult is not only a lack of com-
parative research at the international level, but also the state of German re-
search on gentrification more generally. Though gentrification has since the 
late 1980s been seen as a hot topic on the German academic agenda and nu-
merous articles have been written, empirical research was generally charac-
terized by a positivist application of structural and consumption-side theories 
(Blasius 1993; Falk 1994; Friedrich 2000) and, while production-side explana-
tions were often cited, they were applied much less often. 
The reason for this is less national arrogance in the face of important and 
relevant urban debates, but rather a reaction to the situation in West German 
cities that appeared to differ so greatly from the conditions described in the 
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US and UK in relation to rent and value gaps. This has been due to a range 
of national characteristics that suggest significant and differing preconditions 
which may strongly affect the value of considering gentrification as a live topic 
for German cities, even while interest remained high. A number of local con-
tingencies impact on the probability and nature of gentrification activity in 
German cities. 
In the first place state intervention is much greater than in the West while 
a much lower degree of income polarization at a national level and lower eth-
nic segregation contrast sharply with the US model of neighborhood dynamics 
and locales that have been shaped by gentrification processes. Like the UK race 
is much less of an issue in urban social relationships and neither has there 
been the same degree of suburbanization. Perhaps most important is the dif-
fering tenurial structure of Germany’s housing stock. With rental units form-
ing nearly two thirds of the stock (36 percent private, 26 percent social; Balchin 
1996) many might suggest that opportunities for tenure transfer and gentrifi-
cation are pronounced. 
Germany also differs from the western city model in terms of its traditions 
of urban planning and an urban culture largely different from that of the UK 
and US which is linked to largely different attitudes to housing tenure (a dis-
tinctive “tolerance” of renting rather than owning) and the larger degree of 
state intervention (Häußermann 1983). Traditionally urban planning always 
aimed on balancing socio-spatial disparities and applied large amounts of pub-
lic money to prevent segregation. Also, zoning regulations and rent-laws did a 
great deal to level socio-spatial disparities. Social housing, as an example, was 
for a long time not predominantly directed on the urban poor, but on broad 
strata of the society. As a result segregation in German cities is visibly smaller 
than in their American or British counterparts. 
Due to these special conditions German sociologists and geographers have 
generally assumed that urban change in their country would be slower, less 
dramatic and less pronounced than in US cities. Consequentially studies on 
the upgrading of German inner-city neighborhoods were nearly exclusively 
engaged in the socio-cultural aspects of neighborhood change. Their main fo-
cus was on household-types, lifestyles and invasion-succession-cycles (Alisch 
and zum Felde 1990; Blasius 1993; Dangschat 1990; Dangschat and Friedrichs 
1988), and with an impressive conscientiousness, phase models were analyzed 
and typologies of actors were improved. The outcome was, however, often dis-
appointing, both for the prediction of these processes and theoretical clarifica-
tion (Alisch and Dangschat 1996).
These peculiarly German conditions for gentrification changed fundamen-
tally with the reunification of East and West Germany in 1990. As the result 
of the “return” of real estate properties to their original owners, or their heirs 
in the former GDR, a massive turnover of properties was brought about and 
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markets suddenly started to play a previously unheard-of role in new urban 
changes. This “re-commodification” (or what Sykora has called commercializa-
tion) in the context of post-communist cities, of urban development could, of 
course, not leave German gentrification research unaffected. Inner-cities were 
visibly upgraded by private capital and the face of the urban landscape changed 
dramatically. Furthermore, due to massive social changes the pre-conditions 
emerged on which a wave of gentrification could be expected. What made the 
issue thorny, however, was the fact, that the East German housing stock faced 
huge investments, although all data (due to the low incomes and a different so-
cio-cultural differentiation in Eastern Germany) showed a clear lack of demand 
for “gentrified” housing. Nevertheless, as we show, a combination of local state 
agency, private capital and an urban culture increasingly celebrating centrality 
and a new infrastructure of entertainment have managed to overcome these 
apparent barriers. 
Such processes of rapid gentrification, in the early 1990s, were then proph-
esied for many towns and cities in Eastern Germany (e.g. Häußermann and 
Siebel 1991; Krätke 1991; Herlyn and Hunger 1994). Yet just a few years later 
these hypotheses were toned down by empirical investigations which suggest-
ed that early waves in cities like Berlin were not matched in less “central” loca-
tions (Harth et al. 1996; Rink 1997; Weiske 1996). Harth et al. (1996) even went 
so far as to suggest that gentrification in Eastern Germany would be “halved” 
from initial estimates of its proliferation. Following the mid-1990s the view 
that gentrification was no longer a relevant theme for East German cities be-
came widespread. Recent analyses have now indicated the opposite with gentri-
fication widening its base (Franz 2000; SAS 1999; Friedrich 2000).
THE PUZ ZLE OF PRENZL AUER BERG
The most prominent example of this confusion in academic discourse regard-
ing gentrification is East Berlin’s Prenzlauer Berg. This is an old district in the 
immediate vicinity of the city center but whose centrality was circumvented by 
the Berlin Wall and was therefore neglected during the lifetime of East German 
state socialism. However, following re-unification the area was declared a rede-
velopment zone (Sanierungsgebiet). It is here that our story starts.
It is hard to find another urban district in Germany about which so much 
has been written in the past ten years as Prenzlauer Berg (Mieterberatung and 
TOPOS 1995 and 1998; ARGUS 1997 and 2000; Bernt 1998; Häußermann 
and Kapphan 2000; Borst and Krätke 2000; Holm 1999 and 2000; Reimann 
2000). Moreover, despite many investigations the only thing German urban re-
searchers appear to agree on is that Prenzlauer Berg has undergone fundamen-
tal socio-spatial transformations during the last decade. However, while some 
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scholars have identified a “gentrification process” taking place in Prenzlauer 
Berg (Borst and Krätke 2000), others reject this view as too “one-dimensional” 
(Häußermann and Kappan 2000: 197) and instead see a “juxtaposition of up-
grading and decline” which will continue for a long time to come (ibid.: 177), or 
even anticipate that gentrification (especially around Helmholtzplatz) will be 
replaced by devaluation tendencies with the risk of “social hotspots” forming. 
The difficulty of interpreting and explaining recent and future changes in 
old East Berlin suggests that the area, in some sense, exceeds the conceptual 
and empirical language and indicators of neighborhood change in the city. 
This is perplexing but, as the difficulty is due not so much to a lack of quantita-
tive data and research work, but rather the nature of the topic, it is a good start-
ing point to discuss what it is that makes gentrification in Prenzlauer Berg so 
difficult to analyze. An examination of the assumption that Prenzlauer Berg is 
gentrified can thus not only clarify to what extent the findings of international 
gentrification research are relevant for a German neighborhood and clarify the 
peculiarities of urban change in Germany, but may also advance our under-
standing of gentrification as a process that is deeply embedded into varying 
social and economic environments (Criekingen van and Decroly 2003). 
E X AMINING NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE IN PRENZL AUER BERG
Our approach in this chapter is perhaps a simple one, to put the confusingly 
complex situation in Prenzlauer Berg in analytical order. In order to achieve 
this we framed a series of research questions which drew on conventional defi-
nitions of gentrification from the literature to see in what ways gentrification 
in Prenzlauer Berg converged and differed on these points. We compared these 
hypotheses with the available data and finally we draw conclusions concerning 
similarities and peculiarities characterizing the changes in Prenzlauer Berg 
compared to gentrification processes in other countries. 
We were concerned with three key assumptions. First, that, if gentrifica-
tion is understood as a reinvestment process (Smith 1996), a verifiable rise ought 
to occur in investments in the dilapidated housing stock. These investments 
would have to be spatially concentrated and lead to an increase in the local 
property market and/or in rental prices. Second, regarding population changes, 
new household types with a higher social status (particularly in terms of in-
come and formal qualifications) compared to the previous inhabitants would 
be expected to invade (Ley 1996). As a result an “enhancement” of the social 
structure might be expected to occur, this enhancement being a consequence 
of migration movements. In connection with our first question, these changes 
would be particularly visible in refurbished buildings. Finally, parallel to the 
changes observed in the composition of the population and investment, a gen-
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eral shift in cultural discourses about the affected neighborhood ought to occur, 
which in the meantime would be likely to acquired a reputation as being “chic,” 
trendy or a new locus of cultural activity more generally (Zukin 1991). This 
change in values would be likely to result in a new infrastructure of lifestyle 
restaurants, boutiques and delicatessens. 
THE PROPERT Y MARKE T AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 
Starting with the analysis of investment activity in Prenzlauer Berg over the 
past decade, a number of peculiarities were observed. A central precondition 
for gentrification – and one which is often taken as a matter of course – is the 
existence of developed property markets, which have to be in place before prop-
erties can start rising in price in a certain area. However, such a market simply 
did not exist in East Berlin in 1990. The market was only just emerging in 
Prenzlauer Berg due to the “return” of real estate to its “original owners” (in a 
manner with a marked similarity to that which Sykora describes). In the central 
areas of the old borough, this accounted for some 70-90 percent of the entire 
housing stock, leading to its rapid sale (cf. Dieser 1996; Reimann 2000). Since 
there was no generally accepted land price structure based on rational expecta-
tions and experience, the agreed-upon selling prices were largely speculative. 
Following an unprecedented speculative property boom (cf. Borst and Krätke 
2000: 145 ff.), prices positively exploded in the early 1990s, sometimes well in 
excess of DM 1,000/sq.m. in inner-city areas of old housing. The property mar-
ket has since noticeably cooled down, with prices for unrefurbished tenement 
blocks near the city center dropping to DM 600-800/sq.m.
The overheating of the property price structure in Berlin in the early 1990s 
owing to speculation thus led – in contrast to the assumptions in our first ques-
tion –  to prices falling rather than rising over the course of the decade. The 
development of land prices hence ran against the expectations expressed here. 
However, this state of affairs is a consequence of the exceptional circumstances 
of German reunification, which led to a speculative “bubble” on Berlin’s prop-
erty market, and this point can be expected to become less influential.
Other German peculiarities result from local state intervention. This main-
ly concerns direct subsidies for modernization and repair of unrefurbished 
housing offered by the government of Berlin which are linked with various rent 
and occupation obligations for the owners. Links might be seen here between 
the grant program for disrepair available in cities like London in the 1970s 
and which were also linked to gentrification activity (Hamnett 1973). Before 
German reunification, urban renewal in West Berlin was financed almost ex-
clusively by public subsidies. However, because of the obviously greater need 
for renovation in the older East Berlin housing areas and the deep budget crisis 
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in Berlin, this is no longer considered financially possible. For this reason in 
the course of the 1990s successively fewer funds were made available and the 
financing of renewal was left for private capital to fill the gaps, a process which 
was taken on board with relish given the priming effect of the local state and 
the newly perceived value of the location itself.
Table 1: Refurbishment Progress in Redevelopment Zones in Prenzlauer Berg
no. of 
dwellings
modernized % of which 
subsidized*
% of which 
privately 
financed
%
1994 32,202 811 2,5 811 100 0 0
1996 32,202 6,718 21 4,215 63 2,503 37
1997 32,202 8,186 25 5,002 61 3,184 39
1999 32,202 12,851 40 6,927 54 5,924 46
2001 32,202 16,938 53 8,536 50.4 8,402 49.6
* Includes subsidized schemes under the government programs “Soziale Stadterneue-
rung,” “Stadtweite Maßnahmen,” “Wohnungspolitische Maßnahmen” (figures taken 
from S.T.E.R.N., the 20th report: 36 and the 21st report: 23, as well as own research)
Above all, as Table 1 indicates, in the early 1990s refurbishment was largely 
financed by public money; until 1996 the ratio between publicly subsidized and 
privately financed refurbishment was about 2:1. Since then, public funding has 
been continuously reduced, and by 1999 the ratio had been reversed with only 
about a third of (extensive) refurbishment measures being supported by public 
subsidies, the rest being privately financed. In 2001, following a deep budget-
ary crisis, subventions were completely cut. Nevertheless, thanks to the large-
scale public subsidies in the early 1990s, around a sixth of the entire housing 
stock was refurbished using direct public grants. As a result, the local housing 
market contains a considerable “welfare segment” where rent development, oc-
cupancy and the economic profitability of investment are largely disconnected 
from market activities – at least for the duration of the grant programs.
Another, probably more important peculiarity stems from German tax leg-
islation. The special depreciation possibilities enshrined in the Development 
Zone Act (Fördergebietsgesetz) meant that a considerable share of refurbishment 
costs for building owners in the 1990s was tax deductible. Until 1996 this form 
of depreciation allowed up to 50 percent of refurbishment costs in the first 
year of investment to be offset against tax, this proportion being reduced to 
40 percent until 1998/99. These high indirect subsidies made refurbishing 
old housing extremely lucrative for investors with a large taxable income, es-
pecially if costs were high and rents low, since the “costs” of investment could 
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be transformed into tax savings for the partners involved. The lion’s share of 
the yield from letting housing thus mainly resulted from claiming tax benefits, 
with only a small amount stemming from rental income. As the balance of 
investment could be evened out by tax advantages, investors could afford to 
do without high rental income for a while, as well as building in areas where 
no affluent demand was apparent. Therefore, investment largely took place ir-
respective of the rents realistically expected after refurbishment, and often ir-
respective of location. Encouraged by the possibility of saving tax and due to 
the uncertainty about good or poor locations, refurbishment was widespread 
in Prenzlauer Berg. Even the area around Kollwitzplatz, which was generally 
considered to be especially attractive, did not attract significantly more invest-
ment than other districts.
In consequence investment activities show in Prenzlauer Berg a different 
spatial pattern than that which is traditionally known from international gen-
trification studies. A “frontier of profitability” of the type observed in Ameri-
can gentrification areas (Smith 1996; Reid et al. 1989) has so far not emerged. 
Instead of having a clear “frontier,” gentrification in Prenzlauer Berg has had a 
restricted scattering of investment across the neighborhood. 
HOUSING MARKE T AND RENT DE VELOPMENT 
Since only a dwindling fraction of dwellings in Prenzlauer Berg are inhabited by 
their owners, we now direct our attention to the development of rents – which, 
too, is an area that is strongly affected by federal, specifically East German and 
local regulations. Generally speaking, rent inflation in Germany is subject to 
strict legal control, with the result that rents can only be increased gradually 
within a certain framework defined by the “comparative rent system” (Vergleichs-
mietensystem). In addition, various transitional regulations were in force until 
1998 in what used to be East Germany (GDR), which again provided narrow 
scope for rent increases. Furthermore, in 1995 local “rent caps” were introduced 
in various inner-city districts in East Berlin which were designed to cap rents 
for a certain period at a socially acceptable level of around DM 6-9/sq.m. What 
all these regulations have in common is that they provide far more protection 
for existing than new tenants. Whereas for example rent increases are limited 
to 20 percent within three years (assuming no modernization has taken place), 
rents for new contracts are mainly freely negotiated between tenant and land-
lord. Moreover, the caps applying to certain boroughs and which are supposed 
to apply to all rent contracts are difficult to enforce when premises are rented 
to new tenants. A study of rent development in unsubsidized buildings hence 
found that new tenants paid a third more than existing tenants. In contrast to 
the rent cap of DM 7,91, which generally worked for remaining tenants, new 
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tenants pay an average rent of DM 10,50 (ASUM/Mieterberatung 2003; own 
calculations), considerably higher than the general price level in both East (DM 
9,53) and West Berlin (DM 8,65).
Since rent increases among the existing tenants can only be carried out 
gradually and within certain levels, market development is largely molded by 
the development of the rents paid by new tenants. However, according to the 
“Market Monitor – Real Estate Market 2000” (BBU 2000) in which landlords 
were asked about the development of rents for new tenants, the areas of old 
inner-city housing in East Berlin are considered to be especially attractive for 
investors. Even though incomes in East Berlin are still below those of West 
Berlin, the level of rent agreed by new tenants is significantly higher than that 
paid in West Berlin. For example, whereas a maximum of DM 9.48/sq.m. is 
demanded for refurbished housing in inner-city boroughs in West Berlin such 
as Charlottenburg, Schöneberg and Wedding, rents of up to DM 14.00 are paid 
in districts of old housing in East Berlin like Friedrichshain, Mitte and Prenz-
lauer Berg. Moreover, rents are tending to rise in these areas, whereas else-
where in Berlin they are stagnating. Furthermore, East Berlin is characterized 
by extreme differences in the rent paid by new tenants in refurbished buildings 
(for example in Prenzlauer Berg they range from DM 5.14 to DM 11.00). This 
can be attributed to the effect of the rent caps in redevelopment and “milieu 
protection” areas, which can hardly be enforced for new tenants, and which are 
far below the market level. Whereas the lower level of this range represents the 
effect of state rent caps, the upper level reflects the rent increase potential once 
these regulations expire. Rents in the district of Mitte are already very high, 
and aspiring market locations in East Berlin’s boroughs of Prenzlauer Berg, 
Pankow and Friedrichshain are not far behind. In all other districts of Berlin, 
rents are stagnating. 
It is important to stress that rising rents are mostly paid by new tenants, 
who have a weaker legal position than existing tenants. Rent increases – and as 
a result economic displacement – are here not only dependent on the market 
position of the locality, which could well be explained with the available knowl-
edge on gentrification. Rather than that it is also to a certain degree determined 
by the different positions that legal frameworks offered for different types of 
tenants. 
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POPUL ATION CHANGES IN THE DISTRICT
During the 1990s, the size of households in Prenzlauer Berg changed funda-
mentally. The proportion of single-person households rose by almost 20 per-
cent between 1991 and 2000, and now makes up about 60 percent of all house-
holds, compared to the Berlin average of 48 percent. The average number of 
persons per household has thus declined from 2.1 to 1.6, compared to the mean 
figure of 1.9 persons per household in Berlin in 2000 (2000 micro-census). 
Prenzlauer Berg has developed into a neighborhood dominated by young sin-
gles. In areas of older housing, a considerable decline has also occurred in the 
number of children and youngsters aged below 18. By contrast, the proportion 
of those aged 25-44 has risen from a third to over half. 
A rising tendency towards higher educational qualifications has also been 
seen in Prenzlauer Berg. Despite the declining population size, the number 
of residents with Abitur (higher education matriculation qualification) has in-
creased. Whereas the number of people with solely lower school qualifications 
has fallen below the 1991 figures, the number of people with Abitur has almost 
doubled. Prenzlauer Berg now occupies a premier position in this respect, since 
the average number of people with Abitur in East and West Berlin has only 
increased by about a third.
Table 2: Population in Prenzlauer Berg and Berlin by Higher Education 
Certificate (Abitur)
Berlin Prenzlauer Berg
No. Index* No. Index*
April 1991 564,000 100 25,400 100
April 1993 654,700 116 31,000 122
April 1995 702,600 125 40,500 160
April 1997 752,400 133 49,500 195
April 1999 775,500 137 47,700 188
April 2000 48,100 189
Source: Berlin Department of Statistics, micro-census 1991-2000, * 1991=100
A similar tendency is to be seen in the number of people with higher education 
qualifications. Whereas the number of vocational qualifications has stagnated 
or even fallen, the number of people with higher education qualifications has 
almost doubled in the area since 1991. The number of higher education gradu-
ates increased between 1991 and 2000 from about 15,500 to almost 35,000 – in 
other words more than one in four adults in Prenzlauer Berg has completed 
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a degree course. This significant increase in the share of people with higher 
education sets Prenzlauer Berg apart from other Berlin boroughs. 
This upward movement in educational degrees is not yet significantly 
reflected in income. Households’ incomes, which were among the lowest in 
Berlin in 1991, are still below the East Berlin average – but, given the size of 
households (Prenzlauer Berg 1.6/East Berlin 1.9), it is apparent that Prenzlauer 
Berg has reached an average level of prosperity. This apparent normalization 
of income in Prenzlauer Berg masks significant differentiation, with a large 
gap between low and high incomes exceeding the average elsewhere in the city. 
Whereas nearly one in three households (31.5 percent) has to make do with a 
monthly income of less than DM 1,400 (compared to the average in East Berlin 
of 26.97 percent), 13.08 percent of households have an income exceeding DM 
3,000 (compared to the average in East Berlin of 12.97 percent; 1999 micro-
census), thus high and low earners live cheek by jowl.
To summarize these changes we can see that the changes to the social struc-
ture in Prenzlauer Berg are congruent with the changes to be expected during a 
process of gentrification. In particular, educational degrees and the income distri-
bution demonstrate a clear differentiation among the local population, indicating 
a pioneering phase of gentrification and the fact that “invaders” are living next 
door to the usually “displaced.” Moreover, these changes are not due to endoge-
nous developments but are instead the result of enormous internal changes in the 
population structure of the neighborhood. With a slightly varying total popula-
tion of 130,000-140,000, between 1991 and 1999 over 225,000 people moved into 
and away from the Prenzlauer Berg (Berlin Department of Statistics). Mobility 
grew continuously; in the second half of the 1990s some 30,000 (about a quarter 
of the total population in Prenzlauer Berg) moved in or out of the area every year.
These population dynamics are highest where refurbishment has been 
carried out. Fluctuations are especially prompted by privately financed mod-
ernization. A study of inhabitant structure in privately modernized buildings 
(Mieterberatung/TOPOS 1998) revealed that 50 percent of tenants only moved 
in following refurbishment. Another study put this figure higher at two-thirds 
(Häußermann et al. 2002). The latest survey (ASUM 2003) estimates that 
more than 75 percent of tenants have moved out suggesting a staggeringly high 
level of population displacement. 
The rent, ages and household structure and income of new and old tenants 
differ greatly. Eighty-five percent of new inhabitants are aged between 18 and 
45. Older children as well as seniors are practically non-existent in this group. 
The majority of new tenants are single-person households. The employment 
rate is above the local average. Whereas only slight shifts are to be ascertained 
among existing tenants, the proportions of blue-collar workers, unemployed, 
pensioners and trainees are especially low among new tenants. By contrast, the 
relative numbers of self-employed and students are high.
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The financial position of newcomers is correspondingly high. Extremely 
low household incomes of below DM 1,000, which in 1997 still accounted for 
15 percent of the population in the area (ATGUS 1997), have now almost com-
pletely disappeared. The occurrence of higher income groups is by contrast 
above average. As a result, the equivalent income of new tenants weighted by 
household size is significantly above that of not only remaining tenants but 
also those moving away and the local average. Because of their higher income, 
especially new tenants in privately refurbished dwellings can also afford higher 
rents and the average rent they pay is about DM 3/sq.m. above that of existing 
tenants (Mieterberatung/TOPOS 1998: 25).
Table 3: Average Equivalence Income by Household Type
Tenants in unrefurbished dwellings DM 1,640,-
Tenants in privately refurbished dwellings DM 2,460,-
Tenants in subsidized refurbished dwellings DM 2,050,-
Total population of redevelopment areas DM 2,056,-
Source: ASUM 2003: 27 f f., and authors’ calculations
Privately financed refurbishment, which in the 1990s accounted for two thirds 
of the total refurbishment volume and which was continuously on the increase, 
hence clearly contributed to displacing poorer and larger households, which 
were replaced by smaller, higher-earning households. The changes already 
evident in the analysis of socio-structural change in the entire district are re-
flected here in an even more extreme manner. More generally the data shows 
a close connection between refurbishment, reinvestment decisions and popu-
lation dynamics which has often been described in the wider gentrification 
literature (Berry 1985; Marcuse 1996; Dangschat 1988). Privately financed re-
furbishment can thus be seen as the segment of the local housing market in 
which gentrification has occurred in a way which strongly resembles that of 
accounts in the US. 
FROM PRENZL AUER BERG TO “PRENZLBERG”
As is well-known from studies of other gentrified areas elsewhere, economic 
upgrading and changes of the social structure in Prenzlauer Berg have also 
been accompanied by an unmistakable cultural enthusiasm and an intensive 
media hype. This new discourse has celebrated the recent changes and chal-
lenges the older images of the neighborhood. In the 1990s, Prenzlauer Berg 
was voted the “funkiest part of town” by the lifestyle media and is currently 
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regarded as the “liveliest district of Berlin.” Almost all the major German news-
papers have published reports on the area, and hardly any Berlin guidebooks 
can afford not to include a separate chapter on this now “legendary” borough. 
Local events such as the opening of new bars by local heroes of the area’s bo-
hemian society or the annual Walpurgis Night celebrations receive national 
media attention and are reported in full detail in the press.
In the 1990s, this cultural boosterism increasingly became the basis for 
real investments in a “cultural” infrastructure. The blend of cafés, internation-
al cuisine, boutiques and delicatessens typical of other gentrified at the global 
scale can now be found especially around Kollwitzplatz, but recently also on 
Kastanienallee/Oderberger Straße and Lychener Straße. Prenzlauer Berg has 
effectively become a brand name which can be found in local names, an appar-
ent aesthetic in the interior design of houses, shops and restaurants. Whereas 
in the past Berlin pubs were traditionally named after their location (Dunck-
erquelle, Pappeleck), the cuisine they served (Hackepeter/Steak Tartare) or the 
principal (Antons Bierstübchen/Anton’s Beer Bar), these days pub names fea-
ture intellectual puns and metaphors to appeal to their patrons’ sense of place 
and consumption of these new spaces (Frida Kahlo, Pasternak, Chagall Nr. 1-3, 
Bukowski). One doesn’t simply eat and drink on Kollwitzplatz; these days one 
enjoys the “internationality of Alsatian cuisine” in a restaurant where the US 
President once dined, the lifestyle of the Russian aristocracy, or the feeling of 
drinking your beer amidst imagined poets and dissidents. 
This infrastructure of “conspicuous consumption” (Beauregard 1986) fea-
tures a pronounced degree of spatial concentration. With the exception of the 
area around Hackesche Höfe in Mitte and Simon-Dach-Straße in Friedrichs-
hain, no other place in Berlin contains so many pubs, cafés and restaurants as 
the area around Kollwitzplatz and its side streets. Figures from the area around 
Teutoburger Platz, where the pub trade is chiefly concentrated on Oderberger 
Straße and Kastanienallee, show the seating already almost equals the total 
population of all ages in the surrounding blocks – and is still rising. Yet just a 
few streets little is to be seen of this culinary boom. In the blocks surrounding 
Teutoburger Platz there are just 0.46 pub and restaurant seats per resident, this 
situation being reflected to the north and south of Lottumstraße and north of 
Eberswalder Straße. 
When considering the expansion of catering outlets over time, terms from 
the American discussion such as the formation of “waves,” “beachheads” and 
“frontiers” are encountered (Smith 1992 and 1996; Abu-Lughod 1994b; Smith 
and Defilippis 1999). Whereas the area around Kollwitzplatz already had large 
numbers of pubs and restaurants by 1992/93, the roads to the north, east and 
west of the area (especially Danziger Straße) were for a long time regarded as 
frontiers which could hardly be crossed, especially by more expensive restau-
rants; the few attempts which were made went bankrupt or were demolished. 
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Only recently has this frontier begun to fade, and nowadays restaurants can be 
found on Helmholtzplatz and on Oderberger Straße/Kastanienallee which do 
not differ at all from their counterparts on Kollwitzplatz. Kollwitzplatz is now 
described in listings magazines as humdrum and boring, whereas the adjec-
tives used for Kollwitzplatz five years ago are now being applied to Helmholtz-
platz and Oderberger Straße. The new “urban frontier” is the railway embank-
ment; everything beyond it is “Indian territory” (Smith 1996). 
CONCLUSION: A SIMIL AR OR PECULIAR BR AND 
OF GENTRIFICATION?
To sum up, the most important points regarding gentrification in Prenzlauer 
Berg are the following: The stock of old housing in the district experienced a 
considerable increase in investment in the 1990s. Instead of being concentrated 
on certain areas, this investment was broadly spread across a large area. As a 
result of state intervention the rental market is split and the rents paid by both 
existing and new, privately refurbished and publicly subsidized households dif-
fer greatly. Nevertheless locations have emerged where high rents can be ex-
pected for a long time to come. The structure of inhabitants has fundamentally 
changed and is nowadays dominated by singles and DINKs with higher educa-
tional qualifications. This trend is especially apparent in buildings refurbished 
with private capital, where new tenants have a much higher disposable income. 
Real investment in Prenzlauer Berg was accompanied by the district’s symbolic 
upgrading. The myth of Prenzlauer Berg led relatively quickly (sometimes even 
before the buildings had been refurbished) to investment in a “cultural infra-
structure” with a pronounced spatial concentration belying its significance as 
an international destination and aspect of Berlin’s wider cultural capital and 
caché. All these major trends are absolutely congruent with what is generally 
considered as gentrification.
Nevertheless, important peculiarities remain. Contrary to traditional re-
ports from the US direct and indirect subsidies resulted in investments being 
widespread rather than spatially concentrated and the rent increase (at least 
for existing tenants) is slowed down by a series of regulations. Urban change 
in Prenzlauer Berg is therefore puzzlingly split. On one hand, in the case of 
those dwellings where refurbishment is carried out with private money and 
where the rents for the new tenants are freely negotiated, gentrification and the 
displacement of poorer households shows classic features in its correspondence 
with the wider literature. On the other hand, a supply of substandard housing 
has remained throughout the district for a long period of time which is still 
being used by lower-income groups. As a result, poorer and wealthier sections 
of the population are living side by side for a long time, delaying the transition 
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from a pioneer phase of gentrification. A similar prolonging of this stage is 
linked to rent control legislation, which provides some protection for poorer 
households.2 Spatial form, style and dynamic of gentrification are obviously 
different form the US or the UK – and the reason for this can be found in the 
different patterns of homeownership, in subsidies and rent laws. Prenzlauer 
Berg is thus certainly another case of gentrification; but one of a special kind. 
But, if the aim of an analysis of urban change is not only to see whether the 
empirical reality fits with existing models, but to understand the actual pat-
terns, dynamics and actors of a particular neighborhood, the case also shows 
very clearly that an understanding of regulatory context is crucial. Trying to re-
late the case to more general scientific discussions, we thus mainly find impli-
cations for production-side arguments. In this respect the case of Prenzlauer 
Berg demonstrates very clearly that the particular features of a neighborhood 
cannot be understood without at least some kind of analysis of the reinvest-
ment process on one hand. On the other hand it also points at weaknesses in 
the current application of this kind of analysis, which often failed to go be-
yond general arguments and come to terms with the varying conditions under 
which real housing markets work. In this respect our analysis suggests that 
production-side arguments should be re-examined at least in two areas. First, 
the implied assumption that re-investments into the run-down housing stock 
are mainly conducted because of expectations of rising rents/ housing prices 
(and that there is therefore a clear link leading from investment to rising prices 
and displacement) has proved to be simplistic. The reasons why professional 
landlords took the decision to engage in the renovation of Prenzlauer Bergs 
dilapidated dwellings was the availability of public subsidies, not because of 
rents. The theory that gentrification is caused by a rent-/price-/value gap has 
therefore to be reworked and embedded into a broader perspective. Second, 
the rental income a particular landlord can extract does not only depend on 
supply and demand in the housing market, but also on legal frameworks that 
determine how, where and to what extent rents can be increased. As rising 
rents are seen as the main reason for the economic displacement of poorer 
households, which is the essence of gentrification, legal frameworks and the 
power-relations between landlords and tenants that they provide, should gain 
more attention. 
2 | However, as these regulations expire after a cer tain period, the displacement of 
these residents is at best only postponed, not cancelled.
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Berlin on Sale
At around the turn of the millennium, long before many other places in Germany and 
Europe, Berlin experienced a major economic and financial crisis, including a notori-
ous banking scandal. The phrase “Berlin is poor but sexy,” coined by Mayor Klaus 
Wowereit from the Social Democrats (SPD) in 2004, hit a particular nerve and soon 
became an unofficial slogan and marketing tool of the city, printed on T-Shir ts, coffee 
cups and more. 
The city state of Berlin has teetered on the edge of bankruptcy for many years. 
During the 1990s, when the SPD was the junior partner in a coalition government with 
the Christian Democrats (between 1991 and 2001), they were in charge of a number 
of contentious and very costly flagship projects: the Potsdamer Platz, the fair exten-
sion, the Tiergarten tunnel, the new central train station, the building of huge sports 
arenas (despite the unsuccessful bid for the Summer Olympics in 2000), and plans 
for a new highway (Bundesautobahn 100), plus the international city airport Berlin-
Brandenburg (that has now become famous not for being “Europe’s most modern 
airport” as advertised but as one of Germany’s failed mega construction projects). 
In addition to that, the previous local government also actively contributed to Ber-
lin’s ongoing massive financial crisis by allowing a large public banking consortium 
(Bankgesellschaft Berlin) to engage in dubious real estate speculations and almost 
go bankrupt in 2001. The political decision to bail out the bank cost the city at least 
30 billion Euros and increased the individual debt burden of Berliners to about three 
times the national average. When the Berlin Senate – similar to the mayor of New York 
City in the late 1970s – asked the federal government in 2002 for more aid to over-
come the city’s desperate financial situation, its request was turned down. 
From a progressive point of view, it is an irony of history and especially bitter that 
it was up to a left-leaning local government to take care of the mess after the Con-
servatives, who had dominated politics in West-Berlin for decades and were the main 
“culprits,” eventually had lost the majority in parliament. The PDS (the successor of 
the former SED in the GDR; today The Left Party) that came into power jointly with the 
SPD in 2001 and governed the city until 2011, not only promised in its election cam-
paign to make Berlin a “social city” but also to fight graft and corruption, doing away 
with the outmoded policy model and “sleaze” of the old power elites in West Berlin, of 
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which some were personally involved in the banking scandal. This, however, resulted 
in throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Not only were key staff and management 
in many administrations and public companies replaced, including the various mu-
nicipal housing associations, but the Red-Red government also implemented what 
some would call necessary consolidation policies in order to save Berlin. These are 
what others called neoliberal austerity measures at the expense of the local popu-
lation, focusing on privatization and severe cuts to welfare budgets as well as the 
public sector. The Berlin Senate e.g. abolished in 2003 all housing related subsidies. 
One year later, the municipal Co-operative Housing and Building Society (GSW) was 
sold off to the Wall Street firms Goldman Sachs and Cerberus Capital Management. 
Public employees were forced to accept wage cuts while schools, hospitals, and kin-
dergartens suffered from understaffing and reduced state funding.
The four ar ticles included in this section all address some aspects of these con-
troversial and, until today, not well-explored policies that had a lasting impact on the 
urban fabric as well as the economic and social-cultural environment of Berlin. In 
his paper “City of Talents”, first published in 2004, Stefan Krätke, Professor for Eco-
nomic and Social Geography at the European University Viadrina (Frankfurt/Oder), 
provides – what was rare at the time – a realistic account of the economic base of the 
German capital, arguing that the kind of consolidation and entrepreneurial measures 
implemented in the late 1990s and 2000s were both a threat to the urban living con-
ditions of broad parts of Berlin’s population and also to the prospects of Berlin’s few 
growth sectors in the field of knowledge-intensive economic activities. 
Sabina Uffer, a young urban researcher, who recently passed her Ph.D. at King’s 
College in London, and Andrej Holm, an urban sociologist at Humboldt University in 
Berlin, contribute to this more general picture of Berlin’s enduring fragile economic 
situation with a dif ferentiated analysis of the city’s housing market developments 
and gentrification trends. Uffer shows in her ar ticle how the large scale privatization 
of state-owned housing companies and housing estates since the end of the 1990s 
(aiming to make the highest profit possible in order to close the budget deficit) fa-
vored the entrance of big capital and institutional investors over alternative forms 
of housing providers (such as co-operatives or owner-occupation), therefore creat-
ing greater social and spatial inequalities in Berlin. Holm’s ar ticle provides a refined 
examination of urban dynamics and upgrading and relocation processes in dif ferent 
inner city areas of Berlin (from Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg to Kreuzberg and Northern 
Neukölln), and discusses these as a new urban mainstream as well as against the 
background of the international gentrification debate.
Finally, Ross Beveridge and Matthias Naumann (both urban researchers at the 
Leibniz Institute for Regional Development and Structural Planning in Erkner) in a 
very recent account of the sale of Berlin’s “silverware” and its contestation (using 
the partial reversal of the privatization of the Berlin Water Company as a case study) 
present a slightly more optimistic outlook concerning possible forms of post-neolib-
eral urban governance in Berlin and beyond. For these two authors and most critical 
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urban researches represented in this volume, the main question arising out of the 
experiences with the particular “unification crisis” (Jürgen Kocka) and the failed eco-
nomic strategies of the neoliberal era is: what could be alternative and feasible mod-
els of urban development and what kind of political coalitions and social movements 
are necessary to enforce these? 

City of Talents? 
Berlin’s Regional Economy, Socio-Spatial Fabric 
and “Worst Practice” Urban Governance1
Stefan Krätke
Berlin appears to be one of the most challenging cases of socio-economic re-
structuring within the contemporary urban system of Germany (Cochrane and 
Jonas 1999). “City of talents” represents a new urban marketing formula for 
Berlin, which draws on the debate on knowledge-based regional development 
(Cooke 2002) and might touch some of the particularly strong points of Berlin. 
Furthermore, the notion of a city of talents is related to Richard Florida’s recent 
work on “The Rise of the Creative Class” (Florida 2002). As far as current ten-
dencies of innovation-driven economic restructuring in Western Europe and 
North America lead to a growing importance of knowledge-intensive economic 
activities and the related creative forces – e.g. “talented” people in science and 
research, engineering and design, management and organization, cultural pro-
duction and the media business – creativity and talent might become a central 
basis of successful urban development in the future. This might particularly 
apply to those large cities which are currently suffering from a decline of their 
traditional industrial base in labor- and technology-intensive economic activi-
ties. However, as regards Berlin, the city is home of talents in various fields of 
social activity: it has a concentration of talented creative people in science and 
research, in media production and the arts, and it has – last not least – strong 
talents in corruption and financial self-service in the city’s political class. 
This article is rooted in a regional political economy approach and shall 
broadly outline the main tendencies of socio-economic development in Berlin: 
The first point deals with Berlin’s regional economy and the ongoing restruc-
turing process towards a prime location of economic activities which rely on 
1 | Source: Krätke, S. (2004) City of Talents? Berlin’s Regional Economy, Socio-spatial 
Fabric and “Worst Practice” Urban Governance. International Journal of Urban and Re-
gional Research 28.3, 511-529.
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the concentration of “creative talent” in the city. The second point highlights 
some tendencies of socio-spatial polarization in Berlin. The third point focuses 
on the 1990s’ real estate boom in Berlin, and the fourth point deals with the 
city’s financial crisis under the heading “worst practice urban governance in 
the city of talents.” This crisis might be interpreted as the outcome of a particu-
lar neoliberal approach of Berlin’s political class and its strong creativity in the 
field of corruption and “financial self-service.” In the light of the interrelated 
developments outlined in the paper’s four sections, the Berlin case may offer a 
place-specific insight into the role of knowledge and creativity resources for ur-
ban economic development and the ambiguity of urban “creativity and talent.”
BERLIN’S REGIONAL ECONOMY AND ITS POSITION 
IN THE GERMAN URBAN SYSTEM
Berlin is the largest city in Germany with 3.4 million inhabitants, and it has 
more than 4.2 million inhabitants if we include the fringe area of the met-
ropolitan region. Urban marketing specialists are keen to present Berlin as a 
“metropolis at the heart of Europe” and hence as an ideal springboard for busi-
ness with East Central Europe. However, Berlin’s regional economy is mostly 
oriented towards “the West,” and the city is far away from the position of being 
the central node of new economic relations between the western and the east-
ern parts of Europe (Krätke 2002c). This might be rooted in the weak points of 
Berlin’s regional economy, particularly the lack of corporate headquarters and 
the loss of industrial capacities. 
DECLINE OF TR ADITIONAL INDUSTRIES IN BERLIN 
From 1991 to 2001, Berlin’s industry has lost more than 150,000 jobs; the paral-
lel increase in “service sector” jobs could by far not compensate for this loss of 
manufacturing jobs. Thus we have growing unemployment of industrial work-
ers in the region. The decline of Berlin as an industrial location is due not only 
to the closure of production sites in the eastern part of the city, but also to a very 
large extent to the structural weaknesses of the industries in the western part 
of the city (Krätke 1999), which for decades used the special Berlin subsidies to 
expand the assembly line production of simple mass products. The termination 
of these special Berlin subsidies after 1990 led to factory closures and reloca-
tions. 
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Figure 1: Berlin’s Loss of Manufacturing Jobs
Employment in manufacturing 1991 and 2001 (thousand employees)
Source: Krätke 2004a
THE BIG HOPE TO BECOME A MA JOR “SERVICE ME TROPOLIS” 
AND HE ADQUARTER CIT Y
A prominent simplistic interpretation of restructuring processes in the Ber-
lin metropolis characterizes the development as a transformation of Berlin’s 
economy to a “service metropolis” (Prognos 1997; Häußermann 1997). This 
would mean that Berlin experiences a structural adjustment to the “average” 
economic profile of other large cities/metropolises of the German and Europe-
an urban system. However, large cities are empirically characterized by major 
differences in their economic profiles and in the way their regional economies 
are organized. The different activity profiles determine the development capac-
ities of urban regions. Within the East German economic area and its overall 
development weakness, Berlin is still a relatively strong “economic island” with 
good prospects in particular fields of activity, however, the city’s function as the 
new German capital city doesn’t lead to the formation of a “service metropolis” 
with a high grade concentration of advanced producer services. The relative 
concentration of these functions is much higher in Munich, Frankfurt, Düssel-
dorf and Hamburg, which are the long established prime centers of advanced 
producer services in the German regional system.2
2 | The quantitative data on Berlin and selected cities of the German urban system 
included in figure 2, 3 and 4 are based on the author’s research on the economic pro-
files of German cities (Krätke 2004). This research work analyzed the largest German 
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Figure 2: Regional Economic Centers in Germany: Activity Profiles Relative 
concentration of advanced producer services (without financial sector) 
in selected urban regions 2002 by location quotients (Germany = 1,00)
Source: Krätke 2004b
Whether an urban region can be regarded as a strategic economic center is 
frequently determined by reference to the corporate headquarters it contains. 
“Headquarter cities” have a high level of centrality in respect of their economic 
control capacity, which can extend to many other regions (Pred 1977). Berlin 
suffered an exodus of corporate headquarters in the past following the division 
of Germany. The city’s new role in the German and European urban frame-
work spawned hopes that it would be able to re-establish its position as an eco-
nomic center with a high level of centrality in economic terms. Sceptics were 
pointing out that the newly acquired role of capital city might encourage some 
prominent national and international companies to set up selected corporate 
divisions and “second-rank directional centers” in Berlin. As it turns out, only 
a small number of new headquarters have been located in Berlin since 1990 
(Krätke and Borst 2000).
commercial firm data base (Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank) which covers roughly 
150,000 firms. The results are given for the year 2002. This firm data base has no re-
gional bias – all administrative districts of the German regional system (in West and 
East Germany) are represented according to their share of employment. Fur thermore, 
there is no particular sectoral bias in the data. However, the firms included reveal a 
relatively strong representation of large corporations and of corporations with supra-
regional marketing activity.
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Figure 3: Regional Economic Centers in Germany: “Headquarter Cities”
Relative concentration of large enterprises/external control capacity 
in selected urban regions 2002 by location quotients (Germany = 1,00)
Source: Krätke 2004b
NE W ISL ANDS OF ECONOMIC GROW TH: CLUSTERING OF 
KNOWLEDGE-INTENSIVE ACTIVITIES IN BERLIN
The above described problematic trends do not represent the whole story of 
Berlin’s economic restructuring process: New islands of economic growth have 
been developing in Berlin particularly in so-called “knowledge-intensive” and 
innovation-driven activities like the software industry, biotechnology, medical 
engineering, pharmaceutical industry, research and development services; ad-
ditionally, there has been a strong growth in the Berlin media industry which 
is based on the particularly strong “socio-cultural capital” of Berlin (Krätke 
2002a, 2003). The “knowledge-intensive” economic activities cover a slightly 
broader range of activities than e.g. Howkins’ definition of the core industries 
of the “creative economy” (Howkins 2001). Besides the culture and media 
industry, the software industry and the R & D-sector, which are included in 
Howkins’ definition, the knowledge-intensive economy would also include a 
range of R & D-intensive sub-sectors of the manufacturing and the service sec-
tor which are concentrating on the creation of new knowledge to be incorpo-
rated in innovative products and services. 
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Among the regional centers of knowledge-intensive economic activities, 
which cover certain sub-sectors of manufacturing as well as service activity 
branches – particularly the manufacturing of information and communication 
technologies, the pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology, medical engineer-
ing, measuring and control technologies, the optical industry, the software in-
dustry, research and development services – Berlin reveals a quite strong rela-
tive concentration (Krätke 2004). In a regionally comparative perspective, the 
location quotient for knowledge-intensive activity branches in Berlin today even 
exceeds the value of Munich.
Figure 4: Regional Economic Centers in Germany: Activity Profiles
Relative concentration of “knowledge-intensive” activity branches 
in selected urban regions 2002 by location quotients (Germany = 1,00)
Source: Krätke 2004b
Related to the concentration of knowledge-intensive activities, Berlin today re-
ally has the potential for playing the role of a “city of talents.” However, the 
region’s potential in science, research and development as well as in the sphere 
of culture and media has to be maintained and extended, if such a develop-
ment path shall be strengthened. Richard Florida (2002) has put forward 
the argument that the companies, the technologies and the venture capital of 
knowledge-intensive economic activities are moving to or forming in places 
that have the skilled and talented people. Thus the regionally uneven distri-
bution and growth of the knowledge-intensive activities in favour of selected 
large cities can be interpreted as an outcome of a place-specific concentration 
of creative people in science and research, in media production and the arts. 
The socio-cultural properties which make such places particularly attractive for 
“the creative class” shall be discussed below in the section on Berlin’s culture 
and media industry.
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At the overall level of uneven urban and regional economic development, 
the formation of local and regional “clusters” (Braczyk et al. 1999; Porter 2001; 
Cooke 2002) in terms of the selective concentration of firms and institutions 
of a particular value chain in certain regions has attracted much attention in 
recent times. This phenomenon is particularly relevant with regard to metro-
politan regions – these might be characterized as “super-clusters” which contain 
a variety of different clusters, e.g. a clustering of business services, a media 
industry cluster, various industrial clusters in high technology branches etc. 
(Scott 2001; Krätke 2004). The regional integration of firms and supporting in-
stitutions resulting from dense transaction and communication networks is one 
of the constitutive elements of clusters and their economic performance in the 
creation of new jobs and firms (Krätke 2002b). Berlin is a metropolitan region 
with strong tendencies of cluster formation in the 1990s, and the city has gained 
a quite strong position in a number of sub-sectors of the so-called “knowledge-
intensive” industries which rely on creative knowledge and innovative capacity.
1) The most important strength of Berlin lies in the culture and media indus-
tries, in which it has reached today the position of a first rank “media city” 
(Krätke 2002a). The culture and media industries include film production, 
television and radio, the new media, music production and the performing 
arts, the publishing trade as well as design agencies and the advertising in-
dustry. The Berlin media industry cluster is growing rapidly and comprises 
more than 7,000 firms today.
2) Berlin has a strong position in the software industry, which is defined in 
German statistics as a “service sector” activity. Berlin is not a production 
center of micro-electronics and data processing technology (in which Mu-
nich holds the leading position) – but in the software industry the Berlin 
region reveals a high rate of growth and has developed a cluster of more 
than 1,700 specialized firms.
3) Berlin is (besides Munich) a leading center of the European life sciences 
sector which comprises biotechnology and medical engineering firms. The 
knowledge-intensive industries of the life-sciences sector reveal a high con-
centration in the Berlin region with a cluster of more than 300 specialized 
firms, and these are backed by the strong presence of the pharmaceutical 
industry and of high ranking centers of medical services and related re-
search institutions. In Berlin, all the particular branches of the contempo-
rary life sciences sector are strongly concentrated.
Berlin on Sale138
BERLIN AS AN UPCOMING MEDIA CIT Y 
The German urban system contains a number of competing “media cities” in 
terms of large production clusters in the culture and media industries (Krätke 
2002a). The leading German media cities are characterized by a concentration 
of firms and employees in all sub-sectors of the media industry. Among these 
media cities, Berlin is characterized by a considerable growth in importance 
during the last ten years, as opposed to its overall weak economic development. 
Recent reports on Berlin’s media industry recorded a particularly pronounced 
growth in the sub-sector of multimedia firms and in the music industry. On 
the background of this growth dynamics, which has been accompanied by the 
move of leading companies of the music industry like Universal Music to Ber-
lin, the city now is frequently being labelled as the “music capital” of Germany. 
As regards the spatial organization of Berlin’s media industry, the most im-
portant characteristic is the formation of local clusters within the inner urban 
area of the metropolis. The multimedia firms e.g. reveal most obvious local 
concentrations in the East-Berlin city center, which extend to the inner urban 
district of Prenzlauer Berg. Within the East-City, multimedia firms are par-
ticularly clustering in the Chausseestraße, which in Berlin has got the name 
“Silicon Alley.” A similar pattern of spatial organization becomes visible in the 
inner urban local clusters of the music industry (ibid.).
The strong growth of Berlin’s culture and media industry cluster is related to 
the fact that within the German urban system Berlin has regained its position as 
a prime location of the “creative class” in terms of Florida’s concept (2002). This 
particular locational factor attracts the music industry as well as other branch-
es of cultural production and the media industry. Furthermore, this attraction 
power also applies to a whole range of knowledge-intensive industrial activities 
(like the software industry, the life sciences sector etc.) which rely on creativity 
in terms of technologically innovative capacity. Florida (2002) emphasizes the 
socio-cultural properties which make a city like Berlin particularly attractive as 
a place of living and working for the creative class: “Creative people [...] don’t just 
cluster where the jobs are. They cluster in places that are centers of creativity 
and also where they like to live” (Florida 2002: 7). Thus lifestyle attributes of the 
creative class and a supportive socio-cultural milieu are at the center of a city’s 
attractiveness to the creative economy. Florida highlights the role of a
“social milieu that is open to all forms of creativity – ar tistic and cultural as well as 
technological and economic. This milieu provides the underlying eco-system or habitat 
in which the multidimensional forms of creativity take root and flourish. By supporting 
lifestyle and cultural institutions like a cutting-edge music scene or vibrant ar tistic 
community, for instance, it helps to attract and stimulate those who create in business 
and technology. It also facilitates cross-fer tilization between and among these forms, 
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as is evident through history in the rise of creative-content industries from publish-
ing and music to film and video games. The social and cultural milieu also provides a 
mechanism for attracting new and dif ferent kinds of people and facilitating the rapid 
transmission of knowledge and ideas” (ibid.: 55).
Figure 5: Berlin’s Media Industry Cluster 2000
Locational distribution of multimedia firms
Source: Krätke 2002a
The place-specific properties of the socio-cultural milieu are being reinforced by 
the economic and institutional dynamics of cluster building. The development 
of the Berlin culture and media industry clearly reflects this interplay between 
specific socio-cultural properties and the forming of clusters within the me-
tropolis’ economic space (Krätke 2002a): Most of the newly established media 
firms prefer to locate in the inner urban districts, because the media industry’s 
creative actors prefer “sexy” inner city locations as the best urban environment 
for a particular lifestyle which consciously combines working and leisure time 
activities locally within culturally attractive districts. In Berlin, the creative class 
seeks out locations in the “sub-culturally” shaped districts that offer the best op-
portunities and places to meet other creative people; these are also the districts 
that members of the creative class use as an “extended stage” for self-portrayal 
in their leisure time. In particular inner urban districts of Berlin there is thus a 
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direct link between the forming of clusters of creative firms and certain lifestyle 
forms of the creative class, which leads to a clear overlapping of the creative tal-
ents’ geographies of production and consumption. 
Secondly, the near location of other enterprises active in the same sector is 
a strong pull factor. The media industry actors are well aware of the potential 
for cross-fertilization that a local clustering of creative firms can offer. In some 
local areas of Berlin (e.g. the Spandauer Vorstadt in the Mitte district) the ac-
tors might find the whole value chain of a par ticular media branch being rep-
resented by firms within one single building. Additionally, the local clustering 
can promote communi cation links between the firms and thus create a “space 
of opportunities” which is welcomed particularly by the start-up firms that are 
facing many uncertainties. 
Moreover, the city as a whole can become an attraction factor for the media 
business in that the symbolic quality of the specific location is being incorpo-
rated into the products of the culture and media industry (Scott 2000). Hence 
production locations such as New York, Paris and Berlin are perceived in the 
sphere of the media as being “brand names” that draw attention to the attractive 
social and cultural qualities of the cities concerned. This includes, in particular, 
the perception of the city as a social space in which there is a pronounced variety 
of different social and cultural milieus. As regards the content and “design” of 
their products, media firms have to contend with rapidly changing trends (Pratt 
2000). For that reason the media firms wish to be near the source of new trends 
that develop in certain metropolises such as New York, Paris and Berlin. 
Cities of this kind are perceived as a living space with a socio-cultural mi-
lieu that is marked by great openness and an atmosphere of tolerance. This is 
turn enhances their attractiveness for creative talents and makes them a source 
of inspiration for cultural producers etc. A marked social and cultural variety 
and openness, therefore, represents a specific “cultural capital” of a city, which 
is highly attractive for the actors of the creative economy. On a local level, this 
cultural capital of a city might also be characterized as a specific “sub-cultural” 
capital of particular districts within the city. These thoughts support Florida’s 
thesis that the metropolis’ economic growth “is driven by the location choices 
of creative people – the holders of creative capital – who prefer places that are 
diverse, tolerant and open to new ideas” (Florida 2002: 223). 
Berlin is not only one of the prime media cities of Germany, but also a city 
which has got a quite strong position as a global media city. The media industry 
is a prime mover for globalization processes in the urban system, in which me-
dia industry clusters act as local nodes in the global networks of the large media 
groups (Krätke 2002a, 2003). The global media firms have set up globally ex-
tending locational networks with “local” anchoring points in different regions 
and nation-states. An analysis of the location networks of large internationally 
operating media firms makes it possible to trace the structure of the global 
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media cities as an interlocking network (Taylor 2004) of media clusters in the 
same way as global city research has done with regard to advanced producer 
services (Beaverstock et al. 1999; Taylor and Walker 2001; Taylor et al. 2002). 
According to the number of global media firms’ establishments in the respec-
tive city, a rank order of the world cities of the media industry becomes evident 
(Krätke 2003), which might be divided into three groups (“alpha,” “beta” and 
“gamma” world media cities). Prominent among the top rank group of alpha 
world media cities are New York, London, Paris and Los Angeles. However, 
depending on the threshold values’ numeric range, the alpha group of global 
media cities also includes Berlin, Munich and Amsterdam, three cities that in 
global city research which focuses on advanced producer services are ranked 
as “third-rate” world cities (Beaverstock et  al. 1999). In the system of global 
media cities, by contrast, Berlin, Munich and Amsterdam might be included in 
the top group. While Berlin is still not an economic center with global “control 
capacities,” it is a first-rank global media city. Thus we might say that in this 
particular sub-sector of the economy Berlin can be placed among the leading 
centers, and its economic development policy can built on this strength. 
Figure 6: Global Media City Berlin: Transnational Linkages 
of Berlin’s Media Industry (based on the resident global media firms’ 
organizational networks in 2001)
Source: Krätke 2004a
The strong points of Berlin’s regional economy described above highlighted the 
city’s renewed role as a major locational center of the creative class in Germany. 
Today, Berlin has become again a prime center of knowledge-intensive econom-
ic activities and the culture and media industry. On this background the city 
proves to be an attractive location for global players who wish to make use of 
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the worldwide selectively concentrated pools of talent in particular sub-sectors 
of the creative economy. However, the successful development in specific sub-
sectors of Berlin’s regional economy doesn’t compensate for the tremendous 
loss of jobs in traditional sectors of the regional economy and the related prob-
lematic developments in the city’s social fabric.
SOCIO-SPATIAL POL ARIZ ATION IN BERLIN
Rise of Unemployment and the Spread of Urban Povert y
The decline of Berlin’s traditional industries has led to a considerable rise of 
unemployment and of the number of people dependent on public social as-
sistance. The unemployment rate started from 10 percent in 1991 and reached 
nearly 19 percent in 2003. The number of people living on public social as-
sistance in Berlin also shows a rapid rise in the 1990s. From 1991 to 2001, the 
share of welfare recipients in relation to the urban population has doubled. On 
this background, recent developments of Berlin’s socio-spatial structure appear 
to confirm that Berlin experiences a particularly pronounced development to-
wards a socially polarized city.
Figure 7: Unemployment and Welfare Recipients in Berlin 1991-2002 
(1991 = 100)
Source: Krätke and Borst 2000
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SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE URBAN POOR AND 
THE E XPANSION OF “NE W URBAN SCENE” DISTRICTS
The “loosers” of economic restructuring are unevenly distributed within the 
urban spatial fabric (Hermann et  al. 1998; Krätke and Borst 2000; Farwick 
2001; Kapphan 2002). In contrast to the situation e.g. in Paris, it is interesting 
to note that in Berlin there is a socio-spatial concentration of unemployed peo-
ple, of low incomes, and of persons dependent on public social assistance in the 
inner urban districts of the metropolis. Furthermore, the loosers are predomi-
nantly concentrated in the inner urban districts of West-Berlin, namely the tra-
ditional industrial workers’ districts like Wedding, Tiergarten and Kreuzberg. 
In terms of the socio-spatial fabric, some districts in the city’s Western part are 
facing the most spectacular concentration of social problems. A symbolic policy 
of “local area management” has been introduced in order to support localities 
with the most striking socio-spatial decline, but this approach doesn’t really 
touch the city’s socio-economic development condition which lies at the heart 
of the spread of urban poverty (Krätke and Borst 2000).
Figure 8: Socio-spatial Polarization in Berlin 1997
Urban districts with a concentration of unemployed, welfare recipients, 
families with low income, immigrants, and inhabitants without 
professional training
Source: Krätke and Borst 2000
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Whereas the urban poor are mostly concentrating in the inner urban districts 
of West-Berlin, other inner urban districts are becoming more and more attrac-
tive to “new urban scenes” and are subject to a process of gentrification (Smith 
and Williams 1986; Friedrichs and Kecskes 1996). The most obvious case is 
the district of Prenzlauer Berg adjacent to the Eastern city center (Rada 1997; 
Gude et al. 1999; Krätke and Borst 2000). One out of several relevant indicators 
of the ongoing gentrification process in this area is the relative concentration 
of people with higher education (see Figure 9). A further candidate district 
for gentrification is the adjacent inner urban district of Friedrichshain, which 
today seems to move into the “pioneering phase” of a future gentrification. It is 
worth to note that the concentration of the creative class in Berlin is contribut-
ing to the gentrification processes in the above mentioned districts, since the 
members of the creative class are keen to live and work in exactly these inner 
urban districts, which offer the most inspiring socio-cultural milieu for crea-
tive work and the lifestyle of new urban scenes.
Figure 9: Socio-spatial Polarization in Berlin 1997
Spatial distribution of inhabitants with university education
Source: Krätke and Borst 2000
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SOCIO-SPATIAL SEGREGATION: 
PERSISTENCE OF A MULTIPLY DIVIDED CIT Y
Socio-spatial segregation in Berlin, as measured by the so-called “index of seg-
regation” (Duncan and Duncan 1955; Harth et al. 1998) concerning per capita 
incomes, education levels, and economic positions, reveals that West-Berlin has a 
much higher level of segregation than the cities’ Eastern part, except the segrega-
tion between different nationalities (Krätke and Borst 2000). Thus Berlin is still 
a divided city with respect to the different socio-spatial fabric of its western and 
eastern parts. In the future we might expect that East Berlin is developing levels 
of socio-spatial segregation like the western parts of the city. Even if the actual 
extent of the social divisions in Berlin cannot readily be compared with the situa-
tion in cities like New York and Los Angeles, the Berlin metropolis is on the path 
towards developing a more pronounced polarization of its social fabric. In terms 
of the urban social fabric Berlin is a globalizing city (Marcuse and van Kempen 
2000) with an internationally mixed population as well as a city with growing 
socio-spatial divisions. It is quite a problematic challenge to get the socio-spatial 
divides of a global city without getting the economic power of a global city.
Figure 10: Socio-spatial Segregation in Berlin (West and East) 1997
Index of segregation/dissimilarity: nationality, income, education, 
professional status
Source: Krätke and Borst 2000
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THE 1990’S RE AL ESTATE BOOM: THE POLITICALLY DRIVEN 
RE AL ESTATE BOOM IN BERLIN AND E AST GERMANY
Since 1990, Berlin has been a prime playground for the creative activities of 
professional subsidy hunters in the real estate business. In the course of Ger-
man reunification, large national and international real estate firms expected a 
continuous growth of demand for new office and commercial space in the met-
ropolitan centers of the German urban system. A wave of real estate acquisi-
tion, conversion, and large scale building projects covered particularly the East 
German cities and regions, since the German state introduced a special subsidy 
regulation for real estate investments in East Germany which contained a very 
favourable tax write-off scheme (Krätke and Borst 2000). This incentive com-
bined perfectly with the urban governments’ belief that office building sites 
are a sign of economic progress and a promising future of the respective city. 
Thus urban governments in East Germany agreed to new office projects of any 
size and numbers, and – as we came to know recently – in the case of Berlin, 
the city’s own financial corporation actively took part in large scale speculative 
real estate investments in East Germany. Within four years, that is from 1993 
onwards, the speculative real estate boom in East German cities turned into a 
real estate market crisis with large quantities of unoccupied new office space 
and a quite strong decrease of rents for new office space. 
OFFICE BUILDING BOOM: THE MAKING OF GERMANY’S L ARGEST 
PILE OF UNOCCUPIED OFFICE SPACE
From 1990 to 1998, nearly 7 million square meters of new office space were 
built in Berlin, of which the largest share was concentrated in the city’s inner 
urban area (Krätke and Borst 2000). Outstanding concentrations of building 
activity have been recorded particularly for the East Berlin city center (in the 
Mitte district) and the well known Potsdamer Platz area (Senat Berlin 1998), 
where “poor” large corporations like Daimler-Chrysler and Sony could manage 
to acquire the sites with an extraordinarily high price subsidy from the Berlin 
government, and where the developers implanted a US-American commercial 
city complex in the city of Berlin. In the early 1990s, the Berlin government 
had declared that the city would face a “need” to increase the supply of office 
space by 11 million square meters up to the year 2010 in order to convert the city 
into a major “service metropolis.” Thus the speculative office building boom 
got strongest support, and there was an interplay of legal as well as criminal 
activities to push the projects forward. Besides corruption and murder within 
the professional real estate scene, the Berlin government proved to be high-
ly talented and creative in developing particular instruments to prevent any 
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public control of the project developments in central parts of Berlin’s City East 
(Lenhart 2001). 
In the upturn phase of the real estate boom, Berlin and Leipzig revealed 
a price level in office rents that exceeded the rent prices of Munich and Düs-
seldorf, and on the top of the boom phase in 1993, Berlin even recorded higher 
office rent prices than Frankfurt-Main, the long established price leader of the 
German urban system. The following downturn phase was particularly pro-
nounced in the East German cities: in 1998, e.g. the city of Leipzig recorded a 
32 percent rate of unoccupied office space and office rent levels fell below the 
level of Duisburg, a traditional industrial city of the Ruhr region (see Figure 
11). 
Figure 11: Office Rents in Selected German Cities 1989-1998 
(in DM/sq.m./monthly for new office buildings)
Source: Krätke and Borst 2000
In the course of the real estate boom, Berlin built up the largest pile of unoccu-
pied office space in absolute figures, with more than 1.5 million square meters 
of unoccupied office space in 1998 (Krätke and Borst 2000). This figure only 
fell slightly in the following years, and today there is still a huge amount of 
more than 1.2 million square meters of unoccupied office space in the city. On 
the basis of the above mentioned special tax write-off scheme for real estate 
investments, the speculative bubble in East Germany has contributed to a con-
siderable degree to a shrinking of public authorities’ tax income (DIW 1997). 
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The public authorities’ reactive policy to prevent growing financial deficits is 
concentrating on cuts in public services and social expenditure.
“WORST PR ACTICE” URBAN GOVERNANCE 
IN THE CIT Y OF TALENTS
We might say that Berlin’s economic policy in the 1990s is an outstanding ex-
ample of “worst practice” urban governance, since it has led to a financial crisis 
with really catastrophic effects. This crisis has been actively produced in the 
former urban government’s period, where the Christian Democrats and the 
Social Democrats together had formed a coalition of the two largest political 
parties. After the outbreak of the financial crisis, a new coalition government 
has been formed by the Social Democrats and the Party of Democratic Social-
ism. The Social Democrats managed to hide their share of responsibility for the 
crisis. Now this new Berlin government tries to consolidate the city’s financial 
situation by severe cuts in social expenditure and public services, particularly 
in schools, universities and public medical centers. Additionally, the diverse 
local culture initiatives and scenes which are functioning as a base of the city’s 
cultural creativity outside the commercial sector of cultural production are 
loosing most of their public financial support. The current financial policy 
threatens the urban living conditions of broad parts of Berlin’s population, and 
it might also damage the prospects of Berlin’s few growth sectors in the field of 
knowledge-intensive economic activities. 
TALENTS OF SELF-SERVICE: BERLIN’S POLITICAL CL ASS 
AND THE MAKING OF A FINANCIAL CRISIS
The financial crisis has been actively produced by the former urban govern-
ment in setting up a large public financial corporation (the Bankgesellschaft 
Berlin) which engaged in speculative real estate bonds related to investments 
in East German housing and commercial estates. This business policy failed, 
leaving the city with an unexpected financial burden of 30-35 billions of Euro. 
Thus the major part of the city’s total debt burden, which amounts to roughly 
50 billions of Euros today, represents the social cost of the real estate and bank 
business of Berlin’s politicians. Note that the Bankgesellschaft Berlin created also 
some real estate bonds that have been offered exclusively to so-called “promi-
nent” citizens, particularly to well-known representatives of Berlin’s political 
class and the urban government. Even today members of the Berlin political 
class are continuing to make a private profit from these speculative real estate 
bonds which have got a public guarantee of profits. There was public opposition 
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against this, but the current urban government decided not to close the run-
down Bankgesellschaft. Instead, it released a legal regulation called the Risiko-
Abschirmungs-Gesetz (in a free translation one might call it the “risk prevention 
law”) which loads the financial risks of the Bankgesellschaft and its speculative 
bonds on the city and the Berlin citizens. Indirectly, this regulation makes sure 
that income from the speculative real estate bonds continues to flow to the 
above mentioned prominent citizens and politicians. In 2002, the urban gov-
ernment let the Berlin citizens pay 1.75 billion Euros to prevent the immediate 
financial breakdown of the Bankgesellschaft. Within the next 25 years, Berlin’s 
citizens will have to pay 6.4 billion Euros to cover the financial risks stemming 
from the real estate bonds of the Bankgesellschaft, and this money partly flows to 
the above mentioned Berlin politicians who own such bonds. Additionally, the 
Berlin government has fixed 21.6 billion Euros over the next 20 years to cover 
the “risk prevention” for the former business practice of the Bankgesellschaft 
(including the high cost of corruption in favour of the managers and politicians 
involved). All in all, the financial loss amounts to a total sum which is twice the 
yearly public budget of the whole city of Berlin.
In a broader view, the speculative financial activities of the Bankgesellschaft 
and the related policy are resulting from the ideological concept of a metro-
politan urban economy which bets on financial investments and deals includ-
ing real estate business. This kind of metropolitan urban economy has got the 
strongest support by Berlin’s political class which used to confuse regional eco-
nomic development with finance and real estate business and actively took part 
in these activities. Furthermore, the concept of a metropolitan economy which 
bets on financial juggling and real estate business with active participation of 
public financial corporations whose business policy is consciously being kept 
free of public democratic control is deeply rooted in a neoliberal approach to 
urban governance (Brenner and Theodore 2002). The unleashing of market 
forces and the local state’s active participation in (quasi) private business lies at 
the heart of this approach. In Berlin, this approach has privileged specifically 
the real estate business and related speculative activities. This kind of “entre-
preneurial” local state has led to the city’s financial collapse and the threatening 
of Berlin’s future development chances. 
Berlin on Sale150
Figure 12: Berlin as a Hostage of its Political Class
The impact of the Bankgesellschaft crisis and the concept of a metropolitan 
urban economy based on financial juggling and real estate speculation
It has been established above that Berlin has a comparatively strong posi-
tion in several sub-sectors of the so-called knowledge-intensive industries 
(which include the “creative economy”): These are particularly the media 
industry, the software industry and the life sciences sector. These new is-
lands of growth might become a possible focus of the region’s economic de-
velopment policy. All in all, the creative economy and the broader range of 
knowledge-intensive economic activities do make a quite high contribution 
to the region’s labor market. Particularly the life sciences sector’s impact on 
Berlin’s future economic development could be much higher if all the medi-
cal research activities and advanced health services would be included in this 
cluster. This would mean to concentrate on the development of a “regional 
center of competence in health services” which comprises not only biotech-
nology and medical engineering, but also medical research and health servic-
es. Besides the overall concentration of public and private R & D institutions 
and the culture and media industry in Berlin, the life sciences sector is a real 
strong point of Berlin’s regional economy. However, this sector’s prospects 
are being threatened by the new Berlin government’s intention to make se-
vere cuts in the funding of the city’s large public medical research centers as 
part of a policy which deals with the city’s extreme financial crisis in a very 
short-sighted manner.
As regards the Berlin media industry, its growth dynamics stems to a large 
extent from the city’s “cultural capital” (Krätke 2002a) and from its locational 
attractiveness in terms of being a prime center in all of the cultural economy’s 
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activities, which can’t be reduced to the media industry’s technology-intensive 
activities. Since the Berlin government holds on to a technology-centered vision 
of urban economic fortunes (Senat Berlin 1999; Krätke and Borst 2000), it only 
recognizes the technologically innovative sub-sectors of the media industry like 
multimedia firms as strong points of Berlin’s economy. From a broader per-
spective on the city’s cultural economy, other important actors of the region’s 
cultural production cluster such as the large number of creativity boosting cul-
tural establishments are being threatened today by the urban government’s 
policy of sharp financial cuts in order to deal with Berlin’s financial crisis. 
This financial policy also affects the Berlin universities in a quite destructive 
manner. Today, the financial collapse is directly damaging the city’s science 
base – particularly the public education and research institutions – and indi-
rectly threatening the prospects of Berlin’s innovative clusters and the city’s 
most dynamic fields of economic activity: the current urban government’s fi-
nancial policy is undermining the city’s real economic capacities in knowledge- 
and innovation-intensive fields of activity. Thus the notion of a worst practice 
urban governance does not only apply to the period in which the city’s financial 
collapse has been “produced,” but also to the urban government’s current ap-
proach to “managing” the financial crisis at the expense of the Berlin citizens 
and the prospects of the city’s few islands of growth in the creative economy 
and other knowledge-intensive activity branches.
Altogether, there are many reasons for a strategic re-orientation of Berlin’s 
economic development policy. Such a re-orientation is being hindered by the 
catastrophic effects of Berlin’s financial crisis. In a nutshell, Berlin’s political 
class represented the “city of talents” with strong talents in corruption and self-
service mentality, and the current urban government’s financial policy is dam-
aging the city’s real economic capacities in knowledge- and innovation-inten-
sive fields of activity. The future prospects of a metropolis like Berlin depend 
on the quality of the city’s development strategies. In view of the particular kind 
of talent and mentality of Berlin’s political class, the prospects for high quality 
urban governance in the fields of economic, social and cultural development 
are not as good as the citizens of Berlin would like to expect.
CONCLUSION
In theoretical terms, the case study on Berlin demonstrates that knowledge-
intensive activities and the creative economy are a most important resource 
of urban economic development. However, a flourishing creative and knowl-
edge economy is based on place-specific socio-cultural milieus which posi-
tively combine with the dynamics of cluster formation within the urban eco-
nomic space. Creativity and talent thus depend on the dynamic interplay of 
Berlin on Sale152
economic, socio-cultural and spatial factors, and might become a central basis 
of successful urban development in the future. This might particularly apply 
to those large cities which are currently suffering from a decline of their tradi-
tional industrial base in labour- and technology-intensive economic activities. 
With regard to the specific socio-cultural base of the creative and knowledge 
economy, the concentration of knowledge-intensive activity and creative forces 
within the urban and regional system is highly selective, so that only a cer-
tain number of particular cities and metropolises (i.e. those with “attractive” 
socio-cultural properties) can draw on the creative economy as a focus of their 
development strategy. 
At the same time, the Berlin case study demonstrates the ambiguity of the 
notion of creativity and talent: “Talented people” may also function as devel-
opers of weapons of mass destruction, or as creators of economically and fi-
nancially destructive policies etc. “Creativity” can be directed in socially and 
economically productive efforts as well as in socially negative and economically 
destructive activities. Within a particular city or region, both extremes of crea-
tive action might be followed at the same time by different social actors. The 
outcome will depend on the balance of these forces. The Berlin case makes 
clear that the creative potential of its political class has been concentrated on fi-
nancial self-service and the creation of instruments for an unleashed real estate 
business with active participation of public financial corporations. This “worst 
practice” urban governance not only led to the city’s financial breakdown, but 
turns out to become a threat to the development prospects of the city’s strong 
points which are evident particularly in the concentration of creative talents in 
diverse sub-sectors of the “creative economy” and further knowledge-intensive 
activities. Here we might draw the conclusion that a city needs coherence of its 
creative potential in terms of a socially productive interplay between the eco-
nomic, social and political actors. This would be a prerequisite for high quality 
urban governance and a development strategy which bets on the urban econo-
my’s strong points and consciously supports the related socio-cultural factors 
of urban economic development. 
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The Uneven Development     
of Berlin’s Housing Provision 
Institutional Investment and Its Consequences 
on the City and Its Tenants1
Sabina Uffer
INTRODUCTION
Following reunification, the decision to re-establish Berlin as Germany’s cap-
ital created expectations that the city could become another nodal point for 
the European or global economy. Anticipating Berlin (re-)acquisition of world 
city status, developers, expecting a growing demand for office and commercial 
space, considered the city an excellent investment opportunity (Cochrane and 
Jonas 1999). This created, in the early 1990s, what Strom (2001: 7) called a “gold 
rush mentality.” At the same time, Berlin’s government invested heavily into 
the construction and modernization of the city’s housing stock, especially in 
East Berlin. The government promoted the construction of both new social and 
private housing with subsidies and tax deductions. The growth expectations for 
Berlin, however, were exaggerated, and the city soon struggled with increasing 
financial difficulties due to political, economic, and demographic changes. In 
1995, Berlin had a debt of around 23 billion Euros that was rapidly increasing 
(Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen 2010).
Within this context, the government radically changed its housing provision 
strategy. Housing in Berlin was traditionally provided by either small private 
landlords or by non-profit housing companies that worked under the principle 
of the “common public interest” (Gemeinnützigkeit). These companies were 
owned by churches, unionized companies, housing co-operatives, and in large 
part by the state. The portfolio of Berlin’s state-owned housing companies con-
1 | Source: Uffer, S. (2013) Wohnungsprivatisierung in Berlin. Investitionsstrategien 
und ihre Konsequenzen für die Stadt und ihre Bewohner. In Holm, A. (ed.) Reclaim Berlin. 
Soziale Kämpfe in der neoliberalen Stadt. Assoziation A, Berlin/Hamburg, for thcoming.
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sisted predominantly of modernist housing estates built in the 1920s and 1930s 
and of post-war developments built from the 1950s onwards. The state-owned 
housing companies however also acquired some late 19th-century block develop-
ments in order to renovate them. After reunification, the housing stock built 
under the German Democratic Republic (GDR) regime was passed into the 
ownership of newly created state-owned housing companies, rapidly expand-
ing the state-owned housing stock. In 1991, after reunification, Berlin owned 
a total of 19 housing companies, and through them 28 percent of Berlin’s 1.72 
million housing units (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2002). Starting 
in 1995, Berlin’s government began to privatize the state-owned housing stock, 
reducing it to 15.8 percent by the end of 2008 (Investitionsbank Berlin 2010). 
Exacerbated by the state’s withdrawal from housing provision (e.g. aban-
donment of social housing construction, reduction of housing allowance), the 
privatization of state-owned housing had significant consequences on Berlin’s 
urban development, its housing, and its tenants. This chapter investigates 
these consequences by asking how the privatization led to increasing socio-
spatial inequality. First, the chapter argues that the government’s privatization 
strategy favored the entrance of institutional investors over alternative housing 
providers. Second, it shows how these investors have re-shaped Berlin’s hous-
ing market by selectively upgrading some inner-city neighborhoods on the one 
hand and contributed to a deteriorating housing quality for socially disadvan-
taged tenants on the other.
PRIVATIZ ATION OF STATE-OWNED HOUSING AND THE ENTR ANCE 
OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
When Berlin’s government started to privatize its state-owned housing stock 
in the mid-1990s, it instructed the state-owned housing companies to sell 15 
percent of its stock, preferably to its tenants. This however turned out to be 
more difficult than expected. In former East Berlin, privatization happened 
relatively quickly; 80 percent of the privatized units went to institutional inves-
tors and only a few were sold to existing tenants. In former West Berlin by con-
trast, privatization went slowly, but 75 percent of the privatized units were sold 
to existing tenants (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2002). Since the 
emphasis of the privatization process was on generating the highest possible 
income in the shortest possible amount of time, the government accelerated the 
privatization process between 1998 and 2007 when it sold two of its housing 
companies owning approximately 40,000 and 60,000 units respectively. In 
addition, state-owned housing companies sold entire housing estates en bloc. 
Thus, in contrast to privatization processes in other European countries, 
where privatization predominantly promoted the increase in owner-occupa-
 Uf fer: The Uneven Development of Berlin’s Housing Provision 157
tion, such as the right-to-buy policy in the UK (Murie 1976), or the promotion 
of home ownership in the Netherlands (Aalbers 2004), Berlin’s privatization 
process happened foremost en bloc. This affected who was willing and able to 
buy the housing stock. The en bloc selling promoted institutional investors as 
purchasers for several reasons. Only institutional investors have the financial 
capacity to provide the necessary equity for en bloc purchases. The fact that the 
government wanted to make the highest profit possible reinforced the institu-
tional investors’ position vis-à-vis other possible purchasers, since they could 
bid higher than other forms of ownership with lower access to capital such as, 
for example, housing co-operatives. At the same time, institutional investors 
are particularly interested in buying an entire housing company or an entire 
estate. On the one hand, buying entire housing companies or housing estates, 
they could negotiate discount prices for the individual housing units (see also 
Holm 2010). On the other hand, it was an opportunity to increase management 
efficiency through economies of scale. Institutional investors do not have an 
interest in buying a single apartment, because it would not be worth the effort. 
Being able to buy a housing estate, institutional investors saw an opportunity 
to efficiently modernize and manage the housing units.
The entrance of institutional investors into Berlin’s housing market was 
also triggered by changes in global financial markets. After the stock market 
crash in 2000, most central banks in developed countries drastically decreased 
interest rates, flooding “their economies with more financial liquidity, in order 
to prevent recessions” (Downs 2009: 8). In this financial environment, real 
estate increasingly became a target for financial investors for two main reasons: 
First, the profitability of real estate is “greatest when interest rates are low and 
money can be borrowed easily” (Downs 2009: 8) which was the case at the 
time. Second, because financial investors suffered “from excessive exposure 
to the volatile technology market” in the late 1990s (Falzon et al. 2003: 68), 
they increasingly turned towards the supposedly “safe harbor” of real estate 
(Winograd 2004: 200; see also Rottke 2004). The en bloc privatization in Ber-
lin happened exactly at a time when financial investors entered real estate mar-
kets, matching these investors’ demand. The combination of the effects of local 
regulation and global accumulation strategies created the perfect storm. The 
process of privatization was therefore accelerated by the global economic condi-
tions at the time. The specific conditions of the local housing market, however, 
influenced the way financial investors operated in Berlin’s housing market.
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN BERLIN’S HOUSING MARKE T
In Berlin’s housing market, institutional investment has primarily taken place 
via real estate private equity funds. The hybrid of real estate and private equity 
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presents a good investment opportunity since it combines the relative stability 
of real estate with the “opportunity for high degrees of value creation” in private 
equity (Falzon et al. 2003: 78). Investment banks, investment houses or other 
real estate players create and manage funds by collecting money from insti-
tutional investors (Linneman 2004). Investment banks often also contribute 
equity to the fund in order to stimulate the confidence of institutional investors 
(Rottke 2004). With credit capital from a bank, these funds then invest directly 
in real estate like housing estates or indirectly through shareholding of hous-
ing companies.
A central strategy for investors is to enter the market at the right time, when 
there is an expectation to increase yields by upward rents on the capital invest-
ment. This means that the optimal entry point occurs when prices are lowest 
and are due to rise, using inequalities in the real estate market cycle (Rottke 
2004). Investors speculated on Berlin as a rising housing market despite the 
general macro-economic situation not being very favorable at the beginning of 
the 2000s with a stagnating economy including high unemployment rates and 
little purchasing power. In 2004, 17.7 percent of Berlin’s population was still 
unemployed (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2009). The income of Ber-
lin’s population, an average of 15,000 Euros per person per year, is significantly 
lower than in other German cities (Investitionsbank Berlin 2009).2 Moreover, 
income levels have not increased significantly over the last ten years.
This speculation on a rising market was propelled by several factors: First, 
low rent levels combined with a relatively high fluctuation rate of 9.4 percent 
in 2003 (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2005) was considered inter-
esting; it was an opportunity to increase rent levels through modernization. 
Second, the extreme predominance of a rental market created hopes for the 
potential increase in owner-occupation through the re-selling of single housing 
units. And third, because there was no new construction,3 the expectation was 
that the supply could not keep up with the anticipated demand. The expected 
rise in demand for housing was, however, not the only factor motivating inves-
tors. 
While at the end of the 1990s, investment was still made primarily by Ger-
man investment firms, Berlin’s housing market experienced a veritable hype 
from 2004 onwards when one of the world’s leading investment firms entered 
the market and created a herd-like movement of international investment 
2 | Hamburg 24,000 Euros; Munich 22,000 Euros; Germany 18,000 Euros (Investiti-
onsbank Berlin 2009).
3 | While from the early until the mid-1990s, approximately 12,000 housing units were 
built a year, only approximately 3,600 housing units a year were built between 2005 
and 2008. This is approximately 0.2 percent of Berlin’s housing stock with 1.89 million 
dwellings (Investitionsbank Berlin 2010).
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firms. The investment hype fostered self-reinforced speculation to make capi-
tal gains because the demand for buying real estate was higher than the offer. 
For these investors, the demand for the use of housing did not play a signifi-
cant role. More importantly, it was the availability of cheap credit capital that 
fostered the increase in price speculation. Specific housing market conditions 
such as vacancy rates were therefore mostly irrelevant. The projected return 
was therefore simply a speculation on the increase of value due to an increasing 
demand for investment. 
STR ATEGIES OF INVESTORS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
ON BERLIN’S HOUSING MARKE T
The real estate industry (see, for example, Rottke 2004; Falzon et al. 2003) 
theoretically distinguishes different types of real estate private equity funds 
based on the target return coupled with the degree of risk involved. In reality, 
the different investment strategies are not as easily distinguishable. Fund man-
agers adjusted their strategies according to the prevailing market situation. In 
order to understand the various consequences that different investment strat-
egies had on Berlin’s housing provision, the following section distinguishes 
between two different strategies that could be observed among funds operating 
in Berlin’s housing market during 2008 and 2009: funds with a value added 
strategy and funds with an opportunistic strategy.
THE VALUE ADDED STR ATEGY
Funds with a value added strategy are generally following a middle range risk 
strategy, financing their investment with up to 70 percent equity. Pursuing 
yearly returns of 10-15 percent of equity invested, value added investment funds 
optimize their rental income through the appreciation of property with devel-
opment potential to rent or sell the property at a higher price (Brueggeman and 
Fisher 2008). Property has development potential if the incoming cash flow 
(i.e. rent, government subsidies) is greater than the funding costs (i.e. interest 
rates on borrowing) and management costs; or if the potential profit when sell-
ing the housing is judged to be high enough. The determining factors for this 
evaluation are the location and the quality of the housing, the tenure structure 
and the credit conditions (Whitehead 1999). 
Funds, which bought housing in Berlin with the aim to create added value, 
cherry-picked housing estates with development potential. This was perfectly 
logical and sensible from their point of view and Berlin’s housing market of-
fered the conditions to do so. Value added investment funds selected good qual-
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ity housing estates in attractive locations for their investment, predominantly 
in late 19th-century block developments and housing estates from the 1920s and 
1930s. The rent gap between the existing rent level and the possible rent in-
crease after modernization or refurbishment shaped the investment decision. 
A principal of an investment firm described the selection process for invest-
ment:
“We look where in the city we invest. We look if it is centrally located, how good the 
infrastructure is, and if there is a potential for increasing the rent level. We only invest 
in the property if we know that we can realize higher rents afterwards.” (Principal of an 
investment firm)
In the cases where the investment fund bought an entire state-owned housing 
company, it inevitably also acquired housing with less or no development poten-
tial. In these cases, the value added funds divested the housing units without 
development potential. The portfolio manager of a privatized company con-
firmed this selective portfolio strategy, illustrating the influence of the physical 
outcome and the rent levels for the different types of housing:
“We clearly invest in a way to make capital improvements. This means, we increase the 
rent levels, we lower the vacancy rates and we invest where we see potential for appre-
ciation and divest where there is no potential for appreciation.” (Portfolio manager of a 
private housing company)
The value added funds therefore sold post-war high-rise developments in dis-
advantaged or unpopular areas where investment costs were often deemed too 
high for making capital improvements. The value added strategy had also con-
sequences on the management and exchange of housing.
Reducing Management Costs
In order to increase cash flow from rental income, value added investment funds 
optimize management of the housing by creating efficiency models. This can 
be achieved by reorganizing the management, such as through more flexible 
working contracts for the employees within the housing company and reducing 
tenant services. This is evident in cases where funds bought an entire housing 
company and “also own the claim on the creativity and execution skills of the 
people at the company” (Linneman 2004: 115; Rottke 2004), meaning that the 
fund has the ability to take over the team, restructure it, or make it redundant. 
Restructuring of personnel could especially be observed when the second 
state-owned housing company was privatized in 2004. Shortly after its privati-
zation, the housing company had undergone major restructuring of personnel; 
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the new board of directors exchanged managers and a new wage model was 
introduced, promoting flexible work hours (Holm 2010). The same mechanism 
also took place in the cases where the state-owned housing companies priva-
tized an estate and the state-owned housing company transferred the manage-
ment team for the particular estate along with the estate.
The reduction of personnel within the housing companies created a dete-
rioration vis-à-vis customer liaison and support. Traditionally, tenants had a 
direct link to the state-owned housing company that was on-site with a service 
center. The privatized housing companies have centralized the service centers 
or reduced their business hours. Increasingly, the tenant organization received 
complaints from tenants.
“The reduction of access for tenants has been taken negatively by tenants. It has to be 
said that the state-owned housing companies were also not optimal in their manage-
ment. However, the service has definitely deteriorated [with the privatization]. That is 
obvious, because the housing company has reduced the personnel and has rented out 
the former service centers to generate more income through commercial rents.” (Depu-
ty managing director of an umbrella tenant organization)
The reduction of services also affected the privatized companies’ commitment 
to support the neighborhood and its activities. While state-owned housing com-
panies had a long tradition of supporting and initiating neighborhood activities, 
privatized companies often no longer felt responsible for going beyond their 
core business of managing housing. The pressure to reduce costs became very 
apparent. This mechanism is strengthened because while state-owned housing 
companies were traditionally anchored in specific neighborhoods, privatized 
housing companies often re-sold a majority of their housing units in an area 
and therefore no longer felt responsible to support the area. The consequence 
of the diversification of owners in a neighborhood is therefore an increasing 
lack of responsiveness on the part of the owners. The head of public relations of 
a privatized company confirmed the reduced commitment due to the smaller 
housing stock in the area:
“We do invest in public infrastructure such as playgrounds and parks within the housing 
development. We do that of course not with a philanthropic aim, but with the aim to im-
prove the neighborhood and therefore create positive effects. However, and this is what 
we are criticized for at the moment, we do it within the dimension we feel responsible 
for. And because we are no longer owning 15,000 units in the area, but only 2,000 units, 
our commitment is reduced accordingly.” (Head of public relations of a private housing 
company)
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Increasing Rent Levels
In order to make the investment profitable and achieve their target returns, 
value added investment funds increased rent levels and attracted a clientele 
with a higher socio-economic status after modernizing the housing. The head 
of public relations of a housing company confirmed this:
“We invest in the housing stock and furnish dwellings with attributes that increase the 
quality of the housing, either through energy saving means or through the improvement 
of kitchen, bathrooms, floors, outdoor façade, etc. in order to newly place them on the 
market, mostly in a higher segment.” (Head of public relations of a private housing 
company)
The possibility to increase rent levels however greatly depends on the hous-
ing and rent regulation. Two points are important to understand here: First, 
rent regulations only apply to existing tenant agreements. While vacancy rates 
were already relatively high due to the substandard housing conditions in the 
old housing stock, investors created even higher vacancy rates by announcing 
modernization projects. Tenants often did not want to bear lengthy renovation 
periods so they moved out before it started. This suited investors well because 
they were not tied to any rent regulations for new tenancy agreements, there-
fore allowed to increase rent levels reflecting market conditions. A portfolio 
manager confirmed the benefit of high vacancy rates during renovation:
“Best is of course, if the whole estate is emptied. We had a vacancy rate between 30 
and 50 percent. And of course, we would have preferred to boot out everyone, but that is 
of course not possible. Then you have to deal with the retired and the alcoholics, which 
makes the situation more complex.” (Director of a real estate fund at a bank)
The second point of rent regulation, which is important here, is that investors 
can partly transfer modernization costs onto the rent. This means that even if 
a tenant decided to bear the renovation period and was therefore protected by 
existing rent regulation, the regulatory conditions allow investors to partially 
transfer modernization costs onto rent levels. This created an incentive to mod-
ernize the housing to a high standard. Tenants living in these substandard 
housing units were however often socially disadvantaged and not able to bear 
the higher rent levels after modernization. A district parliamentarian and ur-
ban development consultant summarized the effects on the existing tenants 
when modernization was announced in the neighborhood of a 1930s row de-
velopment:
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“It was already feared and it also happened that after privatization, modernization of 
the estate was announced. […]. It was clear that the now privately owned housing com-
pany wanted to renovate the entire estate and exchange the tenants because the exis-
ting tenant structure was not what the company wanted. It wanted to have a clientele 
that is able to pay higher rents and it wanted to restructure two-room apartments into 
big family homes also with the possibility to sell it af terwards as owner-occupied hou-
sing units. That was catastrophic for the existing tenants, because a high percentage 
of elderly people lived there. […]. A similar high percentage of people on social welfare 
lived in these estates. They were not able to bear the higher rent levels.” (Urban planner, 
member of a district parliament and head of the district’s urban planning commission)
The modernization and increasing rent levels generated two processes of ten-
ant dislocation: On the one hand, the value added investors’ appreciation of 
the housing stock in better locations created a direct displacement of existing 
tenants. On the other hand, it also produced an “exclusionary displacement” 
(Marcuse 1986: 156) whereas households voluntarily vacated, but the barriers 
for new tenants to move into the neighborhood were heightened. The barri-
ers were however not only heightened through increasing rent levels, but also 
through particular allocation strategies.
E xcluding Low Income Households
Value added investment funds upgraded their housing stock not only physical-
ly, but also socially. They intentionally excluded disadvantaged households with 
a selective allocation strategy. A portfolio manager confirmed this strategy:
“We have clearly an allocation strategy, you can’t call it racist, but we do not rent out to 
a single alcoholic for example. I have two letting teams and they have clear instructions 
which profile they should rent out to. We want to have families with children. We are also 
lobbying for a kindergarten nearby. And we have kicked out the pub at the corner of the 
housing estate.” (Director of a real estate fund at a bank)
Similarly to the exclusion of the poor, immigrants were often not welcomed 
in the upgraded housing stock because it could deter German middle class 
families from moving into the area for such reasons as the schooling of their 
children. This mechanism was also confirmed indirectly in an interview:
“The new investors take into account the demand in regards to the German groups who 
wish to live in homogeneous neighborhoods. The investors have tried to create these 
neighborhoods, for example in the row developments. Only middle class households 
that are traditionally anchored and things like that. This minimizes conflicts and creates 
in the investor’s view a stabilized tenant structure which the investor’s housing company 
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also advertises. They argue that they are contributing to an important stability for the 
neighborhood and therefore the city. It however means nothing else than that they di-
splace the problems to other neighborhoods, mostly to those in the outskir ts.” (Deputy 
managing director of an association for housing and urban development)
Value added investment funds have upgraded the housing stock, a task that 
most of the indebted state-owned housing companies were no longer able to 
provide without state subsidies. The privatization process therefore fostered 
the state’s anticipated modernization of the housing stock, however only in the 
market segment where investors saw potential for higher rents to achieve their 
target return. Housing in the lower market segment, for which demand was 
not high enough to make investment profitable was divested or neglected. 
Under the existing market conditions, value added investment funds invest-
ed in the 19th-century block developments and the Twenties and Thirties row 
developments in well-situated areas. It is then also the modernized housing in 
better locations that was most affected by higher rent levels and dislocation of 
tenants. The anticipated modernization legitimated the exclusion of the poor 
and vulnerable tenants. The modernization therefore was not for the benefit of 
the existing tenants, but only for the wealthier ones in future.
THE OPPORTUNISTIC STR ATEGY
Compared to value added funds, opportunistic investment funds target high-
er returns within a relatively short time span. In order to achieve their target 
return of 20 percent or more, opportunistic funds’ main yield strategy is fi-
nancial leveraging (Rottke 2004). Financial leveraging is the profit that occurs 
when the interest rate is lower than the return on the total investment in a 
property. Thus, “[i]f the return on the total investment invested in a property is 
greater than the rate of interest on the debt, the return on equity is magnified” 
(Brueggeman and Fisher 2008: 348). If this is the case, investing with high 
credit capital and low equity is advantageous because it increases the return 
on equity. This has the effect that profit is to a great part not resulting from 
a particular investment project, but from the degree of credit capital on the 
investment (Rottke 2004). 
Opportunistic investment funds’ primary objective is to buy cheap and re-
sell at a higher price as soon as possible to make profit on the credit capital. 
Winograd (2004: 205) summarizes the opportunistic strategy: “buy as much as 
they could, leverage it as much as they could, and wait for markets to recover.” 
As soon as the investment target is achieved, the housing is re-sold to another 
investor. These funds are more specialized in the trading aspect of real estate 
than in the management side. Often, they do not have in-house real estate ex-
 Uf fer: The Uneven Development of Berlin’s Housing Provision 165
pertise, but are solely financial engineers. This has consequences for the hous-
ing and its tenants.
In Berlin at the beginning of the 2000s, the availability of housing at low 
prices combined with easy credit promoted investment from opportunistic 
funds. They bought housing estates from state-owned housing companies, but 
also from value added investment funds that divested the housing units with-
out development potential. They did not analyze the specific housing condi-
tions: Location, the quality, or regulatory issues were neglected at purchase.
“For opportunistic investors, things like preservation orders, rent regulations or dif fi-
culties with existing tenants are negligible details. They almost never appear in Excel-
Spreadsheets. Investors did not look at these details, they saw the cheap housing and 
the cheap money and they wanted to enter the Berlin market.” (Director of a real estate 
fund at a bank)
Linneman (2004: 126) explains this neglect of the housing conditions: “In fact, 
even a property with little or no residual value can still be extremely valuable.” 
While credit was easily available and demand for investment high, opportunis-
tic funds could count on the ‘bigger fool’, another investor that buys at an even 
higher price. The investment therefore was pure financial speculation, based 
on the assumption that the investment hype will continue. 
Opportunistic investment funds bought post-war high-rise developments 
in the outskirts of Berlin, because it was cheap in comparison to older and 
more centrally located housing. These post-war high-rise developments were 
often still locked into the social housing subsidies, which meant that rent levels 
could only be raised according to pre-determined levels. Upgrading for higher 
rent levels was therefore not profitable. Opportunistic funds were therefore de-
termined to minimize costs in order to increase the leverage effect.
Neglecting Maintenance
In some post-war developments, opportunistic investment funds did not make 
necessary repairs as they waited for the opportunity to resell. Instead, they cut 
caretaker jobs replacing them with cheaper cleaning personnel. The opportu-
nistic investment funds allowed already problematic housing estates to further 
deteriorate. A district counselor confirmed this process for one of the cases 
analyzed:
“The estate has been rundown. The caretaker jobs were cut. The investor’s policy is a 
dif ferent one than the one of the state-owned housing company that owned the estate 
before.” (District counselor for social welfare, housing and environment)
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They also reduced customer service to a higher extent than the value added 
investment funds. In contrast to the efficient management of value added in-
vestment funds, opportunistic investment funds were less dependent on rental 
income due to their short-term strategy. The effects in regards to the mainte-
nance and services were therefore more dramatic compared to the ones of value 
added investment. This is in stark contradiction with the state’s intention to 
trigger renovation of the housing which could not be stemmed by the state-
owned housing companies.
The deterioration of the housing estate affected the everyday life of the resi-
dents. Living in a run down estate became increasingly unpleasant, especially 
when garbage was no longer collected and staircases no longer cleaned.
“When the estate was privatized the lack of cleaning of the estate became unbearable. 
It was so dir ty in the communal areas outside and inside the estate. For weeks there was 
no cleaning, so that the tenants star ted to ask why they still pay rent. Now, the property 
manager emphasizes the fact that he newly employed these cleaners. However, these 
are not real caretakers.” (Project director of a neighborhood management team)
This neglect however, generated higher vacancy rates, which had to be reduced, 
especially once the market collapsed due to the financial crisis in 2008 and op-
portunistic funds could no longer sell the properties. Rent levels were therefore 
lowered and letting strategies were aggressively targeting low-income house-
holds.
Reducing Vacancy Rates
Due to the neglect towards the condition of the housing estate, vacancy rates 
rose. When the credit market however collapsed after 2008, investors had to 
seek ways of serving their credit line and the reduction of vacancy rates became 
crucial to the new strategy. The managing director of the responsible property 
management firm confirmed that the investment fund sought a rapid re-sell 
but had to reorient its strategy due to the crisis:
“Because of the banking crisis at the moment, the plan to re-sell has been modified, 
because the price that the investor aimed for is not achievable. No investor is currently 
able to get the credit for paying such a price. This is why the investor decided to go for 
a longer-term strategy. That means we have to ensure that the credit line can be served 
and therefore we need to have the estate fully rented in order to deal with the current 
situation.” (Managing director of a property management firm) 
Since the estates were poorly maintained, opportunistic investors ran into diffi-
culties attracting new tenants and achieve a full occupancy rate. They were also 
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not able to increase their income streams through higher rent levels due to the 
depressed situation in these lower market segments. Opportunistic investors 
therefore created what Holm (2010) calls “discount housing.” Because they had 
to reduce vacancy rates in order to increase their income streams, they also ac-
cepted lower rent levels. The director of a property management company con-
firmed their attempt to reduce vacancy rates, even accepting lower rent levels: 
“We aim at a vacancy rate of five percent. This is however very dif ficult. We have to work 
hard for it and we have to move away from a strategy with high rents. We say, we want to 
rent out the apartment to generate a rental income stream and if we can’t get 5 Euros, 
we have to accept 4.80 Euros [per square meter and month].” (Managing director of a 
property management firm)
This shows how rent levels depend on specific market dynamics and the type 
of housing within this market. Privatization of state-owned housing does not 
necessarily foster increased rent levels in the privatized housing stock. The 
particular way in which opportunistic investment funds financed their invest-
ments contrasts with an expectation that private-led housing contributes to 
higher rents. The analysis shows that opportunistic funds also provide housing 
for the socially disadvantaged. However, they are motivated by the possibility of 
decreasing vacancy rates and not by any social responsibilities they feel towards 
their tenants.
Attracting Low-income Households
Opportunistic investment funds increasingly also applied letting strategies 
specifically targeting low-income households to lower their vacancy rates. The 
fund hired an external agency in order to reach higher occupancy rates. The 
letting agency, paid on the basis of the amount of housing units rented, pur-
sued an aggressive letting strategy, advertising the apartment specifically to 
people with a poor credit history and promised new tenants three month’s rent 
free and a voucher of 200 Euros redeemable at a home improvement store (Du 
Chesne Immobilien GmbH 2009). A district head of a tenant association heav-
ily criticized this strategy:
“Other owners get also better-off tenants, but they are committed to get the better-off 
ones. It is simpler to get the apartments filled by advertising it with strategies like hand-
ing out 250 Euro vouchers for Media Market.4 This is how they get the apartments full. 
However, this is not sustainable because as fast as these people move in, the better-off 
ones become angry and move out just as fast.” (District head of a tenant association)
4 | A famous media chain store in Germany.
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The tenants who moved into the housing estate were those who did not have ac-
cess to other market segments. Often, these tenants received benefit payment. 
The job center, in charge of benefits for people on social welfare, guarantees 
rent payment and therefore created further incentives for the opportunistic 
fund to rent to tenants on welfare. Often, the tenants who had no access to 
other market segments were also immigrants:
“In the last year, thanks to the letting agency, we had an increased influx of Roma. They 
were not in one apartment but in four apartments and that was enough. This year, the-
re is an increased influx of Arab families, many among them very religious. We have a 
mosque nearby, which is observed by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Cons-
titution. These are all things that cause distress.” (Project director of a neighborhood 
management team)
The influx of different nationalities and ethnic groups also affected the every-
day life of other tenants, creating conflicts within the estate because of their 
different degrees of integration into German society:
“It is dir tier and louder in the estate, there is a complete indif ference towards it. All 
problems we had before [privatization], but not to such an extent. And the arrival of 
the Roma families last year created conflicts because they released a wave of grudges 
among other immigrants because they do not speak German. And in comparison to the 
Turkish people who move here and who have to show that they attend a language course 
[because they are non-EU citizens], the Roma [as EU citizens] do not have to do this. 
They rented an apartment and thir ty people lived in it. The staircase was used as a toilet 
and they drank without limits.” (Project director of a neighborhood management team)
The concentration of the more vulnerable tenants in certain areas of the city is 
a common phenomenon (van Kempen and Priemus 2002). Particularly in the 
cases observed in Berlin is that the concentration of the socially disadvantaged 
is not solely generated through their displacement from inner city housing. 
Concentration is actively created through the opportunistic investment funds’ 
specific investment, management, and exchange strategies.
CONCLUSION
This chapter investigated the privatization of Berlin’s state-owned housing 
stock and its consequences for Berlin’s housing provision. The government’s 
privatization of state-owned housing companies and housing estates happened 
pre-dominantly en bloc. The process fostered the entrance of institutional in-
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vestors who followed diverging investment strategies, therefore creating greater 
social and spatial inequalities. 
Value added funds selectively upgraded housing with development poten-
tial in order to place the housing units in a higher market segment. The in-
creased rent levels coupled with a very selective allocation strategy followed 
by added value funds created enclaves of neighborhoods occupied by tenants 
with a high socio-economic status. This selective investment in housing with 
development potential and the divestment or abandonment of housing without 
potential starkly contrasts with an expectation that housing companies invest 
in all types of housing equally. 
In contrast to value added funds, opportunistic investment funds depend-
ed on financial leveraging to achieve their target return. They purchased the 
cheapest, often problematic, housing estates, financed them with high debt 
rates and re-sold them as quickly as possible for a higher price. In a market 
situation, where demand was only increasing for housing in the better neigh-
borhoods, the opportunistic funds’ applied aggressive letting strategies with 
the imperative to serve their credit lines through decreasing vacancy rates. This 
fostered a concentration of socially disadvantaged tenants that have no access in 
the housing stock to better neighborhoods.
The government’s en bloc privatization with the aim to make the highest 
profit possible favored institutional investment funds as purchasers of the for-
mer state-owned housing. Alternative forms of ownership, such as co-opera-
tives or owner-occupation were largely neglected. A balanced development was 
tipped in favor of attracting capital and against tenants, especially the more 
vulnerable ones. This was expected. The outcomes of this privatization process 
were however profoundly unequal.
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Berlin’s Gentrification Mainstream
Andrej Holm
In recent years gentrification in Berlin has become central to political debates 
and media reports covering urban development in the city. More than this, 
“gentrification” has become a matter of everyday-conversations and the gentri-
fication “diagnosis” seems to be possible in different urban contexts. Nowadays, 
both in political and everyday conversations, more or less all inner-city neigh-
borhoods are somehow placed into the framework of the gentrification debate: 
Prenzlauer Berg is portrayed as showcase for family gentrification, Mitte as 
one of the most obvious examples for touristification, Kreuzberg and Neukölln 
stand for the invasion of international creative pioneers, and Wedding is high-
lighted as the eternal candidate for the next urban hot spot. 
However, the fact that urban upgrading has become universal should not 
necessarily be interpreted as a simple expansion of gentrification in a wholesale 
way. As a matter of fact, the differences between the historical trajectories of 
gentrification in different neighborhoods is immense, and Berlin is rather a 
paradigmatic example for the manifold variations that urban upgrading can 
take (Lees et al. 2008: 129  ff.). In Berlin, various characteristic phases and 
many of the contemporary forms of gentrification can be examined. 
Thus, at first sight, Berlin seems to be a laboratory for all the variations of 
gentrifications one knows from the international literature: the boom of luxury 
housing estates could thus be interpreted as “new build gentrification” (Da-
vidson and Lees 2005; Marquardt et al. 2012) or “super gentrification” (Lees 
2003; Butler and Lees 2006); the displacement pressure resulting from the 
gap between long term rental agreements and new contract rents can be seen 
as yet another example for “rental gentrification” (van Criekingen 2010); the 
transformation of rental housing into boarding houses and holiday flats can be 
seen as “tourism gentrification” (Gotham 2005) and so on. But gentrification is 
not just a “global urban strategy” (Smith, 2002) which operates with the same 
dynamics and leads to the same patterns and outcomes all across the world. 
Quite in contrast, gentrification is highly embedded into place-specific contexts 
and frameworks. Therefore, the varieties of gentrification that can be found in 
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Berlin point towards the need to put the local planning histories into the center 
of explanation and to make varying locally conditions in real estate markets and 
changes in urban political regulations central to the analysis. 
The article proceeds as follows: The first section discusses specificities of 
Berlin’s housing market, which form the background for gentrification in this 
city. This is followed by an overview about the course and the dynamics that 
gentrification in the German capital displayed in the last two decades. The 
subsequent sections sketch the state of gentrification in three different neigh-
borhoods, showing immense differences and arguing that these can only be 
explained by taking the different regulatory histories of the respective areas 
into account. I conclude by arguing for a view that acknowledges “many” gen-
trifications, instead of a single, universal process.
BERLIN’S HOUSING MARKE T
In contrast to many cities in the English-speaking world, Berlin’s housing mar-
ket is dominated by rental housing. Only 14 percent of the overall housing stock 
is used by owner occupants, the rest is rentals. More than 60 percent of the 
rental sector is owned and managed by private property owners and companies, 
including 150,000 housing units of institutional investors. Around 24 percent 
are held by public housing associations or housing cooperatives.
For a long time Berlin was perceived as a city with low rents and living costs, 
especially when compared to other German and European cities. And indeed, av-
erage rental prices for housing stayed about the same from the early 1990s until 
2005. The main reasons for this were substantial public investments and subsidy 
programs, a high level of construction activities in the early 1990s, a sizable seg-
ment of public and social housing and strong rent regulations in the 1990s. All 
these factors contributed to a housing system which was much less vulnerable to 
market dynamics. As a consequence, gentrification could only slowly gain ground 
and was until around 2005 only discussed within the context of specific neighbor-
hood transformations in parts of East Berlin (such as Prenzlauer Berg or Mitte).
This has completely changed. Berlin’s rent levels are definitely on the up 
now and despite the still sobering overall economic situation the city shows the 
most intensive rent increases in Germany. The main reason for this is a shift 
in Berlin’s urban and housing policies: since the turn of the millennium, sub-
sidies for building and renovations provided by the city have been completely 
cut. Additionally, a serious decrease of new-built activities, in combination with 
a rising number of households, led to massive pressure on the housing market. 
With regard to the budgetary crisis of the city, more than 220,000 public hous-
ings units (or half of the public stock) were privatized, and the stock of social 
housing was reduced from 370,000 units in 1993 to less than 150,000 in 2012. 
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At the same time, existing rent regulations and planning restrictions on new 
construction were lifted, and a broad array of planning procedures deregulated.
As a consequence of these simultaneous developments, rents are on the up 
in all housing segments in recent years. On average, since 2003, rents for exist-
ing contracts increased by around 23 percent, with inner city neighborhoods 
being above this average. However, rent increases for new rental contracts are 
considerably higher, so that tenants who look for a new apartment today will 
have to pay twice as much as five years ago. 
BERLIN’S GENTRIFICATION CYCLE
In the course of this development, gentrification has become the dominant trend 
for the development of most inner city neighborhoods in Berlin. This “main-
streaming” of gentrification has led to a situation in which the process cannot be 
meaningfully described on the neighborhood scale anymore. Quite in contrast, 
in order to understand the interrelations and dynamics of gentrification, it is 
necessary to widen the observer’s perspective and include the relations between 
different neighborhoods into the picture. Such a bird’s eye view makes it easier to 
identify gentrification dynamics in various phases and places and allows a closer 
look at exclusion dynamics even between less well-established social groups.
Figure 1: Spatial Differentiation of Gentrification in Inner City 
Neighborhoods in Berlin (2009)
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With this knowledge of various forms and phases of gentrification happen-
ing in the city both at different times and in different places as well, one can 
observe gentrification in large parts of Berlin’s inner city and at the same time 
emphasize differences. Thus, while new building projects in the already up-
graded neighborhoods in Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg indicate an intensified 
phase of gentrification, gentrification in Friedrichshain is still a matter of hous-
ing renovations. At the same time, Kreuzberg and northern Neukölln exhibit 
classical forms of symbolic gentrification and are currently experiencing a “pio-
neer phase” in which an in-migration of “creatives” and rising rent prices can 
be studied.
With this background, Berlin’s inner city restructuring is shaped by a spa-
tial expansion of gentrification, but also by a side presence of different phases of 
gentrification and by a circulation of the current epicenters of gentrification. For 
example, the concentration of pioneer locations (such as clubs, galleries, sub-
cultural bookstores) has shifted from Mitte to Prenzlauer Berg to Friedrichs- 
hain in a clockwise movement through the city, reaching Kreuzberg and even 
parts of Neukölln within the last few years (see Holm 2011).
Figure 2: Spatial Dynamic of Pioneer Locations in Inner City 
Neighborhoods in Berlin (1987-2009)
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The spatial dynamics of Berlin’s inner city upgrading thus indicate a stepwise 
process that is characterized by diverse waves of upgrading taking place si-
multaneously, yet with a striking spatial and temporal individuality. The clas-
sical sequence in which a pioneer phase is followed by investments into the 
housing stock, resulting in both economic and exclusionary displacement of 
low-income households and eventually followed by a phase of “super-gentrifi-
cation” in which luxury housing becomes prevalent, can in Berlin above all be 
observed in the districts Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg. The district Kreuzberg 
on the contrary hand is characterized by different conditions: here reinvest-
ment came in the 1980s already and is only now followed by an intensive in-
flux of pioneers and gentrifiers and a second wave of upgrading. In Neukölln, 
again, gentrification was unheard of until very recently and is now proceed-
ing at an astonishing speed, driven by an enormous internationalization of 
in-movers. 
A second characteristic of gentrification processes in Berlin is the step-by-
step spatial expansion of gentrification. Particularly for the pioneer phase, an 
out-and-out migration to the next district every five years or so can be traced 
(see Figure 2). The movements of these gentrification pioneers seem to confirm 
the logic of symbolic gentrification., In districts in their early gentrification 
phase, rental prices rise not only for housing but also for the retail segment, 
so that sub-cultural and interim uses dependent on affordable space move to 
other areas. The establishment of this sort of cultural and sub-cultural use is 
connected to an image shift in the new locations, specifically the development 
of an “artists’ quarter,” “gallery district,” or “hip district” in both the media and 
public perception. Whereas a “cultural” argument about the need to constantly 
discover “new” and “authentic” places, can partly explain this movement of 
gentrification, a closer look at the local trajectories reveals that political regula-
tions need to play a central role in the explanation, too.
In the following section, I will discuss central characteristics of gentrifi-
cation in three different neighborhoods, thus thinking through the “many” 
gentrifications in Berlin.
MIT TE AND PRENZL AUER BERG: SUPER-GENTRIFICATION 
THROUGH LUXURY HOUSING PROJECTS
In the last two decades, the historical housing districts in Mitte and Prenzlauer 
Berlin, built in the late 19th century, have become notorious examples of the 
linkages between politically-initiated gentrification, in which there is a formal 
declaration of urban renewal areas, and public support for privately-financed 
modernization with substantial displacement of the original residents (Krajew-
ski 2006; Bernt and Holm 2005; Holm 2006). As a result of the high reno-
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vation quota (around 80 percent of the buildings) scarcely 25 percent of the 
original resident bases still live in the renewal areas (PFE 2008). Sociological 
investigations have demonstrated that the average income level for Prenzlauer 
Berg has increased from 75 percent of the citywide level in 1993 to 140 percent 
of it in 2007. Being among the poorest neighborhoods to be found in Berlin in 
the early 1990s, both Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg have been transformed into 
some of the most affluent today.
However, although gentrification in Prenzlauer Berg is a process that has 
now gone on for about twenty years, its shape changed considerably starting 
around 2005. There are different reasons for this: First, most of the histori-
cal housing stock with renovation potential had already been revalorized, so 
that there were no old buildings left to gentrify. Second, at the same time, the 
zoning declaration of most urban renewal areas in Prenzlauer Berg and Mitte 
expired and the specific legal obligations and instruments, required in the Ger-
man building and planning legislation for this type of area, were annulled. As 
a consequence, as “rent gaps” in the existing building stock were successively 
closed, new opportunities opened up at undeveloped lots. This led to a shift in 
investment strategies towards “new building,” instead of renovation in which 
new building projects have been increasingly undertaken in empty lots and 
open spaces. 
Since 2005, 27 luxury apartment complexes with a total of 1,250 apart-
ments have been constructed or are currently under construction in Mitte and 
Prenzlauer Berg (Holm 2010). These new building projects typically feature 
luxury fittings, are sold as condominium apartments, and can be described as 
luxury housing enclaves. The new residents are predominantly recruited from 
households living in the area, yet with considerable differences compared to 
traditional gentrifiers in Berlin (with regard to the international composition, 
income and occupational structure). While there are no systematic statistics 
on this, data on prices and sales figures as well as media reports give a more or 
less clear picture. The residents portrayed in the press coverage are predomi-
nantly between 35 and 45 years old, live alone or in a domestic partnership, 
with some having one to two children. The residents are depicted as architects, 
media designers, PR spokespersons, administrative employees and manage-
ment consultants (Westphal 2007; Braun 2008). In interviews, the building 
projects’ business and sales managers indicated, without going into further 
detail, that prominent stars from the art and film scenes as well as managers 
of larger companies are included among the new residents. Furthermore, the 
internationality of the future residents was stressed. In the Kastaniengärten 
in Prenzlauer Berg and its next door neighbor project Marthashof, the buyers 
originate from 18 different countries of origin. Apart from new residents from 
the predominantly western European countries, the US and Canada, individu-
als from Argentina were also named. The largest ethnic minorities in Berlin, 
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namely Turkish, Arabic and eastern European households, were not among 
the buyers of the luxury apartments (Holm 2010). The average sale price of 
3,700 Euros per square meter, which is extremely high for the Berlin housing 
market, indicates high income and wealth of the new residents (Marquardt et 
al. 2013).
While this development clearly resonates with what has been termed as 
“super-gentrification” in international debates (“already gentrified, prosperous 
and solidly upper-middle-class neighbourhoods into much more exclusive and 
expensive enclaves,” Lees 2003: 2487), it also needs to be emphasized that it 
does not so much reflect a “natural development” as a specific change in poli-
tics regulating gentrification in Berlin. Here, the boom in luxury housing in al-
ready gentrified neighborhoods like Prenzlauer Berg and Mitte is entirely based 
on the combination of the successive closing of rent gaps in the old housing 
stock with the abolition of administrative restrictions in the field of new build 
constructions. The new build gentrification can therefore not be understood 
without the history of urban renewal policies in East Berlin.
KREUZBERG: RENTAL GENTRIFICATION 
AND “DISPL ACEMENT FROM THE LIFEST YLE”
This is also true for gentrification in Kreuzberg. As in Prenzlauer Berg, gen-
trification in Kreuzberg cannot be understood without taking into account the 
specific history of urban renewal and planning policies in the district. The 
main point here is the historical policy of “careful urban renewal” (behutsame 
Stadterneuerung) which dominated urban development in Kreuzberg since the 
early 1980s (see Bernt 2003). This policy was the outcome of militant protests 
against preceding renewal policies, which had resulted in large-scale demoli-
tions of historical buildings and caused deep-seated civic unrest, manifested 
in more than 100 squatted buildings (Holm and Kuhn 2011). Careful urban 
renewal strategies replaced these policies and implemented a new model of 
renewal based on: a) the preservation of existing structures, b) the preserva-
tion of the social composition of the population; and c) an encouragement 
of citizens’ participation. In terms of economics, the careful urban renewal 
was based on extensive public funds (close to 95 percent of all buildings were 
renovated with the help of public subsidies) and a transfer of land to public 
redevelopers.
With regard to subsequent gentrification this policy had paradoxical effects. 
First, Kreuzberg was restored as a functioning real estate market. A central 
precondition of gentrification was thus only reinstalled with immense public 
intervention. Second, using public subsidies, a basic standard of housing (mod-
ern heating systems, bathrooms, and inside toilet, modern electrical system 
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etc.) was established and implemented in most apartments. This  –  together 
with rent caps – enabled poor households to remain in modernized, high-stan-
dard flats in a central location, so that some of the most attractive housing is 
occupied by some of the poorest residents to be found in Berlin. 
Interestingly, this paradoxical interplay of public policies with private hous-
ing plays a crucial role in the changes that Kreuzberg faces today: twenty years 
after “careful urban renewal” the neighborhood has become a new center of 
gentrification dynamics. In the former urban renewal areas Chamissoplatz, 
Luisenstadt and Wrangelkiez rapid and frequent ownership changes have tak-
en place within the last five years (Unfried 2009; Hunziger 2010), thereby in 
particular international investors have bought up properties (Oellerich 2010). 
The occupancy and price caps for houses that were modernized in the 1980s 
as part of the modernization subsidy program expired with the end of the sub-
sidy phase, usually a period of 15 to 25 years; these houses are now subject to 
general rental law. As a consequence, prices for new rental contracts have risen 
considerably. A market analysis of rental prices in new rental contracts in the 
district showed that Kreuzberg is one of the districts with the smallest supply 
of affordable apartments (IVD 2010). 
The massive welfare state intervention of the careful urban renewal, which 
has preserved the then-present income and resident structures, is now seen 
as a barrier by many property owners. Additionally, this tension between low-
income inhabitants and increasing rent expectations by the landlords creates 
a strong displacement pressure. How is this to be explained? In contrast to 
“modernization” and “new build gentrification” in Prenzlauer Berg, the rent 
gap and the resulting displacement pressure in Kreuzberg is largely based on 
the difference between rent prices in long term rental agreements and in new 
contracts. As a heritage of the careful urban renewal in the 1980s, there is no 
relevant leeway for rent increases in context of modernization. In general, there 
are three ways in which landlords can increase rents. At first rents could in-
crease after a modernization. But the German rent law restricts rent increases 
only for modernization with a substantial upgrading of the level of housing 
facilities. This means there is only a rent gap if the modernizations really add 
a new feature of housing infrastructure and do not simply upgrade the qual-
ity of a still existing standard. A second way to increase rents in long standing 
rental contracts is to bring them in line with the average rent level for similar 
flats. This rent increase is limit to a maximum of 15 percent rent increases ev-
ery three years. The German rent law strongly protects sitting tenants in many 
ways but only imposes marginal controls and restrictions on rent prices in new 
contracts. Much higher rent increases are possible, at third, if landlords close 
new rental contracts. 
Based on the extensive modernization under the conditions of careful re-
newal strategies, Kreuzberg is being faced with “gentrification without mod-
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ernization” today. Because of this missing rent gap in modernization, land-
lords shift there valorization strategies to realized the highest possible used of 
their properties in replacing the tenants to take the much higher rents in new 
contracts. Higher rental prices in new rental agreements are being realized 
by nearly all property owners. Changing ownership increases the exploitation 
pressure even further, since the buyers usually see the buildings as an invest-
ment whose worth should be realized through replacement of former tenants 
in order to close a new contract or rather through the transformation of rental 
properties into sale properties. 
Tenants’ organizations and neighborhood initiatives report regularly about 
plans to transform rental properties into condominiums for sale.1 The close 
connection between residential change, gentrification and new rental con-
tracts is also reflected in statistics: Studies in selected neighborhoods have 
shown that the rental prices in existing rental agreements have risen, and 
that the average rent costs have risen even faster. In the neighborhoods exam-
ined here, Gräfekiez, Luisenstadt and Bergmannstraße (northern part), rents 
increased 23-30 percent between 1999 and 2008. The average rent payment 
in these areas comprises 30 percent of disposable income (TOPOS 2008). Ac-
cording to the results of the study, the recent transformation in Kreuzberg has 
not yet led to a displacement of poor and lower-class residents. Indeed, the pro-
portion of these groups in the overall population has actually risen slightly in 
the last few years; about 30 percent of the households have a monthly income 
under the poverty line. The proportion of households with higher incomes 
has increased simultaneously. Alone in the years between 2005 and 2008, the 
fraction of households with an income more than double the area average rose 
from 5 percent to 20 percent (ibid.). Under these conditions, poor households 
were confronted with an economic displacement pressure by a rising share of 
rent payments per household income. Beyond displacement, a strong reduc-
tion in the housing-per-household-supply indicates the high social costs of the 
rising rental prices. Between 2005 and 2009 alone, the number of housing 
units per 100 households in an area sank from 91 to 83 percent. In the same 
time frame, the overall average housing supply quota for Berlin sank from 
100 to 96 percent (IBB 2006: 71; IBB 2010: 83). According to these figures, 
households in Kreuzberg share an apartment more often than households in 
other parts of the city. This drastic increase suggests a fundamental reduction 
in housing quality due to overcrowding, especially for households with low 
income. In gentrification research, such effects are described as “displacement 
from the lifestyle” (Verdrängung aus dem Lebensstil; Blasius 1994: 408).
1 | See http://36-gegen-mieterhoehung.blogspot.com; http://kreuzberger-horn.blog
spot.com.
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Summarizing, it can be stated that the dynamics of urban upgrading in 
Kreuzberg are mainly driven by the substantial increases in rental prices for new 
rental agreements. Mathieu van Criekingen (2010) described similar gentrifica-
tion processes in the inner-city districts of Brussels as “rental gentrification.” 
NORTHERN NEUKÖLLN: EXPAT ENCL AVISM WITHOUT REGUL ATION
“Rental gentrification” is also an issue for the northern part of Neukölln, yet 
with a greater speed and without Kreuzberg’s history of local state intervention. 
The highly dynamic rental market in Neukölln grounds on an unprecedented 
internationalization, which builds an increasingly important connection be-
tween gentrification in Berlin and worldwide housing markets.
For many years, the old housing neighborhoods of Neukölln counted as 
social problem areas. They are still characterized by one of the highest propor-
tion of immigrants and low-income households in Berlin. The building stock 
is marked by a high proportion of unmodernized properties (Walther and Rit-
terhof 2007: 23 ff.), and undermaintenance of public places is a clearly visible 
problem in the area. For a long time, Neukölln had a particularly bad reputation 
and numerous German publications used the neighborhood as a prominent 
example of the failure of integration, and portrayed it as a “ghetto” plagued 
by crime, decay and anti-social behavior. This has changed completely. In the 
last three to four years, Neukölln has become a new urban hotspot and gained 
an enormous attractiveness for “creative” people worldwide. One of the mostly 
visible part of neighborhood transformation is the functional gentrification in 
terms of a comprehensive change of the local gastronomy. New pubs, coffee 
shops and clubs make the neighborhood more attractive to young, creative and 
cosmopolitan people than for the traditional mix of working-class Turkish, Ara-
bic and Eastern European migrants and the German “underclass.”
These changes were heralded by a fundamental image shift. Thus the Ber-
lin-based city magazine zitty, always a trendsetter when it comes to “discover-
ing new neighborhoods,” titled its March 2008 edition “Neukölln rocks: Out 
and about with zitty in Berlin’s most exciting new district.” Interestingly, how-
ever, and in contrast to earlier experiences with Prenzlauer Berg or Friedrichs-
hain, this symbolic upgrading is not restricted to a local or national audience. 
Quite the contrast, portraying Neukölln as a new “hip destination” has become 
a global matter. The New York Times travel column promoted Neukölln as the 
ultimate nightlife recommendation for a 36-hour visit of Berlin: “Berlin’s gritty, 
working-class Neukölln district, settled nearly 300 years ago by (actual) Bohe-
mians fleeing religious persecution, is once again a destination for (modern) 
bohemians –  this time, thanks to artists fleeing rent hikes elsewhere in the 
city” (New York Times 2010).
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The symbolic gentrification of Neukölln seems to be nearly complete, and is 
displayed in a wide range of weblogs2 and articles (cf. Bradley 2010). Neukölln 
is presented as a global destination for young international artists and other 
creatives. This storyline is endlessly repeated and it has in fact become difficult 
to keep up-to-date with the media coverage about the “Avantgarde playground” 
(such is the title of a four page report in the Berlin-based magazine tip, March 
3, 2010). Exemplarily for the new Neukölln-narrative is an article by Thomas 
Rogers, a young Canadian author and former arts editor, who reflected his own 
Berlin experience for the journal Salon as living in “Europe’s epicenter of cool.” 
“Berlin has become a beacon for thousands of restless North American and 
European young people and people of any age trying to escape work, or com-
mitments, or the need to put on underwear before 3 pm” (Rogers 2012). “It 
seemed like half New York were leaving their life behind to go drink beers in 
Berlin’s parks” and “especially in the formerly gritty neighbourhoods of Neu-
koelln or Kreuzberg [...] you hear as much, if not more English than German” 
(ibid.). A similar storyline can be found in an article by Robert F. Coleman, an 
Australian musician who lived in Berlin for one year and described the city 
for the Guardian as a “hedonist paradise, where beer was cheaper than water, 
drugs effortless to acquire and the best dance music in the world only a short 
ride away any night the week” (Coleman 2012). Coleman’s Berlin is composed 
by “designers, photographers, illustrators, filmmakers, writers, other musician 
and dozens of miscellaneous expats” (ibid.). These narratives are everything 
but new, and have in fact already been used for neighborhoods like the East 
Village in New York City, Hoxten in East London, or the Raval in Barcelona. 
What is striking about their application to Berlin is that they are increasingly 
delinked from local experiences and attached to a global movement, driven by 
an international creative class. 
Still, these developments are hard to pin-down in local statistics, as many 
of the “creative” immigrants only stay in Berlin for a while and, therefore, do 
not bother about getting registered. Nevertheless, available data on residential 
mobility demonstrates that the structure of immigration and the composition 
of migrant communities in Berlin have dramatically changed since 2011. The 
net migration gain of immigration from abroad rose from a negative balance to 
an overage of around 25,000 people. The data indicate a strong impact of mov-
ing-ins from EU countries and North America, whereas the traditional strong 
migration relation to Turkey is only subordinated today. 
2 | See, for example, http://www.exberliner.com and http://www.uberlin.co.uk.
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Table 1: Immigration to Berlin from Abroad/Net Migration Gain of Selected Countries
all immigration 
from abroad
EU countries North America Turkey
2009 -7,836 801 -1,220 -1,581
2010 -1,172 4,326 -331 -2,143
2011 24,080 17,482 1,600 52
2012 26,224 19,201 2,213 -405
Source: Amt für Statistik 2013
These patterns are particularly pronounced in Neukölln. Here, in the course of 
four years a negative migration balance of non-Germans from abroad has been 
totally transformed into a plus of around 3,800 persons per year in 2011 and 
2012. The net migration gain of non-Germans from abroad in Neukölln is now 
much higher than all other residential moves (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Residential Moves to and out of Neukölln 
number of residential moves by 
non-German citizens from abroad
number of residential domestic 
moves by all nationals
influx departure balance influx departure balance
2009 6,477 6,612 -135 20,750 18,081 2,669
2010 6,758 9,727 -2,969 20,085 17,707 2,378
2011 8,021 4,249 3,772 20,581 18,914 1,667
2012 8,643 4,815 3,828 20,027 19,245 781
Source: Amt für Statistik 2013
The influx of around 17,000 internationals (nearly one third of all in-movers) 
in the last two years has become an important factor in the housing market in 
Neukölln, and it is to expect that a large number of new rent contracts will be 
closed with expats directly coming from abroad. Recent studies in Neukölln in-
dicate that new tenants (that have moved in since 2010) have on average higher 
incomes and are paying higher rents, and more than 60 percent of them were 
classified as gentrifiers or pioneer gentrifiers (TOPOS 2011: 32, 46 and 49). The 
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rising number of students moving in and the high attractiveness of Neukölln 
for a certain “creative class” have changed many neighborhoods in Northern 
Neukölln fundamentally. They are about to replace the mixture of low-income 
Germans and poor migrant families and have become a new component of 
Neukölln’s population. 
The growing importance of expats for gentrification in Berlin has strong 
parallels with what Rowland Atkinson and others, in their studies about new 
living forms of middle class households, describe as enclavism (Aitkinson 
2006; Atkinson and Blandy 2005). Whereas enclavism usually refers to forms 
of settlements like “gated communities,” it could be argued that choosing to 
live in an more or less closed expat community can be regarded as a similar 
phenomenon, as it allows to keep a social imaginary of urban neighborhoods, 
apart from everyday experiences and hitherto images (Atkinson 2006: 821). 
The dominant narratives of “Turkish families picnicking in parks,” of “un-
pretentious Berliners, who all look eerily relaxed and slightly dishevelled,” of 
“friendly drug dealers [...] sitting around with their customers and playing Seu 
Jorge songs for them on their guitar,” or of the “ex-Stasi informants occupy-
ing stools at their local kneipe and mumbling over drinks” (all quotes from 
Coleman 2012 and Rogers 2012) might be far from the real experiences in the 
expats’ communities. At least this separation or disengagement of experiences 
enabled the perpetuation of the myth of Berlin as the cheap city with low rent 
prices. Indeed, compared with 1,400 US-Dollar for a room in New York, the 
400 Euros you have to pay for a room in a shared apartment in Kreuzberg or 
Neukölln seem to be extraordinary inexpensive (Rogers 2013). But in relation 
to an average per capita income of 850 Euros in Neukölln (TOPOS 2011: 18) this 
means, that only about 100 Euros are left per week for all other expenses. 
All the expat immigration is not only important because it transforms the 
linkages between cultural perceptions, mediatisation and gentrification which 
have been described for different localities by Zukin (1990 and 2010) and oth-
ers into a global game. What is even more important that they set into operation 
a new market dynamic, in which rents in Neukölln are not only determined by 
local demand – but in comparison to places like London, New York, or Barce-
lona. The reverse side of these trends is the displacement of the urban poor. In 
a newspaper article, a local real estate agent was quoted as saying that, due to 
the rising rental rates, over 800 housing applications for needs-based shared 
apartments for welfare recipients (Hartz-IV-Bedarfsgemeinschaften) could not 
be fulfilled in Neukölln (Fietz 2010).
The image shift of Neukölln as well as the internationalization of pioneer 
gentrification cannot be explained by any inherent logic of urban changes but 
one has to consider the international branding strategies of Neukölln’s new im-
age in context of the general Berlin hype (Füller and Michel 2013; Colomb 2011). 
We could see the intermingling of symbolic neighborhood improvements, the 
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establishment of an infrastructure for conspicuous consumption and the ris-
ing attractiveness for creative expats as the main triggers for the gentrification 
in Neukölln. In combination with the extensive absence of local regulations 
in mostly all housing questions stands Neukölln for a new modus operandi in 
Berlin’s gentrification circle. 
BERLIN — A SHOWCASE FOR GENTRIFICATION? 
In a nutshell, one could say that Berlin has indeed become a showcase for gen-
trification – yet what we can observe here is not a single process, but many dif-
ferent forms of gentrification. A closer look at the developments in Berlin thus 
demonstrates that many of the mutations of gentrification (Lees et al. 2008: 
129 ff.) discussed in the international literature are becoming evident here, too. 
But, at the same time, the transformation of Berlin’s inner city neighborhoods 
does not just follow the blueprint of international gentrification studies, but 
has specific characteristics which can only be understood properly when locally 
specific trajectories are included in the picture. 
The study of gentrification in Berlin can therefore, I propose, inform in-
ternational debates in three respects: Firstly, the gentrification circle in Berlin 
demonstrates that we have to detach gentrification research from neighborhood 
studies. While the analysis of different aspects and actors of gentrification, of 
detailed patterns of progress and local regulations as well as of personal dis-
placement experiences still need locally focused research, a wider perspective 
enables a better understanding of superior contexts of gentrification, such as 
the housing market conditions under which gentrification can take place, ur-
ban politics and policies or the interrelation of residential changes between 
single neighborhoods. 
Taking this city-wide focus on gentrification, the case of Berlin shows, sec-
ondly, that there is no common modus of upgrading, but a multiplicity of gen-
trification. Guided by the knowledge of this manifold of gentrifications, we will 
understand more about the neighborhood specific conditions in terms of gen-
trification progress, actors’ constellations and local conflict structures. A third 
finding of research on Berlin’s inner-city neighborhoods is the historical embed-
dedness of gentrification. The gentrification experiences in Prenzlauer Berg and 
Kreuzberg show, for example, that existing rent gaps in inner city neighbor-
hoods are highly dependant on former urban renewal policies and changing 
forms of political and administrative interventions in the housing market. The 
declining role of direct subsidies and the hidden role of government in gentri-
fication processes highlight the local path dependency of gentrification experi-
ences. Berlin therefore demonstrates, that in order to understand the imple-
mentation of a “global urban strategy” like gentrification we need to consider 
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and analyze more seriously the political constellations and rent gaps in specific 
locations. The gentrification dynamic in Berlin is basically grounded in the 
change of housing politics and new configurations of urban renewal strategies. 
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The Berlin Water Company 
From “Inevitable” Privatization to “Impossible” Remunicipalization
Ross Beveridge and Matthias Naumann
INTRODUCTION
On October 29, 1999, the partial privatization of the Berlin Water Company 
(Berliner Wasserbetriebe; BWB), was finalized when the city of Berlin entered a 
public-private partnership with RWE Umwelt AG/Vivendi (now Véolia) S.A./
Allianz. To many both at the time and subsequently, the explanation for the 
privatization was straightforward. It was a necessity because both Berlin and 
the BWB had huge debts. As with other cases of privatization around the world, 
particularly during the 1990s, the “there is no alternative” mantra was potent 
in the political debate. This was a seemingly inevitable privatization, occurring 
at the end of a turbulent decade for Berlin.
After reunification, the hype of the emerging “Service Metropolis” (Dienst-
leistungsmetropole) had given way to media attacks on the “Unemployment 
Metropolis” (Arbeitslosenmetropole) at the end of the 1990s (Frese 1999). The 
speculative real estate boom in the early to mid-1990s, in part financially en-
couraged by the Berlin government, collapsed and left Berlin with the largest 
unoccupied office spaces in the world by the end of the decade (Krätke 2004: 
62). City debts rose as the economy shrank through re-entry to global markets, 
the once subsidized industries on both sides of the Wall disintegrated, and the 
new knowledge sectors failed to replace them. In short, there was, by the mid- 
to late 1990s, a financial and economic crisis in Berlin. It led, in turn, to what 
we might, following Peck (2012), now call “austerity urbanism” centered on 
privatization and public sector cuts.
However, after a mere thirteen years of privatization RWE agreed to sell 
its quarter share of the BWB back to the city of Berlin in May 2012. Although 
RWE received a high price of 654 million Euros, this was still a startling devel-
opment, creating the conditions for what Berlin’s politicians had argued was 
impossible, given the long-term privatization contracts and continuing indebt-
edness of the city – the remunicipalization of the BWB. How can we account 
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for this turnaround? How did a political discourse of no alternatives transform 
into one of many alternatives? This article argues that the Berlin water privati-
zation case, like much of the broader policy agenda in the city during the 1990s 
and 2000s, can be seen as emblematic of the contradictions of neoliberal policy 
(Peck and Tickell 2002), and the ongoing possibilities for change this can offer. 
The article has the following structure. Section 1 describes the global con-
text of water privatization and neoliberalism. Section 2 outlines a politics of 
inevitability in Berlin during the 1990s, based on the global city aspiration, and 
the privatization of the BWB as crisis emerged in the late 1990s. Section 3 de-
tails the contestation of water privatization and the reversal of the privatization. 
The paper concludes with some brief remarks on post-neoliberal urban politics. 
NEOLIBER AL URBAN GOVERNANCE AND WATER PRIVATIZ ATION
Privatization of public companies and property is a key element of the neolib-
eral political project. Since the 1980s privatization and commercialization of 
public enterprises and public goods, along with the liberalization of markets, 
have transformed the role of government around the world. Privatizations in 
the water sector can be understood within the “accumulation by dispossession” 
strategy (Ahlers 2010; Harvey 2003) and as an integral part of “entrepreneur-
ial” urban governance (Harvey 1989). While privatization decisions in some 
sectors, such as the car industry, telecommunications, post, have not in general 
caused major conflicts, privatization of drinking water supply and wastewater 
disposal services has often been strongly contested. This is partly explained by 
the fact that water is an indispensable good, one which cannot be substituted by 
other resources. Water also plays a particular role in the shaping of local identi-
ties, is highly intertwined with local natures and thus crucial to nature-society 
relations (Bakker 2010; Castree 2008). Further, water utilities have a symbolic 
importance as the “last frontier” in the privatization program – on of the few 
domains which have not yet been affected by private sector involvement. Never-
theless, water privatization has been promoted on the same grounds as found 
in other sectors: that it would bring much needed investment, know-how and 
efficiency from the private sector (Castro 2002). Privatization has also been 
promoted to solve fiscal crises of the local state (Swyngedouw 2004: 27), as 
a conveniently quick means of reducing deficits and downsizing government 
within an urban politics framed by crisis.
Characterized as the “common-sense of the times” (Peck and Tickell 2002: 
34), neoliberalism can be understood as “a political rationality that both orga-
nizes these policies and reaches beyond the market” (Brown 2005: 38). Colin 
Hay (2007: 10) has argued that one central feature of neoliberalism has been 
the presentation of its policies not as the “best” option but as the only logical, 
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rational option in a context of economic globalization. Hence the “there is no al-
ternative” mantra of politicians like Margret Thatcher and the “inevitabilized” 
cuts to state expenditure in the ongoing fiscal crisis (Peck 2012: 630). The 
depoliticizing effects of neoliberalism have become an increasing concern in 
the social sciences (e.g. Burnham 2001; Flinders and Buller 2006; Hay 2007; 
Mouffe 2005; Rancière 2003; Swyngedouw 2009; Žižek 2008). For Swynge-
douw neoliberalism has helped reduce the “political terrain to a post-demo-
cratic arrangement of oligarchic policing” (2007: 6), in which the outcomes 
of policy-making – what is possible, desirable and who should be included and 
excluded – are virtually known in advance.
Despite its apparent dominance, neoliberal policies, such as water privatiza-
tions, have been recently contested and sometimes reversed. Neoliberalism has 
been challenged by an increasing number of protests on different scales and in 
different fields (Leitner et al. 2007). Ultimately, as Peck (2012: 630) states, neo-
liberalism has failed to secure sustainable economic, social and environmental 
development. Outcomes are unclear, ongoing and subject to contestation and 
change. A “politics of change” has sometime become apparent, a “roll-with-it 
neoliberalism,” in which tentative institutional and policy shifts have emerged 
in particular places at particular times (Keil 2009: 233). 
This is especially the case in the water sector. Even the arch-promoter of 
privatization, the World Bank, has questioned the benefits of privatization (Cas-
tro 2002: 4 f.; Hall et al. 2005: 287). After huge protests, large private water 
companies, such as Suez or Veolia, have withdrawn from a number of develop-
ing countries (Hall et al. 2005: 286; Swyngedouw 2009b: 41). Meanwhile a 
broad strand of literature dealing with the often disastrous outcomes of water 
privatizations in the global south has emerged (Ahlers 2010; Aubin 2002; Bar-
low and Clarke 2003; Cocq and McDonald 2010; Kazimbaya-Senkwe and Guy 
2007; Madaleno 2007; Mirosa and Harris 2012; Shiva 2002; Wu and Malaluan 
2008; Zaki and Amin 2009). Examples for ending privatization projects can 
not only found in cities of the Global South, however, but also in cities like Paris 
(Barraqué 2012), while the uncertain outcomes and contradictions of privatiza-
tion are vividly illustrated in Berlin.
A POLITICS OF INE VITABILIT Y: THE GLOBAL CIT Y ASPIR ATION 
AND CRISIS IN 1990S BERLIN
In his dissection of the construction of economic crisis in 1970s Britain, Hay 
(1996) reveals how selective readings of events by the media and conservative 
politicians, and the strategic inter-linking of “facts,” helped construct a par-
ticular version of crisis, one which apportioned blame to the unions and an 
overblown state. This in turn laid the ground for the “unavoidable” policies im-
Berlin on Sale192
plemented by Thatcher in the 1980s to reduce the role of the state and weaken 
the unions. 
Politicians often invoke the inevitability of a certain policy given their read-
ing of the prevailing economic, social and political conditions. Presenting a 
policy as inevitable is often an effective political tactic in that it directs atten-
tion to the apparent severity of the situation and away from the normative and 
ideological assumptions which underpin all policies. It works to reduce politics 
to a discussion of “needs must,” based upon the “hard facts,” and politicians to 
simple executors of unavoidable, even if harsh, measures. 
Arguing that economic and financial imperatives leave little options in poli-
cy-making may not be a new strategy but it is one that has become more preva-
lent with the rise of neoliberalism. Hay (2007: 100) has stated that a defining 
feature of the shift to neoliberalism has been the presentation of policies not as 
the ‘best’ option but as the only option in a context of economic globalization: 
“it is the very condition of economic credibility and competence in an era of glo-
balization (Hay 2007: 100).” In 1990s Berlin such a strategy was also apparent, 
thought it became intertwined with fiscal crisis. 
1990S BERLIN
Policy-making in Berlin in the 1990s is as much a story of urban governance in 
the context of globalization as it is an account of German reunification. In large 
part, it can be seen as a project of conforming to the global norms of urban 
governance. Berlin was suddenly exposed to the processes other industrialized 
cities had been facing since the 1970s (Strom 2001: 4). After 1990, both parts 
of the city experienced the collapse of their highly subsidized industries and 
a significant decrease of jobs in the public sector (Ellger 1992: 45). The hope 
that there would be a boom in other sectors to compensate for the jobs has not 
been fulfilled. Beveridge (2012a) has argued that urban governance in 1990s 
Berlin and the partial privatization of the BWB should be seen as the outcome 
of the embedding of a “politics of inevitability” in Berlin: a (neo-liberal) poli-
cy-making agenda centered on the belief that Berlin must and, indeed, could 
successfully adapt to the global economy after decades of virtual separation. It 
was a decade defined by policy-making to “re-invent Berlin as a post-industrial 
service metropolis” (Häußermann and Colomb 2003: 201), as a global city. As 
in other cities and nation states, globalization was a “powerful agent of depoliti-
cization” (Hay 2007: 125).
As found elsewhere around the world, this politics of inevitability took the 
form of “no alternatives,” along with promises of impending prosperity. Typical 
was the statement made by the Economy Senator, Wolfgang Branoner (CDU), 
in the midst of economic hardship in 1999: “Truly, we will become the most 
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‘state-of-the-art’ city in the Western World” (Böhm and Hasse 1999). The mes-
sage was clear. Things may indeed be bad, but it is just a matter of time before 
Berlin will prosper. The aim of such political rhetoric was to depoliticize the 
socio-economic hardships which emerged in the city and the drive towards 
knowledge, high-tech sectors, real estate boosterism, commercialization and 
privatization. The naturalization of the forces of economic globalization was 
combined with a belief that Berlin would inevitably prosper through adapta-
tion. Berlin was the capital of the newly reunified Germany, the largest econ-
omy in the European Union and a “gateway city,” strategically placed between 
Western Europe and the emerging market economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe (Krätke 2001: 1777). The Berlin government’s continued hyping of Ber-
lin should be criticized, but it must be stated that many business, political, and 
academic experts thought Berlin was well-placed to grow into a key economic 
center in the global economy, at least until the mid-1990s (Gornig and Häußer-
mann 2002: 334).
By this stage, economic and financial problems were becoming clear. Ber-
lin’s aim to be globally “competitive” was and still is restricted by its inability 
to overtake rivals within the German context (ibid.: 339). Despite slightly im-
proved economic development in recent years, Berlin is still far behind other 
German cities like Munich, Hamburg, Cologne, Frankfurt and Dusseldorf, 
which had developed considerably during the Cold War period and taken on 
many of the economic and financial functions normally associated with capital 
cities (e.g. Frankfurt is the German and mainland Europe financial capital; 
Gornig 2009). 
BERLIN AND THE BERLIN WATER COMPANY IN CRISIS
From the mid- to late 1990s, financial and economic problems grew. On the 
October 29, 1999, the same day as the partial privatization of the BWB, the 
President of the German National Audit Office (Rechnungshof ) criticized the 
city’s government for being around 46 billion US-Dollar (90 billion DM) in 
debt (Schomaker 1999). In the ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, unem-
ployment had risen by five percent to around 15 percent, while the city’s popula-
tion had steadily dropped. Berlin was in effect a shrinking and not a global city. 
Although the government’s policies contributed to this financial and economic 
situation, the strategy of future promises through re-structuring remained in-
tact, and relatively unproblematized (for more detail see Beveridge 2012a).
The crisis of public finances was, however, also a result of the failed urban 
development projects of the city government, especially during the 1990s. Big, 
prestige projects were an integral part not only of trying to transform Berlin 
into a global city but also of neoliberal urban politics. The coalition of Christian 
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Democrats and its junior partner from the Social Democrats was responsible 
for costly projects such as the unsuccessful application for the Olympic Games 
in 2000 and the collapse of a public bank in 2001 (Lederer and Naumann 2011). 
The government also invested and promoted huge private sector investment 
in real estate in the city, encouraging a property boom, which went bust in the 
mid-1990s and resulted in huge amounts of empty office space in the city. It 
was within this context of attempted adaptation to the apparent norms of eco-
nomic globalization and the emergence of a fiscal crisis that privatization of the 
public companies emerged in the mid- to late-1990s. 
MAKING WATER PRIVATIZ ATION INE VITABLE 
Berlin’s water utility and its privatization in 1999 are for a number of rea-
sons of particular importance. The Berlin Water Company (BWB) is not only 
the biggest water company in Germany, it was also strategically important 
for private investors, to enter the still predominately public German market 
(Barraqué 2009: 241) and to enter liberalizing Central and Eastern European 
water markets. The wider context of the BWB privatization was characterized 
by a global trend that saw both private and municipally-owned companies be-
come competitors in global water markets (Swyngedouw 2003: 8). Further, 
in many other German cities water utilities were not only privatized but also 
commercialized to compete with private water companies (Wissen and Nau-
mann 2006: 3).
In line with these international trends, and the restructuring of other mu-
nicipal companies, the BWB underwent commercialization even before it was 
privatized. The BWB was actually a profitable company at this stage. In 1995, 
the total revenue of the BWB was 1 billion US-Dollar (1.75 billion DM) and the 
profit for that year was around 30 million US-Dollar (51 million DM), according 
to the Executive Director (N.N. 1997). Echoing Berlin’s “global city” ambitions, 
the BWB was to be re-made as a global player in the water market. Again, this 
strategy rested on the hope to establish Berlin as “gateway” city to markets in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Similar to other failed urban development projects, 
huge investments of the BWB ended in loss-making failures. Emblematic was 
the purchase of the wastewater treatment plant Schwarze Pumpe in June 1995, 
which became the most high-profile failure amongst many. In the end, Berlin 
lost around half a billion Euros in the course of investing in Schwarze Pumpe, 
according to official reviews (Rechnungshof von Berlin 2004). The BWB man-
agement was forced to deny the highest water prices in Germany were caused 
by such fiascos, stating that investments were funded by bank loans alone and 
that price increases were the result of the costs upgrading infrastructure in 
East Berlin (Wiengten 1997). The city’s fiscal problems also increased between 
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1995 and 1997, with debts rising from about 27 billion US-Dollar in 1995 to 
around 33 billion US-Dollar in 1997 (Marschall et al. 1997).
It was in the context of the BWB debt crisis and Berlin debt crisis that water 
privatization was first proposed in 1997 and implemented in 1999. Ultimately, 
the privatization had little, if anything, to do with water management. It re-
veals the extent to which the traditional concerns of water policy-making and 
management were subordinated to the broader objectives of the government. 
Shifts towards neoliberal practices of government led first to the re-making of 
the BWB as a commercial enterprise and then as a set of assets which could and 
should be sold to ease the city’s debts. 
Apart from the opposition parties DIE LINKE and the Greens the privatiza-
tion deal was accepted by most of the city’s political players. Part of the deal 
have been promises of no price rises for the first four years, the compromise of 
keeping 50.1 percent in public ownership and job security of the BWB’s employ-
ees, which defused initial opposition from the unions. The unions accepted the 
privatization as inescapable and focused on negotiating an advantageous deal 
for the employees of the BWB (Beveridge 2012a). 
CONFIDENTIAL CONTR ACTS, PUBLIC REFERENDUM —
CONTESTING WATER PRIVATIZ ATION IN BERLIN
Profits, Prices and Re-regulation
The sale price of 1.96 billion US-Dollar for 49.9 percent of the company has 
been generally seen as high (Lanz and Eitner 2005a: 4), and can largely be at-
tributed to a mix of the fierce competition between the water companies, espe-
cially the French giants, Vivendi and Suez, the attraction of Berlin as the new 
German capital with over 3 million paying customers and the continued belief 
that the BWB could exploit water markets in Central and Eastern Europe (Be-
veridge 2012a). It was also, however, a result of the details of the Partial Priva-
tization Law which, at least initially, contained the profit guaranteeing “R+2 
formula” (aimed to ensure similar annual profit rates of ca. 8 percent to those 
enjoyed by the privatized water companies in England and Wales). 
Beside guaranteed profits for private investors other outcomes of the privati-
zation included new decision-making structures, greater profit orientation and 
new regulatory instruments (Beveridge 2012a; 2012b; Hüesker 2011). Decision-
making in the privatized BWB rested on the principle that no major decision 
can be made without the agreement of both private investors and the state of 
Berlin. Informal arrangements between both sides were established in order 
to reach a consensus prior to the involvement of the parliament in the more 
official decision-making procedures. These long-term, secretive and informal 
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arrangements reduced transparency and legitimacy in water policy despite the 
fact that the state still retains a majority shareholding (Hüesker 2011). Much 
of the financial dimension of water policy in Berlin has not been subject to 
political scrutiny since privatization. Profits were loosely fixed in the long-time 
secret contracts, and thus not open to parliamentary discussion, which had in-
herent and direct consequences for prices. The greater profit orientation of the 
BWB was followed by massive increases of water tariffs since 2004. Between 
2003 and 2006 prices for water supply were raised three times (with an overall 
increase of 21 percent) and on four occasions for sewerage services (by a total 
of 30 percent). Berlin now has the highest water tariffs in Germany (Bundes-
kartellamt 2012).
In response to these problems, some re-regulation occurred. Gradually, 
from 1999 onwards, the government of Berlin introduced new laws on the 
methods of water tariff calculation. Before 1999, the purely public water com-
pany, namely its supervisory board, decided on water tariffs. Now, however, 
the Berlin Company Law (Berliner Betriebegesetz) regulates in detail how wa-
ter tariffs should be calculated. The Senator of Economy, who has political re-
sponsibility for the BWB, has to agree on that calculation and there must be 
external supervision of this process by regularly changing consultancy firms. 
The re-regulation of the BWB in the years following privatization reveals a pro-
cess apparent in other privatized water sectors, most notably in England and 
Wales (Bakker 2003): introducing private sector, profit driven companies in 
water supply and sanitation services, and the virtually inevitable rise in prices it 
brings, creates social unrest which politicians usually have to address. Overall, 
these new regulatory capacities of the state can be seen as tools for the better 
control of public-private companies but they do not compensate for the demo-
cratic deficits which have emerged through privatization.
GROWING CRITICISM AND CALLS FOR REMUNICIPALIZ ATION
The privatization of the BWB, originally planned by private investors as a refer-
ence for further privatization, became, because of its secretive character and 
negative outcomes, an increasing target of criticisms from researchers, activists 
and Berlin politicians (Beveridge 2012a; 2012b; Hüesker 2011; Lederer 2004; 
Monstadt and Schlippenbach 2006; Passadakis 2006). A change of govern-
ment in the city also opened up new possibilities for questioning the privatiza-
tion deal. After the banking scandal in 2001 the conservative-social democratic 
coalition collapsed amidst allegations of corruption and was replaced by a left, 
so-called red-red coalition of Social Democrats and DIE LINKE. Harald Wolf, 
one of the strongest opponents of the privatization, became DIE LINKE Senator 
for Economy and took responsibility for the public-private BWB from 2002 to 
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2011. He introduced the new regulatory initiatives described above. However, 
contradicting its own position on privatization, DIE LINKE approved further 
privatizations of state companies and land during the first period of the coali-
tion government between 2001 and 2006 (Lederer and Naumann 2011: 130), 
e.g. the privatization of the housing company GSW, including 64,000 flats, 
to an international consortium of financial investment funds in 2004 (Holm 
2010: 394 ff.) 
Despite the declared political will to stop privatization 7,000 flats were sold 
in the second election period from 2006 to 2011 of the red-red Senate (Holm 
2011: 95). While DIE LINKE tried to increase the pressure on the private owners 
of the BWB through re-regulation, social movements in the city demanded the 
immediate annulment of the contracts (Lederer and Naumann 2011: 140). The 
fact that the party did not end privatization once in power caused much frustra-
tion among social movements, while DIE LINKE themselves felt that they were 
being blamed for a privatization deal for which they were not responsible (ibid.). 
Upon re-election in 2006, however, the left government did express its desire 
to strengthen the public sector and the remunicipalization of the BWB was 
written into the coalition contract with the SPD (ibid.). Indeed, both parties in 
government wanted to end the deal with and dependency on the private inves-
tors. But without the private investors’ agreement the state of Berlin could not 
officially terminate the privatization contracts prior to 2028. Thus the adoption 
of this policy objective may be interpreted as being a first symbolic step in put-
ting the BWB privatization back on the political agenda.
While DIE LINKE saw no real possibility to end the unwanted privatiza-
tion, a new anti-privatization social movement emerged. In 2006, the “Berlin 
Water Roundtable” (Berliner Wassertisch), disappointed by DIE LINKE and in-
spired by successful anti-privatization movements around the world, started 
campaigning against the secret contracts and rising water tariffs. Drawing 
on new features of Berlin’s constitution, which enabled a majority of citizens 
to change laws via a public referendum (Volksbegehren), a campaign for a ref-
erendum to publish the secret privatization contracts began. After collecting 
about 280,000 signatures the campaign had met not only the formal condi-
tions necessary to start a Volksbegehren, it also helped transform the discourse 
within the city on the BWB and other privatized companies. The Berlin Senate, 
including DIE LINKE, first blocked the initiative claiming the new law was not 
constitutionally applicable in this case. It was argued that it would be illegal to 
force private investors to publish private contracts which were finalized before 
this new law came into force. For nearly two years the Berlin Senate and the 
Berliner Wassertisch were before the Constitutional Court fighting over whether 
the Senate was allowed to control the contents of the Volksbegehren at this stage 
of the political process. The Berliner Wassertisch won in October 2009, with the 
court ruling the Senate did not have the right to stop the referendum (Hüesker 
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2011). Additionally, in summer 2010, Berlin’s parliament decided on a new law, 
forbidding secret contracts with public companies. 
Finally, a Berlin newspaper published the secret contracts in October 2010. 
Two weeks later the Senate of Berlin also published the contracts on its web-
page. Nevertheless, the Berliner Wassertisch decided to go on with the referen-
dum. This took place in February 2011, and a huge majority of 98.2 percent 
of those who voted, more than 660,000 voters, supported the law proposed 
by the Berliner Wassertisch to publish the privatization contracts (Nowakowski 
2011). Ultimately, the Senate decided to comply with the outcome of the refer-
endum and published all the confidential amendments. Besides publishing the 
contracts, the state of Berlin began negotiations with the private owners about 
remunicipalizing the BWB in 2010, and this continued after the elections in 
2011 and the establishment of a new social democratic-conservative coalition. 
One of the private owners, RWE, and the Berlin Senate agreed on a price of 
654 million Euros for the 24.95 percent share of RWE in the BWB. In 2013, the 
other owner, French company Veolia, also started negotiations to sell its share. 
The executive’s plan is to fund the buy-out from the future de facto guaranteed 
revenues of the BWB. In other words, if Berlin becomes the only shareholder it 
can refinance remunicipalization out of the revenue gained from water tariffs. 
In the short-term, this means an increase in city debts to borrow the money 
to buy the company back and, in this case at least, a rejection of a local “deficit 
politics” (Peck 2012), whereby the aim of cutting the deficit frames policy ob-
jectives. This represents quite a turnaround when we consider that the main 
argument for privatization at the end of the 1990s was to reduce the city’s debts. 
Berlin in 2013 does in fact have more debt than Berlin in 1999, even if it is no 
longer growing as rapidly and the city’s tax revenues are increasing. 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS POST-NEOLIBER AL URBAN GOVERNANCE?
The almost consensual privatization decision, the profit guarantee and the 
secretive decision-making institutions of the public-private BWB were all em-
blematic of the broader privatization project. However, the contestation of the 
privatization and it’s – at least – partial reversal show that despite the discursive 
and structural constraints of neoliberal urban governance there is the potential 
for change. Even in a highly indebted city like Berlin “politics and practices 
of hope” (Coutard and Guy 2007) can emerge. Does the case of Berlin and 
its water company reveal insights to possible forms of post-neoliberal urban 
governance? 
Since 2009 the political discourse has changed significantly and utility 
policy has also changed. Gone is the talk of no alternatives to privatization 
and the need for private sector expertise. Government and civil society actors 
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have started openly debating models of remunicipalization, despite the contin-
ued indebtedness of the city and costs this would incur. However, a genuinely 
new, alternative model of public ownership for the BWB has yet to emerge and 
is unlikely to be implemented by the current coalition government. Indeed, 
throughout the anti-privatization campaign, a coherent vision of a remunicipal-
ized company was not present. This might be seen as a challenge of working 
within, and “rolling with” (Keil 2009), the constraints of neoliberal urban gov-
ernance. It also raises a number of questions. Just how different will the new 
publicly-owned BWB be? Besides providing clean and inexpensive water supply 
and sanitation services, what objectives should a city’s public water company 
have nowadays? 
To be any different to traditional public companies of the past, there is a 
need to allow for greater public participation and control (Wainwright 2009). 
One prominent idea now being by promoted by social movements and DIE 
LINKE is to establish a Stadtwerk  –  an integrated public utility company of-
fering water, energy, transport, waste disposal, etc. (Lederer and Wolf 2010). 
This form of public company has a long existing tradition in German cities. 
The challenge is to see how this model can be reinvigorated to provide greater 
democracy and a new form of “publicness.”
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Berlin Contested 
Summarizing the changes that Berlin has experienced over recent years is far from 
easy. The main reason for this lies in the emergence of developments and conflicts 
that have long remained in an embryonic state but are only now taking on a fuller 
presence. Among these is the actually growing importance of the so-called creative 
industries for Berlin’s economy, a veritable tourist boom in the city, the internation-
alization of real estate speculation and, last but not least, a bizarre over-hyping of 
Berlin as a hedonistic paradise for globetrotting bohemians and center of “hipness.”
A “new complexity” and various political fissures characterize the current situa-
tion and make an already complicated communication between dif ferent urban ac-
tors and groups even more dif ficult. This is also true for discussions in academic 
circles concerned with urban developments. On the one hand, urban topics have 
become more central than ever before for political and public debates in the city. 
This is due to rising rents and the discovery of gentrification that after having been 
neglected for a long time has become a prime concern for local journalists, politi-
cians, and social movements. On the other hand, and in contrast to earlier periods, it 
has become nearly impossible to identify shared key issues around which scholarly 
debates would be positioned. Thus, paradoxically, an increased interest of interna-
tional urbanists in Berlin and a rising number of dissertations and publications on the 
city seem to go hand in hand with less strategic and focused debates about the city 
as a whole. It should also be noted that more and more texts are published in English 
for an international audience without even getting noticed in the city itself.
The articles we selected for the last chapter of this volume somehow reflect this 
odd situation. They all address significant issues and conflicts for understanding 
Berlin’s transformation since the fall of the wall, yet the issues discussed are hardly 
specific to Berlin. As in other metropolises, the “naturalization” of neoliberal policies 
together with new forms of migration and travelling, a growing social heterogeneity, 
or increasingly more de-localized urban lifestyles and consumer cultures have made 
it more dif ficult to define the fault lines of social struggles, and this in increasingly 
manifested in Berlin, too. 
The section starts with a paper written by Stephan Lanz, an urban scholar, work-
ing at the Viadrina-University in Frankfurt (Oder). Lanz takes a critical look at the 
Berlin Contested206
much-celebrated transformation of Berlin into a “cosmopolitan city.” Applying a his-
torical perspective, he sets current changes in relation to the historical frameworks 
of Berlin’s immigration policies and traces a trend of benchmarking and the festival-
ization of so-called integration policies. 
Johannes Novy, who wrote his Ph.D. on urban tourism in Berlin and New York City, 
discusses the remarkable rise of Berlin as a new international tourist magnet and the 
development of tourism to a key economic sector in the city. He also shows that this 
development is not too well liked by many Berliners and discusses the dark sides of 
this boom. This enables him to provide a nuanced perspective on the new conflicts 
that emerge around the “touristification” of Berlin. 
Related to this, Albert Scharenberg and Ingo Bader take up the widely celebrat-
ed Berlin techno culture and analyze the linkages between local avant-gardes and 
global entertainment industries. They describe a somewhat tragic development and 
outline that Berlin’s fame as creative capital is largely based on cheap labor and low 
living costs – and that both these factors are endangered by the successful rise of 
Berlin to a global marketplace for entertainment industries.
The resulting tensions have become most visible in the conflicts around “Medi-
aspree,” a strip of vacant land at the Spree River that has been designated for de-
velopment into a global office center by the local government of Berlin (the Senate), 
but is currently used as a mix of green space and club location by Berliners and visi-
tors. The planned transformation has been challenged by a unique coalition of leftist 
activists, residents, club-owners, and artists for more than six years. Jan Dohnke, a 
geographer from Berlin, takes stock of this experience and discusses its central les-
sons for future protests. 
Taken together, all these articles show that it is not so much intellectual malaise 
that is to blame for the above described lack of orientation. Rather, we would argue, 
it is also due to an emerging “post-political climate” that key issues that can char-
acterize Berlin’s recent development have become hard to identify. Notwithstanding 
many dif ficulties, it has at least to be mentioned that Berlin is currently experiencing 
a remarkable rise of protests and social movements struggling for the “Right to the 
City” across many dif ferent arenas. The outcome of these movements is unpredict-
able – of course. What is certain is that Berlin is about to face tremendous changes 
again: this, we think, provides amazing opportunities but also a striking need for new 
critical urban research.
Berlin Diversities 
The Perpetual Act of Becoming of a True Metropolis1
Stephan Lanz
At a global level, Berlin today has the image of a cosmopolitan metropolis, char-
acterized by a dynamic ethnic and cultural diversity. This image of the city 
increasingly correlates with everyday experiences, where public spaces in inner 
city districts like Mitte, Kreuzberg, or Neukölln exhibit, if you will, a Babylo-
nian diversity of languages or cultural symbols previously only associated with 
global cities like New York or London. Until recently, the dominant perception 
in the German city was one that recognized a diversity of lifestyles on the part 
of the native majority, but regarded immigrants – usually equated with guest 
workers – merely as members of supposedly homogeneous ethnic or national 
cultural groups.
In the following text, I use the example of Berlin to analyze the question 
as to what extent, why, and in what manner this fantasy image of a city in 
which immigrants were considered an “alien presence,” or at least as supposed 
“others,” was transformed into one of the city as an ethnically and nationally 
diverse metropolis. To do that, I’d like to reconstruct the dispositifs that politi-
cally condition the sphere of activity “migration/city,” and in doing so identify 
their core elements at the local and national level, as well as mark the historical 
breaks that have made possible the transformations thus outlined. According 
to Foucault (1977), the term dispositif denotes “a thoroughly heterogeneous en-
semble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the un-
said.” In other words, a dispositif is the entirety of “means, mechanisms, and 
measures established for the treatment of a specific problem” (Keller 2001: 134). 
Foucault assumes that a (new) dispositif emerges from a state of emergency 
1 | Source: Lanz, S. (2011) Berliner Diversitäten: Das immerwährende Werden einer 
wahrhaftigen Metropole. In Bukow, W.-D. et al. (eds.) Neue Vielfalt in der urbanen Stadt-
gesellschaft. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 115-133.
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when an (existing) dispositif becomes precarious and generates the need for 
action. Thus, with regard to their specific sphere of activity, dispositifs have the 
strategic function of fending off a state of emergency, plugging a kind of “leak” 
(to use Gilles Deleuze’s term).
My argument is that in the formation of an “immigration/city” dispositif, a 
central role is played – alongside the national political culture and the respec-
tive dominant conception of the nation – by the “urban meaning” of a city (Cas-
tells 1981), that is to say, the always contested identity and meaning attributed 
to a city corresponding to the interests and values of the dominant social actors 
at a given time.
1871 FF.: THE DISPOSITIF OF
THE NATIONAL-HOMOGENEOUS BIG CIT Y
The enormous boom experienced by Berlin as a result of its transformation 
into an industrial city and its new status as capital of the German Empire after 
1871 was accompanied by strong migration to the city, including foreign work-
ers. The dispositif of the national-homogeneous big city, the predominance of 
which survived three regimes and only subsided at the end of the 1970s, de-
veloped in the space between the priorities of the construction of the German 
nation as an ethnos, a closed door policy with regard to Eastern Europe, and the 
extreme growth of Berlin, the size of which increased tenfold over the course 
of a few decades.
A large part of the labor migration to Berlin, in particular from Poland, 
was temporary: out of the prevailing jus sanguinis “there developed since the 
beginning of the economically motivated immigration […] of Eastern European 
workers to the German Empire a principle of rejection toward foreigners, based 
upon the exclusivity of blood descent” (Herbert 2001: 68). The racist admission 
practice selected members of Western nations as “related” and “worthy,” as dis-
tinct from Jews and Slavs, who were to be rejected as “undesirable elements.” 
This closed door policy supplemented by mass deportations went hand-in-
hand with selective conditional immigration on the basis of “usefulness” (cf. 
Ha 2003). In Berlin, large scale industries received special permits to employ 
foreign workers, particularly for large public construction projects like U-Bahn 
and S-Bahn tracks, or the Reichstag building. Thus, despite the ban on employ-
ment for foreign Poles, a dual labor market emerged, in which foreigners with 
the lowest wages served as a buffer against changes in the economic cycle. In 
the case of an economic downturn, mass deportations followed, legitimized by 
a “national-political demagoguery” (Herbert 2001: 49). Legally employed in-
dustrial workers were housed in mass accommodation separate from the rest 
of the population, to prevent them from becoming settled. In the First World 
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War, this repressive regimentation changed into outright slave labor, in order 
to compensate for the shortage of labor-power caused by the war. That would 
not have been possible without debates about “foreign infiltration” spanning 
decades and repressive special laws for foreigners.
In the Weimar Republic, policy on foreigners remained an “ethno-nationalist 
anti-Polish closed door policy” (Oltmer 2003: 87). When a few hundred thousand 
Russian émigrés nonetheless moved to Berlin and Paris in the 1920s, this was 
considered a threat in Berlin, whereas in Paris it was regarded as a confirmation 
of its outstanding importance (cf. Kiecol 2001). In contrast to Paris, whose cos-
mopolitanism led to its consolidation as the “capital of the 19th Century” (Walter 
Benjamin), Berlin experienced rapid growth, becoming the third largest city in 
the world, but was perceived as an anonymous and threatening agglomeration. 
At the same time, the dominant actors from the period of the Empire until 
the Nazi era constantly pursued the goal of developing Berlin as an imposing 
symbol for Germany’s status as a world power, while nonetheless condemning 
the “Babylon on the Spree” (meaning the internationalism and liberalism of the 
modern metropolis) as a threat to society. Even left-liberals usually engaged in 
polemics against its international flair.
Progressive city administrators confronted the accusation that Berlin was 
alarmingly unstable – intensified by the shock to traditional orientations dur-
ing the First World War and the revolutionary events immediately following 
it – by stylizing the city as a symbol of youth: Berlin “strove, with the attribute 
of youthfulness, to awaken associations such as ability, energy, optimism, and 
vitality and to equate them with the post-war youth” (Stremmel 1992: 155). But 
this fragile structure had already collapsed during the world economic crisis 
after 1929, as a large part of the population was impoverished. In the crisis, 
a “defensive attitude toward everything foreign” (ibid.) intensified. It was not 
only conservative currents that saw the vision of a modern Berlin as a failure 
and attempted to curtail urban diversity.
After the Nazis came to power, they adopted some of the images of Berlin 
from the Weimar Republic, in order to present a model capital to the world. 
They also propagandized for Berlin as a global city of modern technology and 
resorted to symbols of youth: the official guide to the city, “Das neue Berlin,” 
presented a “young, clean, bountiful city, full of joie de vivre” (ibid.: 278). How-
ever, the Nazis also attempted to eliminate any kind of international or liberal 
urban diversity, whereby their institutional racism toward “foreign workers”2 
was distinguished, according to Ulrich Herbert (2001: 187) not so much by 
its principled orientation so much as its radical escalation of the decades-long 
practice of racist discrimination, particularly against Eastern Europeans. The 
2 | Translator’s note: the German word Fremdarbeiter has a more explicitly Nazi conno-
tation than the comparatively mild-sounding English translation.
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living conditions of the slave laborers imported after 1940 were linked to tra-
ditional racist hierarchies, which classified Soviet citizens at the very bottom, 
along with Jews and “gypsies.” They had to live as undernourished prisoners 
in camps, whereas Western European slave laborers received the same wage 
as Germans and could move freely through the city. Despite an order by the 
Gestapo to transfer all foreigners to camps, 120,000 “foreign workers” are pre-
sumed to have lived in private dwellings in the middle of Berlin.
After the war, Berlin lost its significance as one of the most important 
metropolises of Europe. In West Berlin, economic growth and wage levels 
remained far behind those of the Federal Republic of Germany. Only when 
cross-border commuters could no longer work in West Berlin as a result of the 
construction of the Berlin Wall did industry start to suffer from a shortage of la-
bor-power. As foreign “guest workers” were now recruited primarily in Turkey, 
since people willing to emigrate could hardly be found among West European 
treaty partners, general legal and political conditions were cemented in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany. The intended “rotation system” and the identity card 
(Legitimationskarte) that had survived three different social systems illustrate 
the striking continuity of immigration policy and expose the narrative of a (po-
lice order on foreigners, APVO for short) and the new beginning as a “fiction” 
(ibid.: 201): in the 1950s, the order concerning foreign workers (Verordnung über 
ausländische Arbeitnehmer) of the Nazi regime were re-implemented. In the 
continuity of the APVO, the Law on Foreigners of 1965 was aimed at making 
it possible to comprehensively account for all non-Germans and, if needed, to 
deport them. Selection according to place of origin and skin color was official 
policy. Thus, so-called “Afro-Asiatics,” as a “total category of the incompatibly 
foreign” (Schönwälder 2001: 259), were denied residency permits as a matter 
of principle.
The attitudes of politicians and the media had also hardly changed since the 
time of the German Empire: the deployment of foreign workers was regarded 
positively as a mobile counter-cyclical economic buffer. When the economic 
usefulness of this strategy became questionable during the first recessions, 
public discourse concerning a “foreigner problem” began to solidify, which 
culminated in an end to the recruitment of foreign workers in 1973. Manners 
of speaking concerning “otherness” and a lack of assimilation rested upon a 
conception of a national economy and culture being illegitimately appropriated 
by foreigners. “Evidently this threat scenario, so influential within German na-
tionalism since the end of the 19th century, was still familiar and had not been 
disavowed as a result of history” (ibid.: 200).
The central element of the dispositif of the national-homogeneous big city is 
the conception of the foreigner as an alien element. In the city, this was mate-
rialized through the two spatial types of the camp and the “ghetto.” From the 
perspective of state apparatuses, the camp granted the possibility of keeping 
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immigrants under complete control. The “ghetto,” on the other hand, under-
stood as a voluntary spatial concentration, embodied precisely the danger of 
losing this control. Authorities therefore sought to house as many foreigners 
as possible in camps, in order to segregate them from German nationals. In 
1971, 400 immigrant hostels still existed in Berlin. The “keeping of humans” in 
overcrowded, poorly furnished barracks, the monitoring of their private sphere, 
as well as the spatial surveillance of their residency all recalled the practice of 
rule in the former German colonies (Freiburghaus and Kudat 1974: 51).
However, even during the German Empire, most Polish immigrants had 
spread throughout the working class districts. Even the Nazis were unable to 
place all foreigners in camps. In this framework, the inner city Scheunenviertel 
of Berlin (whose name literally means “barn district”) served as a projection 
screen as a “politically threatening agglomeration” of poorer and often Jew-
ish immigrants from Eastern Europe. From 1906 on, the city administration 
began a demolition and redevelopment project, later continued by the Nazis, 
in order to oust unwanted immigrants and deport them as “burdensome for-
eigners” or resettle them in peripheral barracks. In West Berlin, the ghetto 
discourse also structured the debate concerning policy on foreigners. When 
neighborhoods where foreigners were conspicuously visible started to emerge 
in the early 1970s, fears arose concerning the emergence of “ghettos” and a 
disintegration of “established society.” In 1973, warnings about explosive situ-
ations in the cities became dramatic: The revived term Fremdarbeiter, which 
hinted at plundering slave laborers at the end of the war, connoted foreigners as 
a “walking time bomb.” The “ghetto” was established as the central metaphor 
of the foreigner as an “alien presence” that intentionally separated itself from 
Germans. In order to decrease their spatial “concentration,” the Berlin Sen-
ate passed an ordinance prohibiting foreigners from moving to Kreuzberg and 
two other districts. Kreuzberg, a poor working class district in which many 
foreigners who had been pushed out of the Scheunenviertel had found accom-
modation, soon developed into the nationwide symbol of the ideological battles 
concerning the immigration complex, and was regarded as an “appalling” ghet-
to inhabited by foreigners and drop-outs, posing a threat to German citizens 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 13, 1975).
1981 FF.: THE DISPOSITIF OF
THE MULTICULTUR AL-DIFFERENTIAL ME TROPOLIS
Over the course of the 1970s, the ideological consensus concerning policy on 
foreigners ended up in a contradictory relationship with enduring processes of 
immigration and corresponding everyday urban experiences. Previously, im-
migrants were defined as temporary guest workers and understood as a uni-
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form category of “members of foreign ethnicities.” But in the everyday life of 
the city, some “foreigners” were hardly still perceived as such, while others 
were even more so. As increasing numbers of non-European asylum seekers 
reached Europe, a new system of classification emerged based upon cultural 
and ethnic differences. Over the course of the 1980s, the question of the ability 
of immigrant groups to integrate was tied to a national and cultural identity 
which, like that of ethnic descent, was considered “mentally and spiritually in-
nate” (Morgenstern 2002: 315). 
In Berlin in the 1970s, Social Democratic urban development policy – which 
strove to create a homogeneous urban space separated into functional zones, 
as well as standardized living conditions – entered into a crisis: processes of so-
cial reorganization “demolished the system of Social Democratic socialization” 
(Homuth 1987: 101). The overall concept of the modern city collapsed in the 
face of decreasing opportunities for taxation on the part of the state and declin-
ing financial means, as well as the broad resistance of the population. It was 
ultimately a construction scandal in 1981 that ended the decades-long predomi-
nance of the Social Democrats in Berlin and brought the Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) to power. The CDU, with a brief interruption, dominated Berlin 
politics until 2001. 1981 thus marks, as I would like to show in the following, 
the emergence of a new migration/city dispositif, that of the multicultural-dif-
ferential metropolis, which reacts to the state of emergency of the crisis-ridden 
dispositif of the national-homogeneous big city, and becomes interlaced with it.
Particularly in Kreuzberg, “the cartel consisting of construction companies 
and state planners” fell apart in the face of the resistance of the population 
(Krätke and Schmoll 1987: 53). In 1981 in Kreuzberg, numerous squatted hous-
es were defended, sometimes violently. In order to confront the crisis of the 
Fordist city with appropriate urban renewal strategies, the Senate of Berlin ini-
tiated an International Building Exhibition (IBA). It encompassed social peda-
gogic, spatial-construction, and self-help promoting concepts and employed a 
Turkish Commissioner for Foreigners in order to advance the integration of 
immigrants. This “careful urban renewal” was oriented toward the needs of 
residents and functioned as a sort of preventative social policy. The Senate for 
Social Affairs in turn set up a support program for self-help groups that soon 
supported 50 groups with a focus on foreigner policy. The buzzwords of this 
“transformation of municipal activity” (ibid.: 61) – flexibilization, decentraliza-
tion, self-help, participation, and “endogenous development” – were just as at-
tractive for neoliberal CDU positions that aimed at rolling back the welfare state 
in favor of local communities, individual responsibility, and market-oriented 
regulation, as they were for an “alternative” scene that was able to impose its 
interests through participation procedures.
The programmatic orientation of the foreigner policy of the new Senate 
corresponded with this transformation of urban and welfare policy: previously 
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understood as a “problem of state planning” foreigner policy was now estab-
lished as “commissary policy” (Schwarz 2001). Berlin was the first federal state 
(Bundesland) to introduce the office of a “Commissioner for Foreigners” that 
conceived and coordinates measures for foreigner policy. Barbara John, who 
held the office for 22 years, followed an ambivalent political course. Its con-
servative side sought to reduce the number of foreigners, in harmony with the 
national conservative government in power since 1982. At the same time, it fo-
cused upon the cosmopolitanism of Berliners and promoted the acceptance of 
“other cultures.” If self-organized immigrant groups were previously regarded 
as entities promoting ghettoization, now a temporary “emphasis upon one’s 
own ethnic identity” was no longer interpreted as inhibiting integration per 
se. Rather, the self-help coffer of the Senate supported a “dignitary politics” (in 
the words of Thomas Schwarz) drawing upon conservative traditions that no 
longer perceived immigrants as victims, but rather as independent subjects. 
Increasingly, the focus shifted to social problems such as the inadequate educa-
tional situation of youths, or increasing unemployment among immigrants as 
a result of urban deindustrialization. This political course of the Senate, which 
promoted the social activity of foreigners not least in order to compensate for 
their exclusion from the political system, transformed organized communities. 
Initiatives that had previously been political now founded neighborhood cen-
ters or youth projects in order to fulfill the criteria to receive funding.
Since the techniques of intervention described above derived their inputs 
from the socio-cultural needs of those affected, urban cultural policy increas-
ingly became an instrument of social control. Although the depletion of West 
Berlin by a decline in the population, increasing unemployment, and constant-
ly increasing federal subsidies became emphatically clear by 1985, the head of 
the local government, Eberhard Diepgen, described Berlin as a cultural me-
tropolis that could measure up to Paris, London, and New York. As was the 
case with previous regimes: “Berlin is primarily a young city, a city for youths” 
(Presse- und Informationsamt 1985: 29). Urban renewal, an increasing number 
of mass festivals, as well as the promotion of socio-cultural initiatives coalesced 
into an “identity politics” (Homuth 1987: 103). The promise of cultural toler-
ance and diversity was supposed to symbolically integrate those milieus which 
were drifting apart in the process of socio-economic reorganization.
The Senate’s concept of integration was a part of this socio-cultural identity 
politics, to the extent that it focused upon feel-good aspects and culture, but 
not upon social rights: integration meant “the greatest possible tension-free 
coexistence, […] feeling comfortable and at home with each other.” For the first 
time ever, “the coexistence of different customs and cultures [could] be expe-
rienced as enrichment through diversity.” The Berlin Senate thus prioritized 
“programs of integration” that left “a wide space for the cultural independence 
of foreigners” (Der Senator für Gesundheit 1982: 6  f.). Diepgen emphasized 
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that “a metropolis like Berlin [lives] from diversity, from variety, from immi-
grants” (Presse- und Informationsamt 1985: 30). On the one hand, Diepgen 
boasted that the decline of Turkish foreigners was a result of CDU policies, 
while on the other hand he no longer linked the presence of foreigners to their 
economic contribution, but rather with their contribution to the cultural diver-
sity of the metropolis. Here a transformation becomes manifest, from the “big 
city,” which stood for a unified culture and social equality, to a “metropolis,” in 
which social antagonisms are naturalized through the plurality of lifestyles. An 
“assimilative multiculturalism” (cf. Lanz 2007) became predominant, which 
tolerates, promotes, and makes use of cultural diversity, but which also con-
ceives of a hierarchical relationship between a majority society representing a 
norm and immigrant communities that are expected to conform to preexisting 
norms.
Whereas the “part of an ambiguous political approach that dealt with in-
tegration policy was delegated” (Schwarz 2001: 132) to the Senate for Social 
Affairs and the Commissioner for Foreigners, the right-wing conservative In-
terior Senator was responsible until the year 2001 for the repressive aspects 
inherited from the dispositif of the national-homogeneous big city, making the 
immigration of family members of foreigners already living in Germany more 
difficult, pushing for deportations, making repressive integration demands, 
and reviving the ghetto discourse in the late 1990s.
The brief interregnum of a Red-Green coalition government, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989, the unification of the city and the decision to make it 
the capital of Germany did not bring any essential changes to city policy on 
foreigners. On the one hand, the ridiculous boom fantasies – politicians and 
experts predicted that after 1990 Berlin would make a great leap in importance 
toward becoming a global city with six million residents – were accompanied 
by (traditional) closed door policies against Eastern European immigration, 
imagined as a threatening tidal wave. This was legitimized by a racist anti-
Slavic discourse, which had already dominated the dispositif of the national-
homogeneous big city. On the other hand, questions of integration policy were 
regarded as being of secondary importance in the face of the task of reunifying 
Berlin and making infrastructural preparations for the supposed boom: Berlin, 
asserted Eberhard Diepgen in his government policy statement of 1991, could 
not become a city of immigration in this situation of radical change. Even the 
SPD, now a participant in government as part of a grand coalition, was primar-
ily focused upon “reducing the estrangement between East and West [Berlin]” 
(SPD-Berlin 1991).
Whereas repressive measures by the Senate of the Interior aimed at roll-
ing back immigration – not least by means of mass deportations of Poles, the 
Commissioner for Foreigners delved further into a multiculturalism that al-
lowed immigrants the representation of their “cultural identities” while at the 
 Lanz: Berlin Diversit ies 215
same time aiming for their socio-political self-help. In order to “set a concrete 
signal for the growing cultural diversity” of Berlin, the Commissioner founded 
a “Workshop of Cultures” (John 2005: 9), which since 1996 has organized a 
“Carneval of Cultures,” which has quickly grown to become a tourist mega-
event. Within the framework of the historical German concept of defining cul-
tures as ethno-national units, this “identity spectacle” (Levent Soysal) followed 
the logic of an “exhibition of peoples” in public perception until well into the 
2000s, in which “foreign” ethno-cultures are presented to the majority society.
Whereas the “Carneval of Cultures” developed into a symbol of lived multi-
culturalism esteemed by all, socio-economic crisis scenarios gained ground in 
Berlin. The dreams of urban boom had burst after a short period of time, and 
two-thirds of industrial jobs had disappeared. The unemployment rate fluctu-
ated between 15 and 20 percent. Berlin plunged into a dramatic debt crisis and 
the grand coalition established austerity policies that cut and privatized mu-
nicipal services. In public discourse, gloomy crisis scenarios, which envisioned 
Berlin’s socio-economic decline, held sway from 1997 on. To the extent that 
precisely inner-city immigrant districts exhibited high rates of unemployment 
and poverty, a ghetto discourse was revived that contained discursive figures 
identical to those of its historical predecessors and was aimed at the very same 
urban spaces, Kreuzberg and later Neukölln. Once again, discussion focused 
upon the allegedly voluntary self-segregation of foreigners from “Germans,” 
their lack of willingness to integrate, and an ominous slumification. Nonethe-
less, the public funding program “Soziale Stadt” (social city) was established, 
which was used to intervene in disadvantaged districts with the aid of a pre-
ventative social policy focused upon self-help and participation that had been 
developed in the early 1980s.
2001 FF.: THE DISPOSITIF OF
THE COSMOPOLITAN-DIVERSITARIAN ME TROPOLIS
In the year 2001 the grand coalition disintegrated, again due to a scandal, and 
after new elections the SPD and the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism, today 
part of “Die Linke”) formed the so-called red-red coalition. Again, this political 
rupture was preceded by a profound transformation related to both the “urban 
meaning” of Berlin as well as national immigration and integration policy. The 
resulting crisis of the dominant immigration/city dispositif of the multicultur-
al-differential metropolis generated a “state of emergency” in which a new dis-
positif was established: that of the cosmopolitan-diversitarian metropolis.
At the national level, the reforms of the citizenship laws by the red-green 
coalition government since 1998 broke for the first time with the concept of jus 
sanguinis and declared Germany to be a country of immigration. Chancellor 
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Gerhard Schröder also started a “green card” initiative that was intended to 
recruit foreign laborers for the first time since the ban on recruitment in 1973. 
Although it only managed to achieve a modernized system of recruitment, tai-
lored to “highly qualified guest workers,” it fixed a new idea in the national 
political discourse, which linked immigration with the international competi-
tiveness of the country.
In the context of the political philosophy of the red-green national gov-
ernment and its move from Bonn to Berlin, the picture of Berlin in the me-
dia – which in 1998 was still dominated by scenarios of urban decline – un-
derwent a fundamental transformation. Already in 1999, in its issue number 
36 from 1999 with the cover story “New Berlin  –  Aufbruch zur Weltstadt,” 
Der Spiegel hyped Berlin as New York’s successor as the paradigmatic global 
metropolis of the new century. With the red-green national government, the 
figure of the culturepreneur, a new type of cultural businessman, became a part 
of Berlin’s landscape as the national capital as well as the image politics of the 
government. In his intention to reform national identity after the Kohl era, 
chancellor Schröder stylized an urban “new center” as the main addressee of 
his policies. To the extent that the subcultural diversity of post-Wende Berlin 
became increasingly commercialized and attracted all kinds of culture indus-
tries – such as MTV or Universal Music – to the city, Berlin appeared as a cool 
territory with optimal development possibilities for innovative culturepreneurs 
(Lange 2005). In the perception of the media, Berlin became a “human work-
shop” and an “experimental laboratory for long overdue changes” (Der Spiegel 
36/99). Not least, this new Berlin discourse construed new immigrants, con-
sidered to be especially dynamic, as pioneers of a neo-liberal process of social 
reconstruction oriented toward individual self-responsibility.
Internationally, Berlin was also increasingly perceived as an “exciting” me-
tropolis characterized by a dynamic cultural scene, social liberality, and the 
availability of spaces that had not yet been commercially exploited. Alongside 
tourism, temporary forms of migration began to boom among young adults 
who arrived as students, artists, or long-term travelers and stayed for a while. 
Once again, the label of Berlin’s youth came to the foreground of the city’s offi-
cial marketing. The message was: “Young Berlin: Berlin gets a new face: fresh, 
dynamic, young” (Berlin-Brief 99/01). Berlin was conceived of as a city of the 
future, as the cultural capital of the 21st century (cf. Hurtado 2005) with the at-
tributes of cosmopolitanism, urbanity, and diversity. As in the 1920s and 1980s, 
the “urban meaning” of the city was constructed around its cultural force and 
diversity as well as its supposed youth, in order to point a way out of the city’s 
deep socio-economic crisis.
Not least in the context of urban experiences in which news forms of inter-
national mobility and cultural hybridization began to become a part of everyday 
life, the authority of a dispositif of a multicultural metropolis that understood 
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cultures as delimited units existing alongside one another within a historical 
continuity began to crumble. The image of Berlin characterized by narratives 
of urban decline manifested in the ghetto discourse, which stood in diametric 
contradiction to the cultural dynamics experienced in everyday life in Kreuz-
berg, was also no longer sufficiently convincing. In contrast to the 1920s, when 
“foreigners” were considered undesirable or at least as suspect alien elements, 
and to the 1980s, when they were kept at a distance as an ethno-cultural “oth-
er,” for the first time there emerged within this new framework a discourse 
that no longer split off an ethno-national/cultural “other” from one’s “own,” 
but rather declared national, cultural, ethnic, as well as social diversity to be 
characteristic features of a metropolis and worth supporting.
Precisely from an economic perspective, emphasis was now placed upon 
the dynamic of cultural processes of hybridization: “Positive interaction with 
diversity,” according to the integration concept adopted by the red-red Senate in 
2005, “promotes intercultural competence, the vitality and capacity for the city 
to act, and leads to advantages in the international competition for attractive-
ness” (Abgeordnetenhaus 2005: 71). In this official political document, for the 
first time in Berlin the essentialist concept of culture is replaced by a concept 
that understands culture as dynamic sets of everyday practices and discourses 
that constantly blend with and influence each other. Furthermore, and this also 
marks a shift with regard to traditional multiculturalism, this discourse is con-
cerned primarily with the economic potential of immigrants for the globally 
competitive metropolis.
This “diversitarian multiculturalism” (Lanz 2007) is also reflected in an 
altered landscape. The focus is no longer upon urban spaces that deviate in a 
deficient sense from a supposed normality (ghettos), but rather upon neigh-
borhoods conceived of as cosmopolitan, whose obvious, profoundly fluid in-
ternationality is no longer linked to the classic German image of “migration,” 
neither in the sense of labor migration nor in the sense of a permanent process 
of immigration. Here, the city is only considered “sustainable” if it proves to be 
cosmopolitan enough to be attractive and open to globally mobile milieus. It 
was precisely Kreuzberg, which until recently was still maligned as a “ghetto,” 
that was now considered a model laboratory for a successful city of immigra-
tion. Thus, the Social Senator of the red-red government, referring to the 2004 
annual report of the national “Expert Advisory Board for Immigration and In-
tegration,” described Kreuzberg’s diversity as a value-creating location factor 
effecting the influx of creative individuals and media businesses (Lanz 2007: 
226).
The mayor of the Kreuzberg district attempted in 2004 to realize a “total in-
tercultural concept” which, under the term “managing diversity,” was intended 
to subject institutions to an intercultural opening, support the potential of eth-
nic minorities, as well as dismantle discrimination, all the while explicitly dis-
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tancing itself from the dominant concept of integration. However, this renun-
ciation of a paradigm of integration that unilaterally demands that immigrants 
blend into the majority society could not even be implemented in Kreuzberg, 
a district characterized by a progressive attitude with regard to questions of 
immigration. Nonetheless, the official government concept of integration has 
undergone a considerable shift in meaning. In the “Twelve Essentials of Berlin 
Integration Policy” that constitute the foundation for the integration concept of 
the Senate, integration is no longer a form of “restriction” (cf. Schulte 2000), 
but rather demands of the host society that it should “interculturally open in-
stitutions and procedures” (Abgeordnetenhaus 2005: 9). Integration policy is 
here conceived of as a permanent process involving all population groups, and 
which should encompass the social, economic, legal, and cultural dimensions 
of integration.
However, the political goal of diversity, which is linked here to equality be-
tween the most diverse social milieus and lifestyles in the city, has yet another 
side that dovetails with the model of the “activating welfare state” implemented 
by the red-green federal government: whereas municipal integration policy 
since the 1970s was “largely […] identical with welfare policy” (Sackmann 2001: 
17) – the multiculturalism concept of the 1980s supplemented this with a socio-
cultural offer of identity – this social character progressively vanished with the 
“neoliberal turn:” precisely in the field of integration policy, an “economization 
of the social sphere” became manifest (Lemke 1997: 248). To the extent that 
in Berlin in the last decade the unemployment rate for statistical foreigners 
fluctuated around the 40 per cent mark, the demand is addressed to foreign-
ers to exhaust their economic potential. Here, integration implies a successful 
“interpellation” as a subject subsisting without welfare benefits, participating 
in urban society through individual initiative. Since the state interpellates the 
subject as an entrepreneurial self, “all those who are integrated have to cal-
culate their behavior in accordance with the terms of an ‘investment’ in their 
own person and their family” (Rose 2000: 95). Education and the “activation” 
of the individual acquire a central position in integration policy, whereas social 
conditions such as institutional racism, which also disadvantages qualified im-
migrants in the labor market, tend to be ignored (cf. Lanz 2009).
The dispositif of the cosmopolitan metropolis is based upon a conception 
of diversity that regards the cultural, social, and ethnic diversity of individual 
residents to be socially enriching and economically useful, while accepting the 
resulting social inequalities and addressing subjects as entrepreneurial sub-
jects responsible for their own material existence.
As was the case in the 1980s, the establishment of a new migration/city dis-
positif – at the center of which stands a conception of a socially diverse city – in 
no way implies that the elements of the other two dispositifs have entirely disap-
peared. In Berlin, as a consequence of the attacks in New York on September 
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11, 2001, political positions that invoked a clash of cultures and that racialized 
Muslims as others were strengthened. These political positions were rooted in 
the historical archive of German immigration discourse. Once again, a ghetto 
discourse was intensified, accompanied by proposals for political intervention 
that aimed at stigmatizing immigrants, this time focused upon the district of 
Neukölln. Neukölln symbolized not only the problems of a city of immigration, 
but also the social dystopia par excellence, in which all alleged threats – disin-
tegration, poverty, exclusion, brutal youths, religious conflict, violence – were 
spatially condensed into a powerful, socially and culturally explosive mixture. 
Nonetheless, in the Berlin in the early years of the new millennium, such con-
ceptions were unable to develop sufficient power of persuasion to swamp the 
concept of the cosmopolitan metropolis.
CONCLUSION
A historical look back at the interconnection of immigrant and urban develop-
ment in Berlin reveals the existence of three immigration/city dispositifs that 
were established within the context of specific historical events in order to plug 
a contingent “leak” caused by a rupture of the previously dominant dispositif. 
Unsurprisingly, the first event was the founding of the German nation state: 
the dispositif of the national-homogeneous big city developed – with regard to 
the state – from the concept of the German nation as a community of descent 
and common culture and – with regard to the city – from an “urban meaning” 
that interpreted Berlin as a permanently crisis-ridden “city without an identity.” 
In the interrelation between the national and the urban, this dispositif contains 
core elements that are operational even today: the conception of foreigners as 
an alien presence, which obtains an urban-spatial manifestation in the ghetto 
discourse, an essentialist and ethno-nationalist concept of culture, which gen-
erates exclusionary postulates with regard to all-too foreign ethnic groups, as 
well as – at the urban level – an imaginary picture of Berlin on the one hand as 
a proletarian city without identity, stability, and a bourgeoisie, but on the other 
hand as a youthful, modern cultural metropolis.
Neither the transition to the Weimar Republic and then the Third Reich, nor 
the transition to the Federal Republic, were able to shatter this dispositif. Rather, 
only with the globalization of migratory movements as well as the decline of 
the Fordist welfare state model and the concept of the modern state was this 
possible. With the change in government consummated in 1981 from the social 
democrats to the conservatives, a new immigration/city dispositif, interlaced with 
the old one, was established: that of the multicultural-differential metropolis. 
In this new dispositif, the essentialist concept of culture as well as the notion of 
Berlin as a youthful cultural metropolis remained, but now immigrants were no 
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longer regarded per se as an alien presence. On the basis of a selection between 
“good” (related, useful) and “bad” (purportedly all-too-foreign) cultures, they 
were considered to be a potential enrichment of the post-Fordist metropolis, the 
basic principle of which was no longer homogeneity, but rather (social, national, 
cultural, and spatial) difference. However, all of this was to exist under the um-
brella of the dominant culture of the majority society, whose imagined standard-
bearers were to exclude or “reign in” (cultural or social) deviations that went too 
far, with the help of restrictive political intervention. Particularly in crisis situa-
tions, such as the shaking up of the borders to Eastern Europe as a result of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, or the emergence of urban spaces of poverty in the late 
1990s, elements of the “old” dispositif that had been supposedly overcome – such 
as anti-Slavic racism or a ghetto discourse that interpreted certain ethnic groups 
as an alien presence – came to the surface once again.
The dispositif of the multicultural-differential metropolis was exhausted 
within two decades. Once again, the national – the break with the concept of the 
German nation as a community of descent – was interlinked with the urban: on 
the one hand, processes of cultural hybridization and a dynamic international-
ization of urban society had become everyday experiences in Berlin, and on the 
other hand they were now regarded as factors to be supported in establishing a 
location for business, and which pointed the way out of the deindustrialization 
crisis. In the year 2001, it was once again the collapse of the Senate and a change 
of government to a coalition between social democrats and socialists that con-
sequentially enabled the establishment of a new migration/city dispositif: the 
dispositif of the cosmopolitan-diversitarian metropolis now broke with the essen-
tialist concept of culture and with the distinction between one’s national-ethnic-
cultural “own” and an “other,” radicalizes and economicize the image of Berlin 
as a globally important, young cultural metropolis and establishes the notion of 
an urban society characterized by social, cultural, ethnic, and national diversity. 
Here as well, the new dispositif does not completely replace the old one, but rath-
er becomes interlaced with it. Numerous debates conducted in the last decade, 
and the political strategies derived from them concerning supposed ghettos and 
parallel societies, which in particular constitute Muslims as a racial “other,” re-
veal that central elements of both dispositifs established earlier continue to live on 
and repeatedly reach a boiling point during crisis situations.
Perhaps it is precisely the economic dimension of “diversity” that speaks in 
favor of the fact that the dispositif of the cosmopolitan-diversitarian metropo-
lis – an ensemble of specific means, mechanisms and measures based upon 
a specific concept of diversity that shapes the sphere of activity migration/city 
in Berlin – was able to establish itself in a stabile manner. With regard to the 
complex of immigration, this would mean that for the first time in Berlin since 
the founding of the German nation state, ethnic, cultural or national diversity 
as well as ongoing international processes of migration are officially regarded 
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as urban normality and the traditional dichotomy between “Germans” vs. for-
eigners is being dissolved.
Translated by Alexander Locascio
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“Berlin Does Not Love You” 
Notes On Berlin’s “Tourism Controversy” and its Discontents1
Johannes Novy
The word “Berlin,” a crossed-out heart, a capital “U,” and an unmistakable mes-
sage: when the by now notorious “Berlin does not love you” stickers first ap-
peared in the city in the summer of 2011, there was considerable commotion. 
However, the stickers really shouldn’t have been a surprise, since they didn’t 
simply materialize from nothing, but rather reflected a conflict that had been 
emerging for a considerable period of time, one which the media had already 
long-since taken notice of. Whereas Berlin’s business elites and politicians had 
been intoxicated by constant new records in the number of visitors, and the 
booming tourism branch was stylized, with the enthusiastic support of the 
media, as a kind of savior for the economically troubled city, many residents 
particularly in the inner city have reacted far less enthusiastically to the con-
stantly increasing flood of visitors in their neighborhoods. While often far more 
reflective than portrayed by the media, their criticism of and resistance against 
the increased deluge of tourists has led to heated debates about the way tourism 
impacts urban space and the role tourism plays in wider processes of urban 
change. It is a debate that is long overdue and surely worth having but that 
occasionally gets caught up in unwarranted tourist bashing and anti-tourist 
rhetoric. This contribution argues that it makes no sense to make tourists the 
target of political conflicts and that all attention should instead be directed at 
the politics that have not only tolerated but rather have actively encouraged the 
steamrolling of many of the city’s neighborhoods by tourism and other forms 
of place consumption. 
1 | Source: Novy, J. (2013) “Berlin does not love you” – Die Tourismuskontroverse in 
einer von Besuchern “eroberten Stadt”. In Holm, A. (ed.) Reclaim Berlin. Soziale Kämpfe 
in der neoliberalen Stadt. Assoziation A, Berlin/Hamburg, for thcoming.
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BERLIN TOURISM — A FIRST APPROXIMATION
According to the raw numbers, the development of tourism in Berlin since Ger-
man reunification reads like a singular success story. Whereas the euphoric 
predictions from the period immediately after the reunification that Berlin 
would, within a few years, develop into a prosperous service sector metropolis 
or even a “global city” turned out not to be true (Krätke 2004), the development 
of tourism exceeded even the wildest expectations (Krajewski 2006). While 
there were 7 million overnight stays in 1993, in 2012 there were already al-
most 25 million. The number of actual overnight stays is believed to be at least 
double the number officially registered by the city’s accommodation industry 
and if one adds the circa 132 million annual day trippers that, as of 2011, were 
estimated to visit the city, we arrive at an annual total of approximately 182 mil-
lion days of stay, or – reduced to the amount of daily visitors – about 500,000 
tourists who stay in Berlin on any average day (SenWTF 2013). 
In comparison to other European metropolises, Berlin as a tourist destina-
tion is at third place behind London and Paris, even though in comparison 
with other European metropolises as an economic location it only occupies the 
midrange. Due to the weak industrial base of Berlin, tourism is of great eco-
nomic importance: according to information from the Berlin Senate, in the 
year 2011 the tourism business yielded an employment effect of over 275,000 
people – including the non-working members of households that are also pro-
vided for (SenWTF 2011: 10). Furthermore, with a gross turnover of more than 
10 billion Euros, it contributes considerably to the total income and the tax rev-
enues of the state of Berlin, and is in addition to this widely viewed as a crucial 
image factor that has helped the city to shake of its various troubled histories 
and redefine its identity (c.f. Häußermann and Colomb 2003).
The changing hotel landscape of the city illustrates the rapid development 
of tourism in Berlin. Between 2001 and March 2013, the number of accom-
modation establishments in Berlin grew from 543 to 786. In the same period 
of time, the number of beds rose from 62,024 to 131,220 (SenWTF 2013) and 
branch experts expect that the accommodations market in Berlin will continue 
to grow for years to come. In the period until 2015 alone, around 15,000 further 
beds are expected to become available (Falkner 2012; cf. also Deloitte 2011). 
Furthermore, the “gray market” accommodations have also grown consider-
ably in the recent past. According to a study by the tenants association Berliner 
Mietergemeinschaft, in 2011 in Berlin there were already around 12,000 vacation 
apartments in Berlin with 50,000 beds  –  and the number is rising (Berner 
und Wickert 2012). The boom in traffic for business trips as well as conference, 
congress, and convention tourism in particular in the meantime have become 
important pillars of the tourism business, but it is private travel in particular 
that allows Berlin to play in the big leagues of the most popular urban destina-
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tions. Without a number of “hard” location factors, such as the city’s excellent 
transportation links (including especially its addition to the route networks of 
EasyJet, Ryanair and other low-cost airline services) or its still favorable price-
performance ratio, Berlin’s dynamic development within the last twenty years 
would have been unimaginable. Nonetheless, several researchers emphasize 
that Berlin as a travel destination can also score points within the tough inter-
urban competition for tourists and the accompanying revenue as a result of 
“soft” factors (Colomb 2011; Vivant 2007). The city is perceived as attractive to 
visitors due to its turbulent history, its uniqueness as a formerly divided city as 
well as its status as a “capital city” and in addition to this seems to benefit par-
ticularly from its image as the epitome of a “young” and “creative” metropolis 
that captivates visitors because of its contrasts and contradictions, as well as its 
dynamism and diversity (Novy and Huning 2009). 
At the latest, ever since the American Time Magazine referred to Berlin in 
2009 as “Europe’s Capital of Cool” (Gumbel 2009), the word is out worldwide 
that Berlin is “hip” and “exciting,” so it’s not surprising that the city is particu-
larly beloved by young visitors. The average age of Berlin visitors both foreign 
and domestic is, according to survey of guests from 2008, 37 years, and hence 
considerably below the number for Germany as a whole (45 years), and about 40 
percent of visitors are younger than 30 years (BTM 2010b).
It is not least due to Berlin’s attractiveness as a supposed trend and nightlife 
destination that tourism in the city has also been noticeably felt beyond of the 
core tourist areas of the city’s two city centers – the Mitte district and the City 
West – as well as the classical excursion destinations or heritage sites elsewhere 
(Krajewski 2006; Novy and Huning 2009; Huning and Novy 2008). This can 
be observed for example in the gentrification strongholds such as Prenzlauer 
Berg, Friedrichshain, and Kreuzberg, but also in numerous other parts of the 
city, including Neukölln which until recently was portrayed in popular dis-
course rather as a place to be avoided than as an environment for tourist con-
sumption. 
None of this is entirely new, of course. One thing that is new, however, is 
the extent and breadth to which areas beyond the inner city are today integrated 
into Berlin’s tourism and leisure trade. Tourism and leisure development has 
in other words become more evident and more pervasive. And it has emerged 
in many places as a powerful force, bringing about significant changes with 
respect to the urban fabric of the areas in which it occurs. As the Berlin press 
reports: “Tourists are discovering and increasingly changing Berlin’s neighbor-
hoods,” wrote Die Welt already in the summer of 2010 (Bock 2010) under the 
headline “Tourists Conquer Berlin Off the Beaten Track,” and a short time later 
Der Tagesspiegel referred to Berlin as a “conquered city” (Bartels 2010).
Primarily in the old eastern districts of Friedrichshain and Prenzlauer 
Berg as well as in Kreuzberg considerable overnight accommodation capaci-
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ties were – and are being – created, whereby the number of budget hotels and 
hostels in particular has increased considerably (SenWTF 2011: 6). At the same 
time, the glut of hostels and hotels observable in many parts of the city is merely 
one aspect of a more comprehensive transformation of urban spaces associated 
with tourism, which often leaves behind deep traces in the everyday lives of the 
people living there: local businesses tailor their offerings to the growing visitor 
market or are pushed aside by shops and restaurants catering to visitors; once 
calm residential streets are transformed into shopping and party miles and 
community assets and resources are objectified, and commodified for external 
consumption. This multi-faceted transformation of urban places, occasionally 
described as “touristification” (Evans 2002; Gotham 2005), has – together with 
nuisance issues (noise pollution etc.) and the so far insufficiently examined role 
of growing tourist demand as a contributing and accelerating factor of gentri-
fication processes – contributed decisively to the fact that the development of 
tourism has become an increasingly contested topic and tourists have become 
an increasingly popular bogeyman in the course of conflicts concerning urban 
restructuring processes. 
FRIEDRICHSHAIN-KREUZBERG — THE WORLD AS A GUEST
OF TOURIST-HATERS?
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg plays a special role in this context. In the press the 
district is regarded, at the latest since the district’s branch of the Green party 
caused a stir by hosting an event in February 2011 with the title “Help, the 
Tourists are Coming,” as the center of the “tourist-haters” (cf. Haas et al. 2011). 
And in fact, in no other district of Berlin is tourism so controversially discussed 
as here. As in most other parts of the city, tourism was a marginal topic in 
district politics for a long time. While particularly Kreuzberg as West Berlin’s 
former radical and multicultural center has attracted visitors for decades and 
can hence look back at a long history of being a tourist destination, at the dis-
trict level the weal and woe of tourism had been dealt with sporadically at best 
(Novy and Huning 2009; Novy 2010). Only after the turn of the millennium, 
after Kreuzberg was merged with the neighboring Friedrichshain into the new 
district of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, did the topic of tourism obtain a new 
importance in district politics. Initially, aspirations to promote local tourism 
were the focus of attention. Among other things, the district’s own marketing 
bureau was expanded by an economic development project co-financed by the 
European Union and a roundtable was called into existence in order to bet-
ter connect actors relevant to tourism in the district. The success or failure 
of these measures, which illustrate the permeation of district politics by the 
principles and premises of entrepreneurial urban policy (cf. Hall and Hubbard 
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1998; Harvey 1989; Mayer 1990), is difficult to evaluate. In any case, in the 
following years the district was confronted with a veritable tourism boom that 
soon assumed such dimensions that it was no longer the – supposed – benefits 
of tourism that were dominating the district’s political debates, but rather tour-
ism’s negative side effects.
A whole series of different conflicts soon loomed: the Admiralbrücke in 
SO362 became the arena of a bitter struggle concerning the party-tourism 
occurring there; in many quarters characterized by Wilhelminian-period ar-
chitecture, complaints multiplied concerning the legal or illegal conversion of 
rental apartments into bed and breakfast accommodations and vacation apart-
ments; and the seemingly endless proliferation of hotels and hostels, origi-
nally well-received by district politicians, also became increasingly subject to 
criticism. The number of commercial accommodation facilities had more than 
quadrupled since the early 1990s and with the number of overnight stays now 
surpassing that of several mayor German cities such as Stuttgart (SenWTF 
2011: 6) many residents, community groups and district politicians argued that 
a point had been reached where the development of additional hotels and hos-
tels, especially in residential areas, should be blocked.
Furthermore, voices became louder concerning the negative influences of 
tourism upon neighborhood’s existing urban fabrics and Kiez structures, for 
example in the area around Schlesische Straße, a Kiez which for quite some 
time has been in high demand among visitors and which in the eyes of many 
residents, for example the blogger Sebastian Kraus, has been considerably neg-
atively affected by tourism. Kraus (2010), in his “blog novel,” extensively ad-
dresses the “increasing imposition upon everyday life and living environment 
of people living here by tourism, its presence and infrastructure” as well as the 
advancing “transformation of streets and squares in photo and postcard mo-
tifs, pictures, and backdrops.” Kraus describes how, through the “loss of urban 
and social free spaces and niches” as well as the “disappearance of authentic 
places,” exactly that mythos is undermined that forms the basis of Berlin’s cur-
rent attractiveness as a tourist destination. And he discusses the larger issue of 
gentrification that serves simultaneously as cause, context, and consequence of 
the neighborhood’s rise to prominence as a visitor destination. 
2 | Translator’s note: SO36, which refers to the former postal code of the area, is the 
colloquial term for the eastern part of the Kreuzberg district, traditionally characterized 
by the presence of political lef tists and residents of Turkish descent. It is also the name 
of a longstanding concert venue.
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DON’T BL AME IT ALL ON TOURISM! WHO IS “VISITING” 
AND “CHANGING” BERLIN’S KIEZE
Concerns like the ones Kraus discusses have become more and more wide-
spread in recent years and have, unfortunately, also led to some annoying 
excesses. Indeed some more militant groups engaged in the city’s political 
struggles have even gone so far to argue that, since tourists were complicit in 
gentrification, attacking them would be a viable and legitimate way to fight 
it. An article in the left-wing scene magazine Interim suggested for example 
that by “steal(ing) their mobile phones and wallets [...], burn(ing) their cars, 
smash(ing) their hotel windows, drop(ing) rubbish, (and) throw(ing) stuff at 
tourist buses,” tourists could be scared away and prospective developers dis-
couraged to invest (cited in Hasselmann 2010).
Contrary to portrayals in mainstream media, such outright malicious “rea-
soning”  –  if it can be called as such  –  is by no means typical for the wider 
protests spreading across Berlin’s neighborhoods. At the same time, however, 
there can be no denial that it has become increasingly popular to look at tour-
ists as some eleventh biblical plague (Meinholt 2010) and make them single-
handedly responsible for the unwanted changes the city’s more centrally lo-
cated neighborhoods are currently experiencing. From the perspective of those 
who live or work in the immediate vicinity of tourist poles of attraction, the re-
cent vituperation against tourists might be understandable. For example, who-
ever lives on Kreuzberg’s Falckensteinstraße  –  which residents rechristened 
“Ballermanstraße”3 by placing stickers over the street signs – has good reasons 
to be annoyed by the legions of party-crazed visitors that flock there. Overall, 
however, tourist-bashing isn’t really helpful. It distracts from the fact that many 
problems that have come to be associated with tourism are not primarily, let 
alone exclusively the fault of tourists, and furthermore rests upon undifferen-
tiated – and often also rather elitist – clichés about who tourists are and how 
they behave. To put it more bluntly: there is no such thing as “the tourist.” To 
portray tourists as a homogeneous whole has always been misleading as dif-
ferent kinds of people have always engaged in different activities and practices 
when traveling (Cohen 2004: 66) but is even more inadequate today in light of 
the changing and increasingly complex realities that have come to characterize 
contemporary tourism. 
These realities are maybe best described as a continuously ongoing differ-
entiation or segmentation of tourism, due the constant development of new 
niches and trends which has led various authors to postulate the emergence of 
3 | Translator’s note: Ballermann is a bar on the Spanish island of Majorca notorious for 
being a hangout for obnoxious German tourists. The term is also applied to the neigh-
borhood in which the bar resides.
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a “new tourism” (cf. Poon 1989; Voase 2007), and de-differentiation because 
of wider changes in leisure, consumption, and mobility patterns in advanced 
capitalist societies that make it increasingly difficult to distinguish between 
tourism and other forms of migration and mobility, as well as other forms of 
leisure and (place) consumption (cf. Urry 2001; Hall et al. 2006; Novy 2011). 
Contemporary tourism is, in other words, not just more diverse than ever, 
but also characterized by an increasing “routinization” (Veralltäglichung) (cf. 
Wöhler 2011). One the one hand, this is due to the fact that travel for certain 
social groups is increasingly a part of everyday life and on the other hand, be-
cause the lines between tourist and non-tourist activity have become increas-
ingly blurred. Several studies have for instance shown that certain, usually 
privileged urban milieus increasingly behave as “as if tourists” (cf. Lloyd and 
Clark 2001), meaning they use urban spaces and resources in a manner similar 
to tourists (Maitland and Newman 2004: 341; cf. Novy 2010). Furthermore, 
the lines between tourism and other forms of (temporary) migration are also 
becoming increasingly blurred. The growing number of highly mobile academ-
ics, artists, and “creative” workers and entrepreneurs that can be encountered 
in Berlin is a case in point. Sometimes referred to as YUKIS (Young Urban 
Creative Internationals; Knight 2011), these temporary “city users” cannot be 
unambiguously classified as either tourists or residents and due to their grow-
ing presence in today’s cities indeed call essentialist distinctions between “lo-
cals” and “others”/“outsiders” increasingly into question (cf. Martinotti 1999; 
Costa and Martinotti 2003).
In this context, and against the background of constantly increasing mobil-
ity and international linkages, Maitland and Newman (2009) speak of a grow-
ing and increasingly mobile “cosmopolitan consuming class” – which in some 
large cities, including especially “world tourism cities” like London or New York 
has reached a critical mass – or rather of changed behaviors in the mobility, 
work, and consumption of urban milieus, whose effects upon cities and their 
subspaces have up to now not received sufficient attention in urban policy or 
urban research. Alluding to the concept of “new tourism” already mentioned, 
Maitland and Newman also speak of the constitution of “new tourism areas” 
in which traditional tourism, combined with other forms of “place consump-
tion” (Selby 2004) emerges in a way that impacts and changes urban space 
(Maitland and Newman 2004, 2009). A new internationality emerges, there is 
an increased concentration of cafes, bars, and other offers for target groups that 
enjoy going out or are hungry for experiences, processes of transformation and 
valorization are favored. There is strong indication that such dynamics, which 
Maitland and Newman first observe in various quarters of North and East Lon-
don, are also present in Berlin. Here too, processes of urban and neighborhood 
change seem to be influenced – and sometimes even shaped – by the practices 
and preferences of different leisure and consumption-prone groups of city us-
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ers – groups that include residents, tourists but also many others that do not fit 
neatly into either one of the two categories. However, this is not the only reason 
why scape oating tourists is unwarranted and ultimately also counterproduc-
tive. Arguably, even more importantly, doing so also distracts attention away 
from the political factors that have conditioned the ways in which tourism has 
developed and Berlin’s socio-spatial configuration has changed. 
CIT Y TOURISM AND LOCAL MUNICIPAL POLITICS
Without a doubt, tourism plays an important role in Berlin politics, and not just 
since governing mayor Klaus Wowereit openly declared in an interview in 2004 
that he wished to make tourism a “top priority” (Sontheimer 2004a). Already 
before the fall of the Berlin Wall, politicians gave above-average attention to tour-
ism, not least because tourism was regarded as an important instrument in the 
propagandistic competition of both halves of the city (and both political sys-
tems). After the Wende, tourism moved increasingly to the center of attention as 
an important pillar of the city’s economy. The visual power of the fall of the wall 
and the reunification brought record revenues for Berlin tourism and led, along 
with the natural ebb in visitor traffic that followed the immediate post-reunifica-
tion period, to increased political engagement concerning its economic impor-
tance, the organization and orientation of Berlin tourism policy, as well as the 
development and implementation of appropriate marketing activities (Nerger 
1998; Colomb 2011). In 1992/93, it was decided to involve the private sector more 
strongly in the marketing of Berlin as a location. First, the (West-)Berlin tour-
ism office (Berliner Fremdenverkehrsamt) was replaced by the Berlin Tourismus 
Marketing GmbH (BTM for short), a public-private partnership, later renamed 
to Visit Berlin that is partially financed by the city of Berlin and the tourism 
industry. In 1994, there followed the founding of Partner für Berlin – Gesellschaft 
für Hauptstadt-Marketing mbH (PfB; today known as Berlin Partner), a second 
public-private partnership devoted to marketing Berlin. Against the background 
of far-reaching economic and political restructuring marked by a profound re-
orientation of urban governance and policies emphasizing growth and competi-
tiveness, two important actors thus emerged that would significantly influence 
the orientation of political and administrative action with regard to tourism.
During the Red-Red (SPD-PDS/DIE LINKE) state government, which took 
power after the collapse of the CDU-led grand coalition in 2001, tourism, if 
anything, gained in significance in the city’s political arena. By then, policy-
makers had come to grips with the reality that previous dreams that Berlin 
would regain its status as a major economic center were nothing more than 
that: dreams. They were also confronted, not least due to the Berlin banking 
scandal that had come to light in 2001, with an increasingly dramatic economic 
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and financial situation. Whereas Berlin was economically at rock bottom, the 
tourism sector exhibited a downright boisterous development and therefore 
came – along with a few other areas of the so-called tertiary sector – to play an 
even more important role in the city’s increasingly market-, consumption- and 
property-led approach to urban and economic development. 
A “roundtable for tourism” situated in the Senate chancellery was called 
into being, a tourism concept to increase the number of visitors was created, 
and despite the acute budgetary crisis of the state, a considerable intensifica-
tion of Berlin tourism marketing, including the allocation of additional public 
subsidies, was resolved. The tourist branch of the economy in Berlin was pleas-
antly surprised. The state government led by Wowereit was supposedly doing 
“much more for tourism than all of its predecessors” proclaimed the then-head 
of BTM, Hanns Peter Nerger, in 2004, and that despite the fact that the in-
dustry was skeptical toward the Red-Red Senate at the beginning (Sontheimer 
2004b). Meanwhile, the Senate saw itself as vindicated by the sustained growth 
of the tourism sector and during its second term in office continued place a 
special emphasis upon boosting the sector’s development. Since the originally 
formulated goal of raising overnight stays to 15 million by 2010 had already 
been reached during the 2006 soccer world cup, the new goal became to crack 
the 20 million mark by 2010.
Furthermore, noticeable changes occurred with regard to the contents and 
spatial orientation of many measures related to tourism. Berlins Kieze had 
played a rather subordinate role in previous years within BTM as well as in 
debates concerning the development of tourism in the city. In particular, BTM 
focused upon advertising the city center and other mainstream or big-ticket at-
tractions located elsewhere, despite the fact that travel guides and other tourist 
media at the time had long recognized the tourism potential of many Kieze. 
This began to change over the course of the 2000s when Berlin’s policy-makers 
as well as the city’s marketers Partner für Berlin and BTM/Visit Berlin began to 
implement various policy measures to promote Berlin as a “creative city.” Now, 
motifs beyond the usual tourist destinations increasingly shifted to the center 
of attention: places with which the image of the city as a creative and “scene” 
metropolis could be emphasized, such as the temporary “urban beaches” on 
the banks of the river Spree (Colomb 2011), but also images of trendy street 
cafes, apartment building courtyards and other, supposedly kiez-typical motifs 
(cf. Colomb 2011; Kalandides and Colomb 2010). Largely absent during this 
period was a concern for tourism’s negative effects. Rather, the city’s approach 
to tourism policy – understood as what governments choose to do or choose not 
to do in relation to tourism (Hall and Jenkins 2004) – was almost exclusively 
concerned with marketing initiatives, the reorganization of Berlin’s urban envi-
ronment according to the needs of affluent consumers and the visitor economy 
as well as other activities aimed at promoting further tourism growth.
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More recently and in response to the growing criticism of and resistance 
against the course of the city’s development, there have been some slight policy 
changes. Most notably, legislation was introduced to curb the conversion apart-
ments to tourist rentals. The thrust of the city’s tourism policy – as exemplified 
by the recently published “Tourism Concept 2011+” – has remained virtually 
unchanged, however. Growth continues to be prioritized – the magic number 
the city wants to crack next now is 30 million annual overnight stays – and 
in the rare instances that tourism’s negative externalities are mentioned this 
seems more to be due to a concern about the future prospects of Berlin as a 
destination than a concern over the integrity of the city and its neighborhoods 
as lived-in environments.
CONCLUSION
Tourism has become a defining feature of the profound transformation of Berlin 
since the fall of the wall and the reunification of both halves of the city. It makes 
its mark upon the city in terms of its image, its ambiance, and not least its self-
conception, and is regarded as one of the decisive economic glimmers of hope 
in the next few decades. As a source of (tax) revenue, a job engine, and an image 
factor that puts Berlin in a positive light, tourism is courted, celebrated, and pro-
moted. Some commentators even see the future of Berlin as a sort of “Las Vegas 
on the Spree,” a city built around and sustained by leisure and consumption (cf. 
Büscher 2006). One particular characteristic of the tourism boom in Berlin is 
the observable spatial expansion and dispersion of tourism. This development 
is inseparably connected with a profound transformation of tourist interests and 
practices, but is also not least the result of political and political-economic condi-
tions of the last few decades. As with other cities, the premises and principles of 
entrepreneurial-neoliberal urban policy have become essential characteristics 
of political activity. They are articulated among other things in urban develop-
ment and economic policies that overwhelmingly conceive city spaces as “arenas 
for both market-oriented economic growth and elite consumption practices” 
(Brenner and Theodore 2002) and in which tourism is of particular importance. 
This orientation of Berlin politics has played a considerable role in the continu-
ing tourist “conquest” of Berlin, the negative consequences of which, particu-
larly in inner city neighborhoods, are now being problematized by residents and 
neighborhood initiatives. It is because of their activism and protests that the 
development of tourism as well as the so far almost exclusively growth-oriented 
tourism policy of Berlin’s state government have become controversial topics of 
discussion, and the costs and benefits of tourism, their distribution, as well as 
questions of tolerability are now being publicly discussed. Given the extent of 
tourism-induced transformation in the city it was about time. 
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At the same time, it is also important to emphasize that many tendencies 
now being debated using buzzwords like “touristification” can by no means 
be attributed exclusively to tourism. The kind of disrespectful and obnoxious 
behavior that is often associated with tourists is in reality not an exclusive fail-
ing of out-of-towners (Alas 2011), and many of the broader quarrels and con-
flicts that currently rage in Berlin’s inner city neighborhoods do not take place 
between tourists and residents, but along other lines of difference, including 
especially social status and economic resources. Since this development is due 
in no small part to the policies of the last few years, and clear delimitations be-
tween residents and tourists have become increasingly more difficult to make, 
it makes no sense to make tourists the target of political conflicts in the city. 
Doing so implies to mistake the effect for the cause and divert attention away 
from what should be the primary focus of political pressure and that is the way 
the city approaches tourism as well as the more orientation of urban and eco-
nomic development policy in present-day Berlin. 
Translated by Alexander Locascio
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The Sound of Berlin 
Subculture and Global Music Industry1
Ingo Bader and Albert Scharenberg
Berlin booms – but only with respect to culture and more specifically music. 
While the vision of being one of the leading cities in the global economic net-
work has failed dramatically after reunification (Scharenberg 2000; Krätke 
2004), it is, ironically, precisely deindustrialization that has turned Berlin into 
a node of creativity and cultural production. The musical styles most closely as-
sociated with the Berlin music scene – i.e. New Wave, Techno, Electro, as well 
as, in the national context, HipHop – originated in the urban ruins of deindus-
trialized Detroit and Manchester or the dilapidated Bronx. In Berlin, the free 
space that urban movements fought for in the 1980s and 1990s facilitated the 
development of a lively subculture.
To explain the city’s rise to an “alpha World Media City” status (Krätke 
2002), it is insufficient to simply look at the city’s overall economic perfor-
mance. In fact, Berlin’s marginal position in the highly decentralized German 
city network has not changed much since reunification. Therefore, institution-
alist approaches to cultural economy are not able to sufficiently explain Berlin’s 
rise to a central node of the global music economy. We argue that the main 
reason global players and major music industry associations have moved their 
headquarters to Berlin is the city’s dynamic club and music subculture.
Our case study is empirically based on qualitative fieldwork about the music 
economy, in particular participant observation and 20 guideline-based inter-
views with representatives of music-sector companies and associations, as well 
as with administration employees between 2001 and 2005. Interviews were 
carried out with representatives from both the formalized firm-based section of 
the music industry (major and independent companies), and from the more in-
formal club scene. In addition, we consulted Berlin’s culture press, local news-
1 | Source: Bader, I. and Scharenberg, A. (2009) The Sound of Berlin. Subculture and 
Global Music Industry. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 34.1, 
76-91.
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papers and administrative publications, as well as empirical data obtained from 
statistical agencies and business registers.
In the following, we discuss firstly the flexible integration of small busi-
nesses into the networks of global players. Secondly, we examine the relation 
between Berlin’s economic decline and the city’s specific urbanity. Thirdly, we 
analyze the development of the specific urban music scene and its styles. In 
doing so, we follow Amin and Thrift (2007: 158), who make the case that this 
approach “adds a whole new raft of possibilities and connections to contempo-
rary cultural studies of the urban.” We conclude that subculture is more than 
a force of attraction for the creative class, and that Berlin’s attractiveness for 
young and creative people does not correlate with a general economic success, 
as Florida (2002) argues.
CRE ATIVE INDUSTRIES AND THE CIT Y
Most observers agree that an urban context and atmosphere is essential when 
debating the potential locations for enterprises in the cultural economy. How-
ever, this is not only true concerning their economic activities, but also with 
respect to musical innovation and production. It is no accident that most mu-
sic styles are closely connected to certain cities – New Orleans and Jazz, De-
troit and Motown, Chicago and House, Manchester and Brit-Pop, and even 
Nashville and Country. Without the urban density and the specific local con-
ditions, their development would not have been feasible. Even though many 
large cities develop a local music style, only a few of them receive an interna-
tional response, and still fewer become important nodes of the global culture 
industry.
Following the collapse of the dot-com bubble in 2000/2001, the creative 
industries and the so-called creative city have increasingly become the new leit-
motif for urban development. The debate was triggered by Florida’s book “The 
Rise of the Creative Class” (2002). Florida stresses the importance of so-called 
“soft” location factors, in particular as a pull-factor for the creative class (i.e. the 
workforce of the knowledge-based and creative industries). The attractiveness 
for this class is supposed to be the decisive element for the city’s economic 
success. While Florida’s book has had strong repercussions in the arena of city 
politics – in particular in the areas of economic policy and city marketing, it 
has met with strong criticism, too (Scott 2006; Peck 2005). For instance, Scott 
(2006) argues that Florida does not have any theoretically grounded and em-
pirically based understanding of the urban cultural economy and its embed-
dedness in post-Fordist urbanity. In understanding urban culture primarily as 
a “soft” location factor, Florida’s approach, according to Scott, falls back behind 
the institutional theories which focus on the dynamics of cultural production.
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The global city debate shows that services produced for the global market 
need urban centers, i.e. global cities. The same is true for the cultural indus-
try; it is also organized in a global network of (a few) cities with a great deal of 
cultural production (and productivity). These cities have come to be known as 
media or culture cities (Krätke 2002). Here, the controlling mechanisms of the 
global cultural economy, which are part of the heavily centralized distribution 
network, are concentrated. Krätke’s analysis of the institutional embeddedness 
and global networking of this industry offers conceptual starting points for the 
explanation of Berlin’s rise to an alpha World Media City, defined by Krätke 
(2003: 616) as following:
“An alpha world media city had to have more than 17 of the 33 global media firms (i.e. 
over 50 percent of the global players analyzed here) in its location area (first threshold 
value) and more than 60 business units from among the global media firms included 
had to be present (second threshold value).”
According to Krätke, the globalization of cultural production enhances the 
importance of control functions and thus of global media corporations (Ryan 
1992). At the same time, the industry’s tendency to re-agglomeration fosters the 
formation of inner-urban clusters. However, even Krätke does not really come 
to terms with the enterprises’ choice of location since he focuses on control 
functions and agglomeration economies. We thus want to supplement Krätke’s 
theory by focusing on the creative input of the production process of cultural 
goods and on the organizational changes in the cultural economy. Our example 
will be music in the context of the cultural industry’s economic restructuring: 
How significant is urbanity – and, more precisely, Berlin’s specific urbanity and 
(sub)culture – for this production process?
At this point, Santagata (2002) defines “creative districts” as regions of flex-
ible production which generate the specific cultural and institutional forms 
of networks of small enterprises. This concept draws on the concept of “in-
dustrial districts” (Sabel 1992). Due to the fact that within the production pro-
cess, cultural and technological knowledge has become more important, this 
approach – though already developed in the early 1980s – regained influence in 
the scientific debate during the 1990s. The connection between the knowledge 
generation process and a specific social environment as well as institutional 
setting explains both the rise of agglomerations of the creative economy in gen-
eral, and the latter’s spatial selectivity vis-à-vis local institutional settings and a 
locally specific urbanity.
These approaches also offer valuable insights, which help explaining 
Berlin’s rise to an alpha World Media city. Creative economies are based on 
networks of flexible specialization and a vertically disintegrated production 
process (Scott 2000). Technologies and work processes that are used for the 
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production of cultural goods often contain a high degree of tacit knowledge 
and, increasingly, specialized computer technology. In general, the production 
is dominated by networks of small and medium-sized enterprises, which are 
dependent upon each other due to their specialized input and output, although 
large companies often participate in the same networks. Because works in the 
tradition of Piore and Sabel (1984) tend to overestimate the networks of small 
enterprises as the new organizational model of Post-Fordism, we rather want 
to follow Amin (2000) as well as Scott (2001: 11 ff.) in proposing different types 
of incorporation of small enterprises – so-called “independents” – into globally 
operating corporations of the music industry.
Networks of music production are organized in highly complex forms. 
Among other things, they need a highly specialized and trained workforce. 
The size of the agglomeration – or, more specifically, the labor market – mini-
mizes the risk for employers as well as for employees (Scott 2000). Contrary to 
Florida’s assumption of a new and fairly homogenous “creative class,” employ-
ment within the cultural industry is visibly divided (Peck 2005: 757  f.). The 
industry’s work force, i.e. artists and their productive environment, make their 
living through creativity, which in turn is dependent on living conditions. The 
settlement (and financial promotion) of individuals engaged in the cultural sec-
tor is foremost determined by two factors. On the one hand, a large segment of 
the creative economy is based on precariousness – their industries are pioneers 
for unregulated working conditions. Because of their mostly low income, cheap 
rent prices are an important “location factor” for the creative scene in Berlin. 
Additionally, creativity is not only an individual quality (of an artist); it is deeply 
rooted in the interaction and mutual stimulation of a creative field (Scott 1999). 
Furthermore, agglomeration eases the formation of a network-specific institu-
tional infrastructure. In sum, cultural production is based upon the develop-
ment of complex and extensive – and hence largely urban – agglomerations in 
the form of cultural districts.
Beyond the demands on the local labor market, context and detailed pro-
cesses within creative economies are only generally addressed within insti-
tutional theories. Those theories do not take into account the specifics of the 
cultural production of goods. It is precisely this aspect that needs to be ex-
plained; otherwise, the fact that other industries have not – despite the gov-
ernment move to Berlin in 1998 – experienced similar economic booms, can-
not be understood. With its experimental music scene, Berlin has become the 
most important location and an international first class node for the global 
music industry. We want to show that the importance of the city’s cultural 
economy is mainly based on local subcultures and their everyday environ-
ment. This is not only relevant because of its symbolic qualities as a “soft” 
location factor which may be used for city marketing purposes. At the same 
time, it is an important part of production networks and, therefore, an inte-
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gral part of local economic policies. For this reason, we want to first outline 
the societal conditions which have turned subculture into an important field 
in the global music industry.
THE IMPORTANCE OF SUBCULTURE
“Subcultural flair” is of great importance to major record companies. Connell 
and Gibson (2003: 113 ff.) link the new significance of local music and “niche 
markets” to the differentiation of lifestyles. The demand for mass products, i.e. 
mainstream music, decreases, while consumers increasingly ask for diversified 
products. One of the main reasons for this new demand is social distinction 
derived from these products, which can be used for self-stylization. Subcul-
tural, local music is particularly suited for this kind of distinction, because 
it is linked to quality and creativity and differs from the mass market due to 
its local, but also subcultural and rebellious character (Hebdige 1979). Going 
back to Bourdieu’s (1984) term cultural capital, Thornton (1997) proposes the 
term subcultural capital that she defines as accumulated subcultural knowl-
edge signalizing status in the form of “hipness.” It is embodied in style, such 
as a particular haircut, or in a record collection similar to libraries in middle-
class households. Hipness, i.e. subcultural capital, emerges through delinea-
tion from the mainstream and allows social ascendency across the established 
classes. This delineation has an important function of social distinction, in 
particular with within youth culture. Since “youths, from many class back-
grounds, enjoy a momentary reprieve form necessity” (Thornton 1997: 206), 
they also spend money for this purpose. This can economically explain that 
subculture, i.e. hipness, has been integrated into the products of the music 
market, and that “the single sales chart is mostly a pastiche of niche sounds 
which reflect the buying patterns of many taste cultures, rather than a mono-
lithic mainstream” (ibid.: 205). Therefore, subcultures are more than a coexis-
tence of lifestyles. Difference does no longer necessarily signify opposition or 
resistance to a hegemonic culture, as the Birmingham Center of Contemporary 
Cultural Studies (CCCS) put it, but also competition for (sub-)cultural capital. 
Independent labels founded during the 1970s and 1980s represented an at-
tempt to create alternative economic structures beyond a music industry which 
is only interested in commercial success. Their purpose was to autonomously 
produce and distribute creative, experimental (and thus subcultural) music. In 
contrast, underground culture in East Berlin’s inner-city districts was from its 
beginnings around 1990 in part entrepreneurially oriented (Gdaniec, 2000); 
the contradiction between commercial and non-commercial was rarely as pres-
ent as it used to be in the earlier Punk and Independent movement. The club 
culture’s “heroes came in the form of radical young entrepreneurs who had 
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started up clubs and record labels, rather than the poets and activists of yester-
day” (Thornton 1997: 208).
The marketing of niches links products to local history and thereby appro-
priates the sound of the street (Scharenberg and Bader 2005) – not only with 
respect to cultural products, but also concerning the symbolic revaluation of 
gentrified neighborhoods (Allen 2007; for Berlin see Diederichsen 1999). Au-
thenticity is the connection to the local, and it embodies the lifestyle of local 
subcultures. Because it is used to maximize profits through diversified styles 
and local sounds, authenticity is becoming an important element in the strate-
gies of the global music industry. The major labels’ marketing is no longer 
solely directed at the mainstream, but looking for differentiated lifestyles (and 
lifestyle images) – and it is even producing them itself. In sum, subcultures can 
no longer be understood primarily as a cultural attack against the mainstream 
and as standing outside the music industry (if they ever were). Rather, they 
become increasingly important as niche markets.
But a vivid subculture merely arises in cities that are booming and entirely 
gentrified. This matches Hall’s (2000) finding that the development of creative 
milieus and the attraction of creative people is a matter of transitory phases, 
which are open to experiments, rather than something taking place in cities 
that are at the peak of economic prosperity:
“But these talented people needed something to react to. We noticed that these [crea-
tive cities] were all cities in transition: a transition forward, into new and unexplored 
modes of organization. So they were also societies in the throes of a transformation in 
social relationships, in values and in views about the world” (Hall, 2000: 646).
There is a fundamental contradiction to Florida’s thesis involved here: While 
Florida takes it for granted that a creative milieu correlates with economic suc-
cess, the situation in Berlin is quite different. Generally, such a milieu evolves 
particularly within those cities that have to deal with a collapse of their eco-
nomic base. It is precisely the most deindustrialized cities and regions that 
“smell” their chance as “shrinking cities” and attempt to attract creative people 
(Scharenberg and Bader 2005). This milieu is more often than not connected 
to – or at least related to – a social movement protesting against the restructur-
ing of cities. Just as Peck (2005) has questioned the correlation between the 
creative city index and growth, Jeppesen (2004) states in his comparative study 
of five European cities that it is rather those cities and regions without a strong 
creative milieu that have the highest growth rates (such as Galway in the North 
of the Irish Republic).
Now the creative class Florida talks about tends to prefer gentrified neigh-
borhoods and thus a specific form of urbanity (Peck 2005). However, there are 
certain differences: Whereas global control functions and highly specialized 
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production-services tend to be concentrated in gentrified inner-city neighbor-
hoods of booming metropolitan areas, our findings support Hall (2000), who 
argues that creative processes and cultural innovation – and particularly the 
creation of niche products – tend to be concentrated in declining cities. There-
fore, a branding strategy using a city’s subculture may enhance the city’s sym-
bolic value, but simultaneously undermines the everyday conditions necessary 
to sustain the creative process itself.
THE MUSIC INDUSTRY DISCOVERS BERLIN
In Berlin, the music industry has become an important part of the urban econ-
omy. It is, within the concept of “creative cities” (Florida 2002), increasingly be-
ing seen as a key to the success of the regional economy. Despite the industry’s 
crisis – from 2001-2003, the German music economy lost about 40 percent of 
its turnover – the German music industry (including retail) in 2005 produced a 
turnover of 24 billion Euros (32.17 billion US-Dollar) (Senatsverwaltung 2006). 
However, after Universal Music Germany, MTV Central Europe, and many oth-
er music labels and service providers moved to Berlin, the market share of the 
city’s music industry has increased significantly. Starting with the global play-
ers’ relocation to Berlin, a dynamic pull has developed which to a significant 
degree is based on agglomeration economies (Scott 2000). From 2000 to 2005, 
the turnover of Berlin’s creative economy has risen by nearly 23 percent to 18.5 
billion Euros (24.8 US-Dollar) and 23.5 percent of the city’s overall turnover. 
The music industry’s share of the creative industry’s turnover is 5.5 percent 
(Senatsverwaltung 2007).
Although Berlin has been troubled by persistent economic problems that 
have been discussed intensively (see Scharenberg 2000; Krätke and Borst 
2000; Krätke 2004; Krätke and Taylor 2004; Brake 2005), the city has been a 
winner of the music industry’s economic crisis and has become an alpha World 
Media City on a global scale (Krätke 2002 and 2003). In times of its overall 
decline, in Berlin it has increased not as much as all of its creative industry, but 
significantly by 4 percent (Senatsverwaltung 2007). We follow Krätke’s argu-
ment that the cultural economy is a central economic field, on which the city 
should concentrate in their economic policy, in contrast to the failed global city 
policy after re-unification:
“Berlin, in particular, could take the message spelled out by this analysis as a reason to 
make the cultural economy and the media industry core areas of its economic develop-
ment policy and to fur ther enhance the ‘local’ creative potential of the cultural economy 
as an important attractiveness factor for a world media city. […]. Th[e] reputation [as a 
cultural metropolis in the 1920s] can now be restored on the basis of current economic 
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developments and exploited for the development of the city. However, while Berlin is 
still not a global city, […] it is a first-rank global media city in terms of being a center for 
cultural production and the media industry with a world-wide significance and impact” 
(Krätke 2003: 618).
The settlement of music companies and corporations, however, is still one of 
the few fields in which Berlin’s economy could resist its overall decline. Between 
1995 and 2005, the city’s Gross Domestic Product has decreased by 8.5 percent 
(Wall Street Journal 2006). Next to tourism, low-skill services and the culture in-
dustries, only a few highly specialized creative and knowledge-based industries 
managed to flourish (Brake 2005), but they are not able to replace the employ-
ment and economic power of the former industries. Even though the strategic 
focus on certain creative and service industries—and in particular on culture 
and music economy – seem to be without alternative, it is not without problems. 
The core problem of the city’s economy, i.e. the lacking industrial base, remains 
untouched by this strategy (Helms 2000). Before the city’s reunification, West 
Berlin played a rather marginal role in the decentralized German city network 
and had huge structural deficiencies, because it experienced a first wave of 
deindustrialization already right after World War II. Therefore, specific “Berlin 
subsidies” were used to keep alive some assembly line production of mass prod-
ucts. After the fall of the wall, most branches of the East Berlin economy were 
no longer globally competitive. Contrary to the high-flying visions of the early 
1990s, Berlin did not become a global city. Even compared to other metropolitan 
areas in Germany, Berlin’s economy still commands very limited economic con-
trol capacities (Krätke 2001). In effect, “the great hope of a metropolitan service 
economy” did not materialize; the city is currently merely “the ‘capital of clean-
ing squads and private security firms’” (Krätke 1999: 333). Moreover, the global 
city policy accelerated the city’s financial decline (Krätke 2004).
However, one important “industry” moved to Berlin in the late 1990s: gov-
ernment. Though the overall economic impact on the various sectors of the 
city’s economy differed, this move was very important for the music indus-
try – being in Berlin now means being close to political decision-makers. This 
closeness is very important, because the control of copyright  –  and also the 
making and changing of laws –  is central to the functioning of profit-gener-
ating music industry (Reinbacher 2004; Nuss 2006). For instance, influenc-
ing the political regulation of the marketing of music via lobbying was one of 
the main reasons for Universal Music national branch to come to Berlin. On 
the other hand, this does not sufficiently explain that the music industry has 
restructured around Berlin as a central node more so than any other industry 
deriving an advantage from this closeness.
In any case, local networks of creativity are important for musical innova-
tion (Lovering 1998: 37) and also for subculture as an important part of these 
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networks. The global music industry is rooted in local communities (Scott 2001) 
and “is based on place-specific socio-cultural milieus” (Krätke 2004: 527), but 
its sales are mainly based on the back catalogues of the few superstars of inter-
national music. Berlin derives its increasingly important role mostly from the 
production of innovative niche products catering to an international market.
With respect to musical innovation, Berlin has been an important city 
for a long time. But there was hardly any significant creation of value within 
the city until the late 1990s. The term “music capital of Germany” only made 
sense – and hence became established – after Universal Music Group Germany 
and other large companies had moved to the city (Bader 2004). This image 
was strengthened after other important actors in the music industry – such as 
Germany’s largest music fair Popkomm, various medium-sized labels, and the 
most important national associations of the German music industry – moved 
to Berlin as well. Although Universal Music is the label with the highest sales 
rates, it likes to emphasize its closeness to Berlin’s local, subcultural music 
scene.
To a certain degree, Tim Renner, at that time CEO of Universal Music 
Group Germany, exemplified this strategy at the time of the company’s move 
(Renner 2004). Renner still likes to emphasize his love for punk music. In 
Germany, he was the first to sign independent bands via major record compa-
nies; Rammstein later became the most successful of these bands. For a while, 
Renner was regarded as the darling of the German music industry, because 
he was able to profitably integrate a music that used to be the soundtrack of 
rebellion into the major record companies. The eventual dismissal of Renner 
in January 2004 demonstrates that his strategy remains disputed within the 
music industry.
BERLIN AND SUBCULTURE: CIT Y, SPACE, AND ST YLE
Today, Berlin is one of the most important cities for electronic music world-
wide. At the same time, it has kept its experimental, self-made and innova-
tive character. This has made Berlin different from many other cities, where 
nightlife diversity exists only as simulated “air” controlled by large entertain-
ment companies or breweries (see Hollands and Chatterton 2003). This “ex-
periment and laboratory situation” has enhanced the attractiveness of the city 
as a site for the music economy. The best-known labels of Berlin’s electronic 
music scene  –  such as Tresor Records and Kitty-yo  –  are expressions of the 
local creative districts. Social scientists and government reports, for the most 
part, notice only those actors that have an economic output which is statisti-
cally measurable, i.e., next to labels, enterprises from other parts of the value 
creation chain such as sound studios, music publishers, producers of music 
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instruments, music clubs, concert agencies and fairs (Obert et al. 2001; Keßler 
and Reinhard 2004; Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft 2005). The anchorage 
of these actors in a local scene is usually not taken into account. However, eco-
nomically marginal actors, such as temporary and semi-legal clubs and bars 
or record stores, are important places of communication for the local networks 
of creativity (Schyma 2002). They are meeting points and thus contribute to 
the development and diffusion of musical styles. Their temporary and non-
commercial (or less commercial) character allows for experimentation as small, 
though still market-oriented labels. Here, people that may later start economi-
cally successful enterprises meet for the first time, get to know (and trust) each 
other and start an informal exchange of ideas, concepts, etc. Well-known local 
labels and clubs mirror the complex processes that have created the specific 
“Berlin-type” music after the fall of the Wall (Vogt 2002). To a certain degree, 
this music is rooted in West Berlin’s alternative culture of the 1970s and 1980s.
During the 1970s and 1980s, a lively and politically rebellious subculture 
evolved in Charlottenburg, Kreuzberg, Schöneberg and other inner-city dis-
tricts of West Berlin. It was based on new social movements (squatters, com-
munity organizations), gay scene and student milieu, and culturally located 
between Punk, Industrial, and Neue Deutsche Welle (the German counterpart 
of New Wave and the first pop music in German language that dominated the 
national charts for some years; Teipel 2001). Small labels, sound studios, and 
party and club organizers founded networks aimed at counter-culture activi-
ties. The specific geography of the city of West Berlin – as an “island” within the 
GDR surrounded by the Berlin Wall – had turned the city, and in particular the 
south-eastern part of Kreuzberg, into urban periphery. Kreuzberg, a traditional 
working-class neighborhood with a lot of small trade and “backyard factories” 
(Hinterhoffabriken), became a central location for Turkish immigration, and is 
still the city’s poorest district. The controversy about redevelopment caused the 
squatting of empty houses, warehouses and other buildings as clubs, bars, and 
living space. One example is the famous club SO 36 that has been the center 
of the scene from which “Einstürzende Neubauten” evolved as the arguably 
best-known act of the 1980s Berlin underground. Next to the City West (the 
area between Bahnhof Zoo and Savignyplatz)  –  where, among others, Mute 
Records, BMG Berlin and clubs like the Dschungel (Jungle, Berlin’s heart of 
the Neue Deutsche Welle) were located – this area (including Universal Music 
and MTV) became the basis for the second important cluster of Berlin’s music 
industry (Bader 2004).
The Hansa Studios provided the connection to the international music 
scene, where stars like Nick Cave, Iggy Pop and David Bowie worked and pro-
duced during the 1970s and 1980s. They also lived in West Berlin for a time and 
were as deeply influenced by the local music scene as they in turn influenced 
the city. The Hansa Studios not only provided artists with physical infrastruc-
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ture, but was simultaneously “a location, with a political and cultural style, that 
somehow combined pre-war hedonism with post-war political tension” (Conell 
and Gibson 2003: 105).
However, Berlin may have been internationally known for its music scene 
and musical expression. But as a location for the national and international 
music industry, it did not play any significant role. In this respect, Cologne, 
Hamburg, and Munich were the leading cities in the Federal Republic (Scha-
renberg and Bader 2005).
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 changed everything for Ber-
lin  –  and also for its music and “spirit.” The center of subcultural activities 
moved to the eastern part of the inner city. Areas used for subcultural music 
proved to be pioneers for the settlement of music companies. Some of them 
simply moved to these locations, but many evolved directly from subculture 
(e.g., Tresor Records and the Tresor club) (Hegemann 2005).
For the city’s contemporary club culture, this radical change proved to be 
the spark. It was only then that Techno became a mass phenomenon in the 
city, though its roots can be found in the hedonistic gay scene in the city dis-
trict Schöneberg (Westbam 1997), and in the electronic avant-garde that thrived 
in West Berlin during the 1980s (with bands like “Einstürzende Neubauten”). 
Right after the fall of the Wall, the new freedom met with a specific urbanistic 
situation in East Berlin, characterized by massive vacancy of commercial and 
residential buildings as well as the city’s deindustrialization. How the urban 
youth of the 1990s saw itself is reflected in the new centrality of the audience: 
People were no longer just passive consumers, but – as dancers – constitutive 
elements of raves. The slogan of the first Love Parade in 1988 – “Friede, Freude, 
Eierkuchen” (a German saying, meaning “everything is fine,” literal meaning: 
peace, fun, pancake) – shows a renunciation of the depressed, but also highly 
politicized spirit of the Berlin underground of the 1980s:
“Raves take place largely in postindustrial landscapes, transforming rundown warehou-
se sites into timeless, de-localised, and de-realised spaces, where obsolete industrial 
infrastructure is juxtaposed to state of the ar t technology to create a surreal, almost 
vir tual world – a fun factory” (Richard and Kruger 1998: 163).
The local music scene, and in particular electronic music, reflects the quick lo-
cal transformation right after the fall of the Wall. At the same time it can only 
be conceptualized in the context of the global development of electronic dance 
music, as it is marked by the Techno music of the Black inner-city of Detroit 
(Henkel and Wolff 1996), and the Acid-House of the mostly illegal warehouse 
parties in English deindustrialized cities (Ingham et al. 1999). Techno music 
from Detroit, in turn, became famous primarily through the Berlin Techno 
scene. This demonstrates how processes of postmodern urbanism spatially and 
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historically framed Berlin’s local electronic music scene. Similar to HipHop 
(Scharenberg 2004), Techno evolved in the context of the deindustrialization of 
cities, and in Berlin it found its most significant expression.
The use of vacant buildings was possible, because in East Berlin ownership 
status of land and property was often unclear during the early years following 
reunification. Therefore, the administration had no cause to interfere with the 
temporary use of these locations. Even after the reassignment of ownership 
according to the “unification treaty” between FRG and GDR from 1990, it of-
ten took years until the administration decided about legal claims. Since many 
clubs and other subcultural users appropriated the spaces of their activities for 
only a few months, those persons who otherwise may have had the responsi-
bility to legally interfere did not have a survey of the East Berlin underground 
scene.
In addition, many of today’s clubs and other sectors of the urban music 
economy have their roots in these squats. After the fall of the Wall, most of 
the important actors of Berlin’s club music have gone through an “illegal 
phase” – such as the Tresor (the club of the founders of Tresor Records) and the 
Love Parade as an internationally known event that attracted one million people 
at its peak in the late 1990s (and is commonly described as one major example 
of festivalization of local urban policy). However, temporary appropriation, i.e. 
the creation of “temporary autonomous zones” (Bey 1991) free from state and 
institutional control, was not limited to cultural use; living space was squatted, 
too. In addition to about 140 squatted buildings, many vacated apartments were 
squatted without much controversy. This was one of the reasons for the migra-
tion of young and creative people to the city’s eastside. Next to Berlin’s image 
as a stronghold of youth and subculture, the low costs of living were a major 
factor for this migration – low or no rents, cheap food, and a subculture that, 
at least right after 1989, was not particularly commercial. Furthermore, the 
city’s subculture and nightlife have long differed from other (German) cities 
because Berlin lacks a closing time and has less little regulatory interference 
(Bader 2004).
Because of the temporary character of club culture and the exclusive (and 
excluding) advertisement via flyers (Riemel 2005), the spatial manifestation of 
Berlin’s club culture is hard to assess in terms of quantity. The media’s percep-
tion, but also the academic understanding, is dominated by those locations that 
started as illegal clubs and later became commercially successful. Small, tem-
porary locations or clubs playing music that differs from what is globally mar-
keted as Techno via the Love Parade often go unnoticed. In the early 1990s, this 
club scene used to be mainly located in Prenzlauer Berg and in Berlin-Mitte 
(around Hackescher Markt). These districts have since been thoroughly gentri-
fied (Bernt, 2003), and the scene has moved to other districts and areas – first 
to Friedrichshain, and more recently “back to its roots” to the area around 
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Schlesische Straße in Kreuzberg (Bader 2008). This scene has produced vari-
ous styles of electronic music, as they are presented at the independent music 
fair “Marke B” (Brand B; see Gut and Fehlmann 2005). Together with German 
“ghetto-style” HipHop and world music2, they have in recent years replaced 
Berlin’s image as “Tekkno City.”
The experimental and innovative character of these underground locations 
is made possible by the temporary character of these illegal clubs and bars, 
which are permanently threatened by closure, and by entry restriction via codes 
and “informal” advertisement that can only be read and understood by the cor-
responding target group. Ambience and style can only be maintained, if a cer-
tain size is not exceeded, and if the audience is in line with the club or bar and 
thus represents its particular “character” (Ballhausen 1999).
Underground is always at the same time subversive and elitist. Access lim-
its and separation from the mainstream make possible the avant-garde char-
acter, but they also mean exclusion. This shows how the subculture of tempo-
rary clubs and bars with their partly illegal practices could in Berlin go hand 
in hand with the gentrification of city districts, as demonstrated especially in 
Berlin-Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg. The subculture of temporary clubs and bars 
was not only integrated into urban restructuring, but also into the innovative 
processes of the cultural economy. Its elitist character fits the self-stylization 
of the new urban middle classes. The locations’ character has thereby changed 
as well. Non-commercial, dingy, self-made basement clubs have become rare. 
Increasingly, they are being replaced by “chic” and thoroughly styled bars as 
well as by a simulated and “ready-made” subculture.
NE W FORMS OF ECONOMIC COOPER ATION
In order to use the potential of subculture and local creative districts, major 
labels commonly open a local branch. But spatial proximity is not only neces-
sary at the level of cities; local production clusters are also formed at an intra-
urban level. For instance, Low Spirit Recordings, a sub-label of Bertelsmann 
Music Group (BMG) that is one of the major sellers of techno music and the 
label behind the Love Parade, is located close to BMG. A similar proximity can 
be found in the cluster at the Oberbaumbrücke (the bridge connecting Kreuz-
berg and Friedrichshain) with Universal Music Germany, MTV Central Eu-
rope, and various smaller labels and other musical enterprises: reproduction 
and distribution enterprises, which take over those parts of Universal Music’s 
2 | After the demise of the Love Parade, Berlin’s largest music event today is the “Car-
nival of Cultures of the World,“ World Music as well as HipHop are both, though quite 
dif ferently, linked to the migrant communities.
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production process that have been outsourced (and which depend on an urban 
environment), choose a location close to this major record company. This is 
particularly the case for mastering studios, graphic designers and advertising 
agencies (Bader 2004).
This spatial proximity also allows for the acquirement of new contacts to 
other labels, since personal contact and trust are central to business within 
the network of creativity. Concerning production-oriented services, this is a 
general phenomenon. Sassen (1991) has argued that personal trust is one of 
the reasons that specialized services are still highly centralized – despite all 
“disembeddedness.” As it is largely tacit knowledge, musical knowledge is an-
chored locally, too, and it is integrated in networks based on reciprocity (Scott’s 
“creative field”). The innovative potential of networks of creativity is bound to a 
certain place and can thus primarily be used in close personal contact. For the 
success of a label, tacit knowledge about the scene is crucial. With respect to 
subculture, knowing musicians and being known within the scene is a precon-
dition for signing musicians, precisely because for these actors, in contrast to 
major record companies, trust is a central category for cooperation.
Local agglomerations of flexible production – the networks of creativity – are 
integrated into the global music market via transnational corporations (see 
Amin 2000: 165). They use and maintain the advantages of cultural districts 
based on the networks of small enterprises. Major record companies mainly 
take over those segments of music production benefiting from concentration, 
i.e. reproduction, global distribution, and global brand name. This deal, how-
ever, is inherently unequal. First, while successful artists get their share from 
the profits generated by their products, other actors of the cultural milieu pro-
ducing this creativity do not participate. Second, even though individual artists 
who are coming from an independent label or, more generally, the subculture, 
do gain from a contract with a major record company, the distribution of profit 
is heavily one-sided. The bigger part of profits goes to the networks that be-
long to transnational entertainment corporations. These corporations account 
for 80-90 percent of the global music market (Binas 2005). The integration of 
music scenes into the major labels is based not only on their advantages con-
cerning global distribution, but also on their control of networks. Important 
instruments of marketing, such as radio and television stations or international 
chains for entertainment products, are not accessible for independents, since 
they are controlled by the transnational entertainment corporations.
The rigid, inflexible structure of major record companies has also many 
disadvantages. Musical innovation is always a high-risk venture, because the 
future of the music market is hard to predict and highly unstable. Labels that 
are closely connected to the subculture tend to publish high-risk products. 
Their commercial success is precarious or, at best, only profitable on a low 
scale. Moreover, independent labels may suit artists better and more continu-
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ously, because more often than not they belong to the same musical scene as 
the artists themselves. Independents can only reach small markets, even if they 
cooperate with a major record company. Major labels, on the other hand, tend to 
react very slowly (and carefully) to new trends, because their organization and 
processes are highly complex. This is not only due to the level of bureaucracy 
and complex decision-making structures, but also to the fact that major record 
companies organize more extensive marketing campaigns that are directed to 
other large media. Of course, this is primarily a cost factor. More than 90 per-
cent of the products a major record company publishes do not make any profit 
(Ryan 1998).
In recent years, independent labels have become more attractive to artists, 
because today, an international commercial success is possible even for inde-
pendents. This has been shown by, for instance, Tresor Records (with Detroit-
Berlin star DJs such as Jeff Mills and Juan Atkins), or Kitty-yo (with Peaches) 
(Obert and Böhl 2003). Labels that have specialized in a particular music, and 
which are based in the respective musical scene, can more easily turn into a 
brand name than major record companies that cover everything from Country 
to Rap to Punk to Pop. Furthermore, due to the large number of musical styles 
and artists, labels have become quite important for individual purchase deci-
sions. The major record companies have also realized the advantage of flexible 
production and now integrate many of the independents’ advantages. Today, 
the latter have actually become part of the global music industry – not so much 
their “counter model.” The large corporations of the global music industry try 
to use the decentralized structures in various ways as innovation networks.
The “classical” approach assumes that local artists working with small la-
bels will directly be taken over by major labels. A direct take-over, though, is not 
something that majors and independents are aspiring to. It generally seems to 
make sense only if the band (or artist) can be placed on a large market that can 
be reached only through the majors’ marketing. Since a product’s success in 
the music economy is hard to predict as well as a high-risk project, many artists 
taken over by major record companies fail, i.e. they do not economically survive 
the change to the major record company. The risk is not only on the side of the 
majors, in particular since the necessary funds for production and video shoot-
ing are usually given out as a credit. Therefore, the change to a major record 
company – even if sales rates go more or less unchanged – does not pay off for 
many artists.
In their cooperation with subcultural scenes, majors increasingly favor the 
integration of networks of small enterprises – the cultural districts – into the 
global network of the cultural economy. This is mainly done because of the 
advantages of the economics of scale. The cooperation with subcultural actors 
may be understood as a form of outsourcing. In addition, the independent la-
bels do not see the music industry as an enemy any more (as many did in the 
Berlin Contested254
past). Generally, they do have artistic independence as well as (more) economic 
success. Small labels have their strengths in the networks of creativity; in other 
networks, the advantages of the economics of scale, which can be used better by 
large corporations, dominate. This mainly affects distribution. Furthermore, 
small enterprises of the music industry are financially insecure, because they 
usually depend on few artists and the success of a particular style of music. 
In contrast, “the smaller company provides its larger partner with preferential 
access to artists that it discovers through its own A&R department” (Leyshon 
2001: 64), since they are part of music scenes and thus can apprehend and ob-
serve developments taking place in these particular scenes much better than 
major labels.
There are different organizational models for the inclusion of creative dis-
tricts. In Berlin, for instance, the labels Mute (an important independent label 
well known for Depeche Mode or Einstürzende Neubauten), and Low Spirit 
(the label behind the Love Parade which has signed Techno artists who man-
aged to get in the German Top 40) are directly integrated as sub-labels in major 
record companies. This is the most far-reaching form of inclusion: The for-
merly independent enterprise is directly built into the operational structure of 
a major record company, and it mainly serves as an established brand name and 
“development laboratory.”
Distribution contracts are another model which allows the independent 
label to maintain a high degree of autonomy. All large independent compa-
nies distribute their products either completely via major labels, or they do so 
for those products that cannot adequately be distributed by themselves due to 
sheer capacity (Gut and Fehlmann 2005).
The majors’ success is based first on their capacity to use local positive ex-
ternalities and innovative energy; second on their power to place their products 
on national and international markets; and third on their ability to overcome 
various cultural barriers to market-access in all parts of the world. The process 
of distribution is the decisive interface between a local agglomeration and the 
global market. It is through this process that the transnational entertainment 
corporations secure their control over the commodification of music (Scott 
2000).
CONCLUSION
Berlin’s example questions the economic sustainability of the creative city con-
cept. Our analysis has confirmed Hall’s (2000: 646 f.) thesis that cultural in-
novation is a phenomenon of cities in crisis. The basis for musical innovation 
as well as the development of the “global trademark Berlin” – now being com-
modified by the global music industry as well as by many small and medium-
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sized enterprises – has its roots in the period of radical change during the early 
1990s and to some extend in West Berlin’s subculture of the 1970s and 1980s.
Free space is not given; it must be taken. It is no accident that alternative 
visions and creativity reached a high-point during the 1980s in West Berlin, 
and during the 1990s in the eastern part of the inner city. Here, subcultural 
movements organized themselves, fought for another way of living, took over 
free space. And they prevailed, though the results in the long run differ from 
the initial visions in many ways. The link to a specific urban situation, as well 
as to “underground” and “rebellion,” is still an important factor for the global 
marketing of music from Berlin. We have demonstrated that there is a close 
interdependence between major corporations and a large, fluid scene still using 
this free space.
To Florida, economic success of cities correlates with the ability to attract 
members of the creative class. In this context, urban culture and subculture 
is not more than a mere soft locational factor. Creative city politics following 
Florida’s concept contradict the fact that Berlin’s creative districts are based in 
these subcultural scenes. In addition, it is precisely these scenes that attract 
members of the creative class – in the case of Berlin not so much the global 
elite of the creative industries, but independent creative entrepreneurs. Both 
Florida and Krätke do not take into account that cultural innovation processes 
are stimulated by an urban subculture which cannot only be understood in 
terms of economic activity. Our analysis of the nexus between the city’s style, 
the subcultural scene, and the clusters of small enterprises demonstrates that 
Berlin has become a global node of the music economy precisely because of its 
scene and the attraction of subcultural entrepreneurs.
Moreover, gentrification generally limits the opportunities for creative pi-
oneers. This is illustrated by the club scene’s continuous migration through 
various city neighborhoods from Berlin-Mitte to Prenzlauer Berg to Friedrichs-
hain and back to Kreuzberg. While large development projects such as Media 
Spree (with MTV and Universal Music) try to profit from the location’s image, 
it seems highly unlikely that the much-acclaimed diversity can be obtained in 
the long run. Therefore, a politics favoring large-scale development projects 
undermines one of the few flourishing branches of the city’s economy.
The relocation of MTV Middle Europe and Universal Music Germany in-
creased the interest of the public in music as an important branch of the city’s 
urban economy. However, Berlin’s mostly small-scale music economy is, in 
contrast to the national branches of the major companies, genuinely global with 
respect to its markets and perception. The city’s electronic music scene, the 
independent labels and the city’s club culture are accountable for Berlin’s repu-
tation as a global music city. This creative environment is used as a brand, and 
it is also seen as an important economic activity. Furthermore, the independent 
labels which were originally founded as a counter-model to the global music in-
Berlin Contested256
dustry in the 1970s and 1980s in fact revitalized their former rival. The flexible 
integration of independent labels into the major music companies – whether 
directly as sub-labels (by using their distribution channels) or still formally in-
dependent (as creative laboratories) – promoted the reorganization of the music 
economy that fostered Berlin’s rise to a global music city status. In the face of 
the music industry’s restructuring, the integration of small businesses related 
to the subculture in networks of flexible specialization represents a new orga-
nizational model of the industry. In sum, there is not one creative city, but there 
are rather various types: cultural production and branches of the creative in-
dustries in a broader understanding, i.e. design-intensive producer services, re-
spond to different types of creative cities. But the global cultural economy itself 
is simultaneously bound to different urban settings. However, it is uncertain 
which organizational model of the music industry will succeed. The domina-
tion of large companies will not be challenged, but cities like Berlin will have 
the chance to position themselves in those niches within the new geography of 
the music economy that are of still growing importance. The fact that Berlin 
has achieved a first-ranking status within the global cultural economy precisely 
because of its strong subcultural basis underscores this thesis. The lessons to 
be drawn for politics are thus evident: It is better to stop promoting large-scale 
development projects and to rather act cautiously, in order to protect and nour-
ish this cultural and economic treasure.
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Spree Riverbanks for Everyone! 
What Remains of “Sink Mediaspree”?1
Jan Dohnke 
In recent years, the protests against the large-scale investment project “Media-
spree” in Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain have repoliticized the public debate on ur-
ban development more than any other event in Berlin. In the context of urban 
development that is increasingly dominated by neoliberal concepts in the wake 
of German reunification, the “Sink Mediaspree” initiative has been especially 
effective in putting fundamental questions about the sense and purpose of the 
urban development in Berlin back on the agenda. In a manner that drew the 
wider public’s attention, this movement also succeeded in challenging “entre-
preneurial urban policy” in general. In fact, the planning decisions that have 
provoked citizens’ protest since 2006 contained many elements that seam-
lessly fit into Berlin’s neoliberal restructuring. The commitment to large-scale, 
investor-friendly projects at the expense of local organisational structures and 
needs in order to create locational advantages for the city in the international 
competition to attract investors; advancing privatisation and commercialisation 
to the disadvantage of the broader public good; and, overall, the increasingly 
one-dimensional orientation of planning and land utilisation toward economic 
targets. 
In the light of the state of Berlin’s difficult financial situation, development 
is largely expected to come from the private sector, whose investments facili-
tate construction projects and, on this basis, are supposed to create new jobs. 
Apart from marketing strategies, Berlin (like many other cities) also draws on 
particular incentive strategies, e.g. the affordable provision of infrastructure, 
public subsidies, tax concessions, and a form of planning that privileges major 
investors by means of its large-scale and dense nature. At the same time, Berlin 
has either adopted a passive role in the development of the city’s economy by re-
1 | Source: Dohnke, Jan (2013) Was bleibt von Mediaspree versenken? In Holm, A. 
(ed.) Reclaim Berlin. Soziale Kämpfe in der neoliberalen Stadt. Assoziation A, Berlin/
Hamburg, for thcoming.
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lying exclusively on private-sector forces or has brought its remaining activities 
and services primarily in line with economic criteria (cf. e.g. Lebuhn 2007).
Based on the premise that urban policy challenges are constantly increasing 
in scope and complexity, and that collaborative efforts with relevant economic 
and civil society actors are needed to appropriately address these challenges, 
the realignment of urban policy has been accompanied by novel institutional 
arrangements with non-state actors. These have increasingly come to dominate 
both the content and targets of urban policies. Governing by way of urban gov-
ernance does, however, raise questions as regards well-established democratic 
norms and the accountability of urban politics (Edwards 2002). For instance, 
the opportunity to participate directly in urban development processes is, by 
and large, a privilege of actors with economic clout (Walters 2004). As a result, 
urban politics and policy-making centered on social equity has increasingly 
retreated to the background (Häußermann et al. 2008). Moreover, many of 
these new forms of cooperation occur in an “institutional void” (Hajer 2003), 
where rules are mostly hidden from the public. While the urban population is 
given some opportunities to participate in urban policy making, this is usually 
confined to smaller details and tied to a predefined scope of action that allows 
discussion of the “how” but not the “if” of the issues at stake. Public participa-
tion is desirable as long as it does not call into question the rationalities and 
norms of the “entrepreneurial city.” However, as soon as individuals or groups 
dare to raise their voices in favor of a more socially balanced or alternative de-
velopment path, their claims are quickly dismissed as “unrealistic” in public 
debates (cf. Beaumont & Nicholls 2008). In the light of the poor social and eco-
nomic outcomes of neoliberal development, more and more social movements 
have emerged recently in Berlin to contest the dominance of neoliberal urban 
politics. The protests against “Mediaspree”, which were instigated and led by 
the “Sink Mediaspree!” initiative, were the first in a series of citywide protests. 
These protests illustrated the conflicts between residents’ interests and urban 
policy driven by the profit imperatives of the private sector. In the wake of Medi-
asprees protests, two key questions emerge: “What remains of the movement”? 
and “What can future protest movements learn from it?”
“MEDIASPREE” — AN ANCHOR FOR THE FUTURE?2
The planned area for the “Mediaspree” project is situated only a few kilometers 
southeast of the center of Berlin. Stretching along both sides of the Spree river, 
it forms a section of several kilometers with a surface area of 180 hectares. For 
2 | Referring to the motto “Mediaspree – Ankerplatz Zukunft” (Mediaspree – An Anchor 
for the Future).
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the most part, this area is located within the district of Friedrichshain-Kreuz-
berg, which was newly established in 2001. During the Cold War division of 
Berlin, the Spree marked the border between East Berlin (Friedrichshain) and 
West Berlin (Kreuzberg) in this area. The west side was characterized by indus-
try. The east side (which is the much larger part of the area), dominated by the 
building of the Berlin Wall, was a former harbor area, as well as the location for 
large railway and industrial facilities. After reunification (the so-called Wende), 
numerous industrial facilities fell into disuse. Owing to its central location and 
the boom of waterfront development projects in other metropolises, the area 
was soon recognized as an essential development area of Berlin. Initial plans 
were made as early as in the mid-1990s. They envisaged an enlargement of the 
city center on the eastern side of the river, with a high density of buildings as 
well as a focus on offices and retail trade. On both sides of the river, new urban 
neighborhoods were supposed to develop and connect the area to the surround-
ing residential districts. 
Ever since, the planning of this area has been regarded as an issue of city-
wide relevance. It was further substantiated by the “Mission Statement Spree 
Area” (SenStadt 2001) and the “Mediaspree” development plan. In line with the 
Zeitgeist, the latter set out plans for a new center for Berlin’s media and creative 
industries, to contain some of the sector’s leading companies. The idea was 
that this “anchor point” would initiate and promote development in the future. 
Altogether, the area was earmarked for a dozen high-rise buildings, several 
hundred thousand square meters of offices, hotels and luxury apartments, an 
arena for huge events and other event locations. Altogether, this development 
was expected to create up to 40,000 jobs.
This vision of a glamorous world of offices and consumption stood in sharp 
contrast to the reality of life in adjacent neighborhoods, which were densely-
built, dominated by old buildings, social housing and the odd green area. These 
neighborhoods are inhabited by a diverse mixture of workers, students and 
other people on generally low incomes. On the Kreuzberg side, this mix is 
complemented by a high share of people with a Turkish background as well as 
a strong left-wing and anarchist scene. While this scene had established itself 
in Kreuzberg over decades in the shadow of the Berlin wall, it also came to 
manifest itself in Friedrichshain during the 1990s. Due to rising rents (which 
were often justified by landlords who cited the Mediaspree project) and ongo-
ing gentrification processes in other parts of the inner city, there has been in-
creasing concern that this large-scale project will have adverse effects on living 
conditions in the neighbouring districts.
The planning and realization of this mega-project were developed in dis-
cussions between public and private partners. In the initial planning phase, 
the vast majority of land belonged to the state of Berlin or public enterprises 
(which, in turn, were partially owned by the state of Berlin, too). The plan was 
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to privatize this land by means of selling it to the highest bidder, with subse-
quent development by private actors. So-called urban development contracts 
were the preferred means to this end. Bypassing building and planning laws, 
these contracts allowed for investor-friendly agreements without public partici-
pation. The content of these contractual agreements, including the allocation of 
public subsidies, has largely remained unknown to the public. A development 
management group founded in 2001 would later be known as “Mediaspree e.V.” 
This merger of property owners, investors, as well as city and district repre-
sentatives managed the district’s external commercial strategy and was able to 
secure public funding due to its ostensible “public interest” status, even though 
the majority of its members were pursuing self-interested profit motives.
Previous planning measures contained some direct concessions to the pub-
lic. One idea was to make the banks of the river Spree publicly accessible by 
building a riverside path and little parks – even if parts of these areas were 
to remain privately owned. Important parts of the riverbank would have been 
given up more or less completely to private ownership – and thus, it would have 
been possible to refuse entry to “undesirable” visitors and disruptive forms of 
use. Contrary to initial visions and despite numerous large-scale privatization 
measures, only a few of the planned developments made it beyond the planning 
stage. This was not least due to the low demand for office and retail spaces in 
Berlin. Only in a few isolated cases, and with the lure of massive subsidies from 
the Berlin state, was it possible to successfully attract large media and creative 
companies (e.g. MTV and Universal) as “anchors” in this area. In fact, many of 
the highly touted “new” jobs were not newly created: instead, they had already 
existed in other districts or cities, and were now shifted to this area. 
At the same time, creative minds and individuals with permits to temporar-
ily use parts of area were reinventing the industrial wasteland, building a sub-
culture scene on the riverbanks consisting of “beach bars”, trailer parks, clubs, 
and socio-cultural projects. As a result, the area became more and more impor-
tant and attractive to people outside the district. Due to its alternative, chaotic, 
and relatively “open” development, it was accessible to a broad range of users 
and thus stood in contrast to the official forms of planning dominated by mas-
ter plans, profit orientation and formal restrictions. This was also reflected in 
access to the river, which was forbidden or hindered by some landlords to avoid 
“disturbances.” By contrast, many temporary users enabled access to the water 
for the first time, even if this access partly entailed (modest) entrance fees.
The Berlin Senate and some of the investors involved in Mediaspree soon 
became aware of the presence and relevance of these interim users. Inves-
tors began marketing the subculture scene along the Spree’s riverbanks as a 
positive locational factor, or made direct attempts to attract temporary users 
as “placeholders”. Other landlords, however, considered it more promising to 
market their premises without temporary users and therefore made attempts 
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to actively terminate or remove existing forms of use. In this manner, tempo-
rary uses were subordinated to the primacy of the economy, their right to exist 
being tied to their location’s economic value. This treatment must be regarded 
as highly contradictory in nature. On the one hand, it was officially noted that 
many temporary users pursued the goal of wresting certain spaces from a world 
dominated by commercial constraints in order to create something different. 
On the other hand, their temporary character was emphasised, as this kind of 
interim use was only deemed suitable for areas that were not immediately avail-
able for “commercial exploitation” (SenStadt 2007). While self-determination 
and a sense of personal belonging were recognised as factors in this context, it 
proved difficult to fit them into economic calculations. As a consequence, this 
provoked increasing conflicts of use throughout the area.
THE “SINK MEDIASPREE” CAMPAIGN
In response to the noticeable and ever increasing development pressures on the 
inner city, particularly those associated with the Mediaspree project, in 2006 
members of the left-wing alternative scene founded the “Sink Mediaspree” ini-
tiative (Mediaspree versenken!). Their aim was to create a counterweight to 
urban planning that neglected social and ecological dimensions, as well as to 
impede rapid development along the banks of the river Spree created by and for 
large-scale investors, and oriented not towards the district’s needs nor the local 
residents’ and users’ desires for Spree riverbanks (MSV 2010: 4f.). In the sum-
mer of 2007, “Sink Mediaspree” decided to launch a so-called Bürgerbegehren 
(citizens’ initiative, see information in box) to raise public interest and legitima-
cy through a direct democratic vote. To these ends, three demands were made:
No new building on a 50 meter wide strip on both sides of the Spree. By this 
means, the idea was to withdraw the most “precious” areas from the economic 
logic of utilisation. The resulting free space would allow for a broad and diverse 
use of the Spree banks (including temporary forms of use), one that went be-
yond the opportunities offered by the planned public riverside path. 
Limiting the height of new buildings to a maximum of 22 meters. This historical 
height level was meant to limit building density and, moreover, ensure that the 
new buildings fitted in with the older buildings in the surrounding residential 
areas. This measure was also geared to questioning the principle of “quantity 
instead of quality” (which gives highest priority to maximising floor space) and 
to considering alternative ways of planning.
Rejecting the construction of another road bridge: Instead of the proposed 
bridge for automobiles, a new link over the Spree would be accessible only to 
pedestrians and bicyclists so as to protect the surrounding residential areas 
from a sharp increase in traffic.
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The citizens’ initiative entitled “Spree banks for all!” was officially launched 
in October 2007. It was addressed to the local district, which was officially re-
sponsible for the planning measures within the Mediaspree area. 
Citizens’ initiative and referenda
In 2006 citizens’ initiatives were introduced in Berlin as an instrument to al-
low for more participation at the district level. For a citizens’ initiative to be 
successful, the initiative needs to be approved by the district after which three 
per cent of all eligible voters have to support the initiative by signature within 
a set period of six months. If successful, the district administration is asked to 
discuss the implementation of the citizens’ initiative. Should an agreement on 
this issue not be reached, a referendum must be held within three months: The 
district’s inhabitants will be asked to vote on the content of the citizens’ initia-
tive. For a referendum to be successful 15 per cent of all eligible voters3 must 
participate in the vote – and the absolute majority has to vote in favour of the 
citizens’ initiative (BezVG 2006). 
The campaign was a resounding success. The collection of signatures 
helped to raise awareness of the initiative and bring the issue to public atten-
tion. In the end, 15,000 signatures were submitted – significantly more than 
the minimum required. Given that no agreement was reached in the subse-
quent negotiations, a referendum was scheduled for July 13, 2008. At the same 
time, intensive networking, public relations, as well as diverse forms of imagi-
native and non-violent protest helped to move the campaign beyond the con-
fines of traditional left-wing resistance in the district and gain a large number 
of new supporters. This applied in particular to the interim users, who were 
not ready to abandon what they had achieved. While at first the opponents of 
the citizens’ initiative were quick to mention the initiative and its supporters in 
connection with burning cars and other forms of violent protest, these claims 
ultimately did not hold water.
Based on the widespread rejection of the undemocratic development plans 
for the Mediaspree area and the shared goal of defending the value of inter-
mediate uses, socio-cultural free spaces and quality of life beyond economic 
criteria, a district-wide alliance between the creative and left wing milieu was 
created, which became manifest as a new kind of protest movement in terms of 
both its form and activism (cf. Colomb and Novy 2011; Scharenberg and Bader 
2009). In addition to a visible presence in the district, this alliance also re-
sulted in a variety of creative forms of protest in the run up to the referendum. 
For instance, there were actions such as “cheering for investors,” blocking a 
3 | In Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, 3 percent of all eligible voters correspond to about 
5,600 people, while 15 percent correspond to about 28,000 people. 
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steam boat with representatives from the worlds of real estate and business 
with inflatable dinghies, and the “Spree Parade,” a demonstration held one day 
prior to the referendum that mobilized more than 3,000 participants and was 
supported by local clubs. Local cinemas ran advertisements for the initiative, 
while posters and banners with the slogan “Spree banks for all!” appeared ev-
erywhere in the surrounding residential areas. Thanks to the clearly defined 
content and deadlines of the citizens’ initiative, there were also milestones and 
targets which helped to focus and “frame” the campaign. For many residents 
and supporters, the campaign actually served as a more general outlet for their 
opposition to current urban development processes and policies.
The referendum on July 13, 2008 was an overwhelming success for “Sink 
Mediaspree” and its supporters. With a turnout of almost 20 percent, 87 per-
cent of the voters (i.e. about 300,000 people) approved the initiative – and there-
by rendered the referendum “Spree banks for all!” the most successful in Ber-
lin to date. Political decision makers were almost overwhelmed by the popular 
groundswell triggered by the initiative. In order to avoid the need to completely 
revise their plans for Mediaspree, the largest political parties in the district, the 
Greens and the Left Party, found themselves forced to defend an investment 
project against their own electorates. Once it became apparent that the refer-
endum would yield a result in favor of the initiative, a debate was launched on 
how to deal with it. On the one hand, it was impossible to ignore a successful 
plebiscite. On the other hand, officially the referendum was a mere recommen-
dation to politicians, and not legally binding. Out of this confusing situation, a 
decision was made to establish the special committee “Spree Area,” which was 
composed of nine representatives from the district parliament (BVV) and four 
members of the initiative. The task of this committee was to jointly find solu-
tions to the issues raised by the referendum.
THE OBSTACLES TO PARTICIPATION IN TIMES 
OF INVESTOR-FRIENDLY URBAN DE VELOPMENT
September 2008 marked the beginning of more than 15 months of marathon 
negotiations in which options for planning changes were debated with the us-
ers and owners of all premises affected by the referendum. The members of the 
“Sink Mediaspree” initiative re-focused their work and energy from the street 
towards the committee. Here, the obstacles to genuine citizen participation in a 
business-oriented urban policy context became clearly evident. The major argu-
ments used to legitimize Mediaspree can be summed up by the formula “jobs, 
investment, and global competition.” The figure of 40,000 new jobs envisaged 
for the Mediaspree area was constantly presented as an argument in favor of the 
development, even though its accuracy was never substantiated. In the context 
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of international urban competition, Mediaspree was presented as a develop-
ment that would allow Berlin to compete with other European metropolises 
(Der Tagesspiegel, July 14, 2008); it was dubbed a responsible, sustainable form 
of urban project planning that would open up new prospects for the future (Der 
Tagesspiegel, August 4, 2008). As a result, Berliners would profit from both ac-
cess to the Spree as well as the investment and new jobs created throughout the 
entire city (Der Tagesspiegel, July 15, 2008). In this way, citywide relevance was 
ascribed to the plans for Mediaspree, while the campaign against it was depict-
ed as a local protest by a small minority that stood in opposition to the overall 
general interests of the city. In line with this interpretation, investors argued 
that a few thousand people were sabotaging investments running into billions 
as well as the creation of 40,000 new jobs. Indeed, the referendum revealed a 
strange understanding of democracy on the part of some of the proponents of 
Mediaspree. According to some voices, in the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg dis-
trict, “17 percent of all eligible voters […] sank Mediaspree. In fact, this alleged 
majority only represents a minority – namely 17 percent” (Der Tagespiegel, July 
20, 2008).4
The expected compensation payments that would have to be made to inves-
tors for modification of the development plan proved to be the most impor-
tant driver of the debate. Although the affected land was mainly to be used for 
speculative development (there was no actual demand for new offices or hotels), 
the private owners could refer to their planning documents when discussing 
the economic value of the project. It was said that if the demand to ban new 
buildings within 50 meters of the riverside and restrict building height to 22 
meters was implemented, the buildings directly affected by this decision would 
experience a massive loss in value. The district claimed that compensation 
amounting to 165 million Euros would be required. As this calculation already 
included publicly owned premises as well as properties with buildings already 
constructed on them, the “Sink Mediaspree” initiative estimated compensa-
tion of around 40 million Euros would be appropriate. In the light of Berlin’s 
(and its districts’) chronically strained finances, the compensation payments 
became the major argument for not changing the plans with regards to the 
already privatized properties. In the absence of the political will to repurchase 
properties in order to realize the aims of the referendum, the private sector had 
complete control over these areas.  
At the same time, the Berlin executive had repeatedly stressed prior to the 
referendum that in order to safeguard its attractiveness as an investment loca-
4 | This kind of assertion ignores the fact that almost every democratically elected ma-
jority would be confronted with severe legitimation problems. For example, the then 
governing Berlin coalition had “only” been elected by 25.6 percent of all eligible voters 
(Statistisches Landesamt 2006).
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tion, Berlin has to act as a “reliable partner” (Der Tagesspiegel, July 11, 2008) in 
its relations with investors. It was also argued that risk of breaching or jeopard-
izing contracts with private investors through implementing changes in plan-
ning was also grounds for overruling the district on the issue. Even though the 
districts of Berlin are in charge of urban planning (i.e. developing and modi-
fying land-use plans, assigning building rights), the Berlin Senate is entitled 
to remove their planning responsibility when something of “urgent citywide 
interest” (§7 AB BauGB) is threatened by the respective district’s planning ac-
tivities. This obviously appeared to be the case in the Mediaspree area. As a 
result, a range of reforms impairing private sector interests were thus rendered 
impossible.
This line of argument was strongly supported by the investors represented 
in the Mediaspree area, who repeatedly declared that Berlin’s international 
reputation as an investment location was at stake. According to the investors’ 
spokesman, “foreign associates of some investors […] were terrified to see that 
it is possible to nullify legally valid contracts following a referendum” (Der Ta-
gesspiegel, July 22, 2008). The existing forms of planning were not identi-
fied as the chief motive for rejecting Mediaspree. Arguments that had played a 
major role in protests, such as concerns about gentrification, the criticism to-
wards the existing ways of handling public property, or the connection between 
privatisation and property speculation, were denied or negated in a selective 
manner. Instead, the success of the referendum was put down to an allegedly 
selfish minority, which had made itself comfortable within its precarious liv-
ing conditions or, as the mayor put it, people “who do not like to be confronted 
with the demand to give something back to society” and whose criticism must 
“seem like pure mockery to those people in search of a job in Berlin” (Der 
Tagesspiegel, September 11, 2008). To the Berlin Senate, the successful refer-
endum was explained by reference to a local protest culture that was even will-
ing to deliberately abuse the participatory instrument of referenda. According 
to this argument, the criticism raised against Mediaspree in Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg was to be regarded as a quasi-natural process that should not be 
taken too seriously. Taken together, these assumptions denied the legitimacy 
of the district’s citizens’ protests.
These developments were also accompanied by a thorough reassessment of 
temporary uses, which had made the Mediaspree area a well-known location 
even beyond the confines of Berlin. While initially the emphasis was put on 
the positive role of intermediate users of space as catalysts of desired develop-
ments (see above), they now found themselves accused of egotism and a form 
of profit-orientation that allegedly stood in the way of public interests and was 
thus “not acceptable” (Der Tagesspiegel, July 11, 2008). At the same time, the 
previous (unplanned) development, which had provided jobs as well as access 
to the river, was concealed – and the banks were reinterpreted as a “piece of 
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wasteland that virtually cries out for development” (Der Tagesspiegel, July 14, 
2008). By this means, a successful referendum turned into an abuse of in-
struments of direct democracy, the claim for more public space and a mostly 
non-commercial development were reinterpreted as selfish, and profit-seeking 
interests and local residents were now regarded as an antisocial minority. 
In line with this, it was stressed that the responsibility to implement the ref-
erendum rested with the district and that the executive would not do it the favor 
of releasing it from its obligations (Berliner Zeitung, July 16, 2008). Regardless 
of the fact that citywide interests appeared to be threatened in the area, it was 
the district that was declared responsible for safeguarding exactly those city-
wide interests. However, at the same time, a citywide reason was still deemed 
necessary to supervise the implementation of these processes: 
“In the coming months, the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg district will therefore […] be clo-
sely monitored as to how it deals with the existing development plans and legally valid 
urban development contracts. As a matter of course, legal and planning certainty must 
be given to implement investments of such a magnitude. We shall be taking care of this 
matter, which we regard as essential to Berlin’s international standing” (Senator for 
Urban Development, Junge-Reyer, Der Tagesspiegel, August 4, 2008).
Against this background, the discussion was primarily focused on the proper-
ties still in public ownership, i.e. those belonging to the real estate fund (Liegen-
schaftsfonds) of the state of Berlin; the Berlin Port and Warehouse Company, 
BEHALA; and the Berlin Refuse and Cleaning Services (BSR). The debate 
centered on the idea that any planning changes to publicly owned properties 
should be possible without entailing further compensation payments. The ra-
tionale of action pursued by private investors was, however, also adopted by 
the state-owned companies and the Liegenschaftsfonds. They regarded any drop 
in revenues caused by a discontinuation of sale or changes in planning as a 
loss and thus saw no reason to relinquish the potential revenues. As the pub-
lic would face losses if it was not possible to sell public property at the maxi-
mum value, selling was regarded as the only sensible decision for the public 
enterprises present on the banks of the Spree. That public access to these areas 
might be irrecoverably lost seemed of little importance. During the discussion, 
responsibility was assigned to the Berlin Senate, which, as an owner, had is-
sued the directive to sell state-owned premises to the highest bidder. For this 
reason, the state-owned companies and the real estate fund claimed that it fell 
outside their powers to modify their line of action.
“I have the mandate to sell properties for the maximum gain. Should the state of Berlin 
as a shareholder want something else now, it should say so clearly” (BEHALA director 
Peter Stäblein, Berliner Zeitung, July 16, 2008).
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Despite being the owner, the Berlin Senate nonetheless emphasized that the 
state-owned companies had economic independence. This gave the paradoxi-
cal impression that there was no responsible partner within this state-owned 
property management coalition that would have been able to change the ad-
opted course of action, i.e. marketing and selling public property to the high-
est bidder. The key role of the Senate became even more apparent when the 
district tried to change planning decisions within its area by means of ap-
plying its own planning law. Throughout the negotiations, the Department 
for Urban Development adopted such a threatening posture that the district 
hardly dared to modify existing plans. Nonetheless, the situation escalated in 
February 2009. The riverside area of a property belonging to the state-own 
real estate fund was converted into a green area. As an ultimatum, the execu-
tive threatened to remove the district’s responsibility for the issue unless it 
reversed this decision, which it promptly did. On the whole, the work in the 
special committee had little in common with the focused and creative protest 
that had contributed significantly to the success of the referendum. As almost 
all activities were transferred to the special committee and given the appear-
ance of an open, property-related discussion instead of an overriding debate 
on the guiding principles of urban development in Berlin, the campaign “lost 
much of its dynamism. In this way, the underlying conditions that severely 
hampered the likelihood of implementing the aims of the referendum were 
never sufficiently debated. 
The Berlin Senate managed to indirectly guarantee the guiding principles 
of the Mediaspree project and advance the planned development via the state-
owned companies without having to take an active role itself. Investment secu-
rity was used as an argument to guarantee the inviolability of private sector in-
terests. Planning changes on private premises within the area were refused in 
a dogmatic manner. At the same time, the privatization of public property was 
promoted by the state-owned companies, which – although formally independ-
ent – had adopted a one-dimensional economic logic of action at the command 
of the Berlin Senate. With the threat of withdrawing planning competencies 
from the district authorities, the Senate pressured the districts’ leaders not to 
call into question this kind of urban development. This led to a series of actions 
in which it became hard to distinguish the actions and motivations of public 
stakeholders from those of private investors, and one which could not be broken 
at a district level.
Given the limited scope of action, it was thus only possible to find solu-
tions and compromises that did not touch on the Mediaspree project’s guid-
ing principles and which were remote from the actual demands issued by the 
referendum. As a result, the “Sink Mediaspree!” participation in the special 
committee served to legitimize urban policy that it was barely able to influence. 
When more and more members and supporters of the initiative became aware 
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of this, its representatives left the committee in late 2009 in order to prevent 
the further endorsement of its decisions by their presence.
SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK —
WHAT REMAINS OF “SINK MEDIASPREE”?
There were widely diverging views on whether the results obtained represented 
a successful outcome of the referendum. The district celebrated “more Spree 
banks for everyone” (Berliner Zeitung, November 18, 2009), whereas the “Sink 
Mediaspree!” initiative pointed to the “pitiful results” of the negotiations (die 
tageszeitung, December 3, 2009). For some areas, a broadening of public space 
along the riverside was achieved, and one high-rise building was removed from 
the plans. It is indicative that these modifications were only made possible on 
state-owned properties. Notably, they mostly occurred through internal agree-
ments between representatives of the district, the Berlin executive and the 
state-owned companies rather than by way of public debate within the special 
committee. For this reason, they must be understood as a result of general pub-
lic pressure and the district’s negotiating skills rather than as an expression of 
the opportunities to bring about changes in planning by way of participating in 
special committees established by local government.
As the campaign against the project Mediaspree has shown, it is possible 
to turn local large-scale projects and undemocratic forms of planning into an 
issue of citywide relevance and, moreover, to successfully formulate fundamen-
tal criticism to neoliberal urban policy. This was only possible on the basis of a 
common objective as well as persistent, creative and peaceful protest by a broad 
alliance that existed and acted off the beaten path. In fact, the citizens’ initiative 
provided to be a democratically legitimate vehicle for framing the debate from 
which political decision makers could not hide. A different strategy would, 
however, have been necessary to achieve better results. When the protests had 
reached their peak, it was still possible to put the background issues in the 
protest against Mediaspree onto the city’s agenda. By this means, critical voic-
es fundamentally questioning the logic of Mediaspree’s proponents had also 
found a city-wide audience. But instead of maintaining pressure and instead of 
publicly addressing the key role played by the Berlin executive, the one-sided 
emphasis of the special committee weakened the pressure on political deci-
sion makers. In the end, the voices in favor of Mediaspree were the only ones 
heard in the public debate. Moreover, active support for the initiative declined 
because the referendum had suggested a successful end to the campaign, while 
in reality it marked only the beginning of protracted and time-consuming ne-
gotiations. As a result, there was a lack of resources right at the point in time 
when they were most needed in the “political game” against the public admin-
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istration and politicians. Finally, neither the political instrument chosen at the 
district level (the referendum) nor participation in the special committee were 
sufficient to influence the decisive actor, the Berlin Senate. While it is difficult 
to identify responsible policy-makers in a situation of increasingly intercon-
nected public and private interests, it nonetheless remains essential to do so 
in order to enable a genuine form of participation. More recent urban political 
alliances are well aware of this and have thus made an effort to come directly 
into contact with the Berlin executive.
Despite the comparatively meager results, it would not be fair to regard the 
protests against Mediaspree as a failure. Instead, they can be seen as a pre-
lude to a growing awareness for fundamental issues of urban development in 
Berlin. This has become obvious on the banks of the Spree, but also in other 
parts of the city, especially as regards the handling of public real estate. While a 
neoliberal and “entrepreneurial” form of urban policy may continue to prevail 
in Berlin, the emphatic vote for an alternative form of development along the 
Spree will be certain to shape political debates in the city in the years to come. 
Translated by “Truly Translated,” together with Ben Restle
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